

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 413 282

SO 029 005

AUTHOR Oliker, Michael A., Ed.; Ellis, Charlesetta M., Ed.; Gutek, Gerald L., Ed.; Krolikowski, Walter P., Ed.; Campion, Kate, Ed.

TITLE Proceedings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, 1995-1996.

INSTITUTION Midwest Philosophy of Education Society.

PUB DATE 1997-00-00

NOTE 335p.; For other proceedings, see SO 028 511 and ED 371 973.

AVAILABLE FROM Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, 5006 W. Grace St., Chicago, IL, 60641.

PUB TYPE Collected Works - Proceedings (021)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC14 Plus Postage.

DESCRIPTORS *Critical Thinking; *Cultural Pluralism; Early Childhood Education; *Educational Philosophy; Higher Education; *Multicultural Education; Popular Culture

IDENTIFIERS Coppin (Fanny J); *Dewey (John); Peace Education

ABSTRACT

These proceedings are composed of papers presented at the 1995 and 1996 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society. Papers presented at the 1995 meeting included: "Dewey's Idea of 'Intelligent Sympathy' and the Development of the Ethical Self: Implications for Japanese Education" (Naoko Saito); "Using Dewey's Writings as a Basis for Assessment of Project Means" (Sandy Alber); "Carter G. Woodson on Education: A Philosophical Perspective" (Charlesetta M. Ellis); "'This Wonder, Perhaps Deeper than Love, That is Friendship'" (Walter P. Krolikowski); "A Philosophy of Education in the Technological Age" (Louis Silverstein); "Multicultural Education and Cultural Differences" (Wei Rose Zhang); "Multiculturalism: Some Second Thoughts about the Concept" (Michael Davis); "The Introductory Course in Philosophy of Education (Arthur Brown); "The Existence of Pure Consciousness and Its Implications for Education" (James D. Grant); "A Nietzschean Critique of Postmodern Educational Theory" (Don G. Smith); "Post-Modernism: A Phase of Development" (Kenneth Sutton); "Hermeneutics: East Meets West?..." (Robert Craig); "The Language of Educational Policy and Administration" (Michael A Oliker); "Philosophical Problems of Practice: The Emerging University/School/Partnership" (Betty-Jo Dunbar). Papers presented at the 1996 meeting included: "Contemplative Traditions, Modern Psychology, and Education" (Robert Craig); "Response to Robert Craig's Presidential Address" (Arthur Brown); "Unvirtuous Virtue Epistemology" (David B. Annis); "Rudolf Steiner and The Waldorf Schools" (Earl J. Ogletree); "What Multiculturalism Should Not Be" (Alexander Makedon); "Realism Reconsidered..." (Philip Smith); "I'll Show You Differences: Contrast, Opposition, and Antonymy with Special Reference to Multiculturalism" (Walter P. Krolikowski); "...The Philosophical Implications of Researching a Culture other than Your Own" (Bonnie Jean Adams); "Superman, Adolescents, and the Metaphysics of Popular Culture" (Michael A. Oliker); "A Schematic Analysis of Popular Culture, Adolescence, and Sport" (Philip Smith); "The Public Image of Juvenile Delinquents" (Gene D. Phillips); "I was a Teenage Werewolf As Youth Culture Ideology"; "Why We Do what We Do as Early Childhood Educators" (Sandy Alber, Shannan McNair); "Pestalozzi's Idea of 'Innere Anshauung'" (Silvia Schmid); "The Educational Theology of James Solomon Russell" (Terrence A. Walker); "Nonviolence in Education" (Ian M. Harris); "A Paradigm for Teaching

+++++ ED413282 Has Multi-page SFR---Level=1 +++++

"Philosophy of Education" (Jerome A. Popp); "Essentialist Educator: Fanny J. Coppin" (Charlesetta M. Ellis); "Pluralism with Intelligence" (Arthur Brown); "Reclaiming the Ancient Theme of Hospitality" (William E. Russell); "Let Us Praise the Body Erotic" (Louis Silverstein). (KCM)

* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *

PROCEEDINGS OF THE MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

1995-1996

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION
CENTER (ERIC)

This document has been reproduced as
received from the person or organization
originating it.

Minor changes have been made to
improve reproduction quality.

Points of view or opinions stated in this
document do not necessarily represent
official OERI position or policy.

PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE AND
DISSEMINATE THIS MATERIAL
HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

M. A.

Oliker

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES
INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

1995-1996

EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor: Michael A. Oliker, Northeastern Illinois University.

Associate Editor: Charlesetta M. Ellis, Chicago State University.

**Assistant Editors: Gerald L. Gutek and Walter P. Krolkowski, SJ,
Loyola University Chicago.**

Managing Editor: Kate Campion, Chicago, Illinois.



OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

CITY OF CHICAGO

RICHARD M. DALEY
MAYOR

November 8, 1996

G R E E T I N G S

As Mayor and on behalf of the City of Chicago, I want to extend my warmest greetings to the members, honored guests and all participants in the annual meeting of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society (MPES).

Chicago is proud to be the host City for your annual conference. Few endeavors are more important to the future of our region and the nation than those intended to assure that our youth have a solid education. Members of the MPES are at the forefront of educational theory in our region. Your efforts are helping to insure that this goal is met.

While you are here, I hope that you will take time to discover some of what makes Chicago a favorite destination for visitors from around the world. I know that you will like what you find--from our great architecture to our beautiful Lake Michigan shoreline with its refurbished Navy Pier, from our exciting nightlife with its excellent restaurants, clubs and theaters to our many world-renowned cultural institutions, fine shopping and ethnically diverse neighborhoods.

You have my best wishes for an exciting and productive conference.

Sincerely,

Richard M. Daley
Mayor

PREFACE

The 1996 annual meeting of the Midwest PES took place—as usual—at the Water Tower Campus of Loyola University Chicago on November 8 and 9. The 1997 meeting will be there again on November 14 and 15. But the 1996 meeting began with something unusual: the reading of a letter of greeting from the Mayor of Chicago: Richard M. Daley. In his delightful letter, Mayor Daley said:

Chicago is proud to be the host City for your annual conference. Few endeavors are more important to the future of our region and the nation than those intended to assure that our youth have a solid education. Members of the MPES are at the forefront of educational theory in our region. Your efforts are helping to insure that this goal is met.

(The full text of his letter is reproduced, at left) As usual the meeting included a session that met in a private dining room at one of the many outstanding restaurants in the North Michigan Avenue area of downtown Chicago. The Presidential Address by Prof. Robert P. Craig of the University of Houston took place at the House of Hunan—an outstanding Chinese Restaurant. Dr. Ellis arranged a wonderful buffet for the group that included huge servings of an incredible variety of delicious Chinese cuisine.

—Michael A. Oliker
Executive Director of the Midwest PES

1995 ANNUAL MEETING

NAOKO SAITO, UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO.....	4
<i>Dewey's Idea of "Intelligent Sympathy" and The Development of the Ethical Self: Implications for Japanese Education</i>	
SANDY ALBER, OAKLAND UNIVERSITY.....	13
<i>Using Dewey's Writings as a Basis for Assessment of Project Means</i>	
CHARLESETTA M. ELLIS, CHICAGO STATE UNIVERSITY.....	22
<i>Carter G. Woodson on Education: A Philosophical Perspective</i>	
WALTER P. KROLIKOWSKI, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO.....	29
<i>"This Wonder, Perhaps Deeper Than Love, That Is Friendship"</i>	
LOUIS SILVERSTEIN, COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO.....	38
<i>The Internet & The Innernet: A Philosophy of Education in the Technological Age</i>	
WEI ROSE ZHANG, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY.....	45
<i>Multicultural Education and Cultural Differences</i>	
MICHAEL DAVIS, ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY.....	51
<i>Multiculturalism: Some Second Thoughts about the Concept</i>	
ARTHUR BROWN, WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY.....	59
<i>The Introductory Course in Philosophy of Education</i>	
JAMES D. GRANT, MAHARISHI UNIVERSITY OF MANAGEMENT.....	69
<i>The Existence of Pure Consciousness and Its Implications for Education</i>	
DON G. SMITH, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY.....	93
<i>A Nietzschean Critique of Postmodern Educational Theory</i>	
KENNETH SUTTON, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY.....	99
<i>Post-Modernism: A Phase of Development</i>	
ROBERT CRAIG, UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON.....	105
<i>Hermeneutics: East Meets West? Interpretation of What? And/Or How to Be Awake At a Philosophy Meeting</i>	
MICHAEL A. OLICKER, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY.....	112
<i>The Language of Educational Policy and Administration</i>	
BETTY-JO DUNBAR, CHICAGO STATE UNIVERSITY.....	122
<i>Philosophical Problems of Practice: The Emerging University/School/Community Partnership</i>	

1996 ANNUAL MEETING

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

ROBERT CRAIG, UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON.....	138
<i>Contemplative Traditions, Modern Psychology and Education</i>	
ARTHUR BROWN, WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY.....	145
<i>Response to Robert Craig's Presidential Address</i>	
DAVID B. ANNIS, BALL STATE UNIVERSITY.....	150
<i>Unvirtuous Virtue Epistemology</i>	
OGLETREE, CHICAGO STATE UNIVERSITY.....	157
<i>h Steiner and The Waldorf Schools</i>	

ALEXANDER MAKEDON, CHICAGO STATE UNIVERSITY.....	172
<i>What Multiculturalism Should Not Be</i>	
PHILIP SMITH, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY.....	187
<i>Realism Reconsidered -By Any Other Name, Is Realism Really Possible-</i>	
WALTER P. KROLIKOWSKI, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO.....	192
<i>'I'll Show You Differences': Contrast, Opposition, and Antonymy with Special Reference to Multiculturalism</i>	
BONNIE JEAN ADAMS, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO.....	201
<i>"Be Ye Neither Radical Nor Romantic." The Philosophical Implications of Researching a Culture Other Than Your Own</i>	
MICHAEL A. OLICKER, NORTHEASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY.....	207
<i>Superman, Adolescents, and The Metaphysics of Popular Culture</i>	
PHILIP SMITH, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY.....	216
<i>A Schematic Analysis of Popular Culture, Adolescence and Sport -Surprising Implications for Education and Our Democratic Future-</i>	
GENE D. PHILLIPS, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO.....	221
<i>Dead End: The Public Image of Juvenile Delinquents</i>	
DON G. SMITH, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY.....	225
<i>I Was a Teenage Werewolf As Youth Culture Ideology</i>	
SANDY ALBER & SHANNAN MCNAIR, OAKLAND UNIVERSITY.....	231
<i>Why We Do What We Do as Early Childhood Educators</i>	
SILVIA SCHMID, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO.....	239
<i>Pestalozzi's Idea of "Innere Anschauung"</i>	
TERRENCE A. WALKER, UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON.....	246
<i>The Educational Theology of James Solomon Russell</i>	
IAN M. HARRIS, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN—MILWAUKEE.....	255
<i>Nonviolence in Education</i>	
JEROME A. POPP, SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY—EDWARDSVILLE.....	274
<i>A Paradigm for Teaching Philosophy of Education</i>	
CHARLESETTA M. ELLIS, CHICAGO STATE UNIVERSITY.....	284
<i>Essentialist Educator: Fanny J. Coppin</i>	
ARTHUR BROWN, WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY.....	289
<i>Pluralism with Intelligence: A Challenge to Education and Society</i>	
WILLIAM E. RUSSELL, MERRIMACK COLLEGE.....	298
<i>Reclaiming the Ancient Theme of Hospitality</i>	
LOUIS SILVERSTEIN, COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO.....	309
<i>Let Us Praise the Body Erotic</i>	

APPENDICES

A. ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM 1995.....	316
B. ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM 1996.....	318
C. BUSINESS COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES 1995, 1996.....	320
D. MEMBERSHIP DIRECTORY 1995-1996.....	322
INDEX TO 1995-1996 PROCEEDINGS.....	328

**DEWEY'S IDEA OF "INTELLIGENT SYMPATHY"
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ETHICAL
SELF: IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPANESE
EDUCATION**

NAOKO SAITO

University of Tokyo

INTRODUCTION:

TENSION BETWEEN CLOSENESS AND CLOSEDNESS OF A COMMUNITY

In contemporary American society, political philosophers and educators are currently discussing the importance of community and group bonds.¹ Their common claim is usually that the creation and definition of the self requires a communal relationships. However, close community bonds always involve the danger of exclusiveness and parochialism, the suppression of individuality, or what I will call "closedness." An example is found in contemporary Japanese education. Development of individuality is one of the main officially stated goals of Japanese education today. But the school-bully problem shows how difficult it is to maintain one's individuality within the close, intense bonds of a group. This example from Japan challenges American proponents of community. Is it possible to resolve the tension between the closeness and closedness of a community? How could anyone emphasize close bonds of community while valuing individuality and openness?

To answer this question, I will discuss Dewey's notion of sympathy as a quality of human relationships and its related notion of the poetic and imaginative eye. Sympathy as a quality of human relationships is a feature not much discussed. Deweyan scholars usually light social intelligence and communication as main features of

Dewey's idea of democracy. When we think about how to resolve the tension between closeness and closedness, "social intelligence," "critical habits of mind," or "open communication" may be the first hints we get from Dewey. It is true that these traits have an important function in democratic communities. However, in order to remedy the negative outcomes of a closedness of community and to transform people's mentality, "social intelligence" or openness is not enough. More in depth examination of the nature of human relationships is required.

For this purpose, I will try to show that sympathetic human relationships featured by the poetic and imaginative eye will contribute to resolving the tension between closedness and closeness of the community and to creating ethical human relationships. I will also discuss the implications of Dewey's notion of sympathy and the poetic and imaginative eye for Japanese education. Through the example of school-bully in Japanese schools, I will try to show that Dewey's notion of sympathy provides a powerful way of looking at how closed bonds can be transformed into ethical human relationships.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH A CLOSED COMMUNITY? THE SCHOOL-BULLY PROBLEM IN JAPANESE SCHOOLS

In contemporary Japan, one of the urgent tasks of educational reform is development of individuality. In Japanese education, individuality is associated with assertiveness and uniqueness.² Associated with this outlook is the belief that the individual also needs to be respectful of differences in others. These features are important more than ever in Japan, because increasingly, Japanese people come into daily contact with foreign people and cultures. Many Japanese educators are struggling to figure out how to achieve the goal of development of individuality. But it is not an easy task. A close group bond tends to hinder development of individuality. It is still the challenge for Japanese educators to figure out how to develop individuality in a close group bond.

The school-bully problem in Japanese schools exemplifies this difficulty. School-bully behavior has been characterized as a "behavior of exclusion" toward someone different or strange.³ With regard to the causes of the school-bully problem, Oride points out that exclusive and closed nature of a group of students and hierarchical order in a group as one of the causes, which is intertwined with social issues characteristic to contemporary Japanese society and education.⁴

In Japan, sympathy and compassion are regarded as virtues in human relationships. People usually create a strong emotional tie to their groups. However, cruel and devastating nature of school-bully

cases suggests that a close bond of community, under various influences, can become a closed bond, namely, unethical and unsympathetic human relationships which suppress individuality and exclusiveness. Japanese educators now face the need to transform a closed bond to a healthy, open community.

School-bully cases and Oride's analysis show that the closedness of a group in the school-bully problem involves some serious existential crisis of Japanese students in the contemporary society. He characterizes human relationships within Japanese schools as those "being filled with lack of trust" and expresses students' psyche as "alienated" and "apathetic." Oride proposes that adults should pay attention to "signs" of bully shown by students in their daily relationships as the first step in solving this problem.⁵ Traditional Japanese moral education cannot provide a solution to this crisis. The question is how one's self should interact with other selves, and how educators can help students transform their ethical attitude toward others in this existential crisis. The Japanese case of school-bully will make American proponents of community realize the necessity of reconsidering minutely the quality of "connectedness" or "social bond," i. e., how one should relate to others in a community so that a close bond would not become a closed bond.

It is here where Dewey's idea of sympathy seems to give some insights to teachers who search for a solution from within a micro human relationship in the classroom.

DEWEY'S IDEA OF "INTELLIGENT SYMPATHY" AND THE POETIC AND IMAGINATIVE EYE: ITS IMPLICATION TO JAPANESE EDUCATION

Dewey's idea of "intelligent sympathy"

Sympathy is a phrase that Dewey frequently uses in his works. Dewey emphasizes the importance of sympathy as "the sole portions of the psychological structure or mechanism of a man which can be relied upon to work the identification of other's ends with one's own interests."⁶ However, he criticizes sympathy which is sentimental or exclusive and proposes the idea of "intelligent sympathy." He says:

[intelligent sympathy] functions properly when used as a principle of reflection and insight, rather than of direct action. Intelligent sympathy widens and deepens concern for consequences.⁷

However, what does Dewey mean by "intelligent sympathy"? How can the self be intelligently impartial while maintaining the emotional intensity of closeness? It is not impossible to interpret his philosophical conception of sympathy to "be emotionally sympathetic and be intelli-

gent and impartial."

In practice, Dewey's idea of "intelligent sympathy" makes us question how "intelligent sympathy" can radically transform the closedness of a community and exclusive attitude of a human being. Dewey's explanation of "intelligent sympathy" is not persuasive enough for Japanese educators. How can they transform the closed bonds of the students into an ethical tie if the concept of "intelligent sympathy" only means "being sympathetic and intelligent"? Does Dewey provide a more holistic picture of "intelligent sympathy" than "intelligence plus sympathy"?

Searching the answers to these questions and trying to grasp a comprehensive picture of the relationship of "intelligent sympathy," I will highlight what I call Dewey's idea of the "poetic and imaginative eye" as an element of his idea of sympathy.

Dewey's idea of the "poetic and imaginative eye"

Dewey's philosophical and psychological basis of the self is characterized by self in activity; the self is being created in its active interaction with its natural and social environment. However, we should not forget that Dewey is not merely a proponent of the active self. As a prerequisite and an essential phase of the activity, Dewey reminds us of the importance of seeing. In *Child and Curriculum*, Dewey mentions the importance of the teacher's seeing the world of a child as an interpretive phase of activity.⁸ Dewey depicts the child's inner world in a poetic way, which suggests an adult's eye for interpreting imaginatively the child's world.

In his educational writings, Dewey suggests that teacher has two eyes to interpret and guide the child. In Westbrook's words, "a teacher had to be capable of seeing the world as both a child and an adult saw it."⁹ Westbrook's interpretation sheds light on the importance of teacher's imaginative eye which brings the teacher's self into the child's world. I will call the imaginative eye Dewey suggests the "poetic and imaginative eye."

The poetic and imaginative eye as an ethical eye: Teacher's eye for children's growth

Dewey's notion of the poetic and imaginative eye has two features: (a) prophetic character (or an eye for growth); and (b) intervening character. Both features are ethical and educational and help us reconsider the implication of Dewey's idea of "intelligent sympathy" by presenting us with the concrete image of Dewey's idea of sympathy.

(a) The teacher's prophetic eye for the student's growth

The teacher's poetic and imaginative eye is a prophetic eye and an eye for children's growth. It is the teacher's eye that detects the seed of

good in the child, or what Dewey calls "embryonic of good."

Possibility, for Dewey, is related to the notion of an ideal. An ideal is not as a fixed goal but one which is dynamically being re-created in interaction between the teacher and the child in actual situations in classroom. "All possibilities, as possibilities are idea in character."¹⁰ And it is imagination which helps us move toward an ideal or a new vision as he says; "[A]ll the endeavor for the better is moved by faith in what is possible"(CF, p.17). Dewey suggests that imagination makes human beings go beyond the actual toward a new vision and makes the fact more than what it is. It is an eye to expand the horizon of the self beyond the visible fact to the unseen. Dewey also says that the teacher's eye grasps the child "in the light of some larger growth-process "(CC, p.192) and to continuously direct the student's self into an ideal. The teacher's imaginative eye which Dewey describes is an ethical and educational eye.

Dewey implies that the teacher's faith in the student's power for growth will help the student develop his/her ethical self. For a student whose mind is closed and can not realize his/her own possibility for good, just like in the case of school-bully, the teacher's imaginative and poetic eye helps the student develop his/her individuality. This is what Dewey means when he warns against "to confine our gaze."(CC, p. 191) and encourages to "read the meaning" of what we see in the child. Dewey in *The Common Faith* continuously criticizes "adherence to the actual"(CF, p. 35) or "the limited world of our observation"(CF, p. 14).

Dewey's idea of sympathy illuminated by the idea of the poetic and imaginative eye provides Japanese educators with a hint for reconstructing a closed bond among students who are involved in the school-bully problem. As a special implication for Japanese educators who try to transform a closed bond of a community to ethical relationships, Dewey enriches the notion of openness. Democratic openness for Dewey does not merely mean an outward-looking attitude. His notion of openness has another dimension, openness towards the possibility for the betterment of the self, namely, the development of individuality.

(b) The teacher's eye to "intervene into" the student's construction of the good

In order for the teacher's poetic and imaginative eye to function as an ethical eye mentioned above, it should "intervene into" the student's world. By citing Santayana, Dewey indicates that intervening function of the teacher's poetic and imaginative eye connects the teacher's self to the student's self as an eye to reach the other's existence. When we think about how the teacher can help students develop their ethical selves and

transform a closed bond into an ethical human relationship, this intervention of the teacher's poetic and imaginative eye seems to be

critical. Dewey provides us with the vision of a teacher who participates in the construction of the student's potential for the good by reaching the deepest level of the student's world.

The "intervening" function of the teacher's poetic and imaginative eye is especially useful for resolving the problem of school-bully and creating ethical relationships in classroom. The school-bully is an example of a closed community and demonstrates the existential crisis of the self in the contemporary context of Japanese society. In this context especially, the "intervening" function of the poetic and imaginative eye of the teacher will be crucial to significantly move the student's self toward the good and make possible his/her growth. If the teacher is neutrally "impartial," he/she would never be able to reach the existential depth of the student's world.

Though I claim that the teacher's poetic and imaginative eye will contribute to the development of the student's ethical self and make possible his/her growth, I acknowledge the fact that the teacher's poetic and imaginative eye by itself is not enough for resolving the tension between the closedness and closeness and to create ethical human relationships among students. Students themselves need to acquire the poetic and imaginative eye so that they can develop their ethical selves and create ethical human relationships. The poetic and imaginative eye as a feature of sympathetic human relationships is necessary to anyone who is involved in the creation of ethical human relationships.

Implication of Dewey's idea of "intelligent sympathy" for Japanese education

By emphasizing the role of the poetic and imaginative eye as an important element of Dewey's idea of sympathy, I do not mean to forget the significance of "intelligent sympathy." Rather, I try to reconsider the very meaning of "intelligent sympathy." In *Common Faith*, Dewey presents a fused notion of emotion and intelligence. For Dewey, "intelligent sympathy" is not an issue of keeping balance between being objective in a neutral sense and being emotional. Intelligence and emotion are not independent of each other; they have to be fused, not added.¹¹ Dewey indicates that our imaginative and poetic eyes are essential in the function of intelligence. Namely, the teacher's scientific and psychological observation of the child is "intelligent" only when it is conducted through the poetic and imaginative eye. This is the meaning of the "fusion" of intelligence and sympathy Dewey tries to convey.

The "fused" notion of "intelligent sympathy" has various implications for Japanese educators who try to transform a closed bond to ethical human relationships. First, in Japanese soil, being poetic could easily turn to being sentimental and melancholic. Being poetic and imagi-

native for Dewey, however, never means to be romantic nor utopian being separated from the reality of the fact.

The fused notion of "intelligent sympathy" illuminated from the perspective of the poetic and imaginative eye could be a powerful notion for the Japanese educators to gain a new perspective on sympathetic relationship in a community. Hilary Putnam, in his recent article, emphasizes Dewey's notion of "democratization of inquiry," which avoids relations of hierarchy and dependence.¹² It is true that the pillar of Dewey's philosophy and ethics is his idea of "democratization of inquiry" or social intelligence. It is also true that in a closed bond of Japanese community, "democratization of inquiry" is the ultimate goal for Japanese educators.

However, in the Japanese context, where being "rational" and being "intelligent" is not so much a part of traditional vocabulary as in western culture, when Japanese educators try to achieve "democratization of inquiry," illuminating Dewey's idea of "intelligent sympathy" observed from the viewpoint of the poetic and imaginative is a persuasive way to have Japanese educators appreciate the potential of Dewey's philosophy. "Be intelligently sympathetic!" is not a persuasive recommendation to Japanese educators.

Japanese can appreciate the sensitivity Dewey conveys to us, both explicitly and metaphorically. In other words, it is the most "sympathetic" path to introduce Japanese educators to Dewey's notion of sympathy. If we can call this poetic sensitivity "a common ground" which Japanese educators and Dewey, as an American philosopher can share, then starting from this common ground is a more effective way to convey Dewey's vision of "intelligent sympathy" to Japanese educators. In the past history of introducing Dewey's philosophy into Japanese education, this point has tended to be overlooked and vague notion of "intelligence" was imported.

Thus to Japanese educators who face such an issue as school-bully, and those who struggle to accomplish the development of individuality in Japanese classrooms, Dewey would say, "Never forget the quality of human relationships in which individuality develops and social intelligence functions!"

Starting from sympathy and the poetic and imaginative eye is also effective in a sense that "intervening into" other's life is another good strain in Japanese education. In order to find a key in resolving the issue of school-bully, starting from this good tradition will effectively appeal to Japanese educators, if the traditional notion of sympathy is enriched by Dewey's idea of intelligent sympathy and is prevented from becoming sentimentalism.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have discussed the implications of Dewey's notion of sympathy and its related notion of the poetic and imaginative eye for Japanese education. There is, however, a challenge in the application of philosophy from one culture to another. It should be noted that by emphasizing learning from Dewey's idea of sympathy, I do not propose to transport a philosophy directly from one culture to another. It should also be remembered that "using" Dewey's idea of intelligent sympathy in the Japanese classroom will not immediately solve such serious issue as school-bully. We could use the insight which we gain from philosophy of another culture to positively transform one's own culture in each concrete situation.

Endnotes

1. Robert Putnam, "The Prosperous Community," *American Prospect* (Spring 1993): 35-42; Michael J. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
2. Katagiri says that the governmental statement issued in 1985 which highlights the importance of individuality plays a critical role in the current popular trend toward individuality. However, he points out that the concept of individuality in Japan is ambiguous and incoherent both among teachers and in official documents. (Yoshio Katagiri, "Nihon ni Okeru 'Kosei'" to Kyoiku-Sobyo (Outline of 'Individuality' in Japan) in *Illusion of Individuality*, Kyoikugaku-Nenpo, vol. 4, eds. Hisato Morita, et al. (Tokyo: Seori Shobo, 1995).)
3. Kenji Oride, "Konnan wo kakaeru kodomotachi: ijime/jisatsu no kakudo kara" ("Children in Difficulty and School Reform: The School-bully and Suicide"), Paper delivered at the 54th Annual Meeting of the Japan Society for the Study of Education, Tokyo, Japan, 25 August 1995, 12.
4. School-bully behavior in Japanese schools is caused by a complex combination of causes. Along with hierarchical nature of a traditional Japanese group, Oride identifies other causes including mechanism of strict control in schools that suppresses individuality as social backgrounds of the school-bully problem.
5. *Ibid.*, 10.
6. John Dewey, *Ethics 1908*, in *John Dewey: The Middle Works*, vol. 5, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press), 128.
7. John Dewey, *Theory of the Moral Life* (New York: Irvington Publishers, Inc., 1980), 170.
8. John Dewey, *The Child and the Curriculum*, in *The School and Society and the Child and the Curriculum*, ed. Philip W. Jackson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 191-92. (Hereafter cited as CC in the text and footnotes.)
9. Katherine Camp Mayhew and Anna Camp Edwards, *The Dewey School* (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), 312, in Robert B. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 101.
10. John Dewey, *A Common Faith*, in *John Dewey: The Later Works*, vol. 9, ed. Jo Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 17. (Hereafter cited F in the text.)
11. I thank Hilary Putnam for his suggestion to use the term, the "fused notion"

of "intelligent sympathy."

12. Hilary Putnam, "The importance of nonscientific knowledge," (Paper presented at Pierre Bayle Lecture, at Rotterdam, 19 November, 1995).

USING JOHN DEWEY'S WRITINGS AS A BASIS FOR ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT MEANS

SANDY ALBER
Oakland University

THE MISSING PIECE

In the current ends driven, outcome based, educational era, it is important to stop and consider the means. Having recently completed and given a paper (Alber 1995) that described the outcomes of my work with a group of urban parents, the evaluation seemed incomplete. I had reviewed my journal entries searching for scrumptious bits of qualitative data to add spice to the quantitative data I had extracted from parent questionnaires. I had compared my outcomes to those in the literature and to the guidelines of the funding source. I had related this to my project goals. This is often viewed as enough, but I have had a difficult time putting the assessment of the project behind me. What could be missing in my evaluation? The missing evaluative piece was the examination of the journey through the project. This is not to say I had not employed formative evaluation strategies as my work progressed, because I had. The examination of the journey, or the examination of the process, needed to occur in terms of ethical and philosophical standards. In other words, what I discovered was missing in my analysis was a study of my means.

Although a discussion of the need for inclusion of philosophical valuation in project work could serve as the content for this paper, I have elected to play out the idea of adding a philosophical component to my own project evaluation. It is hoped that the concrete

nature of this paper will stimulate others to employ similar strategies and demonstrate one way in which theoretical foundations can serve as an important tool in project evaluation. In order to judge something, as is required in evaluation, it is useful, if not necessary, to have a set of standards. Since the work of John Dewey has provided, and continues to provide, the base for my professional thoughts and actions as an educator, I will use selected excerpts from his writings to examine my project work. After providing the context by briefly describing the project, I will present a series of statements from the work of Dewey that have had a shaping force on my professional development, proceed to ask a series of related questions based on those ideas, and finally reflect on my methods and actions in terms of the statements. In order to limit my reflection and discussion, I will center my thinking in Dewey's discussion of experience. More specifically, I have restricted by thoughts (as best possible) and my discussion to the ideas of continuity and interaction. "Continuity and interaction in their active union each provide the measure of the educative significance and value of an experience. The immediate and direct concern of an educator is then with the situations in which interaction takes place" (Dewey 1938: 44-45)

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

In 1993 the faculty from six metropolitan Detroit universities and the staff at the Katherine B. White Elementary School formed a collaborative partnership under the Michigan Partnership for New Education to make the school a professional development school (PDS). The team serves over 1200 students and their families, which represent 11 language groups. The majority of the students are African American with a large minority of Arabic students from Yemen. Over 75% of the families live below the poverty level and 99% of the families are of a nontraditional nature.

Six goals grounded in the Holmes Principles (Holmes Group 1990) were developed by the team. Parental involvement was one of the goals. The literature on parental involvement (Becher 1985; Berrueta-Clement, et al. 1984; Bronfenbrenner 1974; Chavkin and Williams 1987; Comer 1980; Walberg 1980; and 1985; Zigler & Muenchow 1992) has documented the positive influence of parent participation in the education of their children. Gutmann (1987) and Lynch (1992) have made the philosophical case for parents' rights to involvement in the schools. Although parent participation in schools has many worthy attributes, it is important not to think that it is an easy or hazard free endeavor.

The low levels of parental involvement in the nation's schools tells us home-school connections are not strong in many cases. There

are a host of problems from racial stereotyping (Lightfoot 1978) to teacher aversion to working with parents (Jones 1991) to parent feelings of alienation and powerlessness (Winters 1993) to lack of parent participation skills (Draper, as cited in Zigler and Muenchow 1992) to logistical difficulties, such as childcare and transportation (Bronfennbrenner 1974) to a power imbalance (Garfunkel 1983). The power imbalance is an especially dangerous in a professional development school, where all partners are considered equals. In addition to the educational and economic advantages held by the educators over parents, they had a common language (educational jargon). In the K. B. White PDS the educators had also received training in group process and leadership skills. If equity was to be achieved, parents would need support in lessening their disadvantage through increasing their own appreciation of their expertise and attaining group process and leadership skills. This concern for equity became the driving force behind my work in the PDS. I formed a parent leadership group to attempt to level the PDS playing field. Thus, the goal of the project was to increase parental awareness and confidence and to assist parents in attaining skills in order to work toward equity for all PDS team members. The method used to address these goals was to work with parents to plan, deliver, and evaluate a series of workshops by parents for parents. The processes employed in the planning, implementation, and judging of the workshops will be examined according to

selected writings of Dewey.

PRINCIPLE ONE, IT'S QUESTION, PROJECT REFLECTION

Principle One: Continuity of Experience

... the principle of continuity of experience means that every experience both takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after. . . . There is some kind of continuity in every case. It is when we note the different forms in which experience operates that we get the basis of discriminating among experiences (Dewey 1938:35-36).

Question One:

Are there examples of providing continuity of experience in this project? If so, what are they?

Project Reflection:

In January of 1994 I decided to form a parent leadership group. In the first meeting with the parents in the project, I asked them to consider the following question: What could be done to make Katherine B. White a better school? This gave them an opportunity to identify with a meaningful past experience. They were interested. They were able to contribute to our list of school needs. The bridging to the future experience occurred when the lists of deficits served as a reason for action. This in turn lead to a discussion of previous workshops that parents had attended. The workshops had been delivered to them by educators. The idea of giving a workshop was an old idea that moved forward by becoming workshops that parents delivered. The informal needs assessment was also the prompt to select the topic of the workshop.

In these first meetings, I modeled active participation and leader as facilitator in group work. This carried forward into the planning of the workshop. The parents decided that they liked the way we were working and thought that they would use a similar format in their workshop. The workshop plan was implemented using active participation and leaders as facilitators. The feedback from parent participants to parent presenters was very positive both orally and in surveys. This lead to positive perceptions about parents' ability to be leaders.

Based on the success of the first workshop, a second workshop was planned and presented by the parents. Although the format remained much the same, the intensity of experience increased. Two parents who mentioned outside the school norms and rules attended the second p. The parents, with many promises of support and with many

words about the need to be inclusive, found the courage to practice their newly acquired skills in a very stressful situation (One of the new parents had physically threatened other parents.) Again, the success of the second workshop increased the self awareness and self esteem. And, again, the success lead to the desire to plan a third workshop. We seemed to be on a positive flow. Although we planned the third workshop, the end of the year came and the workshop did not happen.

It seemed that this break in our flow was a break in continuity. In the moment, it was. In the larger picture, it was a major step forward. The following September the parents decided to have a parent rally in October. The idea started with them in this second year. They had taken ownership of the workshops. As their coach, I continued to move into the background. In November they planned a workshop which they presented in December. Growth was evident here, since the parents extended their efforts into the community. They began soliciting support from local business for their work. This was the last of the parent led workshops to date. Had our experiences with workshops stopped bridging to future growth?

While the workshops occurred, other activities were taking place that provided new opportunities for growth. In June of 1994, parents were invited to join the curriculum committee. They not only joined, but made suggestions on methodology and materials. A governance committee was elected to handle the business of the PDS. Parents elected two representatives to the committee. Their leadership skills were extended to a new arena when one parent was elected by committee members to serve as facilitator for fall semester and the other was elected to serve as facilitator in the winter semester. This proved to be a challenge, since the educators brought different attributes to group work. Parents not directly involved in school governance took active roles in study groups. They participated as members, facilitators, process observers, and recorders.

By the spring of 1995 parents seemed to need a large arena. At this time I formed a parent advocacy group. We learned advocacy skills and planned to testify at a state hearing. We did attend a Senate Education Committee Hearing on school reform in May. Although the experience was frustrating for the parents (racism was blatant), they carried out their plans to testify.

I can conclude that our "development in a particular line conduces to continuing growth . . . (and) answer(s) the criterion of education as growth" (Dewey, 1938: 36). I also can conclude that the direction of movement in continuity ". . . arouse(d) curiosity, strengthen(ed) initiative, and set up desires and purposes that (were) sufficiently intense to  y a person over dead places in the future . . ." (ibid., 38). Parents not left ". . . arrested on a low place of development . . ." (ibid., 37-

38). As I consider the principle of continuity, I can conclude that there is evidence that the project met this criteria for an educative experience.

Having been able to document that the project provided positive movement from past experience to positive future experiences, I will turn briefly to ponder if I acted as a responsible teacher (coach) to the parents. Dewey wrote, "The mature person, to put it in moral terms, has no right to withhold from the young on given occasions whatever capacity for sympathetic understandings his own experience has given him" (ibid., 38). I was willing and able to share my knowledge of group process and leadership skills with parents. The evidence for that appears in the discussion above of parental participation in governance committee, study group, curriculum committee, and in non-PDS work. Although I can assure myself that I have shared some of my expertise with parents, I continue to question if I have shared enough of my knowledge, skills, attitudes, values, and experiences with them? I have tried to hold a sympathetic understanding of parents by listening and observing closely. Swartz (1980) discussed the usefulness of mistakes. I have tried to allow parents to make and learn from their mistakes. Have I struck a healthy and educative balance between allowing for mistakes and for sharing information? I am not sure. This reflection has consumed my thoughts over the summer of 1995. It has slowed the writing of this paper to a halt. In an attempt to meet deadlines, I am leaving this issue for the moment. I will allow myself the right to develop at my own rate, but I will not allow myself to leave the issue. I have work left to do.

PRINCIPLE TWO, IT'S QUESTION, PROJECT REFLECTION

Principle Two: Interaction

"Every genuine experience has an active side which changes in some degree the objective conditions under which experience are had" (ibid., 39) Dewey continued:

A primary responsibility off educators is that they not only be aware of the general principle of the shaping of actual experience by environing conditions, but that they also recognize in the concrete what surroundings are conducive to having experiences that lead to growth. Above all, they should know how to utilize the surroundings, physical and social, that exist so as to extract from them all that they have to contribute to building up experiences that are worth while" (ibid., 40).

Question Two:

22

It evidence is there that the project included interaction?

Project Reflection:

Conditions in the school have become more equalitarian. Again, the stories about governance, curriculum committee, and study groups support that notion. There is still work to be done at the school level. Although parents and educators share some common skills and parental decision making and leadership have emerged, communication problems have arisen and in some educators are still uneasy with the new roles parents are assuming. Parents in turn have on some occasions attempted to assert their voice by shouting. There is work to be done in communication skills for all team members. The advocacy group is a bridge from school to community and is evidence of parents who will no longer be passive politically. There are other community effects as well.

There are non-PDS outcomes that leads me believe that our work has been generative. These outcomes occur in the community. Eight of the original parents in the leadership group are now employed. Only one parent does not have her GED, but has to pass only one exam to receive her degree. One parent has begun a post-high school educational program and completed it. All of the parents are hoping to begin post-high school study.

On the other hand, I am pulled at whether I have been able to avoid being a rescuer, rather than an educator. I have served as a parent advocate and think this supported the mother use of her own voice. I have assisted in transportation and the result has lead to jobs and participating in a wide community. I have also driven a parent and child for psychiatric sessions. I am not sure yet of the outcome of this.

Finally, this is a huge area for project growth. The school is adjacent to a housing project. The program could grow by moving from the school into the projects. At this point in time that has not occurred. Parents have been identified and have agreed to support our work in projects, but detailed planning and implementation have not occurred.

I can conclude that there are areas of strength and weakness in the project. We have moved to shape the community, but there remains much to be done in the school, in the neighborhood, and in the state.

REFLECTION ON REFLECTION

What have I learned from this? On the surface I have been able to discovered areas for growth in the project. Swartz (1980) wrote, "When we are aware of our mistakes we are encouraged to rethink our problems and the issues that confront us" (16). I can now work to keep experience educative. I have discovered how very difficult it is to work with an evaluation of our means in terms of what is generative and good. I have a and deeper understanding of what Dewèy meant when he wrote, we come back to the idea that a coherent theory of experience,

affording positive direction to selection and organization of appropriate educational methods and materials, is required by the attempt to give new direction to the work of the schools. The process is a slow and arduous one. It is a matter of growth, and there are many obstacles which tend to obstruct growth and to deflect it into wrong lines" (Dewey 1938:30) I am growing. Writing this paper has been a generative and educative experience. It has renewed my interest. I have rededicated myself to the work at hand. I have become energized by this reflection. Dewey wrote, "To reflect is to look back over what has been done so as to extract the net meanings which are the capital stock for intelligent dealing with further experiences. It is the heart of intellectual organization and of the disciplined mind" (ibid., 87). Amen!

References

Alber, S. 1995. Maintaining the challenge for high level parental involvement in an urban professional development school. Paper presented at the Summer Conference of the Association of Teacher Educators, Williamsburg, VA.

Becher, R. 1993. Equity and choice: New dimensions for adult and continuing education. In Innovations in parent and family involvement, eds. J. Rioux & N. Berla, 354-370. Princeton Junction, NJ: Eye on Education

Berrcueta-Clement, J., Schweinhart, L., Barnett, W., Epstein, A., & Weikart, D. 1984. Changed lives: The effects of the Perry Preschool Program on youths through age 19. (Monograph of the High/Scope Educational Research Foundation, No. 8). Ypsilanti, MI: The High/Scope Press.

Bronfennbrenner, U. 1974. Is early intervention effective? A report on longitudinal evaluations of preschool programs, vol. 2. Washington, D. C.: Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Child Development.

Chavkin, N. & Williams, D. Jr. 1987. Enhancing parent involvement. Education and Urban Society 19 (2):164-184.

Comer, J. 1980. School power: Implications of an intervention project. New York: The Free Press.

Dewey, J. 1938. Experience and education. New York: Macmillan.

Garfunkel, F. 1983. Parents and schools: Partnerships or politics (Report No. 11). Boston, MA: Institute for Responsive Education.

Gutmann, A. 1987. Democratic education. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Holmes Group 1990. Tomorrow's Schools: Principles for the design of professional development schools. East Lansing, MI: Author.

Jones, E. (1991). Involving parents in children's learning. In Readings from Childhood Education, vol. 2., eds. J. Quisenberry, A. Eddowes, & S. Robinson, 138-142. Wheraton, MD: Association for Childhood Education International.

Lightfoot, S. 1978. Worlds apart: Relationships between families and schools. New York: Basic Books.

Lynch, A. 1992. The importance of parental involvement. In Education and the family, ed., L. Kaplan, 304-306. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.

Swartz, P. 1980. Mistakes as an important part of the learning process. In Knowledge and allibilism, eds. R. Swartz, H. Perkinson, & S. Edgerton. New York: New York University Press.

Walberg, H., Bole, R. & Waxman, H. 1980. School-based socialization and reading achievement in the inner city. Psychology in the Schools, 17: 509-514.

Winters, W. 1993. African American mothers and urban schools. New York: Lexington Books.

Zigler, E. & Muenchow, S. 1992. HeadStart: The inside story of America's most successful educational experiment. New York: Basic Books.

This work was supported by the Michigan Partnership for New Education

CARTER G. WOODSON ON EDUCATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

CHARLESETTA M. ELLIS
Chicago State University

If education is of any practical value it should serve to guide us to living, to fit us for the work around us and demanded by the times in which we live. It should aid us into putting the most into life in the age, country, and into the position we are to fill.

—Carter G. Woodson (Riley, 1993: 112)

Carter G. Woodson (1875-1950) noted scholar, historian, and author offered educators via his writings a different paradigm in terms of schooling for the American student. A strong advocate for educational relevance, he stressed the need for practicality at all levels of institutionalized learning.

Both American and European schools, he believed, had failed to adequately equip the common people to successfully function in their respective societies. Pertinent to this dilemma was the "miseducation" of the African American. If, the purpose of genuine schooling was to motivate individuals to acquire the good life then American education had certainly missed its mark. (Woodson, 1933: xiii)

In an attempt to explain the educational philosophy of Woodson, it is wise to examine the background of this unique individ-

ual and that critical period in history which helped to mold his character.

The oldest of nine children, he was born in New Canton (Buckingham County) Virginia of former slaves. Woodson began work at an early age on a small farm that belonged to his father. Because he was too poor to receive a proper education, Woodson was not able to attend the district's five-month school on a regular basis. For example, by age nine he had attended the local school only once or twice. (Scally, 1990)

In 1892 the family re-located to Fayette, West Virginia. Unfortunately, Woodson had to work as a coal miner to help supplement the family's income. By this time, however, he had become a self-educated young man. When he entered Douglas High School (1895) on a part-time basis, he had mastered the art of reading, writing, and primary computation skills.

Despite the severity of his educational encumbrance, Woodson earned the equivalent of a high school diploma in 1896. Shortly thereafter, he entered Kentucky's Berea College. Two years prior to his graduation, May 18, 1901, Woodson received his first teaching certificate. He was now qualified to teach in West Virginia's public high schools. Within the same year, he was appointed principal of Douglas High School (1901-1903). (Logan and Winston, 1982: 665) While attending college, Woodson also enrolled in a summer educational program offered by the University of Chicago.

After graduation from Berea (1903) and armed with a two year Bachelor's of Literature degree, Woodson continued correspondence courses towards a Bachelor's of Arts from the University of Chicago. In addition, he also sought employment with the U.S. War Department.

Eventually, he was assigned to Luzon, a small Philippine island, as a teacher. (Woodson, 1944: 117) He was later promoted to a supervisory position. (Scally, 1985: 7) While on assignment, Woodson traveled to Asia, North Africa, and Europe. Included in his travel itinerary was a semester of study at La Sorbonne, University of Paris. (Romero, 1971: 59)

Woodson received both a B.A. and a Master's of Arts from the University of Chicago within the same year (1908). The first degree was awarded March 17, 1908 and the second on August 28, 1908. In 1906, he returned to the United States. Two years later, Woodson enrolled at Harvard.

By 1912, he had earned a Doctorate of History degree from the University. Despite a heckled schedule, Woodson also found the time to teach French, Spanish, English, and History (1909-1918) at both

the M Street and Dunbar high schools (Washington, D.C.). While concurrently employed as a faculty member of the Miner Normal School in the District of Columbia, he also served as the principal of Armstrong High School from 1916-1919. (Logan and Winston, 1982: 665)

PRAGMATIC SCHOOLING

As a teacher, Woodson was demanding and autocratic. But, he did not sanction corporal punishment or ridicule. Woodson often stated that: "When a boy comes to school without knowing his lesson he should be studied instead of being punish." (Woodson, 1933: 145). In essence, Woodson's stern manner did not distract from his effectiveness as an excellent educator. In fact, he was well liked by many of his students who endeavored to imitate his teaching style.

Perhaps, the reason for this popularity was Woodson's ability to make schooling relevant to the social, political, and economic problems that besieged the African American during the era. For example, throughout his teaching career (early 1900s-1940s) public education had made no serious attempt to address the social ostracism of the African American from American society, nor the economic depression and political corruption that affected the masses both black and white.

According to Woodson, modern education with its defects had managed to preserve the status quo to the detriment of all Americans, and in particularly that of the black community. (Woodson, 1933: xii)

Nevertheless, despite the "mis-education of the "Negro" there were certain measures which could help rectify the situation. For instance, he believed that educational theory could be made applicable to practical form.

In Woodson's circle of contemporaries, he was not the first to advocate for educational reform. Booker T. Washington had also addressed the same issue. In fact, Washington had offered "a program of practical education rather than schooling for the sake of culture." (Woodson, 1938: 287)

Woodson took the issue a step further by suggesting that there were two types of education, one with quotation marks and one without. In essence, the former was education that did not furnish individuals with enough information to allow them to successfully function in society. The other was education that provided sufficient knowledge to enable its part-takers upward mobility. (Williams, 1994: 50-51)

Both Woodson and Washington agreed that a strong vocational program based upon industrial training could help elevate African Americans, especially those who were employed in the areas of the arts

its. Woodson also believed that such a program would facilitate wages, lead to an accumulation of property, and allow African

Americans to successfully compete with Euro-Americans. This in turn would lead to self-esteem and pride within the black community.

In keeping with the sentiments of W.E.B. DuBois, Woodson did not frown upon the attributes of higher education. But, he did criticize educators for distortion of the truth. Of grave concern to Woodson was the manner in which History and Philosophy were taught. He insisted that both be revised to reflect their true perspective. Thus he argued for the inclusion, to both subject areas, of contributions made by African cultures pertinent to world civilization.

ELEMENTS OF PROGRESSIVISM AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTIONISM

Woodson appeared to owe no allegiance to any prescribed philosophical or ideological counsel. In fact, he was often ahead of his time in terms of progressive thought. Contained in his educational theory, however, are certain elements reminiscent of the progressive movement. Like the progressives, Woodson stressed problem solving as a productive tool for learning.

In addition, not unlike many progressives who succeeded him, Woodson believed in social and political reform for the betterment of society. Because the school was representative of a democratic social institution, it too must change. In so doing, its first act of reform should be that of desegregation. Woodson rejected the idea of racial segregation, and saw it as a barrier to educational and social equity. (Crunden, 1984:16)

Thus reconstructing society via education became a central theme for Woodson. He believed that through schooling would come alternative political, social, and economic policies, as well as new agencies that would eradicate the evils of racial discrimination and social class barriers.

Up to this point, public schooling had only mirrored America's social ills. Consequently, African Americans were unable to take full advantage of the educational system. Hence these individuals were rendered, to a great extent, useless in their endeavor to assimilate into society, or to achieve scholarly merit. Unfortunately, no where was this occurrence more apparent than in the area of classical studies. Thus lamented Woodson:

... in spite of much classical education of the Negroes we do not find in the race a large supply of thinkers and philosophers. One excuse is that scholarship among Negroes has been vitiated by the necessity for all of them to combat segregation and to fight to retain standing ground in the struggle of the races. (Woodson, 1933: 15)

ification of school curricular, and its affiliated texts. Accordingly, both were to reflect the accomplishments of the African in the fields of History and Philosophy. For example, the study of History was to include early African influence, as well as Egyptian contributions. It was also to mirror the achievements of Africans to the development of the Americas, especially that of the United States. (Logan and Winston 1982: 665)

The origins of Woodson's curiosity relevant to the subject is difficult to trace. No available record of such History courses offered by the colleges or universities, he attended, was listed. It is possible to assume, however, that this interest might have been spurred by his travels to Africa. Eventually, Woodson's fascination with this aspect of history lead to his involvement with the founding of the Study of Negro Life and History (ASNLH) in 1915.

The organization was, primarily, committed to historical research, collection of manuscripts, and related book publication. All of which were to help promote the study of African American history and its related philosophy in American schools.

The Journal of Negro History, edited by Woodson from January 1, 1916 until his death April 3, 1950, became another notable pursuit. The journal featured articles by reputable black and white scholars about "Negro" life in America.

Like George S. Counts, the social reconstructionist, Woodson also advocated for a "new" history. In other words, one that would tackle the "great" social issues and conflicts of the day. (Dennis, 1989: 20) Woodson, however, went a step further by insisting that the history of the African became an integral part of American education. The course of study was to begin with the primary grades at the elementary level continue through high school, and intensify at the college or university level.

To those critics who argued that exposing younger less mature students to such a curriculum would lead to confusion and further exacerbate racial conflict, Woodson suggested that these "mis-guided" individuals, the majority of whom were teachers, had failed to realize that all students were bombarded daily via the their surroundings and the media with the racial issue.

Thus he quipped: "How, can the school ignore the duty of teaching the truth while these other agencies are playing up falsehood?" (Woodson, 1933: 135) Woodson further suggested that teachers too must become leaders in their attempts to revolutionize the existing social order. (Woodson, 1933: 145)

On the subject of philosophy associated with African culture, he complained that even the "Negro" colleges had failed to examine African connection to the subject. Boldly, he contended, that it

was the Greeks who first recognized and looked to the ancient civilizations of the Nile Valley to broaden their philosophical perspectives. (Woodson, 1933: 137)

Furthermore, Woodson suggested that the great Plato "himself" had studied in Egypt. Slyly, he added, although it is difficult to assess if the Greeks went there to actually study or merely to gain status. (Steele, 1990: 19)

On a more sober note, Woodson emphasized that both black and white educators must recognize that the African Americans' endeavors to philosophically interpret the cosmos are just as profound as the Greeks' attempts.

PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE TEACHING

For Woodson, a true test of teaching effectiveness could be measured via teacher competency. Therefore it was important that teachers be well acquainted with the subject matter. Proper training of students also required that an educator be sensitive to the needs of their charges. In so doing, he warned, permissiveness was not to replace appropriate discipline.

According to Woodson, the development of critical thinking skills and self esteem were also the teacher's responsibility. Thus he stressed that no student should leave the educational system without adequate conditioning to face life's adversities.

Woodson envisioned both the school and the teacher as partners in the production of the next generation of prepared citizens. Armed with intelligence, as well as political and economic astuteness these individuals would be able to apply learned knowledge to existing educational and social problems.

Critical to this endeavor, especially for the African American, was the gaining of self-awareness through accurate historical information relevant to his link with world civilization. (Williams, 1994: 65)

Bibliography

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Crunden, M. Robert. Ministers of Reform: The Progressives' Achievement in American Civilization, 1889-1920. Urbana, Illinois: University Press, 1984.

Logan, Rayford W. and Michael R. Winston, eds. Dictionary of American Negro Biography. New York: Norton & Co., 1982.

Riley, Dorothy Winbush, ed. My Soul Looks Back, Less I Forget: a Collection of Quotations By People Color. New York: Harper Collins Publisher, 1993.

Romero, Patricia Watkins. "Carter G. Woodson: A Biography." Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1971.

Y, Mary Anthony. "Carter G. Woodson: Childhood to Adult," Life and Times of Carter G. Woodson. Kibwe Bey and Co., at the ASNI.H. Associated Publishers, Inc.,

Videocassette, 1990.

Williams, Alvin L. "Carter G. Woodson: Scientific Historian of African American History and Education." Ph.D., Loyola University Chicago, 1994.

Woodson, Carter G. Negro Makers of History. 2nd edition. Washington, D.C.: The Association Publishers, Inc., 1988.

Woodson, Carter G. "My Recollections of Veterans of the Civil War." Negro History Bulletin (February, 1944): 117.

Woodson, Carter G. The Mis-Education of the Negro. Washington, D.C.: The Association Publishers, Inc., 1933.

**"THIS WONDER, PERHAPS DEEPER
THAN LOVE, THAT IS FRIENDSHIP"!**

WALTER P. KROLIKOWSKI
Loyola University Chicago

The theme of combining teaching and friendship raises the question of the personal in the classroom, on which it is easy to be politically incorrect; therefore, it has been arbitrarily dismissed from contemporary discussions of education.² Part of the rationale for dismissal is clear. Free association dredges up odd things when friendship does crop up in educational conversations: sexual incidents under the mask of friendship; professors taking advantage of their students; students offering themselves in exchange for higher grades—all surely masks of friendship, however it is defined. Less vivid and more sober-minded are those worrisome discussions of how true friendship is frustrated by the incompatibility of teacher and student: discrepancies in age, restrictions imposed by standards of professional behavior, time constraints inherent in teacher-student relationships that begin in September and perforce end in January or June, the emotional atmosphere that friendship inevitably engenders but that is so deleterious to the classroom situation. Once aware of these problems, who could possibly favor friendship between teacher and student? Such problems give evidence not of friendship but rather of the defeat of friendship, or of an infatuation which col-
s, indeed poisons, the general classroom atmosphere. More funda-
mentally, do not the very definitions proposed for friendship seem to
exclude its aptness in education?

For example, let us look at one attempt at definition to make this point more forcibly

The sober Cicero, in his dialogue De Amicitia,³ has Laelius describe his friend Scipio: someone who shares his public and private cares, lives under the same roof when at home, serves in the same military campaigns abroad, and enjoys what is the essence of friendship, the most complete agreement in policy, in pursuits, and in opinions (125). Friendship is lived on the highest possible plane.

Ask of friends only what is honorable; do for friends only what is honourable and without even waiting to be asked; let zeal be ever present, but hesitation absent; dare to give true advice with all frankness; in friendship let the influence of friends who are wise counsellors be paramount, and let that influence be employed in advising, not only with frankness, but, if the occasion demands, even with sternness, and let the advice be followed when given (155).

Friendship demands those rarely found qualities of maturity (183) and independence (141). More formally, Laelius defines friendship as "nothing else than an accord in all things, human and divine, conjoined with mutual goodwill and affection" (131). A friend is another self, alter idem; out of the mingling of two souls arises one (189).⁴

Surely friendships like this are extremely rare. In the bustle and change of school life such a friendship is not a possible relation between teacher and student. Does not reflection also suggest that it would not even be a desirable one?

Obviously then there are difficulties with friendship (as Cicero conceives it) in the classroom. But lesser, more remote relationships than friendship seem unworthy of the persons involved. Education is essentially an intervention of one or more persons in the life of another.⁵ Can that intervention be allowed to be purely mechanical or simply contractual in an impersonal way? Or can it be reduced to a professional relationship like that of a doctor with a patient? Seeing ourselves as professional, we are certain that it cannot be less than professional. Must it not be more? The professional furnishes from a store of technical and specific knowledge those things necessary to provide what is missing or to correct what is amiss. Then the surgeon says good-bye when the stitches are removed and the patient is well on the way to recovery. Does not the teacher on a June day do something similar? Let us not fudge on the answer. Yes, teachers do do something similar. But is their action appropriate to human beings in this situation? Gesellschaft seems a particularly bad way to describe the richness and potentialities of the student relationship. That intervention which is education

should involve more than supplying for a deficiency.

Hirst and Peters suggest that that "more" involves recognizing each other as human beings with rights and dignity.⁶ Clouded as the issue of children's rights is, surely there is no controversy whether children ought to be treated like human beings.⁷ Such treatment is only civil, and who is going to fight civility? Nevertheless, as Jane Austen suggests in chapter 20 of *Emma*, civility is "to be always doing more than she wished and less than she ought!" Civility is indeed a high ideal, but humans are called to still more. The person the teacher encounters is not a faceless human being but an individual with all the uniqueness of an individual who cannot be reduced to what belongs to the individual simply by being a member of the species. The teacher is intervening in the life of this particular human being.

What thing is this "more"? Not the odd cases we began by looking at: manipulations of students or teachers for one's own end are less. Not sexual love which demands a commitment and a maturity and an exclusivity that teacher-student circumstances do not allow. Not the friendship that Cicero describes as having flourished between Laelius and Scipio. What, then?

As a first approach, let us remember that Cicero's dialogue allows for another level of friendship, which he calls ordinary and commonplace friendship (*de volgari . . . de mediocri*) (133). This type of friendship is also delightful and profitable. In it there can be disparity of age (177, 207) as well as disparity of condition. Superior and inferior strive for equality and yet remain what they are (179). "You must render to each friend as much aid as you can, and . . . as much as he whom you love and assist has the capacity to bear" (181). Such a friendship need not be forever; changing circumstances sometimes bring an appropriate end to such friendship (147). A similar friendship can be found even among animals (139, 189). But what kind of friendship is this? How is it related to friendship with Scipio? And is it friendship at all?

At this point we need some philosophical distinctions. First, I would suggest that we distinguish carefully between the concept and the conception of friendship. Second, that we recognize the systematic ambiguity inherent in the concept of friendship. Thirdly, that we make some careful distinctions on the nature of the good.

The distinction between concept and conception is well established in the literature.⁸ Conceptions change; the concept does not. The conception, for example, of how superordinate relates to ordinary changes as we move from a slave/master economy through a capitalist economy to a socialist economy. Circumstances specify a situation or transaction.

The concept of justice, apropos here, does not change.⁹ The concept of justice includes one idea of relationship and another of equality. The

embodiments of justice change from time to time, from place to place, from circumstance to circumstance; the idea of justice does not. Similarly with friendship. In Roman times the conception of friendship might have included comradeship in arms and been confined to men. In certain societies, even today, friendship may be only between two members of the same sex, but not in ours. At some times it may include persons of the same generation, in the Marfas¹⁰ sense, but not in others. Any concept allows a variety of embodiments; so should the concept of friendship. Concepts are culture-independent; conceptions are culture-dependent. This distinction between concept and conception, then, allows a certain flexibility of thinking that recent discussions of friendship have neglected.

Another part of the philosophic background we need for handling the problem of friendship in education revolves around the use we put words to. Sometimes the meaning of a word is context independent: no matter its place in discourse it will have the same meaning. "Fourteen" seems to be such a word. It always means the number after thirteen and before fifteen. (In passing, one might be tempted to say that all numbers are context independent. Twenty-one may refer entering one's majority, even though being twenty-one may not necessarily be under some circumstances the actual chronological age at which one enters one's majority.) At other times the meaning of a word is context dependent. Only the context will tell us whether the word "bat" refers to an animal or to a piece of wood.

Among words that are context-dependent, semanticists like John Lyons distinguish words (or signs) that are polysemous from those that are homonymous. In the first instance, words have different but related meanings. In the second, words have different but non-related meanings. "Bat" is homonymous. "Night" and "knight" are homonymous in their phonic but not in their written forms. "Mouth" is polysemous; for "mouth" of a river and "mouth" of a bottle are related to each other.¹¹

The classic philosophical analysis of this phenomenon remains G.E.L. Owen's 1960 article, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle."¹² He distinguishes systematic or non-accidental ambiguity, where meanings are related—his term of "focal meaning"—from purely ambiguous statements allowing two or more unrelated meanings. Systematic ambiguity and polysemy refer to the same phenomenon.¹³ Is not friendship polysemous in Lyons' formulation or a term with "focal meaning" as Owen suggests?

Let us add the third distinction. We need to see that friendship has many forms,¹⁴ a point Cicero made in the Laelius and Aristotle in his discussions of friendship.¹⁵ To make this point forcefully, we have to notice the lindess, which is closely connected by Aristotle to his discussion of

friendship, has many forms.¹⁶ There can be no friendship if there is no goodness to which a friend can respond.

One kind of goodness is potential goodness. Another is goodness by extrinsic denomination. We speak of a puppy as a good dog because it can, under favoring circumstances, become a good (adult) dog. And the puppy sells for a good price today; it is valuable today in view of its future value; it is not only valuable in the future.

The second way of considering goodness, extrinsic denomination, is enjoying a certain amount of currency in these latter years. Harry Frankfurt resurrected the theme in his 1982 article, "The Importance of What We Care about."¹⁷ Annette Baier's reply to Frankfurt, "Caring about Caring,"¹⁸ moved the discussion ahead in a significant way. Some things and persons are denominated good because we care about them. We confer value on them. Examples abound: a thank-you note, the first that a child wrote, is kept in a father's wallet for twenty years; treasured are bronzed babies' booties, a dance card, the label off a wine bottle. Each of these is valuable because we care about it. We care, and it may be unilaterally, about X not because X deserves this caring but because we choose to confer value on what may not demonstrably be a value. We are not responding to a value but attributing a value to something or someone. In such a case where, if anywhere, does the value reside? Frankfurt's answer is that it resides in a certain kind of a person, namely a caring person. The person cares about being a caring person; in other words, there is a sort of second-order caring operative. The goodness of the caring person initiates the relationship.

We have now, I think, a conceptual apparatus capable of clarifying that relation of teacher to student which is friendship.

What we seek then is a conception rather than the concept of friendship. We expect that it can be conceptually connected to a prime analogue of perfect friendship because the friendship of teacher and student is polysemous to other conceptions of friendship. That connection can be both potential and extrinsic. And we seek such a conception because of the peculiar nature of childhood and of the teaching relationship.

A Laelius type friendship obviously cannot obtain between teacher and child because they are not equals; they are not equally drawn to each other; and the relationship is not permanent. But cannot the teacher care about the child as a unique individual even if the child cannot respond in kind? And cannot that goodness which is caring be at least rooted in the potentiality the child possesses to itself become a caring adult and whose realization is brought about at least to some significant extent through the child's interaction with the teacher?

Is such a conception merely a thought experiment? I do not think

which are worth more than a curious glance at an exhibit in a museum. These precedents can be grasped together under the heading of "ritual friendship." To talk of ritualized friendship is to enter the ancient Greek world of xenia, the ancient Roman world of patronus-cliens, the Hispanic world of compadrazgo, and the anthropological world of, in Meyer Fortes' language, amity.

For the Greeks, in addition to the friendship one has for members of one's family, for fellow citizens, and for personal friends, there is a friendship which is extended to strangers.¹⁹ Gabriel Herman defines this ritualized friendship as "a bond of solidarity manifesting itself in an exchange of goods and services between individuals originating from separate social units."²⁰ It is related to and mimics kinship. That is, it is assumed to be permanent and is passed on to descendants. There must be at least a conventional display of mutual affection. Like marriage, it is a ritual act which creates a bond of affinity between unrelated individuals. Unlike other forms of friendship, which share in one social system, similar values and which, through a lengthy process of interaction, gradually develop intimacy, ritualized friendship involves at least two different social systems, is established abruptly through a ritual act, continues even at a distance, and can involve an "as if" relationship.

Patronage, the Roman equivalent, is a social relationship which is essentially reciprocal, involving exchanges of services over time between two parties; personal, as opposed to, e.g., commercial; asymmetrical; i.e., between parties of different status; and voluntary; i.e., not legally enforceable.²¹ As an example, in December 46 B.C., young Aulius Caecina describes himself as a cliens of Cicero, a bond inherited from his father's relationship with the orator.²² Clientage can be contrasted with dependency. Both involve members of different status groups, but the relationship of dependency is involuntary and backed by legal as well as extra-legal sanctions, while the relationship of patron-client is voluntary and backed only by extra-legal sanctions.

Compadrazgo (sponsorship) comes about because an adult assumes publicly a relationship with a child through a ritual act. Strictly speaking, the relationship of compadrazgo is between the padrino and the padre but implies the relation of father to child and of godfather or protector to that same child.²³ Lawrence Sullivan highlights the various facets of this relationship: The ritual companion acts

as either a protecting chaperon who wards off threat; a consort who shares one's apportioned lot of physical, emotional, or spiritual ordeal; a teacher or an escort who serves as a guide into the etiquette proper to a new situation; a conductor who accompanies the person in ritual, the vehicle of passage; or as a stylized

jokester or adversary who, through reverse psychology or a logic of negative coefficient, drives the person to find one's identity on the opposite shore of relations and behaviors.²⁴

All of which is very close to how anthropologists describe amity in its ritualized form. As Meyer Fortes points out, this is the realm of prescriptive altruism which may or may not be accompanied by genuine affection.²⁵ It is, as Julian Pitt-Rivers notes, indistinguishable from ritual kinship (in contradistinction to real or adaptive kinship). It involves gift-giving and is therefore free, but morally it requires some kind of return as a recognition of having received a free gift.²⁶

Thus the teacher and student are examples of ritualized friendship. Unlike what obtains in central cases of friendship, equality, intimacy, and symmetry are missing. But there is a common activity, a shared and quasi-stable pursuit, which the word "pursuit" implies. There is equality, but one looked forward to rather than presently experienced. There is affection, but affection "at a distance." There is a symmetry but, like the compadrazgo, it is between teacher and parent who share similar desires for the child. Prescriptive altruism may be a lower state than spontaneous altruism, but it is not to be sneered at; ascription as well as performance can ground a relationship. Its "coolness" guards it from some of the shoals love founders on. And, perhaps not so strangely, it makes R.S. Peters' notion of education as initiation a bit more attractive. By moving to a quasi-anthropological formulation, we can emphasize friendship as a social, rather than a personal, form of interaction and see how dependent it is on community.

Endnotes

1. George Steiner, "The Friend of a Friend," *New Yorker* (22 Jan 1990): 136.

2. At the 1990 Miami meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, Patricia White of the University of London addressed herself to the general topic of education and friendship: the nature of friendship, its value, and the fostering of friendship in the school. But she would, except in very rare instances and even then only for very short periods of time, favor friendliness over friendship, "spam over steak" as she remarks. "Friendship and Education." *Philosophy of Education* 1990 (Normal: Philosophy of Education Society, 1991), 62-73.

3. Cicero, De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione. With an English Translation by William Armistead Falconer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928). Subsequent page references to the De Amicitia are given in parentheses in the text itself.

4. The choice of Cicero here is fairly arbitrary. The locus classicus on friendship are the 8th and 9th books of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, but, as we shall see later, the 10th book of the Eudemian Ethics and even the Rhetoric contain important elements of Aristotle's analysis. A recent commentary is Martha Nussbaum's "The Vulnerability of Good Human Life: Relational Goods," in The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1986), 343-372. Helpful also is Ferdinand Schoeman, "Aristotle on the Good of Friendship," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 63 (1985): 269-282.

5. Nathan Rotenstreich, "The Right to Education," in *Philosophy for Education*, edited by Seymour Fox (Jerusalem: Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation, 1983), 99-120.

6. P.H. Hirst and R.S. Peters, *The Logic of Education* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), 88-105. See also R.S. Peters, "Personal Understandings and Personal Relationships," in Theodore Mischel, ed., *Understanding Other Persons* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), 37-65.

7. Kant symbolizes part of the problem. Every human is an end-in-itself and deserving of a treatment commensurate to its human status—a part of Kant's thought that we pick up. On the other hand, for Kant, children have no rights—a part we ignore.

8. See H.L.A. Hart, *The Concept of Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 155-159. See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971), 5. See Merrill Ring, "Aristotle and the Concept of Happiness," in *The Greeks and the Good Life* (Fullerton: California State University, 1980), 75-82.

9. Note Stuart Hampshire's odd appeal to "basic procedural justice." Stuart Hampshire, *Innocence and Experience* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 72-78.

10. Julian Marfas, *Generations: A Historical Method* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1970). For Marfas on friendship, see *The Structure of Society* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987), 182-185. Marfas in contradistinction to Nussbaum on Aristotle, contrasts love and friendship. For Marfas, friendship, respecting the other person's privacy, imposes limits on intimacy; love on the other hand, sweetly violates respect for intimacy. Full friendship is extremely rare, and most of us, according to Marfas, settle for approximations or deficient versions which arise in virtue of the complications society or age or limitations of time impose. But differences in sex, opinions, likes, and tastes need not hinder the development of friendship.

11. For further distinctions from a semiotic point of view, see Alexandre Kimenyi, "A Semiotic Account of Polysemy and Homonymy," in M. Herzfeld and M. Lenhart, eds., *Semiotics 1980* (New York: Plenum Press, 1982), 255-266. A standard account of homonymy and polysemy can be found in John Lyons, *Semantics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 550-569. Lyons sees the advantage of the distinction from a pre-theoretical point of view. Theoretically the distinction is difficult to establish and maintain.

12. In *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century*, ed. I. Düring and G.E.L. Owen (Göteborg: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1960), 163-190. A helpful discussion can be found in Michael T. Ferejohn, "Aristotle on Focal Meaning and the Unity of Science," *Phronesis* (1980): 117-128.

13. For present purposes, I am bracketing the question and thus declining to decide with or against Irwin whether these terms refer to a relation of word to concept or of word to thing. See T.H. Irwin, "Homonymy in Aristotle," *Review of Metaphysics* 34 (March 1981): 529-544. See also J.L. Austin's remarks on "linguistic phenomenology" in *Philosophical Papers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 182).

14. This is a point similar to that made by Thomas Green who taught us that "conscience" has many forms. See his 1984 John Dewey Lecture, "The Formation of Conscience in an Age of Technology," *American Journal of Education* 94 (1985): 1-32.

15. In addition to Books eight and nine of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, valuable discussions can be found in the *Eudemian Ethics* 1234b-1246a and in the *Rhetoric* 1380b-1380a.

16. Plato in the 2nd book of the *Republic* speaks of three kinds of goodness. See the *Eudemian Ethics*, 1217b-1218b. Charles Taylor goes a step further. There

are not only different kinds of goods; there are incommensurable goods, homonymous and not polysemous. See "The Diversity of Goods," in Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson, editors, Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 223-240.

17. Harry Frankfurt, "The Importance of What We Care about," Synthese 53 (1982): 257-272.
18. Annette Baier, "Caring about Caring: A Reply to Frankfurt," Synthese 53 (1982): 273-290; reprinted in Annette Baier, Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 93-108.
19. Mary Whitlock Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies. A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 40.
20. Gabriel Herman, Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 10.
21. See Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, ed., Patronage in Ancient Society (London: Routledge, 1989), 3. This analysis of patronage is based on R.P. Saller, Personal Patronage under the Early Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). For how this idea works itself out in early medievalism, see C. Stephen Jaeger, The Envy of Angels. Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe, 950-1200 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 103-106. Jaeger explicitly connects the relation of king/courtier to that of teacher/student, and he also puts these friendships into the public realm as against the love of man and woman, which he sees as a part of the private realm.
22. See Richard Saller, "Patronage and Friendship in Early Imperial Rome: Drawing the Distinction," in Wallace-Hadrill, ed., Patronage in Ancient Society, 49, 52-53.
23. Eduardo García Tamayo, "Estructura y función del Compadrazgo: Dos aproximaciones antropológicas," Debate 4 (1979): 95-119.
24. Lawrence E. Sullivan, Icanchu's Drum. An Orientation to Meaning in South American Religions (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988), 359.
25. Meyer Fortes, Kinship and the Social Order. The Legacy of Lewis Henry Morgan (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), 241, 251.
26. Julian Pitt-Rivers, "The Kith and the Kin," in Jack Goody, ed., The Character of Kinship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 89-105.

**THE INTERNET & THE INNERNET:
A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION IN THE
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE**

LOUIS SILVERSTEIN
Columbia College Chicago

The story goes that Mahatma Gandhi, when asked what he thought of western civilization, replied: "It would be a good idea." Given that Gandhi uttered these words during the times that "civilized" Great Britain was acting in a most uncivilized manner regarding its treatment of its colony—India, all in the name of bringing "learnin" to the unlearned, I would like to suggest that a similar guarded stance be applied to integrating technology into the teaching process; that is, the road to hell is often paved with good intentions, including roads that are seemingly filled with promise.

If technology is harnessed to serve the teaching process, that is, it serves as a means to an end, we shall be on the right track. However, if the teaching process is made subservient to the technology, we who are in the world of education shall fall ever more deeply into the technological trance that this modern age is so susceptible to. Such a frame of mind is well illustrated by one of the main characters in The Education of Little Tree, written by Forrest Carter, when Granma, speaking of the technological/business minded people who are eyeing the land of the Cherokee, tells us that "When they look at a tree, they see nothing but lumber and profit, never beauty. They walk and talk and measure, but they are dead people. A dead person meone whose spirit has shrunk to the size of a hickory nut. And e are lots of dead people around."

Contrary to the notion that if it is technological advancement, it has to be good, technology is inherently amoral, power- and control-hungry, relentless and hard, and one caught up in the technological trance, knowingly or unknowingly, incorporates such qualities into one's character. There are no better examples of these realities than Harry, or is it Harold, the computer in *2001*, and the team of scientists and technicians who worked on *The Manhattan Project*.

In the case of *2001*, we have a computer not so much out of control, as wanting to take total control from the inefficient, feeling humans, willing to sacrifice any human principle as well as any human standing in the way of such a relentless march.

In the case of *The Manhattan Project*, we have scientists and technicians so caught up in the need to succeed at all costs, that they were willing to sacrifice the earth itself to see if what they had created "worked." Historians, such as Richard Roper, have informed us that pursuing the possibilities of technology to its outer limits in what was an amoral milieu had turned these men of reason into headless horsemen, for they were ready to entertain the possibility of a chain reaction of explosions occurring that would set the earth afire.

The danger that we face as a technologically worshipping society is that people with the most highly specialized skills, rather than those with the broadest education may come to occupy the positions with the greatest influence—in effect, a technocracy.

I share such a perspective on technology with you not as a damning indictment of technology in the realm of education, but to afford us the opportunity to take time out from our very busy lives to reflect upon where to go with the inevitable joining of the educational with the technological, and how we wish to go about getting there in a humane way as much as an efficient and effective manner. It is in the pursuit of such reflection that I now pose to you what I believe to be some of the basic issues, concerns and challenges facing those of us involved in bridging education and technology.

—It seems as if the greatest sin of our time is not to avoid giving thought to the nature of one's relationship to oneself, to others, to family, to earth and its myriad life forms, to the great mystery, but not to be connected, not to be tuned in and online; in sum, not to be continually busy. More information has replaced to some very large extent more love, more justice and more compassion as what the world needs right now. Yet, as Neil Postman wrote in Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology: "We are driven to fill our lives with the quest to 'access information.' Yet, the fact is that there very few political, social and especially personal problems that

—If, in the words of John Lyons (*Academe*, Sept.-Oct. 1994), “with the hope held by some that electronic ‘expert systems’ will reduce the need for faculty members and will substitute sophisticated self instruction for the traditional interpersonal teaching, not that large lecture hall teaching had much to offer in this realm, . . . It seems important to ask how the education provided by one person to another differs from that acquired through media?”

I take this to mean, is education in its fullest sense of the word complete without physical interaction? I know by virtue of feedback from my students, both short term and long term (as the years go by, I remain in contact with many of my students), that teaching and learning in my classroom is most effective, the lessons of the day are embedded in consciousness and practice to a greater extent, when my students and I are “touched” by the physical presence and emanations from our bodies. I also know that the teachers who had the greatest impact upon my life, including the one—Professor Bernard Bellush, my history teacher at the City College of New York—who caused me to change my major from accounting to the liberal arts, were those who took an interest in my personal as well as my professional well being with me outside of the classroom, by placing an arm around my shoulder when needed, a human to human act that has to be real and not virtual.

—As ever increasing numbers of the world’s population comes online, a state of affairs that shall allow the world’s leading experts to be brought into our homes, classrooms and workplaces, does this not create the possibility that such experts would be transformed into gurus who shall displace full-time faculty who “know less” than the experts? Why pay tuition to learn from anyone else than the top in the field? Why engage in dialogue with one’s professor when what is wanted is information and not questions in a fast-paced and highly competitive world? Information that the other guy doesn’t have gives one an advantage. Questions that one needs to address lets the other guy get ahead. And wasn’t Socrates compelled to drink hemlock because of his association with questions not answers? In sum, teaching becomes less a mutual inquiry than a telling of the known, with the learner being more a passive recipient than a participant in the pursuit of knowledge.

—In an age such as ours when the bottom line is frequently the decisive factor in instructional decisions, is there any substance to the fear held by those who teach in academia that a significant number of faculty and graduating teaching assistants could lose their positions when courses delivered by means of the mass media are taught repeatedly at several sites? And, if this proves to be the case, what is the responsibility of one’s employer, of one’s society, to those who both possess productive and wish to work, but cannot find work at a livable wage?

Also, what is equitable compensation for faculty who prepare materials for a course that is offered repeatedly by virtue of technology? Also, who owns such materials—the author or the institution whom one is employed by?

—Will technology be the great equalizer in higher education as touted by technology boosters, or shall it result in a greater differentiation between the haves (of technology) and the have-nots (of technology)? While upscale institutions such as those that comprise the Ivy League are finding new ways of fusing computers, the Internet, and other technologies to improve teaching and research, others catering primarily to less affluent and low income students are struggling to provide faculty and students with the most fundamental services.

As reported in the *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (6/14/96), in an article entitled, "Students and Colleges With Ample Computer Access Find New Opportunities; Others Lag Behind,"

Students who can afford their own computers and printers find it easier to get their work done than do their peers without machines, who often must wait in line at computer facilities at the end of the semester, when demand is greatest. Technology has also burdened students with new fees, either added to tuition bills or collected for individual services—among them, laser printing, e-mail accounts, and at-home Internet access.

I know that at my institution, Columbia College Chicago, an open-admissions inner-city college, with many lower income and working class students who depend on college access to computers for class assignments, there is never enough access to the computer labs in part because the equipment is often down due to heavy usage, resulting in those students who possess computers at home having a significant edge over those who do not have computers at home. Wealth not merit thus becomes a decisive factor in academic success.

And, as we all know, who wins and who loses the race for success in academia begins when our students were young. This educational truth is well illustrated by the following words taken from *Machome Journal* (April 1995)

Let's not forget the kids. They can scan pictures that will help spice up their book reports, science fair projects, social studies reports and a host of other school-related activities. And when they print them out in sharp color, they'll feel better about their work (and maybe their grades will be better).

scanners and color printers? Certainly not the children of the have-nots. So the race is won before it even starts, for in the pre-technology era, even the poor could come up with pencils and color crayons; but in the technology era, we are asking parents to shell out comparatively large amounts of money to acquire the tools required to ensure academic success.

How educational institutions come to terms with such a reality is, perhaps, the most significant challenge to equity in education.

—As Edward Barrett asks in The Chronicle of Higher Education issue of January 27, 1995, is the virtual college or university of the future and the virtuous institution of higher education necessarily synonymous? "Higher education, he said, must examine its value system, its 'world view,' and the other things it adds to a student's education if it is to differentiate itself from competitors who offer courses online. 'We are not just training centers,' he said. 'We educate.'"

What, then, is the difference between training and education in the area of technology; and for the largest number of employees, do employers want trained or educated workers. As mentioned above, even the enlightened Grecian world had trouble with the educated mind as contrasted to the trained mind. Let us look to the words of Kenneth Ashworth (Chronicle of Higher Education, Sept 6, 1996) for some guidance here:

The stated and implied goals of satisfying industry, bypassing faculty members, and providing mass credentialing at low cost through technology has much appeal in our times. However, a college degree does not primarily represent perfected skills, competence in performing repetitive tasks, or practice in manipulation of equipment or data. It represents learning to see events in context and in perspective, the ability to formulate and consider options for future action, and comfort in dealing with new challenges.

In this context, I am reminded here of a statement made by the chairperson of the Academic Department of my college as quoted in the college newspaper: "Books are boring." And I am also reminded that the City of Chicago is drastically reducing its expenditures for book acquisitions by libraries in order to put computers in libraries. I guess, there is more than one way to burn books with all the societal ramifications that result from such a reality.

—It is when I remember and inculcate into my teaching these words of Krishnamurti that I realize what I am truly and fully about as a teacher in the deepest sense of the profession:

inwardly, which will result in his giving the right value to possessions. Without inner richness, worldly things become extravagantly important, leading to various forms of destructive misery. . . . when we are inwardly poor, we indulge in every form of outward show, in wealth, power, and possessions. When our hearts are empty, we collect things.

There exists within us, a source of knowledge, wisdom and richness that one can tap into in a way that is contrary to the modus operandi of the technological frame of mind—by not doing instead of by doing. Meditation, a centering and stilling of the self, is not a means of going where you want to go. Rather, it places you in a state of higher consciousness, and thus fosters a favorable atmosphere for the development of the deeper awareness to which your natural being is attracted.

As one's sensitivity to the deeper dimension of one's being develops through the daily practice of meditation, one may begin to find the awareness of the inner teacher arising at times in everyday activity, enabling one to become connected to a world one did not previously perceive, a fuller level of reality that is always present and in which we are invited to participate.

Meditation is a way of awakening to the reality in which we are immersed. We rarely think of the air that we breathe, yet it is in us and around us always. In a similar fashion the presence of the inner teacher is always with us. The purpose of meditation is to awaken us to what has always been there.

Thoughts are like ocean waves. Rising and falling, they see only their own motion. They say "I am a wave," but the greater truth, which they do not see is, "I am ocean." There is no separation between the two, whatever the wave might suppose. When a wave settles down, then it recognized that its source is ocean—*infinite, still and eternal*—was always there.

The same holds true for the mind. When it is thinking, it is all activity. When it stops thinking, it returns to its source in stillness.

And what is the nature of this source? If one were to pick a fruit from an apple tree and split it open see what is inside, one would find many small seeds. Now, if one were to take one seed and split it open, one would seemingly see nothing. The subtlest essence of this fruit appears as nothing. Yet, despite appearances, it is from nothing that apple trees as well as we originate. Meditation returns us to that nothingness, that stillness where the universe and the self are one and the same—what I call the innernet.

If our mission as educators is to educate the student as a whole person, then accessing the innernet must be taught along with accessing the internet. Otherwise we are not serving the student, but serving what he

or she can do. And just as a home is more than what is contained within it, we as well as our students are more than we can do.

Lastly, allow me to tell you a little tale, but one that speaks to the essence of what I hope that I have shared with you. Some many years ago, in a land that never was and always will be, when I returned from sabbatical leave, my colleagues asked of me what did I do with my time? I responded truthfully: "Rest, contemplation, meditation, and being with nature, my family and myself." Inevitably my words were followed by this response from the largest number of my peers: "Yes, but what did you do?"

Description of presentation

Drawing upon lessons learned from the widespread utilization of technology as an educational medium at Columbia College Chicago, an inner-city, open admissions institution serving a most diverse student population, the educational mission of which is the preparation of students for creative occupation in the arts and media, we shall focus on how computers have affected teaching and learning, institutional processes and structures.

Content of presentation

- The nature and essence of technology.
- The role of access to more information in education.
- How the education provided person to person differs from that acquired through media?
- Whither faculty and graduate assistants when budgets are strained in the process of going online.
- Will technology be the great equalizer in higher education or shall it result in a greater differentiation and educational outcomes for the haves and have-nots?
- The virtual college or university and the virtuous one.
- The inner teacher (the innernet) and the outer teacher (the internet).

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

WEI ROSE ZHANG
Eastern Illinois University

Over the last few decades, there has been disagreement and confusion on the role of cultural differences in multicultural education. Is multicultural education about the celebration of cultural differences? Should we teach our students to embrace all cultural differences indiscriminately? This paper intends to answer these questions. Through the analysis of the relationship between multicultural education and cultural differences as well as the historical background of multicultural education, it argues that cultural differences should be used in a way to facilitate critical thinking in multicultural education.

It was in one of my multicultural education classes in spring 1995. Students were emotionally divided over how to treat cultural differences. The discussion evolved from how to treat differences in language, learning patterns and preferred communication styles to a more theoretical focus, i.e. how to deal with different belief systems. The situation before them was, if a culture believes that leaving the female first-born infant in the cold to die is ultimately desirable, should we also celebrate, i.e. accepting and appreciating that difference? While some students firmly shook their heads, a student burst out: "How can we ever deprecate any cultural differences if we are to celebrate them? If multicultural education is to teach us to overcome ethnocentrism and to celebrate cultural differences, are we biting our own tongue when we reject cultural differences?" The class

suddenly became silent, hungry for an answer.

What we got into here is a serious challenge proponents of multicultural education face. Namely, can we celebrate cultural differences, yet still occupy a position to evaluate or even reject certain cultural differences? If the answer is "no" in the sense that celebration of cultural differences means to view cultural differences from another culture's perspective and to prohibit passing judgments on (needless to say to reject) cultural differences, then more serious challenges surface. For example, how can we prevent people from slipping into this convenient cultural outfit to "rationalize" their inaction, complacency and oppression—things that are common-sensically undefensible? It seems as soon as they claim what they do is their cultural practice which amounts to their valued cultural differences, the rest of the world is left helpless and speechless.

Obviously, there are problems with this view of multicultural education and cultural differences. 1) It stifles people's mind by forcing them to withhold their judgments and parrot after others. If the celebration of cultural differences in multicultural education is to prevent people from making judgments about a cultural difference, or more specifically, to prevent people from making judgments that do not line up with the cultural difference, then we can only act like a parrot accepting, for example, foot-binding practice when it was accepted in Chinese culture and rejecting it when Chinese people look down upon it. If multicultural education entitles to be a kind of education, it by no means should prevent people from using their mind for making judgments about worldly issues. The reduction of human faculty of reason to parroting is obviously untenable. 2) this view of multicultural education also invites people to detach themselves from each other's affairs. Plainly, the safest approach not to pass judgments on other people or cultural differences is to become indifferent toward each other. Once we get involved, once we become really concerned, we cannot but step in whenever we feel that our advice, our suggestions and judgments will make a positive difference. If multicultural education is indeed for the well-being of others and the self, it should not foster indifference. Unfortunately, keeping people from exercising their judgment on cultural differences, in essence, signals people to act indifferently about each other. This extreme relativistic position on multicultural education and cultural differences does too much harm and is hard to be rationalized.

However, if the answer to the question is "yes", i.e. multicultural education should encourage critical thinking on cultural differences, then, as the student pointed out, we have the burden to justify how multicultural education can logically encourage the celebration of differ-

how multicultural education can logically encourage the celebration of differences while teaching people to critically evaluate them. To me, there is a complementary nature between teaching students to value cultural differences and encouraging them to make judgments on cultural differences. The former, which in essence constitutes a form of moral teaching, cannot be separated from the latter, which is a form of critical thinking. One necessary ingredient in moral value teaching is to teach students to make moral judgment or critical thinking. Lawrence Kohlberg in his *The Meaning and Measurement of Moral Development* indicated that "Action is not moral action unless it is generated by moral reasoning and motives. Thus we cannot study moral action merely by observing behavior defined a priori as 'moral.' Rather, we must inquire into the processes of moral judgment and decision making that necessarily underlie moral action, as well as the action itself."¹ Emphasizing on the processes of moral judgment and decision making, he suggests the development of moral values and actions are intertwined with moral judgment and individual moral autonomy. According to him, children move along three levels of moral thinking with each level being more morally sophisticated than the previous one. The highest level of moral maturity is reached through the exercise of moral reasoning. Thus a child's moral values are developed by his or her ability to reason and making judgments.² He also claims that "our values tend to originate inside ourselves as we process our social experience".³ This indicates value development largely resides with the choice of the individual, that there is a great degree of personal autonomy in moral value development. There are two points that can be summarized from Kohlberg's moral development theory. One, moral value teaching must be based on fostering moral judgment. Two, value teaching must presuppose moral autonomy of students. To me, these are two crucial elements in moral value teaching. Any value teaching would be futile or constitute indoctrination if, for instance, students are taught to say "no" to drugs without knowing why; to stay away from premarital sex without knowing the possible negative consequences and to value cultural differences without knowing in what way this valuation of differences will affect them individually and why the celebration of cultural differences is desirable. Whenever the change is of the affective domain of the students, the best thing teachers can do is to find the access to the students' mind, for which reason provides a viable means.

What I have argued is teaching students to value cultural differences must be accomplished by engaging students in rigorous critical thinking or moral value debates with oneself and with others. It should guide students to become reflective, "more clear, precise, accurate, relevant, consistent, and fair"⁴ in making judgments themselves regardless whether

the judgment is in favor of cultural differences. Also, multicultural education cannot and should not impose anything—any attitude and positions, upon students. It must assume that students are free in making their choices about what to believe and what to celebrate. It would be unreasonable, actually absurd, for multicultural education, on the one hand, to encourage students to exercise ethical insights on cultural differences, but on the other hand, restrict them from arriving at a conclusion that may be inconsistent with the preferred result, which, in this case, is acceptance and appreciation of cultural differences. Similar to any other education, what multicultural education can and should do is to turn on a light for the students so that they can further explore the new perspective on their own with the necessary critical thinking skills obtained from such an education.

It should be obvious that it is my position that the celebration of cultural differences in multicultural education is not an absolute position. It not only does not exclude the making of a judgment on another culture, but actively promotes it. The reason that many people become confused, sometimes even turned off when they hear that multicultural education is about the celebration of cultural differences has to do with the unclarified yet widely propagandized role cultural differences play in multicultural education. A glimpse at the available multicultural education literature will easily mislead the reader with the theme that celebrating cultural differences is either the end or an end in multicultural education. For example, M. Eugene Gilliom, professor of social studies and Global education at the Ohio State University once wrote:

. . . the movement (multicultural education) recognizes that all cultures possess unique value systems, distinctive frames of references, different modes of thought and action, and diverse world views. It is the recognition and acceptance of these realities—an acceptance of the fact that there are many ways of being human—that is the cornerstone of the multicultural education.⁵

Carl Grant, professor of Curriculum and Instruction at the University of Wisconsin—Madison claimed: "As a philosophy, . . . multicultural education is deeply rooted in principles of democracy, equity, human dignity, respect, and affirmation of human diversity."⁶ While professor Gilliom takes the acceptance of cultural diversity as *the* end and Professor Grant takes it as *an* end of multicultural education, a brief analysis on the historical development of multicultural education in the United States suggests otherwise.

multicultural education which was initiated in the United States in by the Civil Rights movement and then Ethnic revitalization

movement was brought about largely as a response to the man-made negative social conditions for ethnic minority groups. These conditions could be characterized by the unequal treatment of ethnic minority people in employment, education, public housing and many other social areas, and by making them easy targets of negative prejudice and discrimination. These people suffer from these adverse social conditions mainly because they are physically and culturally different. Differences were viewed as a threat for the dominant culture. The domination of the white Anglo-Saxon protestants and their desire to maintain the dominant position led to the fear and the mistreatment of people of differences. It was in this social context that multicultural education came into existence. Multicultural education was brought about for a reason. It is a call to awake the society to accord equal respect to everyone. That is, to treat everyone as having equal rights to life, free from institutional and personal social discrimination and prejudice. Multicultural education claims that treating people unfavorably because of their cultural differences is morally wrong. The slogan that we should celebrate cultural differences in multicultural education obviously was made to facilitate the achievement of a more just social arrangement. It tries to educate people to look at differences in a different light. This is because historically, differences have been a source for cultural conflict and hatred in this world. There had been wars, massive persecution and brutal deaths of millions of European Jews because of religious, racial differences and differences in opinion. It seems that people have the tendency to fear, shun away and resent differences when dealing with differences in human relationships. Making friends with another person who has a totally different philosophy of life, a different taste in aesthetics, and who says "no" to whatever you claim is not a common human practice. This suggests that differences do carry the potential to block communications and destruct human relationships. Encouraging people to value differences for differences' sake seems to go against our natural wishes about differences. Therefore, treating differences as an end or the end in multicultural education will most definitely lead to confusion, animosity and distrust which is detrimental to multicultural education.

It must be pointed out that the celebration of cultural differences is neither an end nor the end in multicultural education. It only serves as a means to enlightening people that differences can enrich human life if they are treated in a rational way. Instead of fearing and resenting differences, people are encouraged to view differences more positively. That is the major goal of the slogan.

Endnotes

1. Lawrence Kohlberg, *The Meaning and Measurement of Moral Development*. (Massachusetts: Clark University Press, 1981), 36.
2. Lawrence Kohlberg, *The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice*. (San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981), 17-22.
3. *Ibid*, 14.
4. R Paul, *Critical thinking: What every person needs to survive in a rapidly changing world*. (Santa Rosa, Calif.: Foundation for Critical Thinking, 1993), 136.
5. Eugene M Gilliom, "The Many Ways of Being Human" *Insights On Diversity*. (U.S.A.: A Kappa Delta Pi Publication, 1994), 13.
6. Carl Grant, "Toward a Common Definition of Multicultural Education" *Insights on Diversity*. (U.S.A.: A Kappa Delta Pi publication, 1994), 31.

MULTI-CULTURALISM: SOME SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE CONCEPT

MICHAEL DAVIS
Illinois Institute of Technology

Like most vehicles of important hopes or fears, multi-culturalism is many things.¹ My primary concern here is to identify some things it should not or cannot be. My approach is to distinguish various senses of "culture" (and related terms), to point out the bad consequences of using one particular sense, and to suggest alternatives. My conclusion is that using "multi-culturalism" as the umbrella to cover what multi-culturalists have tried to do is a serious mistake—though, for now, one hard to avoid.

I begin with the obvious. The root idea of "culture" is caring for, tending, or looking after. Of the many senses of "culture", four might be relevant here. One is culture-as-refinement, what Matthew Arnold defined as "acquainting ourselves with the best that has been known or said". Culture (in this sense) produces a "cultured person", one whom "cultivation" has made a decent, thoughtful, learned enjoyer of what is good in life.

This sense of "culture" is universalist. It does not allow "multi-culturalism". All it allows are disputes about what is "best in the world". (Is this Zulu story teller as good as Tolstoy?) Multi-culturalism can—and has—challenged the concept of "best in the world" (trying to relativize best to a culture). But multi-culturalism cannot—multi-culturalism—argue, for example, that the poetry of New Guinea is better than, equal to, or worse than the poetry of New

York. Fundamental to multi-culturalism has been the view that cultures are, as such, incommensurable.

Yet one aspect of multi-culturalism is an effort to "widen the canon", that is, to add to those works of art studied in high school or college. Here we have a second sense of "culture", culture-as-art. It is in this sense that we might, for example, contrast Europe's "high culture" with America's "mass culture". Can we then understand "multi-culturalism" in terms of this second sense of "culture", with "multi-" suggesting the need to represent different forms or kinds of art ("pop culture" as well as "traditional culture")?

Probably not. This second sense of "culture" is too closely related to the first. Culture-as-art treats the arts as an index of cultivation, both individual and social. The arts (it might be said) are so central to "the culture of the soul" (as Cicero called it) that they may serve as an index of it, both individual and social. Culture-as-art would, then, have to determine what goes into the canon by considering what is best just as culture-as-refinement does.

Efforts to widen the canon should be relatively uncontroversial. After all, Matthew Arnold's canon consisted primarily of Greek, Roman, and Hebrew works. Balzac, Jane Austen, and Tolstoy, though now part of the orthodox canon, would not have been allowed in his classroom. The canon has in fact changed several times since Arnold's time.

Recent controversy over widening the canon is not, I think, attributable in any large measure to ordinary academic inertia. The problem seems to be the multi-culturalist rationale for additions. Culture-as-art allows only for "the argument from quality" (as we may call it): this work should be included because it is among the best in the world. The multi-culturalists have instead offered "the argument from representation" (as we may call it): this work should be included because it represents an under-represented culture.

For a sense of "culture" that does allow for the argument from representation, we must turn to culture-as-traditions-of-making. A culture (in this sense) would consist of certain easily recognized, relatively enduring ways of carrying on arts, crafts, and other making. In this sense, culture is close to technology. So, for example, French culture (in this sense) would consist of those ways of writing, painting, building, cooking, manufacturing, and so on characteristic of France. French culture (in this sense) might or might not differ from, say, Mexican or Senegalese culture.

Is this the sense of "culture" central to multi-culturalism? Probably not. While talk of "multi-culturalism" does touch on traditions of making, it does not seem to focus on them. For example, rarely will a multi-culturalist argue that we should add such-and-such a novel to the canon

because it represents an important break with such-and-such a literary tradition. The usual arguments are a) that the work belongs to a "non-European culture" or b) that the author belongs to a previously ignored "sub-culture".² The work itself might well belong to a literary tradition already well-represented in the canon.

Such cultural arguments seem to presuppose a fourth sense of "culture", culture-as-society. In this sense, culture is the whole complex of symbols, traditions, practices, and the like defining a particular people.³ It is what, being cared for, tended, or looked after, constitutes a society's way of life, something defining it and distinguishing it from all others. Because a culture is a "whole", that is, a way of life from which nothing of significance is omitted, each culture necessarily defines a different society. Each culture is, by definition, a "mono-culture" (to borrow a term from ecology). A fragment of this whole (even something so substantial as an artistic tradition) is not itself a culture but a mere "folkway", meaningless without a culture to interpret it.

If each culture is, by definition, a mono-culture, how are we to understand "multi-culturalism"? Is "multi-culturalism" a contradiction in terms?

Perhaps not. Sociologists often distinguish between two kinds of culture, culture (strictly so called) and sub-culture.⁴ A culture defines an independent society, that is, one that can exist without any other; a sub-culture defines a dependent society, that is, a society that cannot exist except inside a larger society. A sub-culture is a whole, but a whole sharing some essential parts with another culture. So, for example, the Khoishan (the Kalahari bushmen) are a culture (strictly so called) because their way of life would allow them to exist (more or less as they do now) even if they were alone in the world; Chicago's firefighters, in contrast, can have only a sub-culture because their way of life, though complete, presupposes a wider society to provide food, housing, and (of course!) fires to fight. A multi-cultural society is simply a culture that has, in addition to one large culture ("the majority culture"), one or more sub-cultures. For convenience, let us hereafter refer to this fourth way of understanding "culture" (and "sub-culture") as "the sociologist's sense".

The distinction between culture and sub-culture may avoid the contradiction in "multi-culturalism" (at the cost, please note, of making the proper term "multi-sub-culturalism"). But contradiction is not the only problem with multi-culturalism (in this fourth sense). Multi-culturalism seems to assume the existence of cultures—and sub-cultures—in (something like) the sociologist's sense. Those who take up the term "multi-culturalism" (in this sense) seem to take this assumption for granted, as something too obvious for argument. Yet, the assumption is dubious and

Some isolated peoples may be defined by a single, complete (and independent) way of life, as if at birth everyone were handed an identical "handbook of life" and forced to follow it thereafter. I have, however, yet to read a contemporary anthropologist who actually describes such a monolithic society. The isolated groups anthropologists generally study (what used to be called "primitive peoples") seem to be definable only by statistically significant resemblances among members (and their isolated location). The pattern is not that of a single norm with a few deviants but several competing norms (with many of those counted as deviant under one norm counting as non-deviant under another). The lives of individuals seem to overlap in complex ways rather than constituting a single whole.

If we want to understand what a society run as a single way of life would be, we must turn from "primitive peoples" to a modern totalitarian state. Think, for example, of China during the "Cultural Revolution". Mao did indeed try to organize his people into a single way of life. There was even a little red handbook everyone was to consult about everything. What makes a state "totalitarian" is not tyranny (which is merely political) but the effort to control, by force if necessary, the whole of life. I don't think the people anthropologists study try to do that, much less succeed.

That, of course, is a claim anthropologists may dispute. More important for our purposes is what we all know about people like us. No modern nation can be defined by one way of life. We have too many outside interests, connections, and commitments. It is, for example, easier for an engineer to leave India for a job in the United States or Australia than to make a living at home by switching, say, to shoe repair. His profession gives him an international way of life. And not only profession but religion, art, language, or sport, may give people a life sprawling across geographical, linguistic, political, social, or other borders that "culture" may seem to have put up.

What is wrong with multi-culturalism in this fourth sense? Consider an analogue, nationalism as a principle for the organization of states. We might summarize nationalism with this argument:

1. A nation is defined by a complete way of life.
2. Insofar as a group's way of life (for example, a nation's) is complete, nothing outside of it can be important to the group's members.

So: one's nationality determines what is important to one.

Insofar as nationality in fact lacks this centrality in people's lives, much that is important to them lies beyond the nation, nation-

alism will threaten what people consider important. "Why," the Nazi asks, "would a good German read French poetry?" Nationalism, though deriving from the idea of culture (in our fourth sense), threatens culture (in our first).

Patriotism, often equated with nationalism, has little in common with it. Patriotism is love of one's country. A country is not necessarily a nation or even a state; it is primarily a locale (with its plants, hills, buildings, people, languages, customs, and so on). Love of country means treating one's country as at least as important as oneself.⁵ Such love is consistent with having important interests independent of one's country.⁶ Patriotism is consistent with culture (in our first sense) in a way nationalism is not.⁷

We can easily convert the "nationalist argument" into a "culturalist argument":

1. A culture is a complete way of life for a group.
2. Insofar as a group's way of life is complete, nothing outside of it can be important to the group's members.

So: one's culture determines what is important to one.

Insofar as what is important to people lies beyond their culture, defining them in terms of that culture will threaten what they consider important. While multi-culturalism should be (in part) an argument against questions like "What's a black woman want with a dead white guy like Shakespeare?", in practice it often seeks to make its argument for widening the canon in precisely such mono-cultural terms (as in, for example, such statements as "White male culture cannot be relevant to black women").⁸

Those accepting what I have said so far may be tempted to conclude that there is but one culture, world culture, and but one society, world society. Only the world seems large enough to hold a complete way of life. That temptation should, I think, be resisted, first, because a world culture would be as totalitarian as any other and, second, because there are at least two alternatives.

One alternative is that there is no complete way of life. All ways of life are inherently incomplete. If we go on thinking of ways of life as handbooks, then we should think of this alternative as a handbook in which most pages say, "Extemporize". We must make up our lives as we go along, picking up ideas from one another and using them as best we can, life as jazz rather than classical music.

There is, of course, a sense in which even a way of life that consists only in extemporizing is complete. Every life has a beginning, middle, end. Every society consists in such lives held together by work, play,

neighborhood, government, and so on. True enough. But so what? Why try to save an interesting, if false, conception of society (society-as-a-complete-way-of-life) by emptying it of content (society-as-being-together-some-way-or-other)?

Another alternative to one world culture is that, while there is more than one complete way of life, none defines a society (not even a world society). We might think of this alternative as each society having a pile of handbooks, most differing from the rest in important ways. We have a choice of handbook. We can pick one, following it to the letter, or more than one, mixing and matching, trying to patch together a (new) complete way of life, if we can, from these time-tested ways. One handbook may treat country as the organizing principle; another, religion; a third, profession; and so on. I might, for example, choose to become The Professor (with the rest of my life organized around my profession) or choose instead to be a philosopher-husband-father-backpacker (with none of these possible ways of life dominating the rest).

If no way of life defines a society, there can be no cultures (in the sociologist's sense)—and so, no sub-cultures. All talk of sub-cultures, resting on a false premise, will rest on a mistake. Since mistakes generally mislead, we should try to avoid the term "sub-culture" when talking about what sets some people—within a society—apart from the rest. "Ethnic" may look like a good substitute. Indeed, even now multi-culturalists have a tendency to use "ethnicity" as if equivalent to "culture". Nonetheless, "ethnic" cannot do the job alone.

We generally use "ethnic" to refer to those Americans who have a secondary identification with some other nation. "Mexican-American", for example, is an ethnic designation for Americans with family origins in Mexico. (If you are not an American, you are a foreigner, not an ethnic.) Ethnics tend to go to the same church (synagogue, mosque, ashram, or the like) as others of their ethnicity, belong to the same social clubs, eat the same foods, and even live in the same neighborhoods. Insofar as their church, social club, food, or neighborhood is itself distinct, it is (derivatively) ethnic as well.

"Ethnic" is not just another way to say "sub-culture". There is nothing in the idea of "ethnic" to indicate how important the secondary identification is. An ethnic bowler might, for example, prefer to be on a good team to being on a team with "her own people". She might even reject the contrast between "good bowlers" and "her own people". "Good bowlers are my people," she might say—and be no less ethnic for that. Being ethnic is not necessarily a way of life.

In this respect, ethnicity differs from both culture and nationality. Ethnicity differs from them in another respect as well. Every human (according to sociologists) have a culture (in the sociologist's sense).

A being who, though biologically human, lacked a culture would (according to sociologists) be a mere animal (much as would a human without language). For nationalists, the same is true of those without a nation. Ethnicity, however, is not something all people have (or need). In this respect, "ethnicity" resembles "sub-culture". Like "sub-culture", "ethnicity" allows for a neutral background of non-ethnics ("the majority culture"). "Ethnicity" differs from "sub-culture" in not presupposing such a neutral background. Nothing in the idea of ethnicity precludes a society of ethnics. All it precludes is a society in which most people have the same ethnicity. Insofar as one is an ethnic (of this or that sort), one belongs to a minority.

These features make the term "ethnic" seem an attractive substitute for "sub-culture". Unfortunately, "ethnic" can provide only a partial substitute. Much of the domain of multi-culturalism lies beyond ethnicity. So, for example, attempts to understand black Americans as ethnics, that is, as "African-Americans", is problematic in part because Africa is a continent, not a nation.⁹ Attempts to understand black Americans as ethnics is problematic for another reason as well. What seems to distinguish black Americans from other Americans, insofar as anything does, is the racism of others, not their own identification with Africa, common folkways, ancestry, or the like. Much the same must be said about gays, women, native Americans, and others whom multi-culturalism has sought to include in "mainstream culture".

Clearly, then, we need to develop a better vocabulary for talking about these distinguishable groups. Until we do, "culture" will continue to exercise a dangerous charm. I hope pointing out some of the dangers in that charm will encourage a search for satisfactory alternatives. But, until we have found alternatives, I recommend we at least try to eliminate the word "culture" whenever it appears in a discussion of multi-culturalism (for example, by using "group" instead of "cultural group").¹⁰ My impression is that, while such editing rarely affects the meaning of the sentence in question, it often avoids confusion.

Notes

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

1. Among the things multiculturalism seems to be are: a movement toward equality of educational opportunity (or, at least, equity) among identifiable groups of children, especially "ethnic minorities" and the poor; an approach to the curriculum emphasizing differences among nationalities and "ethnic groups", especially their different histories, attitudes, beliefs, and contributions; a process by which one develops different ways of perceiving, evaluating, believing, and doing (taking the point of view of other cultures);

a commitment to combat racism, sexism, and other forms of prejudice by developing appropriate understandings, attitudes, and social skills. For a quick suggestion of that, see *Kappa Delta Pi, Insights into Diversity* (Kappa Delta Pi: West Lafayette, Indiana,

1994).

2. "The push by people of color and women to get their voices and experiences institutionalized within the curriculum and the curriculum canon transformed has evoked a strong reaction from neoconservative scholars. . . . Only a curriculum that reflects the experiences of a wide range of groups in the United States and the world, and the interests of these groups, is in the national interest." James A. Banks, An Introduction to Multicultural Education Allyn and Bacon: Boston, 1994), p. 22-23.

3. Compare Banks, 50: "Culture can be defined as the way of life of a social group; the total human-made environment...[especially], the intangible, symbolic, and ideational aspect"; or Christine I. Bennett, Comprehensive Multicultural Education: Theory and Practice (Allyn and Bacon: Boston, 1995), after quoting several anthropological definitions, offers her own, p. 57, "a system of shared knowledge and belief that shapes human perceptions and generates social behavior", as "more attuned to the definition of multicultural education as the development of multiple standards for perceiving, believing, doing, and evaluating".

4. Banks, 50, suggests the terms "macroculture" and "microculture"—without explaining the advantage of these new terms. My guess is that the "sub-" of "sub-culture" implies subordination. Unfortunately, while "macro" suggests largeness (instead of superiority), some cultures—for example, that of the Khoisan—are quite small (though cultures strictly so called).

5. Hence, a "patriot" might well love a country in which there are two or more "nations". (Think of a country like Canada or Switzerland.) Indeed, a patriot might love her country because (rather than in spite) of the variety of its people. Insofar as patriotism is love of one's country (as it is), it is necessarily hostile to such "excesses of nationalism" as ethnic cleansing (which sacrifices the country to the nation).

6. If the mark of patriotism is a willingness to sacrifice one's own interests to those of one's country, then the mark of nationalism seems to be a willingness to sacrifice the interests of others to those of one's nation. Patriotism is at least a candidate virtue; nationalism is not. Patriotism is "the last refuge of the scoundrel" precisely because it seems to be a virtue (if only in the poor way in which good intentions or loyalty is). Nationalism, in contrast, is not even that. Few scoundrel seeks refuge in nationalism.

7. This way of distinguishing patriotism from nationalism may not be as obvious as it seems. See, for example, the debate in these pages between Stephen Nathanson, "In Defense of 'Moderate Patriotism'", Ethics 99 (July 1989): 535-52, and Paul Gomberg, "Patriotism is like Racism", Ethics 101 (October 1990): 144-150, where patriotism is understood as a willingness to serve interests of one's own nation even when that may be damaging to those of other nations. While I don't think understanding patriotism as I do here would bring Nathanson and Gomberg (and, in the background, Alasdair MacIntyre) to agree, I do think it might substantially clarify the dispute.

8. A number of disreputable "-isms"—including racism, sexism, ageism, and speciesism—are analogous to nationalism insofar as they treat one fact about a person as decisive. They differ only insofar as the fact they designate differs. Insofar as the fact chosen is itself important to most people—as sex and age (and, of course, species) is—treating that fact as decisive will seem less objectionable than where (as in race) it looks almost arbitrary.

9. I prefer "black American" to "American black" because the first refers a kind of American (a black one) while the second refers to a kind of black (an American one). The first phrase describes the people in question as a variety of American; the second, as the American variety of a distinct species (and so, not as Americans at all).

10. "Diversity" is another candidate. Unfortunately, diversity (taken literally) is since it includes every difference. Those who want to "celebrate" diversity do o celebrate all features that distinguish some of us from the rest. Presumably,

THE INTRODUCTORY COURSE IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

ARTHUR BROWN

Wayne State University

Over the 30 years I have been teaching an introductory course in Philosophy of Education, I have evolved a strategy which I am reasonably satisfied with and, judging by their evaluations and remarks, so are a large majority of my students. This is not to say the course does not change anymore; I am always adding new materials, dropping old ones, and providing new emphases. But the basic strategy is pretty much the same as it was, say, 10 years ago.

Before I speak about the current structure of the course, I shall describe certain changes in my teaching practices and the rationale for them. At first, I lectured in almost all class meetings. I always encouraged questions and comments, but the course was fundamentally a lecture course. Over the years I have incorporated students presentations, such that there is now what I believe to be a happy mix of lectures, lecture-discussions, and panel presentations. I have taken seriously the progressive idea, supported by my own educational experience as well as the literature, that learning requires active engagement. Students should do something other than listen; they should speak, write, organize, etc. if they are to acquire genuine competence. Teachers can stimulate students, they can entertain them, they can inspire, they can demonstrate, but it is the student who ¹ st, in the final analysis, make sense out of whatever is studied—that is made possible only by active engagement. (I was amused

when, in his preface to Cultural Literacy, E.D. Hirsch made the observation that a student could "learn" something without understanding it.)

When I say this, I am reminded of an incident which occurred years ago when I was teaching Animal Husbandry. I spent three full weeks preparing my first lecture for a course titled, "Feeds and Feeding." In all immodesty, I must say it was a terrific lecture. It was structurally sound, with a beginning, a middle, and an end, and was sprinkled with humor, anecdotes, and illustrations. A senior student came up to me afterwards and said that it was the best lecture he had ever heard. And I was so proud of myself; I was a real professor, I thought. It was not until some years later that I realized what had happened. The only person who really learned something of significance was me. I prepared for three weeks; I organized the materials; I presented it. I was fully engaged in the process. Henry, I am afraid, had an aesthetic experience, but I doubt he had much of a learning experience—at least anything close to my own.

Second, in the early years of my teaching Philosophy of Education, I used the "ism" approach: pragmatism, idealism, realism, existentialism, etc. and their educational implications. That was how I had been taught Philosophy of Education. After doing the "isms" for several years—and even before that approach became unfashionable—I grew increasingly uneasy about its value; it all seemed so fictive (an idealist would emphasize ideas; a realist, empirical evidence, etc.). Soon I dropped the "isms" and took up analysis. But analysis that was broader than simply language analysis, as I shall explain later.

A third major change in my teaching occurred in 1968. It was in my testing and grading practices. I had already taught for some years—various agricultural courses as well as philosophy, sociology, and philosophy of education—and in all cases I required my students to write a monthly exam, a mid-term, a final, and a term paper. I averaged the grades somehow and came up with a final grade. Then, in 1968, I wrote a paper entitled, "Education and the New Morality." Toward the end of that paper, almost without thinking, I wrote that students should spend more time on papers and projects, and less time on examinations. Those lines changed my life and the lives of my students because when I reviewed what I had written, it occurred to me that I should "put up or shut up." From that day on I have not required an examination of any student, undergraduate or graduate, (except doctoral candidates for whom there is a college requirement). My students only write papers. As a consequence, they don't try to con me and they don't study only what they think will be on the exam. And they are a lot happier. In my judgment learning more by virtue of actively creating their own education, if the grade they get is not one which they are willing to

settle for, I give my students an opportunity to revise their paper in accordance with my suggestions. I point out that I see myself not simply as a judge or a gatekeeper, but, more important, as a coach. I am less concerned with what students do than when they can do.

As a consequence, I avoid in large measure, I believe, the kind of adversarial relationship that exists between most students and professors, a relationship my son so graphically described on his first visit home during his freshman year in college. While we were having our Thanksgiving dinner, he looked at me intently and said: "Now I know who your are; you're the enemy."

With that said, a few words about my introductory course. Shown below is a recent course outline and a schematic (the Frankena model) which is useful for analyzing someone's philosophy of education. (The model has its problems, but that is another matter.) The Frankena model and the course outline are, of course, skeletal in nature. If I may be forgiven a pun, the meat of the course is in the fleshing out process.

In addition to Dewey's Experience and Education and a book of readings (like Schultz's) about educational topics, I ask students to buy several issues of Education Week as well as Phi Delta Kappan in order to get them into the habit of subscribing to the professional literature and in order to make the course current and more interesting. I do not offer a reading list, but at about every session, I distribute something not in the course outline—newspaper or journal articles usually—related to the topic of the day.

As for the Frankena model, after explaining with hypothetical illustrations how the model can be used to analyze a person's philosophy of education, meaning how that person's fundamental philosophic views (Box B) relate to his/her educational prescriptions, I have students model Bishop Emrich's article, "Indoctrination of Values is Vital," first individually, then collectively. Emrich's philosophy of education, to put it mildly, is fundamentalistic, as can be seen in the model. Yet to my question as to how many in the class agree, in general, with Emrich's vision and would vote for him if he ran for the school board, most students respond in the affirmative.

For the next session, I ask them to model out my "Education and the New Morality" (my article, as you might guess, offers a philosophy of education quite different from that of Emrich) and then we do it together in class. In this way students acquire some understanding of the fact that in a systematic philosophy of education, certain values or assumptions undergird prescriptions for social and educational ends (Boxes A and C) as well as for methods, i.e., educational policies and practices (Boxes D and E) designed to attain those ends.

ing of Dewey and for an analysis of the educational topics in Part III.

A word about my objectives. As one can easily see by reading my directions for the term paper and the presentations, I aim to have students get in the habit of reading critically and become good "crap detectors." I also aim to get them into the habit of thinking through something by themselves rather than simply collecting a lot of other people's thoughts. (I have been appalled by the fact that most of my students, even those at the doctoral level in the educational disciplines, have never been asked to do that.) Finally, I aim to help them learn where they stand on important educational issues and learn how to support their position.

A final word about Dewey. No one should graduate from a college of education without having read Dewey. For my purposes, the best book is *Experience and Education*. Others, of course, could be used. What is especially interesting is that by the time we have reached that stage in the course where we have finished studying Dewey, many students (perhaps most) have rethought their philosophy of education and begun to wonder why they were so favorably impressed by Bishop Emrich only six sessions earlier.

Course Outline & Frankena's Models

DATE	TOPIC/READING	FORMAT/READINGS
PART I - COMPONENTS OF A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION		
5/6	Course Preview	Tentative Course Outline
5/8	Discussion of Bishop Emrich's Philosophy of Education	Emrich, "Indoctrination of Values is Vital" and excerpts from Rogers & Harris (handouts)
5/13	Some Major Philosophic Issues and Their Relationship to Education and Other Disciplines	Lecture Recent Remarks by the Pope; "Dance and the Living Body" (handouts)
5/15	A Model for Analyzing a Philosophy of Education	Lecture/Discussion
5/20	Analysis of a Philosophy of Education	Brown, "Education & the New Morality" (handout)

PART II - DEWEY'S EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

5/22 Dewey, Experience and Education, Ch. 1-3 Lecture/Discussion

5/27 Dewey, Ch. 4-8 (esp. 4,5) Lecture/Discussion

PART III - PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF SELECTED EDUCATIONAL TOPICS

5/29 Small Group Discussion of Topics

6/3 MORALITY AND VALUES IN EDUCATION PANEL MEMBERS

Review Bishop Emrich and Brown,
"Education and the New Morality"
Schultz, Unit 4 (except Article 18)

6/5 RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF TEACHERS

Brown, "Ethics for Teachers Today"
Schultz: Strike, Article 18

Brown and Pendlebury, "The Case of Stan"

6/10 PLURALISM/MULTICULTURALISM/DIVERSITY

Schultz, Unit 6

Brown, "Pluralism—With Intelligence: A Challenge to Education and Society"

6/12 ASSESSMENT/ACCOUNTABILITY/STANDARDS

Brown, "Goal-Digging"

Schultz, Unit 3

6/17 SCHOOL CHOICE/CHARTER SCHOOLS/PRIVATIZATION

Schultz, Articles 1, 6, 10

6/19 INDEPENDENT STUDY OR MEET WITH THE PROFESSOR

6/24 TERM PAPERS DUE

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

READINGS

John Dewey, Experience and Education

Fred Schultz (editor), Education 97/98

3 issues of Education Week (1.25 each issue)*

1 issue of Phi Delta Kappan (\$3.00)*

*To be purchased in class

TERM PAPER DIRECTIONS

An 8-10 page analysis of an article in which the author takes a position on one of the following educational issues:

- Assessment/Accountability/Standards
- School Choice/Charter Schools/Privatization
- Pluralism/Multiculturalism/Diversity
- Morality and Values in Education
- Rights and Responsibilities of Teachers

Your analysis should include three components:

1. A summary of the position taken by the writer on the topic.
2. A critical analysis of that position in terms of its philosophical assumptions, internal consistency, empirical supportability, etc.
3. A systematic presentation of your own views on the topic.

Your paper should be based on one of the foregoing educational issues. The paper will be graded on depth of analysis, organization, and cogency. Literacy is, of course, expected. Please do not use a cover; a title page stapled to the paper will do. And please make a copy for yourself before submitting it. Your final grade will be based principally on your paper. Class participation will be considered. Attendance is expected and will also be considered.

This paper offers you an opportunity to think deeply about an important educational problem. Do not cover too much ground because in doing so you will sacrifice depth of analysis. Look below the surface, and spend most of your time (not all) on critiquing and on elaborating on your own views (items 2 and 3) rather than on summarizing (item 1). PLEASE ATTACH A COPY OF THE ARTICLE YOU ARE CRITIQUING.

NOTE: Students registered for 3 credits should do a more extensive paper (12-14 pages) or an additional short paper of 4-5 pages on a different topic.

PANEL PRESENTATIONS


PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF SELECTED EDUCATIONAL TOPICS

The purpose of the panel presentations is similar to that of the paper. In making the presentation:

1. Elaborate on the major issues involved with respect to the particular topic.
2. Critically analyze the principal arguments for or against one position or another. Again, don't try to cover too much ground.
3. Explain and support your own views.
4. Allow ample time for class reaction.


It is expected that the entire class will read on the topic and be prepared to react to the presentations and the readings with written questions or comments.

USING FRANKENA'S MODEL TO ANALYZE A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION




Adapted from
William K. Frankena,
Philosophy of Education (Toronto:
MacMillan 1965)


A HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE



A HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE



A HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE

Example developed
by Arthur Brown

THE EXISTENCE OF PURE CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

JAMES D. GRANT

Maharishi University of Management

John Dewey stated that the task of philosophy is to utilize the findings of science to critique existing practices and point the way to more effective action. Specifically, he used science to challenge traditional idealist perspectives and replace them with a philosophy based on experience (Dewey, 1929). This paper will follow Dewey's lead—but to a different conclusion. It will use science to support the existence of an underlying field of pure consciousness and then discuss the profound implications of pure consciousness for education.

The view that there is an underlying transcendental field of life, which gives rise to manifest creation and which can be directly experienced, has an important role in the history of western educational thought. Influential proponents of this position range from Plato and Augustine to Froebel and Emerson. This perspective has taken on new life in the last decades of this century in the form of a new educational paradigm—Consciousness-BasedSM education—which has been developed by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi and incorporated in K-12 institutions and universities around the world. This paradigm has potentially enormous implications for education, both in how it is conceived and the products it is capable of yielding. This paper will present justification for the paradigm and briefly discuss its implications for education. The discussion will be broken into four

- 1) a clarification of the term pure consciousness;
- 2) arguments, including scientific research, supporting the existence of pure consciousness, the conceptual basis of the paradigm;
- 3) theoretical implications of pure consciousness for education; and
- 4) a brief discussion of the practical benefits of Consciousness-Based education in school settings.

The perspective of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi will be used as the basis for this discussion because it is he who has created a highly successful contemporary educational model based on intellectual understanding and experience of pure consciousness.

WHAT IS PURE CONSCIOUSNESS

The term "pure consciousness" contrasts sharply with the understanding of the term "consciousness" shared by most contemporary philosophers and neuroscientists. John R. Searle, Professor of Philosophy at U.C. Berkeley, for example, writes that consciousness "refers to those states of sentience and awareness that typically begin when we awake from a dreamless sleep and continue until we go to sleep again, or fall into a coma or die or otherwise become 'unconscious'" (1995: 60). Consciousness according to this view is an "emergent property" of brain functioning. As he says in a statement summarizing the position of neuroscientist Francis Crick: "all of our conscious experiences are *explained* by the behavior of neurons, and are themselves *emergent properties* of the system of neurons" (62).

Consciousness as it is used in the Consciousness-Based education paradigm has a different meaning. Consciousness means pure consciousness, the ultimate reality, the source of both the objective world and all subjective experiences. In *Maharishi Vedic University: Introduction*, Maharishi defines (pure) consciousness as follows:

Consciousness is wakefulness, unbounded alertness, pure intelligence, pure existence, self-referral fullness, all knowingness—the self-sufficient and unmanifest source, course, and goal of all creation. (58)

Complete knowledge of consciousness is the complete knowledge of the basic reality of life, which is available to everyone in the field of one's own Transcendental Consciousness (56)

Pure consciousness is synonymous for Maharishi with Being, the ground of all creation, and also with universal Self. As he says in his commentary on the *Bhagavad-Gita*:

The lower self is that aspect of the personality which deals only with the relative aspect of existence. It comprises the mind that thinks, the intellect that decides, the ego that experiences. . . . The higher Self is that aspect of the personality which never changes, absolute Being, which is the very basis of the entire field of relativity, including the lower self. (1967: 339)

This perspective acknowledges that human consciousness at the level of the lower self is influenced by neuronal functioning. But it also maintains that consciousness—pure consciousness—exists independent of physiology—the higher Self—and that experience of this higher Self can transform our conscious experience. This perspective is a variant of idealism, when understood as the perspective that mind or spirit is primary in the universe (Acton, 1972: 110). It is also an expression of the perennial philosophy described by Aldous Huxley (1945), which he defines as positing “one divine Reality substantial to the manifold world of things and lives and minds” (v).

An important contribution of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi to this tradition is the provision in Maharishi Vedic ScienceSM of standardized and easily repeatable technologies for experiencing and stabilizing the experience of pure consciousness, in particular the Transcendental Meditation® (TM) and TM-Sidhi® programs. The Transcendental Meditation program is a natural, effortless, non-religious procedure that allows the mind to settle down and experience pure consciousness. It has now been learned by more than four million people worldwide. The TM-Sidhi program is an advanced aspect of the technology of Maharishi Vedic Science. It trains the individual to think and act from the field of pure consciousness, enhancing the coordination between mind and body and greatly accelerating the stabilization of pure consciousness in activity, a state traditionally known as enlightenment (Maharishi, 1994: 283–9). The great value of the existence of these widely-practiced technologies from a research perspective is that it has made possible the empirical examination of the effects of the subjective experience of transcendence during meditation and in activity, thus giving empirical support for the existence of pure consciousness.

EVIDENCE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PURE CONSCIOUSNESS

The foundation of the Consciousness-Based education paradigm is that there is a field of pure consciousness, a field of Being. The following discussion will present four sources of evidence for existence of this field:

- 1) personal experiences and the historical record;
- 2) empirical data indicating that experience of pure consciousness induces unique psychophysiological changes.

3) research showing that experience of pure consciousness produces holistic personal growth, supporting the contention that pure consciousness is very basic to life; and

4) sociological evidence associated with collective practice of the Transcendental Meditation and TM-Sidhi programs supporting the idea that pure consciousness is a field.

Personal experiences and the historical record

Anyone familiar with world culture will recognize the premise that there is a transcendental field underlying human subjectivity and material creation as one that is very old and shared by many philosophical and educational traditions around the world. Aldous Huxley has referred to this as "the perennial philosophy" precisely because it is so old and shared by so many cultures. Plato referred to this field as the Good, Lao Tze as the Tao, Buddhist scholars as Nirvana, Vedic rishis as Atma, Aristotle as Being, Emerson as the Oversoul, and so forth. The exact meaning of these terms has of course been much debated in the history of philosophy. Are they philosophical conjectures or terms for an actually experienced higher reality? It is beyond the scope of this paper to support the latter position. The point is that the reference to a transcendental field basic to both mind and objective creation, what this discussion refers to as pure consciousness, by many traditions throughout the world across the span of time provides initial support for the contention that there is such a field.

This position is bolstered by the reported experience of many individuals throughout time. When Plato in Book VI of the *Republic* says, "This, then, which gives to the objects of knowledge their truth and to him who knows them his power of knowing, is the Form or essential nature of Goodness" (1982: 220), his point is abstract and open to different possible interpretations. Personal experiences, however, have a greater force of authenticity. Edward Carpenter, the early 20th-century British social philosopher, gives the following experience consistent with the description of pure consciousness provided above:

The Man at last lets Thought go; he glides below it into the quiet feeling, the quiet sense of his own identity with the self of other things—of the universe. He glides past the feeling into the very identity itself, where a glorious all-consciousness leaves no room for separate self-thoughts or emotions. He leans back in silence on that inner being, and bars off for a time every thought, every movement of the mind, every impulse to action, or whatever in the faintest degree may stand between him and That; and so there comes to him a sense of absolute repose, a consciousness of

immense and universal power, such as completely transforms the world for him (1904/1921: 228)

The British poet Tennyson reports a similar experience:

A kind of waking trance I have frequently had, quite up from boyhood, when I have been all alone . . . as it were out of the intensity of the consciousness of individuality, the individuality itself seemed to dissolve and fade away into boundless being, and this not a confused state, but the clearest of the clearest, the surest of the surest . . . utterly beyond words, where death was an almost laughable impossibility, the loss of personality (if so it were) seeming no extinction, but the only true life. (1899: 268)

Similar experiences are reported by individuals practicing the Transcendental Meditation technique of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. For example:

I experience a state of complete silence devoid of any motion, a state of unboundedness and total ease in deep relaxation. There are no thoughts, no feelings or any other sensations like weight or temperature. I just know "I am." There is no notion of time and space but my mind is fully aware and perfectly clear. It is a very natural and simple state. (Alexander & Boyer, 1989: 334)

Another practitioner of the Transcendental Meditation technique states the experience as follows:

During meditation, the experiences of being the whole universe started to occur more and more often. It reached its climax in one meditation when I had the overpowering realization that I was so unbounded and so unlimited that anything I wanted could easily be obtained. I kept feeling more and more expanded, and the feeling of bliss kept growing and becoming more powerful within me. . . . This gave me a feeling of being whole which I knew could no longer be taken away. (Maharishi, 1977: 79-80)

We see in these reported experiences marked similarities. First is the sense of unboundedness, the movement from a small localized self to a larger unbounded Self. This transition in all cases is associated with heightened awareness and an exalted sense of life, consistent with Maharishi's description of pure consciousness as "wakefulness, unbounded alertness, pure intelligence." Associated with this experience

is a sense of great power, but also great ease and relaxation. The experience of identity with the "self of other things" and of "being the whole universe" connect to the idea that pure consciousness is not just the source of subjective reality, but objective reality also.

The striking similarity among these accounts and reports of such experiences throughout time in books such as Huxley's *The Perennial Philosophy* or Richard Bucke's *Cosmic Consciousness*, suggests that these are universally available experiences and not culturally bound or a product of a particular eastern or western mind set.

Psychophysiological research

The advent of research methodologies of modern science along with a systematic means of promoting experience of transcendence—the Transcendental Meditation technique—have led in the last 25 years to empirical verification that these experiences represent unique states of consciousness, defined by distinctive psycho-physiological parameters. This research is of two sorts: research on the experience of pure consciousness—the state of transcendence—in meditation and research on stabilized experiences of pure consciousness outside of meditation.

Experience of transcendence: Research, published first in *Science* (1970) and *Scientific American* (Wallace and Benson, 1972), has indicated that practice of the Transcendental Meditation technique produces a unique hypometabolic state in which the mind is alert and the body very rested. Further research has shown that clear experiences of pure consciousness, such as those described in the experiences above, are correlated with a distinct pattern of autonomic changes, distinct from the general experience of restful alertness produced during the period of Transcendental Meditation. The key features are breath suspension coincident with decreased electrodermal activity (skin resistance) and immediate drop in heart rate. Electroencephalograph (EEG) patterns differ between individuals during the experience of transcendence, but in all individuals there is increased EEG power and coherence during these periods (Travis, 1997). These features indicate that experience of pure consciousness is a 4th state of consciousness, different from waking, dreaming, or sleeping.

Experience of pure consciousness outside of meditation: Maharishi (1963; 1967) has indicated that repeated experience of pure consciousness, the 4th state of consciousness, leads to stabilization of a 5th state of consciousness, in which pure consciousness is maintained 24 hours a day. He calls this cosmic consciousness because it is an all-inclusive state of consciousness in which pure consciousness is maintained along with waking, dreaming and sleeping. This is a state of great stability in which one is overshadowed by external events. The key subjective experience

associated with this state is witnessing, because one's Self is experienced as separate from activity. It is uninvolved—it witnesses activity. This experience comes in a permanent way from regular practice of Transcendental Meditation, but it can also happen for short periods spontaneously. There is a growing body of research showing the frequency of this experience in natural situations. This experience has been referred to as a "flow" experience, or "zone" experience for athletes (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). All flow/zone experiences do not involve experience of pure consciousness, a sense of witnessing or unbounded Self, but some do. Following is a representative zone experience reported by the tennis player Billie Jean King:

I can almost feel it coming. It usually happens on one of those days when everything is just right. . . . It almost seems as though I'm able to transport myself beyond the turmoil on the court to some place of total peace and calm. Perfect shots extend into perfect matches. . . . I appreciate what my opponent is doing in a detached abstract way. Like an observer in the next room. . . . It is a perfect combination of [intense] action taking place in an atmosphere of total tranquillity. When it happens I want to stop the match and grab the microphone and shout that's what it's all about, because it is. It's not the big prize I'm going to win at the end of the match or anything else. It's just having done something that's totally pure and having experienced the perfect emotion. (King & Chapin, 1974: 199)

Another flow experience, reported by a composer, has similar qualities:

You yourself are in an ecstatic state to such a point that you feel as though you almost don't exist. I've experienced this time and again. My hand seems devoid of myself, and I have nothing to do with what is happening. I just sit there watching in a state of awe and wonderment, and it just flows out by itself. (Goleman, 1995: 90)

The following two experiences are from practitioners of the Transcendental Meditation technique. The first reflects the experience of pure consciousness in activity, the second in sleep.

IN ACTIVITY: I notice it most in meetings with people, especially very heavy meetings with people where peoples' emotions and feelings are not in the most positive framework and opposing views are being expressed. . . part of me is separate and retains cool-

ness of mind, so I don't lose coolness of mind and I'm not sucked in the emotion of whatever it may be . . . it just gives you great stability. (Mason, 1995: 137-138)

IN SLEEP: It's a feeling of continuum all night long, somehow you are always there. There's a part of you that never goes to sleep, that part of you is like a night light that's on all night long. There can be that feeling in witnessing sleep of separation. Like the mind is drawn back on the bow, the mind is way back, is silent in the depth of the personality or pure consciousness. The experiencer is way back at the subtlest part of the mind . . . So senior controller is watching everything happen and not much happens in sleep but later you can watch dreams go by. (137)

In all the descriptions above, the experience of detachment or witnessing or clear. In the first three, dealing with witnessing in activity, the experience is associated with enhancement of functioning and greater well-being, indicating that this is a state of more optimal functioning, not mental derangement.

In the process of developing cosmic consciousness, maintenance of pure consciousness along with sleep is the last to stabilize because wakefulness and sleep are diametrically opposed. Because the states are opposed, however, it also shows the most unique psychophysiological signature.

Pathbreaking research, published recently in the leading sleep research journal (Mason et al., 1997), demonstrated that the EEG patterns found when individuals witness sleep are significantly different from those during regular sleep. The study compared 11 long-term practitioners of the TM and TM-Sidhi programs who were reporting witnessing, to 9 short-term meditators not reporting witnessing, and 11 non-meditating controls. The research found that witnessing experimental subjects had significantly more theta2 (6-8 Hz) and alpha1 (8-10 Hz) relative sleep power for sleep stages 3 and 4 than non-witnessing meditators and controls, with no significant differences between groups in time in delta, which is the characteristic EEG pattern of deep sleep. In the spectral analyses theta-alpha waves were seen to be riding on top of the delta waves characteristic of deep sleep. The research further indicated that there was a graded difference across groups during stage 3 and 4 sleep in theta 2-alpha1 power, with witnessing subjects having greater power than short-term meditators, who in turn had greater power than non-practitioners. This supports the contention that this develops with repeated experience of pure consciousness in Transcendental Meditation. This research is highly significant because it

is the first to document the electrophysiological correlates of stabilized experience of pure consciousness, a state that has traditionally been referred to as enlightenment (Maharishi, 1967).

Holistic growth from experience of transcendence

Another line of research supporting existence of a fundamental field of pure consciousness is the research showing that practice of the Transcendental Meditation technique promotes holistic growth. If pure consciousness is the most fundamental element of our being, then growth of this value in our life should nourish all aspects of our physical, emotional, and cognitive lives. More than 500 studies conducted on the TM technique have confirmed this. In published research, practice of the TM technique has been shown to:

- increase intelligence, learning ability, and intellectual performance (So, 1995; Cranson et al., 1991);
- improve academic performance and academic orientation (Nidich, Nidich, & Rainforth, 1986; Nidich & Nidich, 1989; Kember, 1985);
- increase creativity (So, 1995; Travis, 1979);
- increase organizational ability and efficiency (Seeman, Nidich, & Banta, 1972; Jonsson, 1975; Alexander et al., 1993);
- optimize brain functioning (Orme-Johnson & Haynes, 1981; Dillbeck & Bronson, 1981; Dillbeck et al., 1981);
- improve mind-body coordination (Appelle & Oswald, 1974; Holt, Caruso, and Riley, 1978);
- increase energy and dynamism (Jonsson, 1975; Alexander et al., 1993);
- improve health (Orme-Johnson, 1987; Herron, 1993);
- increase integration of personality and growth of self-actualization (Alexander, Rainforth, & Gelderloos, 1991; Chandler, 1991); and
- reduce negative personality characteristics such as anxiety, neuroticism, and drug abuse (Eppley, Abrams, and Shear, 1989; Alexander, Robinson, & Rainforth, 1994; Alexander et al., 1993).

A recently completed study (So, 1995) demonstrates the holistic effects of TM practice particularly well. This study, conducted in Taiwan over a year, included three separate studies at different schools—a high school, a junior high school, and a vocational engineering school. In all three studies, the students were randomly assigned to a TM group or a no-treatment control. In one of the studies a third group napped instead of meditating and in another study a third group practiced contemplation meditation. 363 students were involved in all.

found significant increases on each one independently compared to the no-treatment control when the studies were combined.

- Creative intelligence—test of creative thinking
- Experiential intelligence—decreased state and trait anxiety
- Contextual intelligence—field independence as measured on the embedded figures test
- Practical intelligence—constructive thinking inventory
- Physiological intelligence—inspection time (reaction time)
- Intellectual intelligence—culture fair intelligence test

This research supports the theoretical understanding that during TM practice one contacts a fundamental level of existence capable of nourishing all aspects of the individual.

Field Effects Research

A final body of research is highly significant both for the insights it gives into the field nature of consciousness and for its implications for means to improve society. More than 40 carefully controlled research studies show that significant positive effects are created in society—reductions in negative tendencies such as crime, violence, sickness, and accident rates, and increases in positive indicators such as political cooperation and economic indices—when a sufficient number of individuals practice the Transcendental Meditation and TM-Sidhi programs (Orme-Johnson, 1992). This effect, known as the Maharishi Effect because Maharishi first predicted it, cannot be explained by direct interactions between people because it is produced when only one percent of a population practices the TM program or the square root of one percent of a population practices the more advanced TM-Sidhi program. In some of the studies, the effect was produced by an intervention group that stayed in hotels and did not interact with the broader population and in other cases where the intervention group was even in a different country.

The two following descriptions will give a flavor of the research. The first shows the effects of a group of TM-Sidhi practitioners who gathered in Jerusalem in July and August of 1983. The number of participants varied due to such things as personal work schedules, vacations, and family responsibilities. This study, which has been published in the Yale-based *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, found a strong, significant correspondence between the number participating in the coherence-creating group and indices of quality of life, including auto accidents, fires, crime, news content analysis, and war statistics in Lebanon (Orme-Johnson et al., 1988).

Second, more expanded study looked at the impact of seven international and national "World Peace Assemblies"—large gatherings of

individuals practicing the TM and TM-Sidhi programs—on the war in Lebanon during the period from June 1983 to August 1985. The overall analysis of the 821-day series indicated that on days when the size of these groups of TM-Sidhi practitioners—most of which were not in the Middle East—was above the predicted threshold, there was a 66% increase in cooperative events among antagonistic parties in the Lebanon war, a 48% reduction in the level of armed conflict, a 71% reduction in war deaths, and a 68% reduction war injuries. These data were collected by an experienced, independent Lebanese coder who used standard scales to analyze leading international and Lebanese news sources. The influence of prior trends in the war, seasonal cycles, and holidays was statistically controlled and could not explain the results. Remarkably, the probability that these changes were due to chance was less than one in ten million (Davies, 1992; Davies, 1988).

This research supports the field-nature of consciousness because all so-called action-at-a-distance effects in nature are mediated by underlying fields. When a radio is turned on and music is heard, it is because a radio signal has been carried by the underlying electromagnetic field. Similarly, the gravitational effects of the sun on the earth are mediated by the underlying gravitational field. The reductions in violence just described are explained in the same way. Individuals meditating in one place can effect those in a far distant place because they are connected by an underlying field of consciousness. When, for a given population, a critical mass of people practice the TM and TM-Sidhi programs together, the enlivenment of the underlying field of consciousness is enough to influence the individual consciousness and physiology of individuals not meditating. The evidence suggests that these individuals gain the benefit of transcending without meditating themselves. On an individual level, these benefits include more effective activity, happiness, and positivity, effects which translate on a societal level into less frustration, less violence, and greater cooperation.

The experiences of pure consciousness related above in conjunction with the physiological, psychological, and sociological research on the Transcendental Meditation and TM-Sidhi programs support the existence of a field of pure consciousness that can be experienced by human beings. The existence of pure consciousness and the availability of an effortless technique to contact it have important theoretical and practical implications for education.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

The existence of a field of pure consciousness that can be experienced has important theoretical and practical implications for education. Theoretical implications include transformations of our understand-

ing of knowledge, of development, and of the goals of education.

Understanding of knowledge

Educational theorists throughout the ages who have recognized the existence of pure consciousness have maintained that the most significant knowledge is knowledge of this absolute field of pure consciousness. Plato, writing in the *Republic* about the Good, states:

Once it is perceived, the conclusion must follow that, for all things, this is the cause of whatever is right and good; in the visible world it gives birth to light and to the lord of light, while it is itself sovereign in the intelligible world and the parent of intelligence and truth. Without having had a vision of this Form no one can act with wisdom either in his own life or in matters of state. (281; 517c)

Knowledge of pure consciousness is the basis of wisdom, whether private or public, because it is the ultimate reality and the highest value in life. Being the cause of all that is right and beautiful, one can't fully appreciate or realize these terms without knowledge of pure consciousness. Because wisdom is knowledge of what is true, right, or lasting, it requires knowledge of pure consciousness. Without this knowledge, one doesn't have an adequate reference point for what has greatest value in life.

Maharishi makes a related point about why this is the highest value: It produces the pinnacle of human flourishing. In *Maharishi Vedic University: Introduction*, he writes:

Consciousness is fundamental to life. It is the prime mover of life. Every word that we speak and every act that we perform is an impulse of consciousness.

All speech, action, and behaviour are fluctuations of consciousness. All life emerges from and is sustained in consciousness. The whole universe is the expression of consciousness. The reality of the universe is one unbounded ocean of consciousness in motion.

Since consciousness is the most basic element of everyone's life, knowledge of consciousness is the most basic requirement for everyone to exist consciously and intelligently and enjoy full, unbounded creative potential of life, with maximum success in all fields of personal and professional life. (67-68)

meaning in light of the experiences of pure consciousness quoted earlier. Edward Carpenter's reference to experiencing a "glorious all-consciousness" or Billie-Jean King's reference to experiencing "the perfect emotion" convey the possibilities for human flourishing that this experience brings.

Experience of pure consciousness is necessary for gaining complete knowledge because it transforms the way we see the world. Cognitive psychology has demonstrated that the schemas, or concepts, that we have about the world determine how we see the world (Anderson, 1980; Gagne et al., 1993). Perception is active and therefore how we see the world, our perception of reality, changes as we ourselves change. This has led contemporary adherents of the constructivist view of knowledge to declare that there is no objective knowledge, that all knowledge is relative to the knower (Derry, 1992). This relativity of knowledge corresponds to a central principle of Maharishi Vedic Science: Knowledge is structured in consciousness (Maharishi, 1972, Lesson 9; Maharishi, 1977). According to this principle, as our state of consciousness changes, our experience of reality changes, and as our experience of reality changes, our "knowledge" of the world changes. For the individual in waking state consciousness, the self is experienced as always changing: This is the perspective of contemporary psychology. For the person in cosmic consciousness, the first state of enlightenment, the self (Self) is experienced as an absolute, unbounded, unchanging reality. For these two individuals, reality is different and thus knowledge is different.

The experience of pure consciousness, however, allows one to break from the radical subjectivity of the constructivist view of knowledge. Because pure consciousness is a universal, non-changing level of consciousness, perception based on this non-variable state of consciousness can be non-relative and fully reliable (Maharishi, 1994). Because knowledge is structured in consciousness, full development of consciousness gives fully adequate knowledge. In the most fully developed state of consciousness—unity consciousness—one directly perceives that pure consciousness, our own Self, is the essence of all things, permeating all creation.

This understanding that knowledge is structured in consciousness has profound implications for education. It means that consciousness must be fully developed in order to have complete knowledge. Consciousness can only be fully developed through repeated experience of pure consciousness and thus this experience must be given priority in education.

way we conceive the process of education, and hence how we conceive the educational enterprise. Education, as Dewey (1916) noted, is fundamentally about promoting human growth, human development. Education today assumes that growth, other than biological, occurs through interaction with an external environment—books, teachers, nature, computers, etc. The Consciousness-Based paradigm indicates that the most profound growth occurs through transcendence, turning the attention inward to its own source.

The implications of transcendence for development are articulated by Charles Alexander, in his book *Higher Stages of Human Development: Perspectives on Adult Growth*:

Just as language learning is fundamental for promoting development beyond the sensorimotor level to the conceptual domain of ordinary adult thought, we propose that exposure to a postlanguage developmental technology—such as the Transcendental Meditation (TM) and TM-Sidhi program—may be at least as fundamental in facilitating development beyond the language-based conceptual level of thought to postconceptual higher states of consciousness. The capacity for language use is inherent but actualized through participation in a linguistic environment; in a similar way, capacity to transcend the thinking process and act from a postconceptual perspective may be inherent but made available through systematic exposure to a postlanguage technology of consciousness. (298)

Because development, or growth, is so central to education, understanding of the possibility of experiencing pure consciousness transforms the way one understands the nature of education. Based on this understanding, both Maharishi and Plato define education in terms of transcending, in terms of experiencing pure consciousness. Plato writes in the *Republic*:

we must conclude that education is not what it is said to be by some, who profess to put knowledge into a soul which does not possess it, as if they could put sight into blind eyes. On the contrary, our account signifies that the soul of every man does possess the power of learning the truth and the organ to see it with; and that, just as one might have to turn the whole body round in order that the eye should see light instead of darkness, so the entire soul must be turned away from this changing world, until its eye can bear to contemplate reality and that supreme splendour which we have called the Good. Hence

there may well be an art whose aim would be to effect this very thing, the conversion of the soul, in the readiest way; not to put the power of sight into the soul's eye, which already has it, but to ensure that, instead of looking in the wrong direction, it is turned the way it ought to be. (232; 518c)

This process of turning the soul, the mind, from the changing world and taking it to the non-changing field of life, is transcending.

Maharishi, in *Maharishi Vedic University: Introduction*, writes:

The process of education is to bring the awareness to this level of pure intelligence, self-referral intelligence, self-referral consciousness—Transcendental Consciousness—and let the awareness be the lively embodiment of total knowledge—pure knowledge fully awake in its infinite organizing power—so that every state of consciousness is always lively in its infinite organizing power.

Education, therefore, is to bring the awareness from knowing anything else (object-referral consciousness) to knowing oneself (self-referral consciousness, subject referral consciousness). (110-111)

This redefinition of the process of education by both Plato and Maharishi, is consistent with the primacy of knowledge of pure consciousness. Pure consciousness is experienced through going within, through transcending from the field of becoming to the field of being, and this must therefore be the defining character of education.

Understanding the goal of education

Finally, the consciousness-based paradigm transforms our understanding of the purposes of education. As Lawrence Kohlberg writes:

The most important issue confronting educators and educational theorists is the choice of ends for the educational process. Without clear and rational educational goals, it becomes impossible to decide which educational programs achieve objectives of general import and which teach incidental facts and attitudes of dubious worth. (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1978: 123)

One can formulate educational goals in different ways, from individualistic or societal viewpoints, but there is one formulation that encompasses both: the full development of individual potential. As ey says, "Here individualism and socialism are at one. Only by being to the full growth of all the individuals who make it up, can society

by any chance be true to itself" (Dewey, 1980: 5).

Recognition of the existence of a field of pure consciousness and the ability to contact it transforms our understanding of the nature of human potential. The endpoint of human development is enlightenment—the state where human awareness is permanently open to pure consciousness. With this understanding, enlightenment becomes the highest goal of education (Maharishi, 1994).

And the ultimate state of enlightenment is unity consciousness. At this state of development, infinity is located at every point in creation, and every point in creation is raised to the infinite status of the Self. The entire cosmic life is realized to be nothing but the Self functioning from within itself. In unity consciousness, love is universal because everyone and everything is as dear to one as one's own Self (Maharishi, 1972). In this state, one gains mastery over Natural Law because it has its basis in pure consciousness, and thereby gains the ability to engage the basic intelligence of Nature to achieve one's ends. This state, for Maharishi (1994), is the "fruit of all knowledge," which he describes as "mistake-free life, fulfilling life, daily life in satisfaction and fulfillment—the natural ability to think and act in accordance with Natural Law so that one enjoys the full support of Natural Law" (115). In this state, one becomes a true master of life, not the victim of circumstances. Maharishi summarizes as follows:

Gaining the full support of Nature through development of the full creative potential of consciousness makes the student a master of his life. He spontaneously commands situations and circumstances; he spontaneously controls his environment; his behaviour is always spontaneously nourishing to himself and everyone around him. He has the ability to spontaneously fulfill his interests without jeopardizing the interests of others. (115)

This is the quality of life possible through the systematic experience of pure consciousness. On the individual level, it is the highest goal of education.

The goal of education can be looked at both from an individual level and a societal level, and as the quote from Dewey above suggests, the two are closely connected. The ability of education, through providing knowledge and experience of pure consciousness, to create enlightened individuals makes it possible also to conceive of an ideal society. It is not by chance that Plato's *Republic*, which is the first systematic western treatise explaining the nature and importance of pure consciousness, is also a systematic western treatise on the creation of utopia. The ability

edge of ultimate reality creates the possibility of a more perfect society. As Maharishi says: "A few fully educated or enlightened individuals are sufficient to give a new direction to the life of their community and by their very presence bring about an enlightened society, create and maintain world peace, and establish Heaven on Earth" (147). In his *Science of Being and Art of Living*, Maharishi presents this new potential for society in moving terms:

A new humanity will be born, fuller in conception and richer in experience and accomplishments in all fields. Joy of life will belong to every man, love will dominate human society, truth and virtue will reign in the world, peace on earth will be permanent, and all will live in fulfillment in fullness of life in [enlightenment]. (1963/1995: xiii)

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

It is important to conclude by emphasizing the great practicality of experience of pure consciousness for education. As discussed earlier, the goal of education most generally speaking is to promote human growth. As a means to this, and of central concern to educators everywhere, is the promotion of learning. It is failure in this area that has prompted so much concern among educators and the public in recent years. It is to address academic underperformance that efforts such as Goals 2000 have been devised. Experience of pure consciousness offers a key contribution to this effort.

Research has shown that up to 75% of educational outcomes are accounted for by the cognitive and affective characteristics (intelligence, creativity, motivation, self-confidence) that learners bring with themselves to the learning experience (Bloom, 1976). It is the learners themselves who are the most crucial element in the learning equation. Experience of pure consciousness through practice of the Transcendental Meditation technique is important in this regard because it promotes development of the cognitive qualities—such as intelligence, memory, alertness, and creativity—and affective qualities—such as self-concept and well-being—that enhance learning (Dillbeck and Dillbeck, 1987; see http://www.mum.edu/TM_Research/TM_Biblio/EducTM_ResSum.html for detailed research summary). (See earlier discussion "Holistic growth from experience of transcendence.")

As one would expect, therefore, when students begin practice of the Transcendental Meditation program, their academic performance improves. This has been reported in research done both at the collegiate and pre-collegiate level by researchers in North America, Europe, and Kember (1985) showed significant improvement relative to controls made point average in graduate students randomly assigned to begin

the Transcendental Meditation program. Similar improvements in academic performance at the undergraduate level were found in retrospective studies done by Collier (1973) and Heaton and Orme-Johnson (1974).

Similar changes have been seen at the pre-collegiate level. Kory and Hufnagel (1976), even with relatively small groups of students, found significant increases over just one semester in students at two of three high schools who learned the Transcendental Meditation technique. At a secondary school in India, where all 5,000 students learned the TM technique, academic performance on country-wide exams improved noticeably and more students began achieving national academic honors than in any other non-governmental school in India (Dillbeck & Dillbeck, 1987, p. 415). In an inner city school in the United States, performance of students in a 6th grade that had learned Transcendental Meditation improved markedly on the California Test of Basic Skills, compared to a previous administration and to other 6th grades in the city. Students at this school who practiced TM, said the following about their experience:

- "I have more energy in gym and I think better in my classes all day."
- "I am more into what I am doing."
- "I get energy the whole day."
- "I feel relaxed and ready to learn."
- "I feel more aware."
- "I felt very happy for the first time."
- "I feel like I can do anything at least better than I have."
- "I feel different. I feel smart."
- "I don't act up as much."

One student, in the week following TM instruction, reported getting a 94 on a test in his science class. He had failed every previous test in the class and attributed the change to practice of TM.

The most powerful demonstration of the efficacy of Consciousness-Based Education at the pre-collegiate level comes from the first Consciousness-Based primary and secondary school in the world, the Maharishi School of the Age of Enlightenment in Fairfield, Iowa. The Maharishi School, in which all students, faculty, and staff practice the Transcendental Meditation technique, has a liberal admissions policy and the standardized test scores of entering students are close to the national average. The achievements of this school, therefore, reflect the quality of its educational program. This is substantiated by research on new students, which indicates that students make significant gains relative to age norms—from 10 to 15%—on the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills and the Tests of Educational Development over the course of their first year at the Maharishi School (Nidich, Nidich, & Rainforth, 1986; Nidich

& Nidich, 1989). In addition, these researchers found that length of time practicing the TM technique correlated with overall academic achievement scores and added significantly to the prediction of academic achievement beyond that which could be accounted for by IQ scores alone (Nidich & Nidich, 1987). This again indicates that growth of consciousness is the key factor behind improved academic performance. General achievements include:

- Upper School classes consistently score in the 95th percentile or above in the nation on the Iowa Tests of Educational Development. In both of the last two years, 1995 and 1996, all Upper School classes, 9-12, scored in the 99th percentile on the ITED, both nationally and in Iowa.
- In seven of the last eight years, Maharishi School students have won at least one of the two first prizes in the state science and engineering fairs.
- In the last two years, individuals and groups from the school have won first places in state competitions in speech, *Odyssey of the Mind* (a competition in improvised creativity), spelling, the American Junior High School Mathematics Exam, the American High School Mathematics Exam, poetry and writing competitions, the Iowa History Fair, and many areas of artistic achievement.
- Over the past five years, 95% of the graduates of the Maharishi School have gone on to college.

The above findings, at both the collegiate and pre-collegiate level, indicate that giving students experience of pure consciousness is a direct means of increasing academic achievement.

Experience of pure consciousness not only improves the cognitive and affective factors related to learning, but also reduces alcohol and drug abuse. The abuse of alcohol, cigarettes, and non-prescribed drugs has become a serious concern among educators, whether for its effect on classroom learning, on social order, or for its effect on the overall development of the individual. With data indicating that drug use in the student population is increasing (National Education Goals Panel, 1995), this is a particularly important concern.

A number of published studies in the last 25 years indicate that experience of pure consciousness through practice of the Transcendental Meditation technique is highly effective in reducing substance abuse. In a recent meta-analysis involving all 19 research studies on Transcendental Meditation and substance abuse, TM was found to be more effective than any other treatment category for reducing different types of substance abuse: for alcohol, TM effects are 1.5 to 8 times larger than other treatments; for cigarettes, TM effects are from 2 to 5 times

larger; and, for illicit drugs, TM effects are 1.5 to 6 times larger. The

course. Whereas with standard treatments success rates generally fall off over time, effects of TM appear to increase or at least remain stable over time. The authors postulate that the Transcendental Meditation technique's unique success with decreasing substance abuse reflects its holistic effect on a constellation of factors—social, environmental, physiological, psychological, and spiritual—that influence addictive behavior (Alexander et al., 1994).

CONCLUSION

This paper began with a reference to Dewey and his perspective that the findings of science should be used to critique educational practices and point the way to more effective action. Dewey was concerned specifically with challenging traditional idealist perspectives that denied the importance of experience for gaining knowledge. This paper has showed that scientific findings now support the existence of an underlying transcendental field that can be experienced, what has been referred to as pure consciousness. The breakthrough that has made this possible is the existence of a simple, effortless technique—the Transcendental Meditation program—which has enabled literally millions of individuals around the world to experience pure consciousness. The existence of this technique along with the development of science has allowed systematic empirical investigation of the correlates and effects of experience of pure consciousness for the first time in history. With this empirical support to verify the personal experiences of so many people throughout the ages, it is now possible with increasing confidence to say that there is a field of pure consciousness that can be experienced.

The latter part of this paper has examined briefly the important implications of experience of pure consciousness for education. Research on the Transcendental Meditation technique has shown that experience of pure consciousness develops the cognitive and affective foundations for effective learning and also enhances academic success. More fundamentally, this paper has argued that existence of pure consciousness and the ability to experience it changes significantly the way we view key elements of education: knowledge, development, and goals. Because knowledge is relative to state of consciousness, full development of consciousness is necessary for full knowledge. For this reason, knowledge of pure consciousness, in both its experiential and intellectual dimensions, becomes the most important knowledge one can gain in education.

Understanding of pure consciousness also expands the contemporary understanding of mechanics of psychological development. Development occurs not only through maturation and interaction with environmental environment, but also through the process of transcending,

through experience of pure consciousness. The profound nature of growth promoted by experience of pure consciousness suggests that technologies for development of consciousness should be basic to all educational programs. Finally, the existence of pure consciousness and the ability to experience it changes our understanding of the goal of education. The goal of education should be to promote enlightenment, the state in which the experience of pure consciousness is stabilized permanently in the individual. This is the state of full human potential in which life is most full and meaningful, a life of maximum value to ourselves and others.

References

Acton, H. (1967, reprinted 1972). Idealism. *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. 4: 110-118. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. and The Free Press.

Alexander, C.N. & Langer, E. (1990). *Higher stages of adult development: Perspectives on adult growth*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Alexander, C.N., Rainforth, M.V., & Gelderloos, P. (1991). Transcendental Meditation, self-actualization, and psychological health: A conceptual overview and statistical meta-analysis. *Journal of Social Behavior and Personality* 6(5), 189-247.

Alexander, C.N., Swanson, G.C., Rainforth, M.V., Carlisle, T.W., Todd, C.C., & Oates, R.M. (1993). Effects of the Transcendental Meditation program on stress reduction, health, and employee development: A prospective study in two occupational settings. *Anxiety, Stress and Coping: An International Journal* 6:245-262.

Alexander, C.N., Robinson, P., & Rainforth, M. (1994). Treating and preventing alcohol, nicotine, and drug abuse through Transcendental Meditation: A review and statistical meta-analysis. *Alcoholism Treatment Quarterly* 11:219-336.

Anderson, J.R. (1980). *Cognitive psychology and its implications*. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.

Appelle, S. & Oswald, L.E. (1974) Simple reaction time as a function of alertness and prior mental activity. *Perceptual and Motor Skills* 38:1263-1268.

Bloom, B. (1976). *Human characteristics and school learning*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Bucke, R.M. (1901/1969). *Cosmic consciousness*. New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc.

Carpenter, E. (1921). *The art of creation: Essays on the self and its power* (5th ed.). London: George Allen & Unwin. (Original work published 1904)

Chandler, H.M. (1991). Transcendental Meditation and wakening wisdom: A 10-year longitudinal study of self-development. *Dissertation Abstracts International* 51:5048B.

Collier, R.W. (1976). The Effect of the Transcendental Meditation Program on Academic Attainment. In D. W. Orme-Johnson & J. T. Farrow (eds.), *Scientific research on the Transcendental Meditation program: Collected papers* (Vol. 1, pp. 393-395). Rheinweiler, W. Germany: Maharishi European Research University Press.

Cranson, R., Orme-Johnson, D.W., Gackenbach, J., Jones, C., & Alexander, C.N. (1991). Transcendental Meditation and improved performance on intelligence-related measures: A longitudinal study. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 12 : 1105-1117.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1990. *Flow: The psychology of optimal experience*, 1st ed. New York: Harper and Row.

J. 1988. *Dissertation Abstracts International*, 49, 2381A. (This research was first presented at the 85th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association

in 1989. The presentation was entitled "Alleviating political violence through enhancing coherence in collective consciousness: Impact assessment analyses of the Lebanon war."

1992. Assessing the impact of coherence creating groups on the Lebanon war. *Modern Science and Vedic Science*, 5, 138-149.

Derry, S.J. (1992). Beyond symbolic processing: Expanding horizons for educational psychology. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 84, 413-419.

Dewey, J. (1916/1966). *Democracy and education*. New York: Free Press.

—. 1929. *Experience and nature*. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company.

—. (1980). The school and social progress. In Boydston, J.A. *The School and Society*. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press.

Dillbeck, M.C. & Bronson, E.C. (1981). Short-term longitudinal effects of the Transcendental Meditation technique on EEG power and coherence. *International Journal of Neuroscience* 14:147-151.

Dillbeck, M.C., Orme-Johnson, D.W., & Wallace, R.K. (1981). Frontal EEG coherence, H-reflex recovery, concept learning, and the TM-Sidhi program. *International Journal of Neuroscience* 15:151-157.

Dillbeck, S.L. & Dillbeck, M.C. (1987). The Maharishi Technology of the Unified Field in education: Principles, practice, and research. *Modern Science and Vedic Science*, 1, 4, 383-431.

Eppley, K.R., Abrams, A.I., and Shear, J. (1989). Differential effects of relaxation techniques on trait anxiety: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Clinical Psychology* 45:957-974.

Gagne, E.D., Yekovich, C.W., & Yekovich, F.R. (1993). *The cognitive psychology of school learning* (2nd ed.). New York: Harper-Collins.

Gelderloos, P. (1987). Psychological health and development of students at Maharishi International University: A controlled longitudinal study. *Modern Science and Vedic Science*, 1, 471-487.

Goleman, D. 1995. *Emotional Intelligence*. New York: Bantam Books.

Heaton, D.P. & Orme-Johnson, D.W. (1976). The Transcendental Meditation Program and Academic Achievement. In D. W. Orme-Johnson & J. T. Farrow (eds.), *Scientific research on the Transcendental Meditation program: Collected papers* (Vol. 1, pp. 396-402). Rheinweiler, W. Germany: Maharishi European Research University Press.

Herron, R.E. (1993). The impact of Transcendental Meditation practice on medical expenditures. *Dissertation Abstracts International* 53(12): 4219A.

Holt, W.R., Caruso, J.L., & Riley, J.B. (1978). Transcendental Meditation vs. pseudo-meditation on visual choice reaction time. *Perceptual and Motor Skills* 46:726.

Huxley, A. (1945). *The perennial philosophy*. New York: Meridian Books.

Jonsson, C. (1975). Organizational development through the Transcendental meditation program: A study of relationships between the Transcendental Meditation program and certain efficiency criteria. Master's thesis, Department of Business Administration, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden.

Kember, P. (1985). The Transcendental Meditation technique and postgraduate academic performance. *British Journal of Educational Psychology* 55: 164-166.

King, B.J. & Chapin, K. 1974. *Billie Jean*. New York: Harper & Row.

Kohlberg, L. & Mayer, R. (1978). Development as the aim of education. *Harvard Educational Review*. Reprint No. 19.

Kory, R. & Hufnagel, P. (1976). The effect of the Science of Creative Intelligence course on high school students: A preliminary report. In D. W. Orme-Johnson & J. T. Farrow (eds.), *Scientific research on the Transcendental Meditation program: Collected papers* (Vol. 1, pp. 400-402). Rheinweiler, W. Germany: Maharishi European Research University Press.

Kozol, J. (1996). *Amazing grace: the lives of children and the conscience of a nation*. N.Y.: Crown Publishers.

Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. (1968/95). *Science of Being and art of living*. New York: Meridian Books.

_____. (1967/72). *Maharishi Mahesh Yogi on the Bhagavad-Gita: A new translation and commentary, chapters 1-6*. Baltimore: Penguin Books.

_____. (1972). *The Science of Creative Intelligence: knowledge and experience (Lessons 1-33)* [Syllabus of a videotaped course]. Los Angeles: Maharishi International University Press.

_____. (1977). *Creating an ideal society*. Rheinweiler, W. Germany: Maharishi European Research University Press.

_____. (1994). *Maharishi Vedic University: Introduction*. Holland: Maharishi Vedic University Press. This book has been republished under the title *Vedic knowledge for everyone*.

Mason, L., Alexander, C., Travis, F., Marsh, G., Orme-Johnson, D., Gackenbach, J., Mason, D., Rainforth, M., Walton, K. (1997). Electrophysiological correlates of higher states of consciousness during sleep in long-term practitioners of the Transcendental Meditation program. *Sleep* 20(2):102-110.

Mason, L.I. (1995). *Electrophysiological correlates of higher states of consciousness during sleep*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Dissertation Information Service.

National Education Goals Panel. 1995. *The National Education Goals Report executive summary*. Washington, D.C.

Nidich, S. & Nidich, R. (1987). Holistic student development at Maharishi School of the Age of Enlightenment: Theory and research. *Modern Science and Vedic Science*, 1, 4, 432-468.

_____. (1989). "Increased academic achievement at Maharishi School of the Age of Enlightenment: A replication study," *Education* 109:302-304

Nidich, S., Nidich, R. & Rainforth, M. (1986). "School effectiveness: Achievement gains at the Maharishi School of the Age of Enlightenment," *Education* 107: 49-54.

Orme-Johnson, D.W. (1987). Medical care utilization and the Transcendental Meditation program. *Psychosomatic Medicine* 49:493-507.

_____. (1992). "Theory and research on conflict resolution through the Maharishi Effect." *Modern Science and Vedic Science* 5: 76-98.

Orme-Johnson, D. W. & Haynes, C.T. (1981). EEG phase coherence, pure consciousness, creativity, and TM-Sidhi experiences. *International Journal of Neuroscience* 13: 211-217.

Orme-Johnson, D.W., Alexander, C.N., Davies, J.L., Chandler, H.M., and Larimore, W.E. (1988). International peace project in the Middle East: The effect of the Maharishi Technology of the Unified Field. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32(4): 776-812.

Plato. (1982). *The republic of Plato* (translated by F.M. Cornford). New York: Oxford University Press.

Searle, J. (1995). The mystery of consciousness. *The New York Review of Books*. 17:60-66.

Seeman, W., Nidich, S., & Banta, T. Influence of Transcendental Meditation on a measure of self-actualization. *Journal of Counseling Psychology* 19:184-187.

So, K.T. (1995). *Testing and developing holistic intelligence in Chinese culture with Maharishi Vedic Psychology: Three experimental replications using Transcendental Meditation*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Dissertation Information Service.

Tennyson, H. (1899). *Alfred Lord Tennyson: A memoir by his son* (new ed.). London: Macmillan.

E, F. (1979). The TM technique and creativity: A longitudinal study of Cornell University undergraduates. *The Journal of Creative Behavior* 13: 169-180.

Travis, F. & Wallace, R.K. (1997). Autonomic patterns during respiratory suspensions: Possible markers of transcendental consciousness. *Psychophysiology*. 34: 39-46.

Wallace, R.K. (1970). Physiological effects of Transcendental Meditation. *Science*. 167:1751-1754.

Wallace, R.K. & Benson, H. (1972). The physiology of meditation. *Scientific American*. 226:84-90.

SM Consciousness-Based is a service mark of Maharishi Foundation, Ltd. and is used under license.

® Transcendental Meditation and TM-Sidhi are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office as service marks of Maharishi Foundation, Ltd. and are used under license.

A NIETZSCHEAN CRITIQUE OF POSTMODERN EDUCATIONAL THEORY

DON G. SMITH

Eastern Illinois University

Postmodernism, we are told, is upon us—or we within it. But what is postmodernism? It is many things and nothing. As soon as critics get it in the sights of their analytical rifles, postmodernism shifts shapes or vanishes into the air like Shakespeare's hags in Macbeth. Those hoping to challenge the assumptions and conclusions of postmodernism would possibly best be served by calling Ghostbusters than by summoning forth reason, evidence, and common sense. As daunting as the task may seem, I am nevertheless prepared to launch a Nietzschean critique of postmodernism. Because it most closely resembles postmodernism in relation to educational philosophy, I arbitrarily accept the following definition of postmodernism: "a philosophical movement that seeks to expose the internal contradictions of metanarratives by deconstructing modern notions of truth, language, knowledge, and power."¹ I choose Nietzsche to unmask postmodernism's inconsistencies because many postmodernists themselves praise Nietzsche as one of their own. Still, while Nietzsche may have errored in his thinking, he never errored seriously enough as to be a postmodernist. He was not a postmodernist, and, more to the point of this paper, he would have looked with dis-
in upon most postmodern educational theories.

mon strand seems to be the wholesale rejection of metanarratives. One cannot be a postmodernist and embrace a metanarrative, whether it be philosophical, psychological, sociological, religious, or otherwise. In postmodernism there are no privileged positions from which to criticize and evaluate correctly everything else. While Nietzsche is a forerunner of certain postmodern attitudes, he cannot be a postmodernist because he accepts a theory that explains the cause of all human behavior—the will to power. To quote Nietzsche, "Life is will to power."² In humans, the will to power exhibits itself as "man's will to overwhelm, outdo, excel, and overpower his neighbor."³ It exhibits itself on the grand scale as nations overpowering other nations, and on the small scale as individuals overcoming themselves. In what I consider to be the best critique ever done on Nietzsche, Tracy Strong argues that Nietzsche's will to power also entails "giving one's particular form to that which is encountered."⁴ It is this form of the will to power that produces metanarratives in the first place. Nietzsche therefore concludes that all metanarratives are subjective and relative. From the standpoint of Nietzschean perspectivism, there are no facts, only interpretations. Ironically, Nietzsche uses the will to power, which he presents as an objective, absolute metanarrative, to cast doubt upon the validity of all metanarratives. This problem allows both proponents and opponents of Nietzsche as postmodernist to make a case for their position.⁵ Yet, I find it difficult to argue that Nietzsche considered his particular metanarrative as useless as all the rest as an explanation of human behavior. He clearly thought otherwise.

While I have given reasons for Nietzsche's not being a postmodernist, it is not my purpose here to mount defenses against those who would disagree. Instead, I will now consider why Nietzsche would have disdained most postmodern educational theories. The reason, simply stated, is that Nietzsche disdained "resentment," the reaction of the weak against the strong. As Robert C. Solomon writes, "he [Nietzsche] argues extensively that 'moral' principles, whether conceived in terms of their historical origins, their justification and sanction, or their logical form, are also expressions of the will to power, even when they explicitly disclaim any desires for power."⁶ Both postmodernism in general and postmodern educational theory in particular are the late twentieth century's best examples of what Nietzsche identifies as resentment.

Let us now examine the positions of some leading postmodern educational theorists and see why Nietzsche would denounce them. Before beginning, however, we must understand that just as postmodernism itself is largely undefinable and indescribable, so is postmodern educational theory. As Patrick Slattery writes in *Curriculum Development in the Modern Era*, "Postmodernism challenges educators to explore a world that envisions schooling through a different lens of indeter-

minancy, aesthetics, autobiography, intuition, eclecticism, and mystery."⁷ Since there is nothing coherent at which to aim in criticizing postmodern educational theory, I will employ a Nietzschean critique to criticize key principles of some of the most visible proponents of postmodern educational theory, namely Henry Giroux and Stanley Aronowitz.

Giroux and Aronowitz ask that the curriculum include marginal knowledge and discourses of difference based on gender, race, ethnic, and class identities. These marginal voices are equal or superior to the traditional canons. When postmodernists address traditional knowledge, they deconstruct it to see how it elevates some segments of society to power and affluence while stratifying others in poverty and powerlessness. Giroux argues that the basic function of education is to engage students in social discourse that helps them reject needless human suffering and exploitation. Students, he says, must develop identities that help them struggle against inequality and that expand human rights. In *Border Crossings*, for example, Giroux writes that alternative critiques, such as those of the feminists, help us understand the causes of oppression and head us in the direction of extended human freedom and social responsibility, a direction he obviously favors.

So what would Nietzsche make of this? First, I believe, he would accuse the marginalized and their cheerleaders as seething with resentment. They lack power, and like all creatures, they want power. They are weak, and as such they cannot compete with the strong on the terms of the strong. To gain power they must discredit Western culture and the ideals upon which it is based, making a virtue of powerlessness and weakness just as did Christianity, the religion of slaves. Pity the poor marginalized victims of male chauvinist, homophobic, patriarchal, white Anglo-Saxon Protestant Western culture! The culture of poverty and dependence, Giroux tells us, is equal or superior to that of the strong and self-sufficient. If I might translate: students and teachers are to discuss why marginalized people are poor and powerless through no fault of their own and why knowledge structures, not individual lack of initiative, makes marginal groups poor and powerless and keeps them that way. The implication is that deconstruction raises consciousness and empowers. Empowerment of marginalized groups leads to social, political, and economic change. All of this is obviously no more than a thinly disguised reconstructionism with all its talk of hegemony and false consciousness. What we are talking about here is postmodern educational theorists attempting to wrest power from the status quo and empower the marginalized through the means of schooling. Postmodern educational theorists are seeking power while explicitly disclaiming any desire for power. Their energy is the fuel Nietzsche terms "resentment."

Further, Nietzsche, who argued against privileged perspectives,

would question from what privileged perspective postmodern educational theorists judge human suffering, inequality, and exploitation as negative. Nietzsche, incidentally, saw all three as positive. Certainly postmodernists and postmodern educational theorists claim to agree that there are no privileged perspectives. Do they not then have to admit, as Nietzsche would insist, that postmodern educational theory is merely an expression of marginalized people's will to power? Though Nietzsche considered master and slave morality equal, he would certainly condemn any capitulation on the part of the strong to this self-righteous threat to their power. Such a capitulation Nietzsche would label "decadence," the sorry response of a people who no longer deserve the power and privilege they have earned, the fall of a culture or segment of a culture suffering from nihilism.

Patrick Slattery writes that Coretta Scott King echoes the Giroux/Aronowitz postmodern philosophy of curriculum development, and he summarizes her position as follows: "A holistic perspective is essential for the emergence of compassion, optimal learning environments, nonviolent conflict resolution, just relationships, and ecological sustainability."⁸ First, from what privileged perspective does postmodernism argue that holism is superior to non-holism. Since there are no privileged perspectives, they logically cannot. They do so simply because a holistic approach is more amenable to their reconstructionist/postmodernist political agenda. In other words, holism allows the proverbial camel's nose of radical relativism and egalitarianism under the tent of rational discrimination. Further, from what privileged perspective do postmodernists elevate compassion over lack of compassion, nonviolence over violence, etc.? Since there are no privileged perspectives, they logically cannot.

Of course, one postmodernists ruse is to discount logic as an arbitrator of disputes. Nietzsche is ambiguous on this point. He often ignores the law of non-contradiction. He also clearly believes that truth lies beyond reason. Yet he also believes that truth is revealed on the road of reason. He finds truth without reason monstrous. Aside from how Nietzsche viewed logic and reason, today's postmodernists assert that logic is modern, and we are now postmodern. There are no arbitrators of disputes anymore, so all arguments and all voices are equal. There is no basis for defensible discrimination. Still, postmodernists find ways to discriminate against traditional Western culture. What is their criteria? Perhaps they discriminate on the basis of intuition, or autobiography, or eclecticism, or mystery!

Closely allied with their banishment of logic is the postmodernists' reliance on the indeterminacy of language. True statements can only be thought or said if language itself is indeterminate. There

can therefore be no true perspectives, only perspectives. This conclusion underlies the postmodern educational theorists' insistence that all voices should be equal in the classroom marketplace—all world views equal, all perspectives equal—except for the perspectives of male chauvinist, homophobic, patriarchal, white Anglo Saxon Protestant males. These perspectives, postmodernists claim, are clearly less desirable than those touted by postmodernists. Or, as George Orwell might put it, all perspectives are equal, but the liberal egalitarian perspectives of postmodernism are more equal. Only in a world devoid of logic and determinate language could such conclusions be taken seriously.

Though he was a philologist, Nietzsche agrees that language is indeterminate. It is also a vehicle for self-deception and myth making. That is why Giroux and Aronowitz can, with some Nietzschean justification, assert the equality of all perspectives. If all language is indeterminate, then all explanations are relative. Why not open the classroom to all "voices?" But all explanations are expressed in language—even those of the postmodernists. That is why Nietzsche insisted on the necessity of "horizons," culturally created boundaries that allow people some epistemological and axiological moorings. The absence of such boundaries leads to cultural decay and nihilism. The postmodern deconstruction of Western culture is an attempt to erase the current boundaries and replace them with . . . what? Here Nietzsche would again part company with Giroux and Aronowitz. Deconstruction destroys; it does not build. The hitherto marginalized and powerless are not likely to create great new boundaries for the sustainance of culture. Perhaps it is an encroaching nihilism in Western culture itself, a growing lack of self-confidence as the twentieth century ends, that has allowed postmodernists to make the inroads they have. Perhaps postmodernists have sensed a lack of confidence in Western culture and are taking Nietzsche's advice that when one sees something falling, one should give it a push.

This brings us to the crossroads and conclusion of our investigation. Claiming a debt to Nietzsche, postmodern educational theorists call for curriculum reform that challenges, diminishes and in many ways denies the very metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological foundations of Western culture. As Nietzsche would have pointed out, however, postmodern educational theorists are either naive or hypocritical. If they wish to claim some values superior to others while at the same time rejecting all criteria by which to make such judgments, then they are naive and confused. If they recognize postmodern educational theory as merely the expression of their own will to power and yet persist in touting their motives as virtuous while criticizing proponents of Western culture as hegemonic, then they are hypocritical. Either way, we should judge postmodernism and postmodern educational theory. If we judge

the postmodernists naive and confused, we can only try to teach them through recourse to language and reason, both of which postmodernists unfortunately reject as indeterminate. As Mortimer Adler once counselled, if in a dispute with a person who rejects reason as an arbitrator of disputes, the wise person should simply cease discourse, turn, and walk away. On the other hand, if postmodernists are hypocritically pushing their ideas in an effort to conquer Western civilization without firing a shot, then Western civilization is justified in defending itself (if it still has the will) by deconstructing the deconstructionists as I have done in this paper, or in using any amount of morally justifiable power in self-defense. From that perspective, we are engaged in a real "culture war," and postmodernists should not be the only ones aware of the stakes.

Endnotes

1. Patrick Slattery (1995) Curriculum Development in the Postmodern Era. New York, Garland Publishing, p.15.
2. Friedrich Nietzsche (1968) *The Will to Power*. New York, Vintage Books, p. 148.
3. Walter Kauffman, "The Discovery of the Will to Power" in Robert Solomon, ed. (1973) *Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays*, New York, Doubleday Anchor, p. 230.
4. Tracy Strong (1988) *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration*, Berkeley, University of California Press, p. 234.
5. For essays arguing both sides of the issue, see Clayton Koelb, ed. (1990) *Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Con*, Albany, State University of New York Press.
6. Robert Solomon, "Nietzsche, Nihilism, and Morality," in Robert Solomon, ed. (1973) *Nietzsche: a Collection of Critical Essays*, New York, Doubleday Anchor, p. 215. See also Robert Solomon, "Nietzsche, Postmodernism, and Resentment," in Clayton Koelb, ed. (1990) *Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Con*, Albany, State University of New York Press, pp. 267-298.
7. Slattery, p. 23.
8. Ibid, p. 171.

POST-MODERNISM: A PHASE OF DEVELOPMENT

KENNETH SUTTON
Eastern Illinois University

"Post-Modernism" is a designation that is sometimes used loosely. I will begin by explaining my use of the term in this paper, and will use this process to locate the part of the perspective I wish to treat.

The critical task of post-modernists is the unmasking of cultural and gender biases of various structures we propose and seek to advance. This sets the stage for deconstruction of these structures in terms of alternative perspectives. This work has been largely directed toward the proposals of dominating cultures and genders; but, technically, all structures have biases to be uncovered and may be "fair game" for deconstruction.

When applied to educational processes Post-Modernism amounts to advocating and promoting "level playing fields" for different cultural and gender perspectives in the classroom or other educational setting. These perspectives are to critique, transform and enrich each other.

In both of its modes Post-Modernism, as Ozmon and Craver put it: ". . . celebrates an iconoclastic outlook that breaks with claims of universality, and . . . rejects . . . objective certainty that seeks to end discussion and debate" (Ozmon and Craver, 1995: 363). During an interview in which his famous idea of "differance" was being discussed Derrida stressed the richness of meaning that always permits

metaphysical claims to be "deferred" to another possible perspective, or, as he put it, in ". . . another past or future element in the economy of traces" (Derrida, 1981: 29). Doll, similarly kept openendedness in his view of a post-modern curriculum. He redefined "rigor" so as ". . . not to close too early or finally on the rightness of an idea, . . ." and so as to ". . . throw all ideas into combination." It was to involve "mixing" that has both an "indeterminacy" and ongoing "interpretation" (Doll, 1993: 182). In sum, post-modernists are hesitant, even loathe, to make any values general or universal. This presumably even includes the intercultural tolerance and appreciation they seem to advocate. As one of my post-modernist colleagues once said: "I don't want to get transcendental with all of this!"

This clinging to Relativism is the part of Post-Modernism I wish to address in this paper. I share the belief that broadening effects of interacting cultural and gender orientations are profoundly beneficial. However, I have noticed that especially those post-modernists who have made recommendations for education have sometimes encountered problems with their relativism. There has even been one notable occasion where a leader in the movement has written as though there is some general principle, or structure beneath what he would have educators do. As far as I am concerned this "slip" was a good thing. By more intensely celebrating diversity it put the philosophy even higher into the stage of intercultural perspective than it could be if it maintained its relativism. Being principal based, it would also escape the moral problems of ethical relativism and extend educational possibilities beyond a kind of interpretivism which is too confined to the cultural and gender richness of available participants.

First, I will tip my hat to the philosophy I once maintained. Listening to different cultural and gender voices is better than hearing only one voice in many respects. Not only will we all learn to treat each other better if this is done well, we will be better served toward the end of our lives when changes become necessary and we need options. Clark and Anderson showed that older people who are more ready to ". . . drop their pursuits of primary values . . . and go on to pick up, as workable substitutes, the alternative values which have been around all along, . . ." remain more healthy than older people with no acceptable alternatives. (An example of a necessary value change is a switch from a value of independence to a value of interdependence brought on by failing physical ability) (Clark and Anderson, 1967: 469). Fry recently confirmed the conclusions of Clark and Anderson, noting that ". . . mental health can be affected by adherence to certain values in the face of . . . in old age" (Frey, 1988: 462). Such value flexibility would seem to people to have previously entertained alternative perspec-

tives—a process advocated by post-modernists, among others. Literally in the long run perspective variety and flexibility is a praiseworthy quest.

While Post-Modernism promotes important activities along lines of broadening the options available to all of us, its Relativism is problematic to the point of even bothering some of its leading advocates. When writing about the importance of removing theory as the exclusive property of educators and also letting those they teach theorize, Giroux offered the following qualification: "This is not meant to suggest that all theories should be given equal weight—such a view is a form of relativistic nonsense." He only wanted to have ". . . the human subject . . . reintroduced into the process of theorizing, . . ." but all theories, nevertheless, would be subject to critical treatment (Giroux, 1983: 240).

There has also been strong suggestion of values that are more than relative—values that support the flexibility and multiculturalism of the whole process. Doll, when expressing the importance of community to develop to replace authority imposed from the top, insisted that this community be "caring and critical" (emphasis his). He advocated a mutual critique by people who care for each other (Doll, 1983, 168). It seems to me there is an underlying ethic in this. Giroux even went further in this direction. When he was dealing with the risks and abuse in the lives of radical educators he suggested that they could take comfort, when persecuted, in the fact that what they did was rooted in "ethical principle" (Giroux, 1983: 242). If this isn't saying intercultural tolerance and appreciation is a generally relevant imperative it is only a hair's breadth away from saying it.

One reason post-modernists sometimes get close to the boundary between Relativism and Absolutism, or even cross it, is that Relativism is hard to maintain. Our thought and language are not kind to it. If a person says "Everything is relative," then a universal claim is made. Sometimes Absolutism can be shoved to another place; but it doesn't disappear. Harris, for instance, was able to rather easily attack Quine's Relativism at the point where he suggested that a revision of the Law of Excluded Middle might simplify quantum mechanics. Harris noted that such a move could do no more than cause the ". . . omitted law to appear in another place. . . . Quantum theory must either force a revision of the Law of Excluded Middle or not force a revision of the Law of Excluded Middle." The law would at least still have to be used on "the meta-linguistic level" (Harris, 1992: 40). Even if a person decided, as Zen Buddhists seem to have done, that language itself is problematic, an ontological Absolutism gets substituted. One is the truth, even if it can't be known or communicated.

Another reason post-modernists get dangerously close to Absolutism at their Relativity developmentally drives them in that direction.

They share, after all, the study of culture and philosophy that often fosters broad appreciation.

Anthropologists deliberately plunge into other cultures to do their jobs. Wax described what happens to them: "Obtaining . . . the understanding of the insider is . . . only a first step. They expect . . . to become capable of thinking and acting within the perspectives of two quite different groups." She held that this experience makes anthropologists "peripheral" to both a culture being examined and their own cultures. In the latter case they move beyond their cultural borders to the extent of being forced to shed commitments to values they once blindly accepted. They realize that these culture-bound values are relative (Wax, 1971: 1,2).

The study of philosophy has a similar effect, because we may well be able to regard it as the study of culture made overt and argued (not that some philosophy couldn't be intercultural). Students of philosophy must get inside powerfully developed cultures with "bite," or arguments. A frequent result is the ability to admire perspectives other than their own. And, of course, just knowing that sharply different perspectives are still around and being advanced skillfully leads them to suppose that some aspects of philosophy are relative.

However, when study of culture and philosophy reveals relativity, in the accompanying broadening of appreciation there is a paradoxical closeness of absolute values. These are not found in single cultures considered alone, but rather in the comparison and interaction between cultures—the very place where post-modern education takes its participants.

Conflicts between cultures raise moral questions. What, for instance, should be an educator's role in a place where violent ethnic cleansing is taking place? Is one culture, in this instance, as good as another? Should both be served equally? The Relativist is already able to broadly tolerate different cultures, and is most probably leaning toward favoring and trying to build tolerance and appreciation between groups. This is only one short step away from projecting mutual tolerance and appreciation between cultures as an imperative value.

Kramer and Kahlbaugh have theorized that we have a developmental need to overcome both uncritical Absolutism and Relativism; and their research along these lines has been successful so far. In early adulthood, they noted that ". . . one comes to question whether objective knowledge is indeed possible." Later on, however, dialectical investigations allow ". . . for integration of the seemingly disparate assumptions inherent in absolute and relativistic thinking." They called the psychological "trigger" for this change an "existential dilemma," meaning by we come to a point where we feel unable to commit to anything,

and this inability is unbearable. In their study they found that older adults are more receptive to dialectical processes than younger adults precisely because some of the general answers rising from them help them out of their unbearable state of relativity (Kramer and Kahlbaugh, 1995: 15).

Descartes' famous experiment in doubt is somewhat similar to what I believe ought to happen to post-modernists. By the very act of doubting he confirmed thought as an undoubtable aspect of his being. By multiple perspective critiques post-modernists have broadened tolerance and appreciation. They should come clean and admit to having struck something solid—to having a structure beneath what they do.

This would not destroy dialogue. No one at this conference could imagine that she or he is able to do this. On the contrary, it would celebrate diversity and flexibility more deliberately.

For instance, proposals for a post-modern curriculum and pedagogy so far have done nothing much beyond suggesting that the different perspectives of given communities of learners should critically interact with broadening transformations taking place. Perhaps the hesitancy to deal very much with instructors introducing perspectives not present in the setting stems from a fear of imposing something—even as an enrichment of the possible dialogue.

In rural, downstate Illinois, where I have lived for several years, this Interpretist-like limitation has obvious disadvantages in its ability to offer options to students. In some schools the only perspective differences are gender and social class. While these are significant, the possibilities are not so rich as they would be elsewhere.

The making of tolerance and appreciation a value to be mutually maintained by those with differing life programs would embolden educators in such areas—would give them a definite purpose. This would permit enriching studies to be imposed. People in rural areas live in a broader world, and they, like all of us, have need of gathering options to better help them meet challenges through life. Something more relative may be more comfortable, but will not serve them as well.

Post-modernists have occasionally come close to revealing a structure. It seems clear that being on an intercultural level is preferable to being on a cultural or precultural one. It seems there are imperative and mutual values of tolerance and appreciation behind what they are advocating and doing. These need to be stated and stand for critique. I believe their application will enhance the quality of life during all of life.

Bibliography

Clark, Margaret & Anderson, Barbara Gallatin. Culture and Aging: An Anthropological Study of Older Americans. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1967.

Derrida, Jacques. Positions. Alan Bass, Trans. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981.

Doll, William E. Jr. A Post-Modern Perspective on Curriculum. New York: Teachers College Press, 1993.

Frey, Christine L. "Theories of Age and Culture" in James E. Birron & Vern L. Bengtson, Eds. Theories of Aging. New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1988. 447-472.

Giroux, Henry A. Theory and Resistance in Education. South Hadley, Massachusetts: Bergin & Garvey Publishers, Inc., 1983.

Harris, James F. Against Relativism. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1992.

Kramer, Deirdre & Kahlbaugh, Patricia E. "Memory For a Dialectical and a Non-dialectical Prose Passage in Young and Older Adults." Journal of Adult Development. 1: 1, 1995, 13-26.

Ozmon, Howard A. & Craver, Samuel M. Philosophical Foundations of Education. 5th Ed. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1995.

Wax, Rosalie H. Doing Fieldwork: Warning and Advice. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971.

HERMENEUTICS: EAST MEETS WEST? INTERPRETATION OF WHAT? AND/OR HOW TO BE AWAKE AT A PHILOSOPHY MEETING

ROBERT CRAIG
University of Houston

1. Interpreted experience is unavailable to us. In fact, it is a contradiction in terms.

2. Human experience, that is, history, is NOT an objective succession of happenings in the world. Such happenings become history, that is, experience, only when they enter the sphere of human interpretation. Thus, we call language, in a broad sense, logos/mythos.

3. According to Campbell, mythic language has to do with "a transformation of consciousness, You have been thinking one way, you now have to think a different way" (Campbell, 1988: 124). Eliade notes that one integral aspect of this "transformation of consciousness" is incorporated in interpretations of origins (Elide, 1961).

Mythic thinking often traces the origin of things to supernatural time, sometimes called "strong time" by mythologists (Hitchcock, 1991). Supernatural ancestral beings are also integral to the interpretation of the origin myth. The order of the social and natural worlds is explained by showing how these worlds relate to "strong time" and to the divine beings that inhabit that time. The mythic id, then, is unhistorical. The only significant change for humans is the fall from "strong time" into daily time.

4. Logos, from which our word logic is derived, refers to human rational powers and understanding. But, the distinction between these two interpretative modes, mythos and logos, is problematic. Carl Jung, for instance, has argued that logos is simply our modern, Western way of mythmaking and in some respects is inferior to other forms of mythos (Jung, 1989). Robert Pirsig argues this way when he writes:

The mythos-over-logos argument states that our rationality is shaped by these legends, that our knowledge today is in relation to these legends as a tree is in relation to the little shrub it once was. One can gain great insight into the complex overall structure of the tree by studying the much simpler shape of the shrub. There is no difference in kind or even difference in identity, only a difference in size . . . Mythos is the huge body of common knowledge that unites our minds as cells are united in the body of man. To feel that one is not so united, that one can accept or discard this mythos as one pleases, is not to understand what this mythos is (Pirsig, 1975: 315-316).

Thus, a hermeneutic of logos is dependent on and interrelated to a hermeneutic of mythos.

5. Another problem with the mythos/logos distinction is that even if one accepts it as delineating the difference between myth and rational thought, which itself is a spurious distinction, it still cannot be used to distinguish between philosophy and other forms of rational thought, such as science. As Rorty points out, there are many philosophical questions, indeed those speculative questions which define philosophy, that by their very nature cannot be made experimental, especially questions having to do with values (Rorty, 1982).

Likewise, philosophical questions arise within science. What counts as the confirmation of a theory? And, by what criteria do we determine that something is "fundamental" in particle physics? These are but two examples of any attempt to eliminate mythos from our hermeneutic.

6. We know only what we interpret & there is no way out of this predicament, this hermeneutical circle, for humans ESSENTIALLY are the act of making sense.

7. We can't peek over interpretations to see things or happenings in the "raw." How do we "peek over," say, into a student's intention? ^h concepts, models, paradigms—interpretative devices, all.

8. We can't peek over interpretations anymore than we can step outside (even if the weather is sunny, beautiful, inviting—a series of interpretative prisons) our logos/mythos & see the world, reality, as it really is (What does "really" add to "is," like what does "absolutely" add to "certain") without "us."

9. When we look back at Socrates (Who refused to interpret; he never wrote a word. At least Jesus wrote something in the sand. And, both have been interpreted, as they must, ever since) we see not pristine, untouched events, but only someone else's interpretation; human experiences articulated in human form.

10. Caught as we are in our interpretations, the philosophical (human, spiritual) task is to "uncover," as Heidegger put it, Plato's interpretation of Socrates, both before & after he died, & then to interpret that interpretation (Heidegger, 1977).

11. If we wish to "understand," that is, to stand under, Socrates or Aquinas or Descartes or Dewey or Rand, etc. etc. etc., we must initially (Is that all?) stay within their texts' "rhetorical boundaries." It is devastating to try to look over the edges for meaning, purpose, intent, & so on. Or, at least, this is not the task of philosophy.

12. That is, we must perform (like a surgeon who, when she cuts, performs an act of compassion) a "phenomenological epoché," a provisional suspension of truth/falsity—all that "sick" dualistic, judgmental stuff.

13. Our purpose in performing this suspension, obviously, is to find out what the philosopher is saying, before we examine the questions of where it came from, what it means, & whether it is true. Of course, complete suspension, like hanging over a cliff by a branch, is programmed to fail. That is, it can't be done for too long. Some people, Buddhists, for instance, would argue that it can't be done at all (Suzuki, 1960).

14. Yet if we try, hopefully we discover that the text, story, narrative, etc., its "rhetorical force," is directed entirely to you & me. It confronts us; invites us to get inside, an important "sex-act." That is, to make it yours, as far as this is humanly possible.

15. We can, though, if we really want to, if we desire to deal with the interpretative indigestion: either by deconstruction and/or recon-

struction.

16. Option one would be to attempt to go behind the narrative (actually an act of rape or at least an invasive procedure. But, isn't ALL philosophical analysis THIS?), namely, to demythologize or deconstruct the narrative & search for historical, ideological, political, theological, economic, psychological, etc.etc. etc. events that give rise (but don't determine) it in the first place. The author could have gone somewhere else. The frozen bread I buy in the mega/super/market didn't rise the other day.

17. Option two is revisionist, reconstructive. This, too, steps outside the original narrative, but this time not in the backward direction of the historical past, which is even yesterday, or the moment from the moment I type this. The movement is forward in the direction of the philosophical future (literary, ideological, historical, etc. future also. But this is not philosophy, I don't think).

18. Let's use Descartes (however crudely) as an example. The revisionist, reconstructive emphasis consists of changing future versions of the narrative to emphasize something else. With Descartes' texts, to emphasize the knowability of matter (behaviorist, materialism, etc.) & to de-emphasize ego-knowledge (that is, Descartes' narrative, however improperly "understood").

19. A third option—one I've been fooling around with—is to live within logos/mythos. That is, to not step outside the narrative, but to remain within it to allow it to speak to me in the way it spoke to Descartes, or at least to his contemporaries.

20. Is 19 possible? All concepts, thoughts, images, words, & so on are interpretations that require further interpretation(s)—& so on ad infinitum. Is 19 possible?

21. In all our efforts of "understanding," really standing under, anything, the point is to "see" the inevitability of interpretation. So, Jesus says that unless we become LIKE, underline the LIKE, little children we can't enter the kingdom. That is, our interpretative scheme is keeping us at the edge we tried all our lives not to be on.

22. In other words (thus a differing interpretation & rhetorical "see" what makes us human is our inexorable finitude, which is & liberates us to being acts of indirection & mediation, where

all is "hints & guesses/hints followed by guesses" (Eliot, 1969: 190).

23. Let's follow this "hint." Instead of the term "hermeneutic," let's use "nowhere." Someone told me that the terms "nowhere" & "now here" are synonymous. And "nowhere" is where we usually don't want to be, that is, in the present moment, because it feels like nowhere. Yet, all your interpretations happen in the now. In fact, all that has happened to you in your entire life has happened in the now. & that's the one place we don't want to be in.

24. Jung speculated that intuitives want to run to the future, to the place of possibilities; while sensates want to run back to the past, to a place of no possibility (Jung, 1989). The present moment is terrifying. I know. I've been there. There are no interpretations. Text, narrative, story—unfolding, mutually arising—but no interpretation. Thus, the present moment is empty. Empty of what? Empty of interpretations, that is, empty of separateness.

25. If that's true, then logos is logos/mythos & mythos is mythos/logos. If that's true, then the question is to get outside the mind. We are no longer in philosophical terrain. But, I live in the mind. I'm a professional philosopher. I get paid—money. The mind is a great place to hide, to go on vacation. Living in the mind leads to a pseudo sense of control. The great (an interpretation, judgement) spiritual traditions teach one how to go beyond the mind, not to cling to it. Not to abandon it, of course, for concepts, so I'm told, lead to progress. The idea is not to take our ideas & concepts too seriously—even what I am now writing.

26. It's not a matter of having the right interpretation, nor of even being for the right cause, but coming from the right place, the right energy. A lot of people don't know who they are, don't know how to interpret without their thoughts and/or feelings. Descartes: "I think, therefore, I am." No. We want to get to the non-interpretative "I am," the naked "I am," before we thought anything true/false, good/bad.

27. As Plato observed, when you really get attached to your thoughts, your interpretations, they're called opinions. Now we enter into politics. Opinions are more troublesome than thoughts—the need now is to have your own group, to win, to be right. We end up on a stage of ideological hysteria, shouting slogans & ridiculing each other.

28. The above is not logical. Everything belongs; is interrelated. No interpretation because no separation. No rape. No "sex-act," even. We

need to be secure enough to be insecure; to have fallen into enough nets (read interpretations) that you fall into a net you can't fall out of. You don't have to hold or defend or push anymore. You know you are ALREADY held, ALREADY named, so you don't have to name yourself.

29. It's important to "understand," that is, to look deeply. You can't "understand" when you're interpreting, when you're approving or disapproving—judging. Looking deeply at what is, with all its brokenness & sadness & joy & sweetness.

30. So, we need to develop a practice, a discipline, something that does not feed the mind/emotions. There needs to be room for the not-me; room for holy, wholly other. Always, to go to the place of no-interpretation, of mystery, darkness, & emptiness is to taste "wormwood." The first angels you see are not gracious angels. They are you (and me). They show you your-self. Exactly what no one, or hardly no one, wants to know.

31. When you no longer need to please others, to win approval, to succeed, all those interpretative prisons, when you stand in the naked place, "when you build the bridge with no house on it," you are holding opposites together. (Niels Bohr in speaking of science reportedly said: "A great truth is a truth whose opposite is also a great truth"). This is the state of non-duality. There is some truth here & here & here & even here.

32. Interpretation was interpreted; talked around. It's metaphor, anyway, that drives humans. Remaining on the wheel is what is important, not what you (or I) think/feel about the wheel. Those are fleeting, changing, impermanent. Maybe there's darkness; maybe later light. They're the same, anyway. But if it's perceived, interpreted, as light, ok. It's a light you can trust, because it's not self-manufactured. Joko Beck writes:

The truth is that no one loves everyone all the time, and no one loves a spouse all the time. Such generalities obscure the specific, concrete reality of our lives, what is happening for us at this moment (Beck, 1993: 171).

33. It's non-interpretative reality. You have to want reality so badly, desire it so much (without clinging), that reality can't be kept from you  (Because, of course, you were keeping it from yourself) your rhetorical & interpretative devices. All those we discussed

at the beginning. And more. When you've "seen" in this way, when you've stood under (understood), when you've looked deeply, no other seeing satisfies you. Berends writes:

We sense there is something we're just not seeing, so we seek better mental and spiritual health. We associate happiness with something in thought. Like dreamers beginning to suspect it is 'only a dream,' more and more when faced with trouble we question our perspective. Like the bear who went over the mountain, we climb to the top only to see the other side. Now what? Priorities shift. Perspectives change. The time comes, and now is (Berends, 1990: 11).

References

Charlotte Joko Beck, Nothing Special: Living Zen. (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993).

Berends, Polly, Coming to Life. (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1990).

Campbell, Joseph, The Power of Myth. (New York: Doubleday, 1988).

Eliade, Mircea, The Sacred and the Profane. (New York: Harper & Row, 1961).

Eliot, T.S., Four Quartets, V, in The Complete Works of T.S. Eliot. (London: Faber & Faber, 1969).

Heidegger, Martin, Basic Writings, ed. David Krell. (New York: Harper & Row, 1977).

Hitchcock, John, Jung, The New Physics, and Human Spirituality. (New York: Paulist Press, 1991).

Jung, C.G., Memories, Dreams, Reflections. (New York: Random House, 1989).

Pirsig, Robert, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. (New York: Bantam Books, 1975).

Rorty, Richard, Consequences of Pragmatism. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982).

Suzuki, D.T., Manual of Zen Buddhism. (New York: Grove Press, 1960).

THE LANGUAGE OF EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

MICHAEL A. OLIKER
Eastern Illinois University

I. INTRODUCTION

In my 1992 Midwest PES paper "Analytical Philosophy and the Discourse of Institutional Democracy," I briefly discussed the hostile criticism of Analytical Philosophy of Education (APE) by Professor Walter Feinberg and contrasted it with Prof. B. Paul Komisar's analytical discussion of the various forms of discourse in education. Contrary to Feinberg's caricature of APE, Komisar does not restrict himself to analyzing "crystallized concepts;" nor does he ignore "struggles over meaning." Komisar identifies four major categories of discourse in education, one of which is termed "Political Discourse." The three kinds of Political Discourse in education are: (1) Philosophy of Education; (2) Policy Discourse, and (3) Publicity Discourse. All of these uses of language in education can be vague or ambiguous and can serve as the battleground in Feinberg's "struggles over meaning."

In this paper, I shall examine some key concepts, images, and ideals that are the subject of controversy in educational policymaking and administration with the goal of showing the contribution that a philosopher of education can make toward understanding "struggles over meaning" in policy and administration. Let me state for the record that I reject the view that the proper task of the philosopher in this area would be to show the "implications for policy and admin-

istration" of various "schools of thought" in academic philosophy and to urge practitioners to make a dogmatic commitment to a single "ism."

I suspect that my writing shows the influence of many of my teachers, colleagues, and students and the different views that they hold.

II. POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

Educational policy and administration deal with the actual conduct and operation of educational institutions. A perennial problem for the philosopher of education is to demonstrate a connection between educational ideas and actual organizational processes. A possible strategy is to show that a particular ideology has become the basis for human action by showing that a proposed system of rules that the ideology advocates is actually followed. According to James E. McClellan (1968) policy making is itself a rule-directed activity that generates the rules that govern the activities of office-holders in an institution. Administration is commonly characterized as the maintenance of the rules that govern an institution (Lipham). For McClellan, the process of policy making must ideally: (1) acknowledge conflicting interests, (2) be generated by an organization that carries on a public and reasonable debate, and (3) produce rules that can be actually enforced. James M. Lipham contrasts "administration" and "leadership," identifying "leadership" with activities intended to change the rules of an institution while "administration" maintains those rules. Notice that McClellan's definition of "policy" is programmatic in that it treats policy making as a rational process. An older distinction—going back to Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924)—contrasts administration and politics and identifies "administration" with rational organizational analysis and "politics" with irrational social conflict.

Notice that in the above analysis, I employ John Rawls's notion of an "institution" as an analytical tool. Educational policy and administration take place within the context of educational institutions. For Rawls, an institution is "a public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like. These rules specify certain forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden; and they provide for certain penalties and defenses when violations occur (51)." While John Rawls is not an Analytical Philosopher, I shall employ his metaphor in an explanation (See Pepper). I have already attempted to show conflicts of uses of "policy" and "administration" in the writings of McClellan, Lipham, and Wilson. Now I shall use Rawls's metaphor as

a "meta-metaphor" in an analysis of four metaphors that have had major historical influences on the practice of educational policy and administration.

An educational institution may be either an **Instrumental System (IS)** or a **Non-Instrumental System (NIS)**. In an IS, the institution exists to achieve a goal and the lack of attainment of the goal may threaten the existence of the IS. In a NIS, the institution exists because the activities that go on within the institution are seen as worthwhile—period. Also the rules that govern the institution may be either a **Tightly Coupled System (TCS)** or a **Loosely Coupled System (LCS)**. A TCS has strict, precisely defined rules that prescribe virtually every activity that office-holders participate in. In a LCS, the rules are vague or ambiguous and subject to continual reinterpretation. In the next section, I will describe four metaphors for educational administration that can be put into practice and become full-blown ideologies: the temple, the traditional factory, the human relations-oriented version of the factory, and the jungle (See March, 1972; Weick).

1. In the temple, the school is a TCS and a NIS.
2. In the traditional factory, the school is a TCS and an IS.
3. In the human relations-oriented factory, the school is still an IS but has become a LCS.
4. And in the jungle, the school has become a LCS and may be a NIS.
(But in the jungle institutions may not survive for long.)

III. ADMINISTRATION AND SCHOOL IMAGES

Terrence E. Deal and Martha Stone Wiske see both policy-making and administration as heavily influenced by one's vision of schools as organizations or school images. They identify three metaphors—the factory, the jungle, and the temple—as the bases of three contemporary school images. The main section of this article will discuss the history of these school images. The final section of this article will address parallels between the philosophical reflections on educational policy of Thomas F. Green and John Dewey and the policy-making of James B. Conant and his archenemy Frederick M. Raubinger.

A. THE SCHOOL AS A TEMPLE

The metaphor of the school as a temple places the administrator in the role of a priest whose task is to enact rituals and ceremonies that maintain the faith. William Torrey Harris (1835-1909)—a well-known advocate of Idealistic philosophy—rose to the position of Superintendent of Schools in St. Louis and subsequently served as States Commissioner of Education. Harris would have insisted those activities carried on through social institutions have edu-

cational value (Dunkel). In the 19th Century, states increased the power of school administrators (Karier). William Estabrook Chancellor (1867-1963) narrowed William Torrey Harris's faith in American institutions to a faith in public schooling. Chancellor was contemptuous of politicians and businessmen. He explicitly compared schooling to religion and superintendents to ministers. Chancellor advocated an increased authority for school administration and the abolition of school boards. Like his hero Woodrow Wilson, Chancellor sought to separate administration from politics. Ironically, in 1920 Chancellor's career temporarily ended because he became involved in a smear campaign against presidential candidate Warren G. Harding. He was dismissed from his teaching position, hunted by a lynch mob, forced to leave the country, and had his book on Harding burned by Harding Administration. Books on school architecture of the late 19th Century explicitly referred to the school building as a temple (Cutler). After several years as a traveling salesman in Canada, Chancellor returned to the United States and resumed his teaching career (Mason; Russell).

B. THE SCHOOL AS A FACTORY.

Chancellor's textbooks were displaced by those of Ellwood P. Cubberley (1868-1941). While Cubberley was sympathetic to Chancellor's authoritarian views, Cubberley's ideology was based on a different metaphor: the factory. Cubberley sought to establish a profession of educational administration, promoted the use of intelligence tests as a selection device, and urged the increased presence of businessmen on school boards. The rhetoric of the school as a temple was being displaced by the new rhetoric of efficiency (Scott). Like Chancellor, Cubberley deplored the presence of women and minorities on school boards but unlike Chancellor, Cubberley idolized businessmen. He saw children as the product of the school as factory—designed by the professionals to meet the needs of society. Cubberley saw the American educational system as the apex of civilization and the professional school administrator as one of history's greatest heroes. But—like Chancellor and Wilson—Cubberley sought to free administrative decision-making from the conflicts of politics. Cubberley believed that the presence of businessmen on school boards would give the professional school administrator greater freedom of decision-making (Callahan).

C. THE HUMAN RELATIONS APPROACH

Douglas McGregor (1906-1964) opposed the authoritarian inclinations of both the temple model and the factory model. He studied psychology at Harvard during the 1930s—a time when Harvard psychologists sought to identify themselves as scientists and divorce themselves

from philosophy. Like many early writers on organizational behavior, he based his views of organizations on means-ends rationality and argued that in a congenial work environment, employees will seek to integrate personal objectives with organizational goals. McGregor deplored the carrot and stick approach to management. As President of Antioch College from 1948 to 1954, he sought to include students, faculty, and blue-collar workers in discussions of college policy but his openness left McGregor vulnerable to the machinations of professional anti-communist informers who were willing to spread outright lies about student activities on the Antioch campus. In McGregor's view of management we see a tension between the rhetoric of the democratic institution and the image of the school as a factory (Oliker, 1976).

D. THE SCHOOL AS A JUNGLE

A 1960 paper by McClellan applauded administrators' efforts to develop scientific administrative theory but warned that the then new behavioral science-based administrative theory assumed a centralized model of decision-making. But the administrative theorists discussed by McClellan may have been engaged in wishful thinking. During the mid-1950s a popular film (based on a popular novel) introduced a phrase into the national vocabulary that contained a new and disturbing metaphor for the school: *The Blackboard Jungle* (See Hunter).

The need for constant negotiations, the exercise of power, and the flux of symbolic meaning that are characteristic of the school as jungle seems to be the school image that informs the administrative theory of James G. March—a distinguished social scientist on the faculty of Stanford University. During the 1970s, March conducted extensive studies of college presidents and school superintendents. His resulting works can be understood as a rejection of most of the assumptions of educational administration theory in the 20th Century. Specifically, March rejects the assumptions that: (1) organizations exist to achieve goals; (2) individuals act on their beliefs; (3) only actions based on goals or beliefs are rational. He sees schools as "organized anarchies" or "loosely coupled systems" which have ambiguous goals, unclear relations of means and ends, and decisions made in the context of chance interactions of people, problems, and solutions. For March, actions on the basis of intuition and tradition are just as rational as actions toward a goal mind. His work even hints at a convergence with the long-forgotten views of W.T. Harris. March's disciple Karl E. Weick urges school administrators to consider the leadership style of a clergyman as possibly more appropriate than that of a management scientist.

IV. IDEALS OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM: DEMOCRACY OR RATIONALITY?

While the metaphors of temple, factory, and jungle do seem to identify four kinds of educational institutions, we lack any clear intuitive characterization of educational systems. And the question of the very existence of educational systems is still controversial in some circles. Philosophical inquiry about educational systems and the making of educational policy at the national level seems to involve at least three central questions:

1. Does nation N have a system of education?
2. Can policy for that system be made rationally?
3. Can policy for that system be made democratically?

According to Thomas F. Green, the Educational System began to take shape around 1910. The System is a well organized institution defined by rules that operate with the rigor of an Aristotelian Practical Syllogism. The System as Green sees it as composed of Primary and Derivative Elements. The Primary Elements are:

- P1: Schools.
- P2: A medium of exchange.
- P3: A principle of sequence.

While the Derivative Elements are:

- D1: Size.
- D2: A system of control.
- D3: A distribution of goods.

And The System "behaves" according to such laws as:

- L1: The Law of Zero Correlation.
- L2: The Law of Last Entry.
- L3: The Principle of the Moving Target

Green paints a picture of The System as a well-programmed computer that will continue to function in spite of the misguided (he thinks) efforts of reformers. This claim may be reassuring to the conservative who fears the breakdown of The System, but it is hardly reassuring to those who see The System as perpetuating social injustices. Green's L1 asserts that educational credentials become worthless once everyone accepts them. L2 can be summarized as the claim that the least advanced social groups cannot benefit from The System until the higher sta-

tus groups have exhausted The System's resources. And L3 maintains that the attainment of educational credentials can change from being sufficient conditions for social status to being necessary conditions.

Why did The System come into being? In the 19th Century a wide variety of schools existed with drastically different functions. John Dewey favored the organization of a national system of education as an expression of the evolution of America into a democracy. In teacher education the normal schools which taught teaching methods existed completely separate from university education departments which prepared educational researchers. Dewey's ideal was a unified college of education that integrated both functions and prepared teachers in the public interest.

Dewey would have rejected Green's suggestion that the logic of the educational system is unassailable by any external standards. He warned in a 1903 paper entitled "Democracy in Education" that the authority structure of any kind of educational institution must be evaluated by the standard of whether it impedes or encourages the freedom of thought that is necessary in a democratic society. Thirty-five years later, Dewey reiterated this point in a paper entitled "Democracy and Educational Administration." In that paper—an address to a group of school administrators—he chided his audience for their failure to develop structures that allowed teachers a sufficient role in decision-making.

The conflict between the views of Green and Dewey on educational policy-making can be termed a conflict between rationalist and democratic philosophies. This conflict is not just a theoretical debate for the philosophy of education classroom. During the 1950s and 1960s, New Jersey State Commissioner of Education Frederick M. Raubinger (1908-1989) attacked the work of the Educational Testing Service—located in Princeton, New Jersey—and its guiding inspiration former Harvard University President James B. Conant (1893-1978) as an undemocratic elite who had seized educational policy-making from public officials. Like Chancellor, Conant was fond of dismissing critics of public education as being misinformed. Raubinger, by contrast, was a firm believer in local control of education (Shine) who devoted an entire chapter of his 1974 educational administration textbook to a discussion of democratic theory. In the early 1970s, Conant sought to establish the Education Commission of the States which took as its mission the expansion of the two-year community colleges. Raubinger pointed out in 1972 that the ECS has also sought to increase the power of the fifty state governors over educational policy at the expense of education officials. In his autobiography *My Several Lives*, Conant clearly advocated the expansion of two-year college at the expense of the four-year college. Because of the influence of Conant and the ETS, Raubinger was forced to resign as

New Jersey State Commissioner of Education in 1966. From 1966 to 1976, Raubinger taught in the Department of Educational Administration at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

During the twenty-five years since Conant completed his autobiography, the two-year college has continued to be the subject of fierce debate (Levinsohn). The conceptual framework of this entry can illuminate controversies over this new kind of institution. The earliest type of two-year college—the junior college—satisfied a public demand for access to higher education while rationally fitting into the educational system and enabling students to transfer to bachelor's programs. But the junior college was never seen as a "temple of learning" like the traditional university. Almost immediately, the factory model of administration with greater emphasis on vocational education and a rational fit with the job market became the controlling ideology of the junior college. However, recent demands on these institutions by ethnic minorities have placed faculty in a jungle environment wherein the role of the teacher is poorly defined. Cynical administrators see this situation as an opportunity to deprofessionalize teaching and expand vocational programs that do not terminate either in a degree or in the opportunity to transfer to a bachelor's program. But newer non-degree programs and the reduction of faculty can be seen as antagonistic to the demands of the community for more course offerings. Jungle-oriented administrators' attempts to save money may backfire and antagonize the community and threaten the survival of the institution. Perhaps a return to the more ministerial role by educators that was characteristic of the school as temple could even be defended as democratic (See Weick)!

Bibliography

Callahan, Raymond E. *Education and the Cult of Efficiency*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.

Chancellor, William E. "Hypermoron as Educator." *School and Society* 5 (9 June 1917): 668-671.

Chancellor, William E. *A Theory of Motives, Ideals, and Values in Education*. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1907.

Cohen, Michael D. and James G. March. *Leadership and Ambiguity: The American College President*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974.

Conant, James B. *My Several Lives*. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.

Cubberley, Ellwood P. *Public School Administration*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1916.

Cutler, William W., III. "Cathedral of Culture: The Schoolhouse in American Thought and Practice since 1820." *History of Education Quarterly* 29 (Spring 1989): 1-40.

Deal, Terrence E. and Martha Stone Wiske. "How to Use Research to Win Battles and Maybe Wars." In *Managing Schools in Hard Times*, ed. Stanton Leggett, 1-16. Chicago: Teach 'em Inc., 1981.

John. "Democracy and Educational Administration." In *The Later Works*, ed. Jo Ann

Boydston, vol. 11, 217-225. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987.

Dewey, John. "Democracy in Education." In *The Middle Works*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 3, 229-239. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981.

Dewey, John. *The School and Society*. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. With a preface by Joe R. Burnett. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980.

Dunkel, Harold B. "W.T. Harris and Hegelianism in American Education." *School Review* 81 (February 1973): 233-246.

Eaton, William. "From Ideology to Conventional Wisdom: School Administration Texts 1915-1933." In *An Analysis of Texts on School Administration 1820-1985*, ed. Thomas E. Glass, 23-38. Danville, Illinois: Interstate, 1986. ERIC DOCUMENT ED 294 314.

Feinberg, Walter. *Understanding Education*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Green, Thomas F. *Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System*. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1980.

Hunter, Evan. *The Blackboard Jungle*. New York: Pocket Books, 1955.

Karier, Clarence. "Supervision in Historic Perspective." In *Supervision of Teaching*, ed. Thomas J. Sergiovanni, 2-15. Alexandria, Virginia: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1982.

Komisar, B. Paul. "Language of Education." *Encyclopedia of Education*. 1971 ed.

Levinsohn, Florence Hamlsh. "City College Showdown." *Reader* (Chicago, Illinois) 22 (2 April 1993).

Lipham, James M. "Leadership and Administration." In *Behavioral Science and Educational Administration*, ed. Daniel E. Griffiths, 119-141. The Sixty-Third Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part II. Chicago: NSSE, 1964.

March, James G. "American Public School Administration: A Short Analysis." *School Review* 86 (February 1978): 217-250.

March, James G. "Model Bias in Social Action." *Review of Educational Research* 42 (Fall 1972): 413-429.

Mason, Robert. "From Idea to Ideology: School Administration Tests 1820-1914." In *An Analysis of Texts on Educational Administration 1820-1985*, ed. Thomas E. Glass, 1-21. Danville, Illinois: Interstate, 1986. ERIC DOCUMENT ED 294 314.

McClellan, James E. "Theory in Educational Administration." *School Review* 68 (Summer 1960): 210-227.

McClellan, James E. *Toward an Effective Critique of American Education*. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1968.

Oliker, Michael A. "Analytical Philosophy and the Discourse of Institutional Democracy." In *Proceedings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society 1991 and 1992*, ed. David B. Owen and Ronald M. Swartz, 127-135. Ames, Iowa: The Society, 1993. ERIC DOCUMENT ED 364 493.

Oliker, Michael A. "Douglas McGregor's Theory Y and the Structure of Educational Institutions." Ph.D. diss. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1976.

Oliker, Michael A. "Neutrality and the Structure of Educational Institutions." In *Philosophy of Education 1979*, ed. Jerrold R. Coombs, 252-259. Normal, Illinois: Philosophy of Education Society, 1980. ERIC DOCUMENT ED 187 688.

Oliker, Michael A. Review of *Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System*, by Thomas F. Green, et al. *Journal of Thought* 18 (Spring 1983): 118-124.

Pepper, Stephen. "Metaphor in Philosophy." *Journal of Mind and Behavior* 3 (Summer 1982): 197-205.

ERIC: Frederick M. "Compact for Education: A Tale of Educational Politics." *Educational Forum* 36 (May 1972): 441-450.

Raubinger, Frederick M. "A National Testing Program: Viewed with Misgivings." *NEA Journal* 48 (November 1959): 29.

Raubinger, Frederick M. and Harold C. Hand. *Later than You Think*. Typewritten manuscript. 1967. Archives, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Raubinger, Frederick M., Merle R. Sumption and Richard M. Kamml. *Leadership in the Secondary School*. Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1974.

Rawls, John. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Russell, Francis. *The Shadow of Blooming Grove: Warren G. Harding in His Times*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968.

Scott, Fred Newton. "Efficiency for Efficiency's Sake." *School Review* 23 (January 1915): 34-42.

Shine, William A. "The Chief State School Officer and Educational Change." In *Educational Policy*, ed. Janice F. Weaver, 53-64. Danville, Illinois: Interstate, 1975.

Weick, Karl E. "Administering Education in Loosely Coupled Schools." *Phi Delta Kappan* 63 (June 1982): 673-676.

Wilson, Woodrow. "The Study of Administration." *Political Science Quarterly* 2 (June 1887): 197-222.

**PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF
PRACTICE: THE EMERGING
UNIVERSITY/SCHOOL/COMMUNITY
PARTNERSHIP**

BETTY-JO DUNBAR
Chicago State University

ABSTRACT

The university is a reflection of society and as such it is in the process of a great metamorphosis—as is our society. In many ways the university has traditionally reacted to the needs of society. Today it is being called upon to lead its communities into multi-cultural partnerships that involve innovative models of communication, planning, collaboration, assessment, evaluation and research. This paper explains how some of our great philosophers viewed society and community involvement in education. It touches upon periods of Naturalism and Idealism as new modes of thought at that time. Several colleges and universities were involved in new philosophies which produced the American Philosophical Association in 1902, organized by James E. Creighton and Jacob Gould Schurman both of Cornell University. Following historical background of college and university involvement in communities, this paper examines philosophies and missions of various societal and community institutions such as: 1) the university, 2) foundations, and 3) the Chicago Public Schools. The Nation of Tomorrow (TNT), an example of an emerging popular educational framework, has been used to depict university/community partnerships. The Nation of Tomorrow was a

Schools, community organizations, local businesses and service agencies. As the former director of this project, this paper explores philosophical and administrative issues from the perspective of its director. This partnership was designed from an ecological perspective and was initiated as a response to societies maladies. It was from the philosophy of the late President Theodore Roosevelt that it received its name. The president often stated that, "When you take care of children, you are taking care of the nation of tomorrow." The university enjoined public school faculty, administrators, teachers, families, students and community members to improve the lives of approximately 4,000 children attending four (4) Chicago elementary schools. This project was intended to develop educational prototypes that could be replicated nationwide. Ecosystemic assessment, intervention and evaluation have been discussed for this project that served African-American, Mexican-American, Puerto Rican-American, Caucasian-American and Asian-American students. An on-site evaluator conducted formative and summative evaluation and graduate students conducted research studies. Typologies have been presented for comparative analogy. Issues of support, cooperation and collaboration have been posed in this paper and various levels of institutional impact have been discussed.

INTRODUCTION

The university is a reflection of society and as such, it is in the process of a great metamorphosis as is our society. In many ways, the university has traditionally reacted to the needs of society. Today it is being called upon to lead its communities into multicultural partnerships that involve innovative models of communication, planning, collaboration, assessment, evaluation and research. This paper discusses briefly how some noted philosophers view society and community involvement in education.

Societal and community involvement in education have increased; thus, university/school/community partnerships have emerged throughout this nation in the last ten years. If the partnership was funded by external resources, these external philanthropic organizations also play an important role in the collaboration process. In other words, all parties are important stakeholders whose voices have to be heard. This can promote harmonious relationships as well as problems of practice. If problems do occur, how do these various entities work together to resolve their differences and to embrace a

philosophy of education and a common framework whereby



tries achieve their goal?

When universities, schools and community groups work together

er, they each must reap a reward that is internally beneficial. A typology of educational partnerships is used to portray The Nation of Tomorrow, an educational partnership that spanned over five years.

This paper is intended to promote thought as it relates to what is the most efficient and effective way to work together to get whatever it is that you personally and collectively need to get from this partnership endeavor and how students will improve academically.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

During the fifty year period between the Civil War and World War I, there was a vast revolution of intellectual thought in America. There were wide ranging investigations in the physical and biological sciences. Outlooks about: 1) how the universe was conceived; 2) man and his relations to nature; and, 3) conceptions of how knowledge and learning affected education were issues of the day. There were numerous controversies between science and religion that challenged man's origin and destiny. Principal intellectual views about man emerged during this period of time. One view saw man as a reflection of God. A second view saw man as a reflection of the natural world. A third view saw man as a reflection of human society—man as primarily a social and cultural being.

However, it was idealism that provided a transition toward nondenominational spiritual orientation within colleges and universities after the Civil War. This was an important outlook for educational theory for it stressed the child's self and personality and care in providing optimum conditions whereby the child's spiritual nature could grow and unfold itself.¹

An "important point . . . about idealism is that it helped to replace sectarian orthodoxies of the early 19th century in American higher education with a kind of nonsectarian reliance upon spirituality. . . . The heart of idealism . . . was that the essence of the universe was spiritual and not material."²

Several colleges and universities spawned educational centers of philosophic idealism in the late 19th century and early 20th century. At Cornell University, James E. Creighton along with Jacob Gould Schurman developed an "objective idealism" and organized the American Philosophical Association in 1902. George Sylvester Morris of Johns Hopkins University developed his "dynamic idealism" which had an influence on John Dewey. And, at Harvard University, George Palmer and Josiah Royce developed "absolute idealism." In various ways, all three men, Creighton, Morris and Royce stressed the social character of idealism. Creighton advocated that thought is the product not of an individual mind but of a community of minds and that individuals cannot

ment of human experience and the creative activity of minds in the process of achieving knowledge. Royce argued that reality and knowledge are social products of the human community achieved as individuals communicate with each other and interpret themselves.

Idealism, in its various forms, made important contributions to American education. Its vision that individuals were related to other individuals in a social and spiritual community was the development of a new philosophy of education. It also laid the foundation for the now emerging university/school/community partnerships.

However, it was not the idealists themselves, but rather John Dewey who emphasized the social and creative role of persons in education and used it to form a different philosophy. Theories of the social nature of the human self produced by George H. Mead from 1890 to 1931 also significantly influenced John Dewey. Mead's basic premise was that a person develops a conception of himself as he learns to use the symbols of communication that are common to others. The significant symbol is a social learning and therefore mind is a social learning. It is the social activity of communication through significant symbols that distinguishes man from lower species. Communication is the crux of a community. Social action and social reform became an extension of the philosophy of thought and mind as social processes.

Another educational trend in later 19th century philosophy was the development of the philosophy of pragmatism. John Dewey, George Mead and others were forerunners in this philosophy that held that knowledge arises out of the consequences of human experience. It looked upon truth and knowledge as the achievements of human experience. As we see, John Dewey was somewhat eclectic in his philosophical approaches. This paper pinpoints some of his viewpoints upon which the university/school/community concept was formulated. As stated earlier, Dewey began his career under the influence of philosophic idealism at Johns Hopkins University. He broke away from idealism but held onto Hegelian thought which viewed ideas as a product of a community of minds. He held that man lives in a process of interaction with his environment. In developing his own philosophic theories, he saw an integral connection between education and the operating beliefs of human nature, self, mind, knowledge, learning and intelligence. "Philosophy for Dewey was not simply a pleasant exercise with abstract symbols and intellectual generalizations. Philosophy properly understood should be a general theory of education. Unless philosophy made a difference in educational practice, philosophy was a useless though entertaining enterprise."³ Dewey also emphasized studying both the psychological

e of the individual and the social nature of his environment. He stressed that in the educative process, the child is inherently an

active being, and as such, he needs to communicate with others, to investigate, to construct things and to create. This should be recognized in the school and opportunity should be given to the child to develop these impulses by engaging in such activities as language, nature study, art, music and the dramatics. This was the origin of the "activities" program which emphasized the social nature of learning. He felt that "the school must be a social institution in vital connection with the society of which it is a part. Education is a moral and social enterprise; the school should provide better conditions for social goals to be realized by the child. Therefore, the school must carry forward the life of home, neighborhood, and community which are the local sources of the child's experience. It must lead him into the far wider community of ideas, customs, and beliefs of his larger society."⁴

Also at this time, coinciding with changes at the elementary and secondary level, considerable emphasis was often placed upon the "community school." Efforts were made to bring the school much closer to community activities. Community resources were used and there was effort to adapt the school to the needs of the local community. Thus, evolved the concept of the "community college."⁵

The concept of the community college was to provide an extension of educational facilities for youth in the community beyond the twelfth grade. Youth could obtain knowledge, and skills to assist them in skilled work, semiprofessional and technical fields. There was also an opportunity for youth to prepare for advanced college work and a degree. As early as the 1920's, an increasing number of urban communities launched adult community wide education programs. One of the largest adult education programs was the rural, agricultural and home economics program supported by the United States Department of Agriculture's Cooperative Extension Services.⁶

In higher education, at colleges and universities, there was emphasis upon scholarship and research. Emphasis on vocational and professional preparation, however, determined the curriculum. Although some colleges made efforts to promote new and innovative programs in terms of societal needs, the student's individual needs and attention to social problems seemed not so important. A subject matter curriculum seemed to be dominant in most liberal arts colleges. Departments of economics, history, political science, physics, chemistry, botany, English, Greek, Latin, French and German offered a set of courses from which students could pursue a degree.

EDUCATION PARTNERSHIPS

W- have had a historical overview of a few philosophers and their ^{onal} theories, let us turn now to a brief history of education part-

nerships. During the last decade, there has been ample documentation of business and education partnerships that have been linked since the late 1800's.⁷ Teaching colleges and universities also have collaborated for years with public elementary and secondary schools by placing teacher interns in the schools under the guidance of experienced public school teachers. In the sixties and seventies, social pressures in urban areas led to greater university/public school involvement as the need for multicultural curricula and the need to address supplemental instruction for disadvantaged students emerged. In the late 1970's, "the term 'partnership' became a popular expression and notion . . . motivated largely by public relations concerns and the desire for corporations located in or near urban communities to be good neighbors."⁸

In 1983, the U. S. Department of Education's National Commission on Excellence in Education issued "A Nation at Risk." This report articulated the need for educational reform. Businesses also became alarmed that the work force was inadequately prepared. "Between 1983-84 and 1987-88, the number of business/education partnerships rose from 42,200 to 140,800. More than nine million students—24 percent of public school students were directly involved in education partnerships."⁹ As the business/education partnership took hold, multiple partnership projects were initiated that included the human services sector, community based agencies, labor unions, health organizations, hospitals, and city and county governments. Agendas reflected societal issues such as the social and economic health of the community or the self-sufficiency of the citizenry. The U. S. Department of Education states that, "Those efforts—community wide change initiatives—have begun to develop over the last 5 years. It is perhaps too early to determine either their efficacy or their impact."¹⁰

One of the latest federal efforts of educational reform has been the Goals 2000 introduced during the President Bush Administration. On March 31, 1994, President Clinton signed the Goals 2000: Educate America Act. The theme of this act is "Building Community Partnerships for Learning."¹¹ This act provides seed money for "a partnership of parents and teachers, business and colleges, administrators and school boards, grandparents and extended families, hospitals and social service agencies, art and cultural institutions, newspapers and other media, libraries and law enforcement, cable TV and telephone companies, religious and volunteer organizations and others."¹²

THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

The University of Illinois spans two vast campuses in Urbana-Champaign and Chicago, Illinois. It is a land grant university receiving federal support. In 1862, an act of Congress granted each state 30,000

acres of land of which the proceeds were to be used for the endowment and maintenance of colleges and universities teaching agricultural and mechanical arts and other subjects. In addition, "a focus on the welfare of American youth and their families has been an integral part of the mission and activities of land-grant institutions over the past century. However, rapid changes in the structure of American society and American families in the post-war, post-industrial era, have outpaced the rate of structural change in the land grant university's approaches to working with youth and families, particularly in the urban setting. Thus, the one American institution uniquely designed to serve the needs of youth, finds itself playing catch-up at a time when it is most needed."¹³ The university has a mandate to transfer research into practice because it is a land grant institution. Historically, its Cooperative Extension Services has been delegated the role of working with youth and families. Due to societal changes, this role has become increasingly complex. Thus, in 1988, the University of Illinois established a new Center for Urban Education Research and Development (CUERD) to address issues of urban education and research. This center was the principal investigator for TNT.

THE W.K. KELLOGG FOUNDATION

In the late 1980's, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation issued a request for proposals from major universities. The University of Illinois (along with two other universities) received grants. Illinois received 3.7 million dollars to initiate a five (5) year partnership with four (4) Chicago Public Schools in diverse cultural neighborhoods. The Kellogg Foundation's mission is "to receive and administer funds for educational and charitable purposes. Aid is limited to programs concerned with the application of existing knowledge rather than research. Current funding priorities include projects designed to improve human well-being through: adult continuing education; problem focused community based health services . . . and broadening leadership capacities of individuals."¹⁴

THE CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS

In 1988, the Chicago Public Schools underwent a major reform movement with state legislation entitled the 1988 School Reform Act. This act brought about change in principals' tenure and the formation of local school councils in every school in the city. The councils, which consisted of the principal, teachers, parents and community members, placed these council members in decision-making roles at their respective school. These council members made decisions regarding budgets, n selections and principal hiring and retention. They were given power than any previous elected body at local schools. Thus, the

formation of educational partnerships was also reviewed by local school councils.

THE NATION OF TOMORROW (TNT)

The following excerpt from the University of Illinois' grant proposal to the W.K. Kellogg Foundation states the philosophy and mission of the university/school/ community partnership entitled, The Nation of Tomorrow:

The Nation of Tomorrow is designed to improve academic, attainment, decrease self-destructive behavior, increase awareness and adoption of physically healthy behaviors, and increase prosocial behavior. Our proposal is based on an ecological model that views the emergence of the child as an interplay between common stages of development and the configuration of social institutions forming the ecology of the child's environment. The situation of children can be improved only by changing the institutions that serve them. We believe meaningful change must take a system perspective, attending to the interrelations among institutions rather than focusing on a single institution or several institutions in isolation. The Nation of Tomorrow is a collaborative effort linking the resources and expertise of the University with the primary institutions that frame the context in which children develop schools and families.¹⁵

This mission and philosophy was accompanied by three objectives:

1. To enhance learning opportunities for students in schools by promoting university, faculty and public school teacher collaboration to improve the quality of teaching and learning opportunities for children (School Enhancement Activities).
2. To enhance the capacity of parents to contribute to their children's development by designing parent education programs with child development experts, (Families Ties).
3. To enhance school-based health programs and increase accessibility to primary health care by collaborating with faculty/staff from the colleges/schools of social work, nursing, pediatrics, dentistry, vision, pharmacy, kinesiology and education (Partner in Health).

The Nation of Tomorrow was a complex partnership that was funded over \$10 million dollars for over a five year period (1989-1995). Ed by the University of Illinois, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation and business and agencies, this venture spanned four multi-cultural

communities in Chicago. Only one of these communities, the Pilsen Mexican-American Community was in close proximity to the Chicago campus. The other communities were Puerto-Rican American and African-American as the majority population. The project served over 4,000 students. Table 1 (see page 136) depicts the various colleges within the university and the Chicago Board of Education's administrative departments, local school councils, administration, teachers, students and parents who played active roles in this partnership.

TYPOLOGIES, DISCUSSION AND PROBLEM AREAS

The U.S. Department of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement (OERI) has published a *Synthesis of Existing Knowledge and Practice in the Field of Educational Partnerships* in which typologies have been used to categorize national partnerships. Typologies provide a useful conceptual framework also for The Nation of Tomorrow Projects as its complexities are reviewed by this author, the former project director. Two typologies have been offered here to describe partnership paradigms. These typologies have been adapted from the OERI models levels of involvement and levels of impact.¹⁶

In Table 2, Typology #1 describes the graduated stages of partnership development by levels of involvement. The three levels of involvement which are support, cooperation and collaboration are represented in several areas.

TABLE 2
TYPOLOGY #1 - LEVELS OF INVOLVEMENT

Partnership Involvement	TNT Involvement		
	Support	Cooperation	Collaboration
Resources	X	X	X
Activities	X	X	X
Decision Making	X	X	
Communication	X	X	
Commitment of Leadership			
• University	X	X	X
• Public Schools	X	X	X
Participation of Faculty	X	X	
Participation of Teachers	X	X	
Participation of University Administrators	X	X	
Participation of School Administrators	X	X	X
Participation of Parents	X	X	X
Participation of Local School Council	X	X	
Participation of Community Agencies	X	X	
Ability of Parties	X	X	X

Table 2 indicates that there was unanimous *support* for all areas of involvement during the initial stages of the project. In numerous areas support was later enhanced by *cooperation* between the various institutions and appropriate faculty, administrators and staff. *Cooperation* is defined as a greater degree of communication, participation and leadership, although the relationship is unequal with the school being on the receiving end in terms of accruing benefits.

In defining *collaboration*, "the partnership begins to assume a life of its own, in this stage the partnership looks like a full scale orchestra performance led by various conductors. The partnership team has full attention and involvement of top level leadership and has implementation support from full-time staff. Partners have established long-range goals that address essential school or community needs. Major resources from various partners are committed, and many activities are happening at once. There is widespread staff involvement within all partner institutions, and all benefit within a relationship where parties enjoy a relationship among equals."¹⁷

DISCUSSION OF NOTED PROBLEM AREAS

The Nation of Tomorrow was *supported* in all areas not only by its participating institutions but, also by its community politicians (and in Chicago that's significant support). *Cooperation*, as noted, was also in all areas of involvement. *Cooperation* was often smooth because the level of commitment of faculty and school administrators was increasingly high even though there were periods of discouragement. Discouragement was often due to a lack of understanding of the busy schedule of school administrators and their inability to attend to one's needs as urgently as one would expect.

By year four, TNT was in full operation with various "orchestral conductors" (program directors, and site directors) attending to each school and its multiplicity of activities. When called upon, there was involvement of college deans and the director of the Center for Urban Education Research Development. The Chicago campus chancellor and university president often referred to TNT during their regular community and/or board meetings. Full-time staff was maintained in each school (except during replacements). Long-range goals were established prior to program implementation. Monthly school meetings and quarterly "Operations Board" meetings addressed goal related issues for the schools and communities.

According, aligned with the definition of *collaboration*, TNT made the grade. Weaknesses or problem areas occurred in *collaboration*. Decisions would be made at management levels but sometimes university administrators reversed (or would disallow) decisions because of uni-

versity policy and/or time schedules. Ongoing efforts to communicate and disseminate information were conducted through weekly school site meetings and regularly scheduled "Operations Board" meetings with principals, directors, faculty coordinators and project evaluator. Sometimes there was communication breakdown among the four schools and the university. Site directors were to have served as liaisons from the university to individual schools. It had been hoped at the beginning of the project that numerous faculty would participate. However, the ever increasing workload of faculty members and/or lack of interest prevented maximum numbers of faculty participation. Teacher participation in schools decreased in some classes over the years. However, it was like a pendulum-increase then decrease by the end of the school year.

University administrators provided more technical assistance than true collaboration. They were always there when needed though! Local school councils differed by school. Three school councils were active but one council was just receptive to ideas than an active participant in creating ideas.

To me, collaboration involves people not just institutions. Everybody has to get something out of it.

In Table 3, (*at right*) Typology #2 focuses on levels of impact upon the education system. It can be helpful in evaluating outcomes of goals.

DISCUSSION OF NOTED PROBLEM AREAS

There was partnership in special services because of collaboration with the Chicago Public School's Department of Educational Pupil Support Services; collaboration with the Colleges of Pharmacy, Nursing, Pediatrics, Dentistry, Kinesiology, Education and the Jane Addams College of Social Work. Each of these colleges provided ongoing activities germane to their department. University faculty worked directly in the *classrooms* with teachers assisting them with instructional strategies. Teachers also attended classes at the university and received credit that could be applicable to a graduate degree. The Partners in Health teams and Family Tie teams also used the *classrooms* on occasion to reinforce pertinent skills. Parenting classes were held in school and community sites.

The *teacher training* program on the Chicago campus encouraged student teachers to work in these partnership schools. Many students accepted TNT schools and had diversified experiences; other students were uncomfortable having been placed in a cultural situation different from their own. Sometimes a change was requested.

regards to *management*, one school had a team of teachers who closely with faculty who promoted organizational assessment

TABLE 3
TYPOLOGY #2 -LEVELS OF IMPACT

Partnership Involvement In:	TNT Involvement
Special Services	Health fairs Dental examinations Pediatric examinations Nursing services Social work services
The Classroom	Faculty trained participating teachers Teachers seminars Teacher hands-on workshop Course accreditation Multicultural awareness training
Teacher Training and Development	Student teachers were placed in TNT schools
Management	School reorganization of the school day discussed and planned by teachers
Systemic Educational Improvement	Prevention of a school closure due to financial resources and increased activities
Partners in Policy	The governors office launched a state-wide replication of TNT TNT after careful review of TNT schools
Research	The University of Illinois, Chicago campus launched a new citywide business, university initiative following assessment of TNT.
	Several graduate students conducted TNT studies.

and school change based on need. This however proved to be a time-consuming process. The university faculty and teachers worked expeditiously to draft a new school organization model with flex-time schedules. This was approved by the teacher team and subsequently by the administration. However, a year later it still had not been put in place.

The same year that TNT started was the same year of sweeping *reform* movements within the Chicago Public School system. ERIC partners began a four (4) year contract as opposed to having their tra-

ditional tenure. Local school council members were elected to take power away from principals. These councils needed extensive time to be trained for their magnanimous responsibility. Problems loomed throughout the city for principals, parents and communities.

Yes, school and community needs were addressed however, the university faculty need for *research* was not addressed as thoroughly as had been anticipated. The University of Illinois is classified as a research one institution and as such, it produces quality research. The faculty participants were so involved with the project, that time did not permit them to address research areas. The five-year time span was too limited to produce quality research or to accurately assess long range student achievement and community involvement. Another problem was that research, teaching and service were university priorities (in that order). TNT was considered a service-related partnership. Faculty tenure was directly related to research and teaching. Thus, only those faculty who were tenured or those who could interrelate the three areas of research, teaching and service could feel productive as active participants of TNT.

CONCLUSION

Because of the complexity of the partnership, assessment and evaluation were not easy to tackle. Ongoing formative reports were however compiled by a full-time staff evaluator. The plan was for the partnership to approach student learning from an ecological perspective (as mentioned earlier from the proposal). With that goal, a plan for ecosystemic assessment and intervention might have assisted in analyzing student achievement. Viewing a child from the ecosystemic perspective requires taking into account all of the forces that interact in a child's life such as school, home and community. It might have been an oversight not to employ a full-time consultant trained in this dimension.


The Nation of Tomorrow was a complex partnership. For the problems that might have surfaced, the successes far outweighed the concerns. "Commitment" and "persistent" were the trademark words used by faculty, administrators, and teachers. Student achievement and parent participation made us all realize that it was such a rewarding experience. Dewey's theories of student engagement in activities were well implemented in TNT. Because many activities were executed in the school as well as in community institutions, TNT recognized Dewey's concept that the school must be a social institution in vital connection with the society of which it is a part.

Endnotes

1. Freeman Butts and Lawrence A. Cremin, *A History of Education in American Culture* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958), 329.
2. *Ibid.*, 330.
3. *Ibid.*, 344.
4. *Ibid.*, 594.
5. *Ibid.*, 599-600.
6. *Ibid.*, 599.
7. U.S. Department of Education: Brandeis University, *Synthesis of Existing Knowledge and Practice in the Field of Educational Partnerships*, (1993), 3.
8. *Ibid.*, 3.
9. *Ibid.*, 4.
10. *Ibid.*
11. U.S. Department of Education, *An Invitation to Your Community—Goals 2000*, (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1995), cover.
12. *Ibid.* 3.
13. The University of Illinois, "The Nation of Tomorrow: A Proposal," (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois, 1988), 3.
14. The Foundation Center, Provides descriptions of projects funded, *The Foundation Directory*, (New York, 1987), 318.
15. (The University of Illinois), i.
16. (U.S. Department of Education: Brandeis University, 1993), 3.
17. *Ibid.*, 9.

TABLE I

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS THE NATION OF TOMORROW (TNT) COLLABORATION CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS



BEST COPY AVAILABLE

1996 PROCEEDINGS

141

**CONTEMPLATIVE TRADITIONS,
MODERN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION**

ROBERT CRAIG
University of Houston

Contemplatives are people who spend a fair amount of time just trying to stay awake. Otherwise, they don't seem to do much. Yet there is a unique kind of insight that comes through immediate wakefulness. This address will unpack this idea, relate it to modern psychology, and develop rather general educational implications.

Much of contemporary psychological technique is based on analyzing peoples' behavior and discussing what they tell us about how they feel and think. This is twice removed from immediate experience. Thus, modern therapists observes peoples' relationships and try to draw some conclusions and inferences on what's behind them. Or, we tell therapists our thoughts and feelings about our past and how it seems to affect our present functioning. This is a good way of going about things and has lead to a lot of knowledge about the mind and how it works.

But, the contemplative traditions suggest something more. That is, there is a more precise knowledge and appreciation of the mind that comes from stillness, quiet and wakefulness—when one can see directly what is going on in the mind at the time (Salzberg, 1995). This is what contemplatives have to offer modern education—the experience of much time noticing what is happening in the moment exactly, within their consciousness.

may use a journal and sit down with a therapist and try to figure it all out. But, a contemplative slant brings the additional experience of sitting quietly and noticing how a thought arises, where it comes from in consciousness. How does this happen, thoughts that come and go, feelings that rise and fall? What are they made of? You tend to see mental events in a different light.

This is sort of like the difference between a meteorologist talking about rain vs. how you know what rain is by standing in it, savoring it, touching it. This is hard for science to deal with since it is so subjective.

Contemplatives 3000 years ago came to many of the insights modern psychology did in the Twentieth Century (deMello, 1990). Such as the unconscious. Contemplatives speak of the life of the soul which goes on without our knowing it. This is called self-knowledge. One thing you learn is not to spend too much time worrying about how you feel or what you think, because both thoughts and feelings come and go. They are not permanent.

Since Freud, there is the idea that feelings must be managed. If we don't deal with our feelings, they will get us. In the Victorian era, feelings were to be repressed, which gave Freud a lot of clients. The only legitimate emotion was a "righteous indignation in the face of scoundrels." (Fehr, 1993). With Puritanism, feelings were to be rigidly controlled and repressed. With Freud, if you repress them, you get into trouble. But, in the late 60's & 70's, with sensitivity training, every feeling must be expressed. The thought is that with the slightest twinge of fear or anger, we are COMPELLED to express it.

The ironic thing is that there is no difference between being compelled to repress or to express feelings. Contemplatives just sat there and watched their feelings and they noticed that feelings are like a sparkle of energy, like a very little firework going off in the night and if you just watch it, you see it just "puff". The energy flashes up your awareness (fear, anger), spreads out and for a moment everything is kind of vibrant with that energy, and it passes and goes down.

They were able to say, "If I notice the beginning surge of energy and my mind wants to figure it out, control it, the sparkle of energy will for a moment be captured by my thoughts, as if my thoughts make a little concentration around it. I have suddenly a concept in my mind that "this is fearful" and that concept, if I want, can lead to other thoughts, ("Well, it's because she did that to me," etc.). So I can weave these branches of thoughts around the little sparkle of energy, which has died by itself, but now we've got this thing, concept, and as I think about it, as we hold it in our psyche, it takes on a feeling of once and we think "She really shouldn't have done that to me,"

etc. And that thought creates another sparkle (maybe burst by now) of energy (anger) and around that we form more thoughts—and on it goes—thoughts—energy of emotion—thoughts—and we are “in a state,” as they say.

It is no longer, “I have this anger,” but, “I am angry.” This is a whole psychology about how we are with our feelings and thoughts, which we have not gotten at in a scientific way. The Contemplative Literature says, you can just HAVE a feeling, as simple as that (Wallace, 1989). It doesn’t have to go anywhere. You don’t have to suppress it, express it, analyze it, control it, figure it out, or do anything with it.

Thus, you can have some freedom to choose if you want to do anything with the feeling or thought. You don’t have to be subjected by a tyranny of feeling or thought—if you can just see it—a big “if.” These people gave their lives to doing this; a lot of time and grace to overcome their attachment to have control over their lives.

This is extremely hopeful. We need not be tyrannized by our own minds. There is a freedom for the human spirit from the chains of conditioning (emotions, concepts, etc.). We are not doomed to live out or to act out the injuries done to us in our childhood experience.

This psychological freedom is in the little space that can happen between noticing what is going on and doing something about it. In that space, the real contemplative space, the moment in which you just see and don’t have to immediately REACT, is endless freedom for any kind of response.

For most of us this is far removed from our actual experience and idealistics. Yet generations of contemplatives have suffered for self-knowledge through wakefulness (enlightenment, salvation, sanctification, etc.). But their psychological side of it is the same message.

ATTENTION

What is it? No one knows. If there is anything contemplatives know about, it is attention, awareness, consciousness, by being terribly bored, distracted, going to sleep. As well as being awake, attentive, conscious, etc. (Muktananda, 1978).

The dynamics of paying attention. If you really concentrate on X, your face will scrunch up: you will get a little tight; you might lean forward and work at paying attention—even get a headache. What contemplatives say is that your concentration doesn’t make the desk more clear, effort is not the issue. But that paying attention, in this sense, is a process of shutting everything else out (Krishnamurti, 1964). That is, working very hard not to pay attention to anything but X.

“More we learn to concentrate, as little kids our attention is wide it’s not this or that, but “Ah.” We call it awe and wonder when we

get older. We give it concepts. But it's still "Ah."

When I'm concentrating (focusing) on anything, I'm shutting things out. This is exactly what Freud called repression—the way the mind works to shut things out of attention, out of consciousness. So, repression and paying attention, in this sense, are the same thing.

It's been discovered that the brain expends a great deal of energy when we're paying attention to anything. And that energy is spent keeping unwanted stimuli and perceptions from coming into awareness.

For instance, people are hooked up to a monitor and told to concentrate on X and the researcher presents a distraction (noise). The brain exerts energy on the incoming nerves from the ear and will block the transmission of those sound impulses right out at the ear—so they never get to the brain (Spink, 1983). Much better to say "selective inattention" than "paying attention."

Contemplatives found that trying to still the mind through concentration they created more turbulence and great fatigue. They found that the greater the perception, the greater presence and quality of freedom—where when one did not try to pay attention to this or that, but was simply open to what is (Abbott, 1996).

This is a real message of hope. There may be a way in which we may move and live and function without bending our minds out of whack to do it. There can be an easier way of accomplishing what needs to be accomplished. We don't have to get tight and tense and restrict our awareness in order to live well.

Contemplatives would go further and say that if we want to live a life of love we can't be that selective in our attention. If we really want to move toward justice—reverence the earth and our sisters and brothers—we're not going to do that by concentrating on the tasks at hand, which means ignoring others. It's going to happen somehow in a simple openness to what is. Incredibly hopeful.

LOVE AND ADDICTION

What is love? Is there a psychology of love? This is what contemplatives are after. In the world's spiritual traditions there is one common theme: people looking to love (deMello, 1990). I do not know what this means.

One definition of spirituality is to seek love consciously (Mitchell, 1991). Does psychology or philosophy have anything to say to the contemplatives about love, or visa versa? No. For contemplatives, love is the way and the means, the beginning and the end. They don't pick it apart nor spell it out, though.

Psychology and philosophy do address some aspects of love, though: Is protecting offspring, sexual love, motivation, what the absence

of love during childhood seems to do to some people, etc. But the Contemplative Traditions are somewhere else. It is like love is a given in psychology and spirituality, but there is no real data about it—love always seems mysterious and elusive.

The human brain seems to function by establishing addictions (May, 1988) The cells work by adjusting to patterns that become normal and having withdrawal symptoms if they're changed. This is 99% of how the brain functions. What we learn—our personality characteristics, what we are conditioned to do—are all minor or major addictions.

Through repeated behavior the nerve cells have been working in certain ways, patterns. That's how the brain works, through attachments—not to be free, not to have that little space to be free to choose how to act regarding our thoughts and feelings. What blocks that space out is attachment/addiction/cravings.

Neurologists have shown how that works with brain. They have taken one nerve cell and addicted it to a drug and watched what it goes through when it doesn't have the drug (May, 1988). They have taken one nerve cell and taught it to respond to a positive or negative stimulus and watched what happened on the cell surface when it got used to that—the same thing (withdrawal) occurred as when addicted to the drug.

So the brain mechanism by which we become compelled to do routine things is very clear. These are ways we are held back from loving.

An addition occurs when the number and power of the brain cell which keep the addiction going are greater than the opposite. If you can stop it by will power, it isn't an addiction.

Where does the empowerment vs. addiction come from? It has to come from outside the brain. The Heart, the center, where we are really most ourselves—feel our deepest feelings and thoughts—deep intimacy with the Divine, in which human nature is most authentically expressed.

This is where the drive to love resides. Not a matter of psychology nor neurology—why we seek truth, beauty, communion, union. This does not exist in our brains.

Humans were meant to yearn—our existential condition is for love—it's the way, the end, the beginning—everything.

FUNCTIONALITY

Consider the people who taught you the most about love and how functional they were. How much excellence in personal management they had achieved. How self-actualized they were. Obviously, the two don't necessarily go together.

Some people are forced to relinquish their efficiency through sickness's contingencies. Others, choose it. The contemplatives. This

relinquishment may be a matter of degree at times, of course.

Often the most loving people are far from the most functional. This may sound simplistic: but this is the challenge we are facing today. LOVE vs. EFFICIENCY. And, where are you going to find and claim your identity? Where are you going to own it?

Saying: "This is what I am and what I'm for?" That's where. We've been searching for our identities long enough. It's not to be FOUND. It's in what you want to claim. The power of your intent—your willingness, not your willfulness. For us to claim our longing, our restlessness, is the only hope for us in First World countries.

Yet this claiming puts us in conflict with the way the world runs. In our culture we have been taught that if you don't feel fulfilled, complete, satisfied with your life, there is something wrong with how you're living. You have psychological problems, or you don't have the right or enough faith. If you were right with God and were healthy in mind, then you should either be fulfilled or on your way to being fulfilled and know exactly what you need to get there.

So, most of us feel a yearning and we're in the midst of a lie in which we have been taught that happiness consists in having most of our physical and psychological needs met. Yet we feel an emptiness, a longing for something and we can't specify exactly what it is.

So we think we've got a problem. We think we should be satisfied—or if we're not, we ought to figure out why and do something about it. When we feel that way, when we feel bad about our longing, we are disparaging what is our most precious gift—debasement, devaluing our fundamental identity.

To turn that around and to love our longing, or those emptinesses inside that prompt us to seek "something else," embrace our restlessness, to truly love the spaces inside ourselves (the hole in the soul), and try not to fill them up all the time, this is a radical change. And we don't get any cultural support for it. You can't justify it. You can't say: "I'm seeking love so I can deepen the spaces inside me"—how's that going to sound to your principal or department chair?

There are a few people around you can connect with, who understand. But culturally you can't justify it. If pushed to the wall and someone says: "Why aren't you out there doing more?" All you can say is: "I want to do what I'm doing." You can't even say, "because this part of my brain is acting up."

So, what are we to do and how can we teach any of this to our students—if indeed we even agree with it? We need to find our own "hole in the soul," our own contemplative spaces first. We need to value and love our longing and restlessness. The rest will follow.

References

Emily Abbott, *States of Meditation: A Qualitative Inquiry Into the Practices of Fifteen Meditators*. (Houston: University of Houston, Doctoral Dissertation, 1996).

Anthony deMello, *Awareness*. (New York: Image Books, 1990).

Dennis Fehr, *Dogs Playing Cards: Powerbrokers of Prejudice in Education, Art and Culture*. (New York: Peter Lang, 1993).

Krishnamurti, *Think On These Things*. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).

Donald Mitchell, *Spirituality and Emptiness*. (New York: Paulist Press, 1991).

Swami Muktananda, *Play of Consciousness*. (New York: Syda Foundation, 1978).

Sharon Salzberg, *Loving-Kindness: The Revolutionary Art of Happiness*. (Boston: Shambhala, 1995).

Peter Spink, *The Path of the Mystic*. (London: Darton, Long,an and Todd, 1983).

B. Alan Wallace, *Choosing Reality: A Contemplative View of Physics and the Mind*. (Boston: Shambhala, 1989).

RESPONSE TO ROBERT CRAIG'S PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

ARTHUR BROWN

Wayne State University

INTRODUCTION

After presenting what I think is a fairly clear, if not brilliant, analysis of an educational issue and then looking around for evidence of admiration and comprehension, occasionally (not often, you understand), some student will say, "I'm confused." Careful to hide my impatience, I try again. Then sometimes I understand it. Perhaps when Bob hears and responds to my confusion, he may have a similar experience.

I may be somewhat confused, but this does not mean that Bob is not onto something. Having over the years become more interested in political and social philosophy as they relate to education and having become increasingly concerned about ethical problems in this difficult and complex world, I find myself not paying much attention these days to mental states or to matters metaphysical. I am not suggesting that these matters are unimportant. But I find they do not help me either understand or arrive at positions on the practical problems of the world. (Bob, as you now know, believes that they can; I will say more about this later.)

I hasten to add, however, that I am not totally unacquainted with what Bob is talking about. I did go through years of deep introspection and a long search for identity and meaning. And, during the years between ages 20 and 30, the nature of mind, metaphysics,

religion, and "self-knowledge," to use Bob's term, were of profound concern to me. For a time I was into Vedantism and, later, Catholicism and read, among others, the three Thomases (Aquinas, a Kempis, and Merton). In fact, after reading Thomas Merton, I was tempted to join his Trappist monastery, where silence reigned; a wonderful cure, it seemed to me at the time, for the shallowness of so much of the speech and life that surrounded me. Instead of the monastery, I went into agriculture and was involved with farming for a number of years. The attraction of the farm was similar, I believe, to that of religion. It was a place for elevation of the spirit, for communion, for peace, for self-knowledge, and for meaning.

Notwithstanding this experience, Bob's paper still leaves me somewhat confused. In order to help resolve this predicament, I am going to do the following: First, I will attempt to tease out the essence of Bob's paper. Second, I will critique three particular problems Bob addresses. And third, I will compare and contrast the educational prescriptions which devolve from Bob's position on these problems and those which follow from my own. In the process, I expect that we shall see two quite different world views.

ESSENCE OF CRAIG'S PAPER

Bob is contrasting what we might call the "activist" nature of contemporary psychology with (if you will excuse the double meaning) what I shall call the "passivist" (pacifist) nature of contemplation. Contemporary psychology, he says, seeks to do something: explain our behavior, help people become more functional, help us "manage our feelings," etc. Contemplatives want to do more, Bob claims. (I don't think he means "do more"; I think he means do something different.) Contemplatives, according to Bob, are acceptant. For them, self-knowledge has intrinsic value. "The contemplative literature says you can just HAVE a feeling, as simple as that. It doesn't have to go anywhere, you don't have to do something with it." This condition, Bob maintains, offers us hope and freedom. Moreover, he says, by not paying attention to our feelings, by simply accepting them and by being open to our experiences and not selecting what we will pay attention to and what we will not pay attention to ("selective inattention"), we can "live a life of love." From here Bob gets into worldly matters: "If we really want to move toward justice—reverence the earth and our sisters and brothers—we're not going to do that by concentrating on the tasks at hand, which means ignoring others. It's going to happen somehow in a simple openness to what is.

is uniquely human capacity for universal love, like an addiction, happens. Loving is not an act of will, Bob claims, and cannot, as

with any addiction, be overcome by an act of will. "If you can stop it by will power; it isn't an addiction," he says. Love is beyond the explanatory powers of neurology and psychology or philosophy. "It is a given" and resides not in the brain but in the heart. It is part of our human nature or existential condition to yearn for it and to give it. ". . . it's the way, the end, the beginning—everything."

In his conclusion, Bob bemoans the fact that contemplatives are aliens in a world which prizes efficiency, functionality. The challenge today is love vs. efficiency: "Often the most loving people are far from the most functional." Facing up to our existential condition, he says, recognizing that a certain emptiness is part of our "soul-ful" nature, and being open about it, is the road to both personal and societal salvation, "the only hope for us in First World countries."

MY REACTION

On the Opposition between Functionality and Love

We must be careful not to stretch a concept so far—even the concept of love—that it promises to be totally out of touch with the world. To say that love is the "only hope for us in first world countries" is asking too much of love and asking too little of rationality, of intelligence, of the willingness to compromise. There is no reason why love and efficiency cannot co-exist. In fact, they must.

For one thing, to believe that love is the only hope for us, leaves us prey to those who would manipulate us, who would subjugate us. The world is full of vultures. Relying solely on love is not only not our only hope, it would eventuate in disaster as the vultures do their dirty business. For another, even if we accept the view that evil does not inhere in the nature of things and that evil actions are caused by social inequities and injustices, which in theory at least can be eliminated, we still must face up to the fact that in a complex world any number of competing values exist and that inequities and injustices are to a large degree matters of perception. The attendant social problems simply do not lend themselves to a simple solution. As H.L. Mencken pointed out: for every complex problem there is a simple solution—that is wrong. Even love.

On Self-knowledge

"Contemplatives," Bob says, "speak of the life of the soul which goes on without our knowing it. This is called self-knowledge." He adds: ". . . generations of contemplatives have suffered for self-knowledge through wakefulness (enlightenment, salvation, sanctification, etc.)." My understanding is that for Bob, there is some kind of core self, some kind of self, some kind of universal soul in all of us, which we can come to

"know." Not an uncommon concept, but one, I am afraid, inadequate to life's demands.

We are never the same self; over time we are always different selves. Selves are always in the making. By virtue of living in the world, experiencing, suffering, persevering, reflecting, we grow into different selves. In this never-ending process we can arrive at higher levels of integration and understanding—and loving.

If what I am saying is correct, the implications for education are enormous. Rather than have students acquire "self-knowledge" in some decontextualized manner through examining, as Bob says, "the psychological side of their experience" or through "enlightenment, salvation, sanctification" (whatever they mean), we should put students in situations where they are engaged in problems of vital interest, where they reflect on those problems, and where they try to do something about those problems. That is how we all grow (if we do at all); that is how over time we get to "know" our selves. There is no such thing as "self-knowledge" without a context.

The Will and Value

To review for a moment, according to Bob, love is an addiction and like other addictions "simply happens; loving is not an act of the will." "It is letting-go, a surrender into a net which one cannot fall out of." Further, we cannot stop an addiction by the exercise of will: "If we can stop it by will power; it isn't an addiction."

For those of us not inside the contemplative tradition described by Bob, this concept of surrendering to addiction is not easy to comprehend. Nevertheless, I believe the relationship between the will and human behavior merits some consideration in light of its pedagogical implications—a matter which, as far as I can see, Bob has not addressed.

I am convinced that the power of the will is greatly exaggerated—perhaps non-existent. In this regard, I am in agreement with Bob. However, "surrender" is not the substitute I would offer. If an "addiction" is to be overcome, it will be done by valuing an action or a state of affairs more than the addiction. I offer a couple of examples from my own life. Some thirty years ago I suffered from periodic stomach pains sometimes so excruciating that my doctor would have to knock me out with Demerol before the pain would subside. At the time, and for several years prior, I was interested in losing some weight, but apparently not interested enough. After three years of suffering episodes of stomach pains and several misdiagnoses, it was finally discovered that I had stones in my gall bladder (minute ones which apparently clogged the bile

In addition, I discovered that I suffered the attacks principally after eating a heavy meal. During the two week period between these

discoveries and my scheduled surgery, valuing food less than being free of pain, I decided to eat only half of whatever food was placed before me. Voila! I lost 12 pounds in 14 days!

It may be that for some, food does not qualify as an addiction. How about smoking? I smoked for 40 years—cigarettes, pipes, cigars. After 20 years of cigarettes I quit because I convinced myself that smoking had been responsible for what was then diagnosed as a heart attack (several months later the diagnosis was changed to pericarditis). Occasionally I have nightmares about someone forcing me to smoke a cigarette.

I quit smoking the pipe because it was burning my tongue. Finally, about 10 years ago I stopped smoking cigars when I had to have surgery for urinary bladder stones. The relationship between urinary bladder cancer and smoking was well-known and I valued my life more than the cigar. I have not suffered any withdrawal symptoms nor do I have any desire to take up smoking again.

One could find any number of instances in daily life of how the acceptance of certain values has resulted in overcoming habits or addictions of long standing. I offer two: heightened sensitivity to the environment and its effect on how we handle household trash; heightened sensitivity to discriminatory practices and the treatment of women in the workplace. The reader, I am sure, will have no difficulty finding other instances where a change in values has effected a change in behavior, however habitual or "addicted."

I have spent considerable time on this matter because it has profound implications for education. With all the talk about educational reform, with all the restructurings proposed, with all the legislation passed to create charter schools, with all the attention from Washington on national standards, and with practically every governor declaring him/herself an Education Governor and every president of recent memory, an Education President, we seem to be neglecting a fundamental principle: **WHEN STUDENTS VALUE WHAT THEY ARE DOING, WHEN THEY IDENTIFY WITH THE TASK AT HAND, PROBLEMS OF INATTENTION, DISCIPLINE, AND ACHIEVEMENT FADE AWAY.**

UNVIRTUOUS VIRTUE
PISTEMOLOGY

DAVID B. ANNIS
Ball State University

The recent focus on virtue ethics in the professional literature is enriching our understanding of ethics. For a long time, at least in the modern period, ethical theory restricted itself to deontic ethics. The fundamental question in deontic ethics is, "What should I do?". Deontic ethical theorists attempted to formulate relatively abstract principles specifying right conduct. For example, utilitarian theories determined right conduct in terms of what acts maximized overall welfare. Kantian theories specified right conduct in terms of whether the conduct could be universalized.

For virtue ethics the fundamental question is, "What kind of person should I be?". It focuses on the study of character and the kinds of traits, emotions, desires, and motivations that virtuous or vicious people display. A theory of virtue ethics will explain, among other things, what a virtue is, provide an analysis of key virtues and vices, and explain what makes a particular virtue valuable or a vice bad.¹ For example how is integrity to be analyzed? How does it relate to hypocrisy and fanaticism? Is what accounts for the value of integrity the same that explains the value of courage or compassion? How does one develop integrity? Is integrity a "master virtue" integrating and balancing other virtues and values? Is integrity an emotion, a skill, a capacity, or what? Exploring these questions helps to reveal the richness of virtue ethics and how it deepens our under-

standing of morality.

Deontic ethics by focusing on right conduct tends to be overly narrow and leaves out much of the nature of morality. Think of what factors we might appeal to in evaluating a person from a moral point of view. Yes, we would certainly appeal to the person's conduct, but the person's motives, goals, desires, beliefs, attitudes, emotions, character traits, and other factors would all be relevant. Virtue ethics takes these factors into account in assessing an agent, and so it paints a richer tapestry of our moral lives.

Recently, some philosophers have started approaching theory of knowledge or epistemology from an "epistemic virtue" perspective. Instead of focusing on competing theories of knowledge such as foundationalism or coherentism, or on competing theories of justification such as internalism or externalism or responding to the challenge of skepticism, by studying the epistemic virtues and vices, the hope is our understanding of epistemology will be enriched.²

I certainly applaud this broadening of contemporary epistemology. It offers the same hope of enrichment which has resulted in ethics from the study of virtue ethics. The problem is that there is undue narrowness in the approach displayed in the literature, and this narrowness is resulting in losing much of what a virtue epistemic approach has to offer. By drawing on some of the issues in virtue ethics, I suggest how virtue epistemology might be pursued in a broader and more rewarding way.

Some philosophers have treated virtue epistemology as a kind of reliabilism (Greco 1993). Reliabilism holds that knowledge is true belief generated by a reliable process. Thus, if Tami has the true belief that there is a tree in front of her, and this belief was generated by seeing the tree and such perception in the circumstances is reliable, then Tami knows that there is a tree in front of her. Reliabilism is contrasted with internalism which requires the person to have reasons for his or her belief and appreciate the evidential nature of those reasons, i.e., understand whether those reasons justify his or her belief.

What virtue epistemology is supposed to add to reliabilism is that the true belief must result from a cognitive virtue, where a cognitive virtue is a reliable belief generating mechanism. It is reliable in generating true beliefs rather than false ones.

Such an approach gives only a scance look in the direction of real virtue epistemology. The thrust of the discussion that has taken place in the literature follows the familiar reliabilism v. internalism debate.

Attention is given to exploring the intellectual traits and skills that constitute the epistemic virtues. In ethics this approach would be similar to praising the study of virtue ethics, but approaching

ethics as follows. What is important in ethics is right conduct. Right acts are determined by what maximizes overall welfare, i.e., by utilitarianism. A trait is a virtue if it generally results in acts which maximize utility. Here the focus is on right acts and maximizing utility. The virtues and vices are given a side-glance only insofar as they relate to maximizing utility. But this is to ignore most of the richness virtue ethics has produced. Reducing virtue epistemology to reliabilism is like reducing virtue ethics to utilitarianism. There isn't much progress in this!

Much of the richness of virtue ethics comes from a study of moral character and the various virtues and vices which in part constitute one's character. Some philosophers have approached virtue epistemology in a parallel fashion, and have focused on those traits and skills which are virtues and vices from an epistemic point of view.

Here are some of the epistemic virtues. Being knowledgeable, well-informed, being curious, inquisitive, being persistent, diligent, thorough, careful, precise, reliable, orderly, being rational, having intellectual courage and integrity, being honest, fair-minded, judicious, impartial, willing to revise or reconsider one's views, being open-minded, flexible, being creative, having a good imagination, being a good critical thinker, having good problem-solving skills, being able to synthesize and organize parts into a whole, and the list could go on.

Studying each of these traits, skills, capacities, attitudes and desires, how they relate to each other, how they are developed, and what explains their value would produce a very rich epistemology. But this is not what is being done by virtue epistemologists. Again there is an unwarranted narrowness in their approach.

Part of this narrowness may be due to how our epistemic ends are conceived. It is usually suggested that our epistemic ends are having true beliefs and avoiding false ones (Montmarquet, 1993). But these ends easily could be achieved by believing one is a number, two is a number, etc. Clearly we have more epistemic ends. We want to understand and be able to explain the world about us. This requires a fairly comprehensive and interrelated set of beliefs. It might be said in reply that the ultimate epistemic end is truth. Wanting a comprehensive set of beliefs which enables us to understand and explain the world about us is simply a means to the ultimate end of truth. Accepting this instrumental view of other possible epistemic ends results in our focusing on understanding and reaching satisfactory explanations only as a means to truth.

Aristotle held that happiness or well-being is the ultimate end of our (voluntary) actions. Suppose we held that courage, integrity, and self-control were merely means to happiness. This would distort our understanding of these virtues. Having these virtues may be in part a means to happiness, but they are also in part constitutive of a virtuous life, a life of

well-being. In the same way, the instrumental view of other epistemic ends distorts what it is to be epistemically virtuous.

We want truth. But we also want to understand and be able to explain. We want people with creative imaginations. By not focusing just on truth, we may be encouraged to explore other epistemic ends and traits and skills related to these other ends.

Another narrowness displayed in the literature on virtue epistemology is the tendency to want to reduce the many epistemic virtues to a few. For example, it has been suggested that a person is epistemically conscientious when the agent does his or her best to arrive at truth and avoid false beliefs. Being impartial, open-minded, having intellectual courage, perseverance, etc. are all viewed as forms of conscientiousness (Montmarquet, 1993: ch. 2).

Virtue ethics on the other hand is much more diverse. It is harder to satisfy our craving for unity. James Wallace argues that the value of the moral virtues can be understood in terms of the various functions or roles they play in our lives (Wallace, 1973). The virtues are connected in various different ways to living a good human life. For example, honesty makes possible activities and institutions necessary for communities and social cooperation. Compassion, kindness, and generosity foster mutual feelings of good will and an individual's sense of worth. Courage, patience, and self-control enable individuals to govern themselves, pursue plans, and to participate fully in a life structured by intelligence, institutions, and conventions.

What explains why certain traits are moral virtues varies across a number of the virtues. Thus it is doubtful that the moral virtues can be reduced to a few. The same is probably true of the epistemic virtues. Creative imagination plays one role in our epistemic life. Recognizing fallacies plays another role as do many of the other epistemic virtues.

Some further diversity in virtue epistemology is revealed by the discussion of the unity of virtues in ethics. Socrates held that to be morally virtuous in general requires possessing all the virtues. But why can't one be in general virtuous, in general a decent person, but be at least somewhat lacking in a particular virtue. Perhaps one is impartial, respectful, honest, patient, self-controlled, but not particularly generous. There is a moral "gappiness" that many people seem to display. They aren't consistent across all the virtues, and yet this doesn't stop us from thinking they are generally virtuous.

There is even some reason to believe that there is an incompatibility in the virtues, so one couldn't have them all. Think of some of these pairs: impartial, loyal; persistent, flexible; courageous, careful; gentle,

As general traits these may pull in opposite directions. If Carol

being kind, compassionate, giving and nurturing, and a justice perspective, oriented towards being impartial, respecting rights, and giving people their due, then again we may have reason for thinking that it is difficult to have all the virtues (Gilligan, 1986). To be well developed in the care perspective may make it more difficult to develop the more impartial justice perspective and vice versa.

In fact what seems to happen is that people develop their moral personalities around a cluster of traits. They may be quite honest, a person of one's word, very fair in their dealings with people, impartial, a person of integrity, and courageous. But they may not be particularly compassionate or generous. People manifest different moral personalities with traits occurring or not and to different degrees.

This diversity of moral personalities has implications for virtue epistemology. There may be a tension among some of the epistemic virtues. For example good analytic skills may tend to exclude more global abilities—seeing the whole, how the pieces all fit together. We do have measures for different cognitive styles. We have all experienced the person who is great at critically evaluating the ideas of others, but who isn't particularly good at producing his or her own creative solutions. Just as our moral personalities seem to differ, so our epistemic profiles may also differ. We may excel at some epistemic virtues while be lacking in others.³

If there is a diversity of epistemic profiles, then much of contemporary epistemology is wrong. Epistemology as pursued by analytic philosophers has tended to focus on individual knowledge—what it is for *S* to know that *P*. But perhaps a different focus is needed. To produce, discover, and verify knowledge requires a host of epistemic traits. But these traits or virtues are distributed throughout society in diverse ways. Individuals don't have all the epistemic virtues. Instead of focusing on individual knowledge, our focus should be on how the group with its diverse traits, some analytic, some global, some creative, some critical, discover and verify knowledge. Such an approach would treat knowledge as the social enterprise that it is (Nencel and Pels, eds., 1991; Salomon, 1993).

Wittgenstein once mentioned to a friend that he had almost used a line from *King Lear* as the motto of the *Philosophical Investigations*, "I'll teach you differences" (Pitcher, 1964: 217). In using virtue ethics as suggestive for exploring theory of knowledge, we need to take advantage of the diversity revealed in virtue ethics, not hide it. Here are my suggestions.

Don't try to reduce virtue epistemology to one of the traditional positions in the theory of knowledge such as foundationalism, coherentism, externalism, etc.

Don't try to subsume all the epistemic virtues under a few. Revel in

the richness of different epistemic virtues. Explore and savor each of the virtues.

Don't try to reduce all our epistemic ends to truth. Even if they are all related to truth, they are still broader. By including these broader epistemic ends, it encourages us to explore more of the epistemic virtues and vices.

Virtue epistemologists need to recognize what researchers in other fields have already seen, namely, individuals develop different epistemic profiles. We have different cognitive styles. We learn and know in different ways.

Finally, virtue epistemologists should take note of the importance of the social dimension of knowledge, just as virtue ethicists place virtues and vices in a social context. Researchers in psychology, sociology, education, and other fields already have stressed the importance of the social aspects of knowledge.

One last comment. If virtue epistemology is pursued in the ways I am suggesting, we will get a realistic epistemology with implications for education. The analytic epistemology of the last 30 years or more carries very few implications for education. To me that means it isn't a very realistic theory of knowledge. But a theory of knowledge which focuses on intellectual virtues such as creative thinking, critical thinking, intellectual honesty and fairness, and so on will produce a theory of knowledge which would be quite relevant to educational theory.

Notes

1. For a brief introduction to different approaches to ethics, including virtue ethics, see James Rachels (1993), *The Elements of Moral Philosophy*, 2d ed.

2. See Louis J. Pojman (1995), *What Can We Know* for an overview of these positions in epistemology.

3. And there may be gender differences too. Compare M. Belenky et al. (1986), *Women's Ways of Knowing*.

Bibliography

Belenky, M., et al. *Women's Ways of Knowing*. New York: Basic Books, 1986.

Gilligan, Carol. *In a Different Voice*. Cambridge: Harvard, 1986.

Greco, John. "Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 23 (1993): 413-32.

Montmarquet, James A. *Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993.

Lorraine, and Peter Pels, eds. *Constructing Knowledge*. New York: Sage, 1991.

George. *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964.

a, Alvin. "Epistemic Justification." *Nous* 20 (1986): 3-18.

Pojman, Louis J. *What Can We Know*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995.

Rachels, James. *The Elements of Moral Philosophy*. 2d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993.

Salomon, Gavriel, ed. *Distributed Cognitions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1993.

Sosa, Ernest. *Knowledge in Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1991.

Wallace, James. *Virtues and Vices*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1973.

RUDOLPH STEINER AND THE WALDORF SCHOOLS

EARL J. OGLETREE
Chicago State University

Men who have new ideas that are not in tune with the thinking of their day are rarely recognized during their lifetime. Too often their ideas and contributions, though known in a small circle of followers, do not surface in the public domain for decades.

Rudolf Steiner is one of these men. He and his followers have established the largest nondenominational private school system in the world known as Waldorf Schools or Steiner Schools. The system consists of 700 schools in 44 countries and over 1000 kindergartens worldwide. One hundred twenty of these schools are in the U.S. In addition, Steiner and his students founded 550 residential and day schools for special children. These schools are also scattered throughout many countries.

Although Steiner is best known for the Waldorf school system he initiated, both he and his schools are almost unknown in educational circles. Few educators in public and private schools or even in universities have heard of him. Neither he and his schools are mentioned in the educational literature, journals or books. Neill's *Summerhill* in England, attended at best by forty to fifty students annually, was internationally known. It is discussed in most textbooks of education and in educational courses taught at teacher colleges and universities. Montessori schools are much discussed and published here and abroad. Why isn't Steiner's educational system better

known?

Parents and educators are seeking innovative approaches to education. Why the silence on Steiner and his enterprises? Perhaps it is Steiner's esoteric philosophy—Anthroposophy, the unusual theory of human development and educational practices that flow from it.

RUDOLF STEINER AND HIS WORK

Before delving into the theories and the practices of the Waldorf Schools, it would perhaps be appropriate to say something about the man. Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925), the son of a stationmaster, was born in Austria. He was a precocious child. During his teens, grounded in math and science of the day, he acquired a deep and extensive knowledge of literature and philosophy. At age 14, he read and critiqued Emmanuel Kant's Critique of Reason. He received his first degree in mathematics, chemistry and natural science from the Technical University in Vienna. At 21 he was appointed editor of Kurshner's edition of Goethe's scientific writings, and earning a PhD in 1891. Out of his extensive study of the work of Goethe and other philosophers, and his own insight, he developed a philosophical school of thought known as Anthroposophy (wisdom of man), an esoteric form of objective idealism. He then began his work as an international lecturer.

Steiner spoke and wrote voluminously. He gave more than six thousand lectures and wrote more than sixty books and essays and articles on history, religion, education, evolution, science, architecture, astronomy, religion, psychology, physiology, agriculture, and medicine. In his writings and lectures he revealed little about himself. Little is known about his personal life, his parents, friends or financial affairs. His major objective was to propagate his philosophy and the enterprises that sprang from it. Steiner gave new indications and insights in philosophy: his major philosophical work is his Philosophy of Freedom (Steiner 1964). His interests were wide ranging. He delved into painting, sculpture, music, speech, drama, eurythmy, pharmacology, economics, agriculture, and education. The enterprises that sprang from Steiner's work include hospitals, clinics (including the training of hundreds of physicians in his form of medical therapy), two pharmaceutical companies, a university, biodynamic farms, and scientific research centers where techniques of chromatography, crystallization, and water purification are studied. These enterprises, and the approximately 1200 schools for typical and special children and 40 Waldorf teacher training centers, are located internationally, including Russia, eastern block countries, India and Japan. Milwaukee and Sacramento public school systems have adopted the Waldorf model as an alternative or magnet school.

question of why Steiner is not recognized as a philosopher in

contemporary society or his Waldorf Schools known or understood in any detail. The answer seems to be is the origin of Steiner's philosophy—Anthroposophy. Steiner's philosophical works—Philosophy of Freedom, Truth and Knowledge and Riddles of Philosophy were not based on western philosophical thinking, but based on spiritual thinking, his ability to research the spiritual world. As a child Steiner brought with him into the world a vestigial of old clairvoyance. He was able to see into the spiritual world, which he hid from others. His first verification of this gift was substantiated when a recently deceased cousin request his help. In Goethe's writings he found confirmation of this unusual gift of inner experiences in which the spiritual world was as real as the physical world. Like Goethe, Steiner believed in a spiritual world that interpenetrated the physical world. In 1886, age 24, he published his first book, Theory of Knowledge in the Light of Goethe's Weltanschauung. In 1894, he published his major work Philosophy of Spiritual Activity or Philosophy of Freedom which represented the results of many years of struggle with the problem of knowledge and the relationship between the worlds of senses and spirit. Steiner could not accept what he thought were the "narrow materialistic and mechanistic theories of the day;" they contradicted his distinct, daily perceptions of the reality of the spiritual world. In his Philosophy of Spiritual Activity he argued that by clarity of thought via meditation and strengthening one's thinking any one could gain insight into the spiritual realm. His whole philosophical system was based on immediate spiritual experience. He said that the experiences of our consciousness can enter the true realities (spiritual world) by means of strengthening our soul forces (mind/thinking).

He claimed by extending or continuing the natural scientific method of thinking process into the cognitive exercises given in his Philosophy of Spiritual Activity and the Knowledge of Higher Worlds and its Attainment one could penetrate the spiritual world and acquire the knowledge and know the other half of reality which penetrates the physical world. He claimed that the result allows a person to find answers to the deepest questions to life. Therefore, one acquires freedom of knowing by experience, not on the basis of faith or dogma. Freedom is attained by thinking which is no longer limited to the physical realm. This also leads to recognition of the individuality in one's selfhood and the individuality of others in their selfhood and not their type—gender, race, ethnicity, etc. Therefore the goal of Anthroposophy is to show the way to acquire knowledge beyond the physical world. The term "anthroposophy" is derived from the Greek word *anthropos* "man" and *sophia* "wisdom" which Steiner used to denote that wisdom which comes

when they are able to perceive the spiritual world as well as the physical world. Apparently Steiner had reached this stage which he

calls intuitive thinking. His knowledge and work were derived from the spiritual world. For example, instead of man being conceived as body and soul. Steiner via his supersensible experiences found that man consists of a physical body, an etheric (energy body or forces), an astral body (soul or mind) and spirit (ego). These concepts are applied in medicine and education. Steiner's philosophy, Anthroposophy, is called spiritual science or in conventional terms: "concrete or objective idealism" in that ideas are as real as the physical world. For example, the idea of reincarnation on which he gave numerous lectures, describing the after and earthly lives of such noted individuals as Jesus and Plato, became reality based on his ability to perceive and follow them into the spiritual world. In 1904, from his enhanced experiences Steiner wrote, the above mentioned, Knowledge of Higher Worlds and its Attainment which describes meditational processes of developing one's thinking to perceive the spiritual world. One can say that Steiner developed a theory of knowledge, which took its beginning from the direct experience of the spiritual nature of thinking. It is because of the origin and basis of Steiner's philosophy he has not been recognized by the "world of official" philosophers and educators.

Steiner was essentially a religious thinker. His life and work were based on his vision of the universe and of the nature and destiny of mankind. He felt his special mission was to reveal the invisible world to the public in concepts and language that could be understood. Yet he not only addressed metaphysical and lofty ideas, he also dealt with mundane and practical questions. He carried over and implemented his insights of his spiritual reality into the physical world. He and his followers established numerous enterprises in the areas of education (e.g., Waldorf), medicine (Iscador), medical clinics, hospitals, pharmaceutic companies, retirement villages, 50 facilities for the care of special children and adults (Camphill Villages and schools), 1500 biodynamic farms, Christian Community Churches, developed the art of eurythmy (describe), he gave special indications in techniques of painting, and architecture, (twice he designed the Goetheanum—a massive building—headquarters for the Anthroposophical Society in Dornach, Switzerland—a fire destroyed the first building. In addition he established social organizations such as the Threefold Commonwealth in which the political, economic and culture (religion and education) were separate and independent entities. He encouraged his followers to follow in his foot steps. Today, there are approximately 58,000 Anthroposophists, internationally, including approximately 2500 in the U.S.

PHILOSOPHY OF WALDORF EDUCATION

ERIC first Waldorf School was established in Stuttgart, Germany in 164

1919 with the support of Emile Molt, an industrialist, who was seeking a humanistic school for his employees. Following the chaos of WWI, Molt felt that many of the problems of Germany was facing in the post war period were due to the neglected education of the working class. Steiner was asked to introduce a new approach to the social, economic and political life of Europe. Steiner set up the curriculum, recruited and trained the teachers and supervised the operation of the school. It became the model for subsequent schools. Steiner stated that the "highest endeavor (of Waldorf education) must be to develop free human beings, who are able to, in themselves, to impart purpose and direction to their lives" (Steiner, 1948, p.2).

The philosophical foundation of Waldorf education is based on Steiner's spiritually-inspired Anthroposophy. Included in his anthroposophy is the meaning of life and the nature of man as a spiritual being. He perceived that man is a threefold being of spirit (ego), soul (mind) and body (corporeal body) whose capacities unfold in three developmental stages toward adulthood: early childhood, middle childhood and adolescence. Children are viewed as distinct individuals with a pre- and post-destiny, who bring with them individual capacities and talents. These attributes are to be nurtured and drawn out by the teacher. Her job is to remove all obstacles and hindrances to make possible the full development of children's talents for later service in behalf of humanity, rather than prematurely forcing the learning of outside prescribed subjects that are incompatible with and not supportive of the child's unfolding stages of development. Although Steiner's Anthroposophy is not taught to students or to parents, the curriculum and methodology are influenced by it. Waldorf teachers' anthroposophical beliefs influences the way they view their students, the implementation of the Waldorf curriculum and teaching techniques. All teachers receive formal Waldorf training in Steiner's philosophy, theory of child development and hands-on teaching methods, followed by continuous weekly inservice meetings, summer seminars and self-study.

What makes Waldorf fundamentally different from other methods is that it approaches the teaching process both as a science and as an art. The approach to child development is based on scientific knowledge of the whole child as body, soul and spirit. "The art of education requires the teacher to adopt an artistic approach in educating children in every subject, so that the body experiences, via activity, so the soul is touched by and the spirit understands the inherent meaning in what the intellect processes" (Maher and Shepperd, 1995, p. 23). The methodology includes teaching on three levels to involve the children's willing (doing), feeling and thinking to help them to integrate and harmonize their soul

The basic tenets of Waldorf education offers: 1) a new way of looking at the world, seeing it as both material and spiritual, healing the conflict between science and religion, 2) a new picture of the human being identified as a spiritual identity with a past, present and future, whose task is to use his/her individual gifts in community with others for the benefit of the earth, 3) an imaginative education that nourishes the whole human being, including his/her moral nature, not simply the intellect, 4) a curriculum that matches the learning process to the stages of inner growth in the child, promoting appropriate, stress-free, enjoyable learning, and 5) an indepth grasp of child development which understands how education of the will via motoric and artistic activities and the feelings via imaginative and pictorial teaching influences intellectual development (Maher and Shepperd, 1995).

In regards to premature intellectual learning, a prevalent practice in other education school systems, is a major concern in Waldorf schools. Steiner (1924) warned:

We must take the greatest care that intellectual thinking does not appear too early. We must strive to educate in such a way that the intellect, which awakens at puberty, can find its nourishment in the child's own nature. If during his early school years he has stored up an inner treasury of riches through imitation, through his feeling for authority and from the pictorial character of his teaching (as in Waldorf education), then at puberty these inner riches can be transmuted into intellectual activity. He will now always be faced with the task of thinking what before he has willed and felt. For a human being can only come to an experience of freedom if his intellectually awakening within him of itself, not if it has poured into him by his teachers. But it must not awaken in poverty. (p. 85)

If the student is taught in this manner the intellect will be properly exercised and strengthened, instead of being dulled and perhaps retarded. In the early and elementary grades Waldorf teachers attempt to teach intellectual conceptual academic content by transforming it into artistic and pictorial conceptions, which are compatible with the children's thinking.

WALDORF TEACHING METHODS

The Waldorf schools approach the child as a growth-readiness, developmental being. Any form of premature forced learning is taboo. Teachers at the elementary school level use a kinesthetic, action-approach to intellectual subjects. The child is involved first in the

realm of impulse and doing, then in emotions, and then gradually led to knowledge and developmental skills. Waldorf teachers feel that by delaying the teaching of a subject until the child is cognitively and motivationally ready, they economize teaching time, permitting a broader curriculum.

The consciousness of young children is primarily imaginative; their thinking occurs in pictorial, mental representations; and they learn by doing. Every effort, therefore, is made to present subject matter so as to involve the child motorically and artistically. With this approach, art is not an isolated subject, but a pervasive medium that gives meaning to every subject and promotes intrinsic motivation. Intellectualism is "out"; art, rhythm and music are "in." The emphasis is on the development of skills and capacities (Finsor, 1994).

MAIN LESSON

Another special feature of the Waldorf School is the main lesson or block period. This is a two-hour period at the beginning of each day. The lesson is devoted to one subject for three weeks or longer. Typical subjects are mathematics, language arts, history, and science. The main lesson allows the pupil to give his undivided attention to each subject. He lives with his studies more intensely. The brighter pupil deepens his interest and is stimulated to intensified creative work. The slower pupil, whose interest may be hardly touched in the fifty-minute periods, has time in the two-hour main lessons to develop his interest in the subject and to deal with it in some depth.

BALANCED DAY

The activities of the school day are balanced or distributed in relation to the child's restfulness and activeness. The child is more rested and attentive in the morning and more restless and less attentive in the afternoon. Therefore, the intellectual subjects are taught in the morning and the artistic and the physically active subjects are taught in the afternoon. In the main lesson, for example, the intellectual subjects are taught during the first periods of the day, when the children are rested and can concentrate. The artistic subjects arts, crafts, music are taught in the late morning and the early afternoon. The more active subjects—Bothmer gymnastics, physical education, eurythmy, industrial arts—are taught at the end of the school day, when the children are restless and less attentive.

STUDENT CREATED TEXTBOOKS

Commercial textbooks are used in the Waldorf schools, particularly in the lower grades. Waldorf teachers do not teach from commer-

cial textbooks or use worksheets or computers as instructional tools. (Computers are introduced in grade 12.) Pupils write and illustrate their own class work in lesson books from the material developed and given by the teacher. Each class teacher has skills in drawing, painting (water color), knitting and other handcrafts, and playing the recorder (flute). These are taught as developmental skills so that the child progresses in these areas from grade to grade as in the more academic subjects. The arts become tools for learning the intellectual subjects. For example, reading is taught through a developmental sequence in which writing is taught through form drawing before reading. Since writing is active and reading is passive, the children are taught to experience the letters, imaginatively (through fairy tales, pictures, art, drawing and writing) before any attempt is made to decode their meaning. Geometric form drawing (create and practice drawing geometric patterns) and painting are used to lead the children into writing. The children first read what they have written in vivid colors in their class workbooks. These workbooks or pupil-made lesson books serve as readers in the first three-five grades.

EURYTHMY

Eurythmy is a disciplined art form in which the movement of the arms expresses the vowels and the consonants of speech. In short, eurythmy is visible speech. There are three forms of eurythmy—speech, tone (music), and remedial. Speech and remedial eurythmy are used extensively in the reading and the speech programs and as exercises for perceptual-motor development.

SEQUENCED CURRICULUM

Subjects are arranged sequentially so that they are compatible with the child's psychological or cognitive development. The reading program includes a sequence of literature that is supposed to be historically compatible with the child's mode of thinking at each grade level. According to Steiner, the sequence follows the evolutionary development of man's consciousness (Steiner, 1988). For example, fairy tales are taught in first grade, animal stories and fables in second, the Old Testament in the third grade, Norse and Greek mythology and legends in fourth and fifth grades, history of the Middle Ages in sixth grade, history of exploration in seventh grade and history to the present time in eighth grade.

The Waldorf curriculum has breadth and depth in which all children can find success. Huebner (1972), a German education inspector,

In view of the fact the potentialities and talents of children vary greatly, the Waldorf curriculum is unusually rich. In addition to the regular subjects there are gardening, surveying, mechanics, surveying, bookbinding, weaving, spinning, etc. With such a variety of offerings, every child will find something of interest and something in which he may excel. The generally accepted distinction between gifted and non-gifted thus tends to disappear. Every human being is gifted in some area. (p. 2)

GEOMETRY PROGRAM

Geometry is introduced by drawing wavy, metric, non-metric forms to intricate freehand designs in the first five grades, a precursor to handwriting in the earlier grades. In the sixth grade, the children construct geometric figures and designs, using compass, protractor and ruler. The child experiences geometry through artistic and motoric involvement, prior to attempting to master formula and theorems. A child who experiences geometry via this approach is more likely to have a more positive attitude and understanding than a child whose is taught in the reverse fashion.

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Children from the first grade on learn two foreign languages by the oral method. German, French or Spanish are commonly taught in U.S. Waldorf schools. They simply listen to and imitate the teacher in a natural manner. Translating, for example, from English to German or vice versa is avoided. Daily recitation speech exercises, poetry, songs, tongue-twisters enhance their feeling for languages and clear enunciation. Good oral language development precedes reading.

CONTINUOUS TEACHER

The pupil-teacher relationship is a significant feature of the Waldorf approach. The class teacher, who takes over the class in first grade, follows the class throughout the elementary grades. Thus, he can form a personal relationship with each pupil in the order of a third parent. The teacher creates a close relationship and comes to know the weaknesses and strengths of each child. Each child not only has a continuity of friendship and authority, but a continuity of subject matter.

The class teacher is personally responsible for the academic achievement and progress of each pupil. However, the class teacher is not the only teacher with whom the class comes in contact. Special subjects are taught by specialists—foreign language, music, crafts and eurythmy. Hence, there is little need for annual testing grading of stu-

IOWA or some other standardized test at grades 6 and 8.) Students are not awarded quantitative letter grades, but instead teachers write essay evaluations and progress reports on each student. Weekly college of teacher meetings and parent conferences are an integral aspect of monitoring students' development and progress. The school physician may attend the meetings. Parents are very much involved in the schools. In most Waldorf schools, each classroom has a volunteer parent sponsor-helper.

FACULTY RUN SCHOOL

The Waldorf schools are administered by the college of teachers, not by an outside appointed administrator. Teachers in some cases elect a faculty member or individual to manage school finances. All decisions regarding curricula, students, faculty, enrollment and resources, including finances, come before the college of teachers for discussion and determination. Decisions are based on the needs, health and welfare of the students, which includes a contracted or volunteer on-call physician on staff. "No two schools are identical; each is administratively independent. Nevertheless, a visitor would recognize many characteristics common to them all" (Barnes 1990, p. 2).

STEINER'S THEORY OF LEARNING

The most important aspect of Waldorf education is Steiner's spiritual-inspired theory of human development and school readiness in that it explains the rationale for delaying premature intellectual development and pedagogical principles. Steiner's theory of child development is based on an ancient but recently rediscovered concept of growth, or vital forces, or bioplasmic energy. However, the following discussion is only a partial explanation of Steiner's theory of human development. Steiner conceived the human being to be made up of four bodies—the physical body, soul or mind (personality, emotions and feelings), etheric or biological energy forces (basis of growth, activity and thinking) and the ego ("I", the self). It is this theory and the inter-developmental relationship of these bodies that undergirds Steiner's educational systems and enterprises and which makes it very difficult to explicate to the public sector. It partially explains why Waldorf education is not better known (Steiner, 1966, 1943).

Steiner's theory is based on the concept that biological energy is required for activity, physical growth, and thinking. Biological energy is known as bioplasmic energy by Russian scientists and vital energy by acupuncturists and homeopathic physicians (Ostrander and Schroeder, 1970, Moss, 1970, Coulton, 1972). During the child's growing years this biological energy is used mainly for physical maturation and is later

transmuted into energy for thinking during the process of physical growth and maturation.

The Swiss psychologist, Piaget (1969) and Steiner (1966) found that children manifest different mental abilities as they mature. Other research has shown that children cannot be forced from one stage of intellectual development to a higher stage. They must be maturational-ly ready (Moore, 1979). A skill that comes easily to a seven-year-old may be totally beyond the grasp of a five-year-old. Ilg and Ames in School Readiness (1964) placed the transitional period, or the period when a child is ready to learn certain skills, at about the age of seven, when a child loses his baby teeth. The loss of baby teeth signifies that the brain has reached about 95 per cent of its development, the head about two-thirds of its adult proportions. With the change of teeth, the biological energy of physical growth has mostly completed its task in the development of the brain and the head. According to Steiner, these growth forces are then gradually released for energy for thinking, which coincides with Piaget's concrete operational stage of cognitive development.

Steiner's theory of transmuted energy forces appears to explain Piaget's transitional stages of cognition—sensory motor, preoperational, concrete operational, and formal operational. Piaget's theory is based on a child's voluntary control or movement of his/her thinking, based on maturation. The following table depicts the general transitional characteristics of each stage of Piaget's stages of cognitive development:

TABLE I

Preoperational (2-7 years)	Concrete operational (7-14 years)	Formal Operational (14...years)
1. Cannot conserve (hold a mental image)	1. Can conserve (hold images)	1. Thinking is under voluntary control e.g. operational
2. Thinking is perceptual bound	2. Thinking is bound to emotional/affective life	2. Thinking is more objective, relatively free of emotions
3. Thinking is non-reversible	3. Thinking is reversible	3. Can Manipulate two or more variables
4. Cannot deal with variables/changes	4. Has greater voluntary control over thinking	4. Thinking is more flexible
5. Has little voluntary control over thinking	5. Thinking is pictorial	5. Predictive problem solving is possible
	6. Needs concrete props to support problem solving	6. Can manipulate symbols and concepts without outer perceptual props
	7. Can deal with one variable	171

At each of the above stages, the gradual release of the energy forces from the development of the physical body is the causal factor for gaining increase control of the thinking processes and the development of intellectual thinking. Thinking requires concentrated effort. Mental fatigue is as real as physical fatigue. Thinking requires mental energy, just as physical development requires energy for growth. Attempts to force premature learning are likely to be ineffective because a child's energy or growth forces are not totally free from physical development. At the same time, attempts to force premature learning drains growth energy from cognitive and emotional maturation. A child who is forced to learn academic subjects may become emotionally and motivationally ill equipped later on (Elkind, 1981, Moore, 1979). By elementary school or in later grades, he may be "burned out—turned off."

Steiner believes that if growth energy is used for premature intellectual development, the child's psychological development may be sacrificed. Steiner (1966) wrote:

Any disturbance in etheric (growth) forces during the formative years of childhood will have a significant impact on the emotional and intellectual constitution of the child. There is a delicate balance between the two functions (physical and mental development) of the etheric (energy) forces. (pp. 65-66)

King (1955) found that shortened processes of maturation caused immaturity.

The Waldorf curriculum is based on the theory of developmental and transmuted growth energy. The process of human development unfolds in cycles of seven years each, similar to Piaget. Waldorf schools base their curriculum and methods on the principle that during each these approximate three stages—ages 1-7, 7-14 and 14...—(which Steiner calls: willing, feeling and thinking stages) children need methods of instruction and specific subjects and activities that will nurture the healthy processes of development. Steiner (1967) described Waldorf education as a "developmental approach that addresses the needs of growing children and maturing adolescents . . . that develops capacities as well as skills" (pp. 10-11). Artistic activities—eurythmy, music, painting, handcrafts, modeling—sustain and enhance the growth or energy forces. Premature/force intellectual learning tends to stunt and dissipate the growth forces of young children. The sustenance of these forces of growth during the growing years permits the physical body and bioplasmic forces to remain more pliable longer. Hence, the child has greater capacity for intellectual growth and creativeness. More energy is available for cognitive development, when the energy forces are released

from the task of physical growth at the proper time, when the child is maturationally ready.

In addition, eurythmy provides a primary function in the nurturing of the growth forces and the health of the children. The primary focus of Waldorf teachers and staff is on the developmental needs of the children—to fit the curriculum and methods of teaching to the child, rather than mold the child to a traditional or socially-determined curriculum. As indicated, this is also facilitated by the organization of the school—the continuous teacher and the faculty run school.

What appears to be unique about Waldorf education is its unusual application in which its educational practice closely follow its philosophical goals and psycho-developmental theory, and "in which the part reflects the organic whole" (Harwood, 1963). Barnes (1990) added "When the Waldorf curriculum is carried through successfully, the whole human being—head, heart, and hands—has truly been educated" (p.7). Ernest Boyer, President of the Carnegie Institute for the Advancement of Teaching, stated:

The Waldorf School I have observed (Princeton, N.J.) celebrates the uniqueness of each child, blends a rich curriculum in creative ways and sensitively evaluates student progress along the dull line of human talent. Waldorf students are encouraged to live with self-assurance, a reverence for life and a sense of service. (Waldorf flyer, nd.)

As Joseph Chilton Pearce put it:

I used to think Waldorf education the most undamaging education, but then the more I looked at it, I found it the most beneficial system we have. Among many things that the Waldorf system does, it nurtures, protects and develops the intelligence of the true child. (It) bring(s) out the best in each child, rather than molding children to a particular perspective of society. (Fenner and Rivers, 1992, p. 82)

The reason Rudolf Steiner and Waldorf education are so little known is a combination of a number of factors. The sectarian nature of the schools. The undergirding Anthroposophical philosophy and the theory of learning is esoteric and complex. The Waldorf school movement is isolated from other public and independent school movements and guards its independence jealously (Blunt, 1995). As a result extremely few experienced educators have ever heard of Waldorf education and even fewer have any accurate knowledge of the schools. Also schools with unusual theories and new ideas that are incompatible with thinking of time neither they or their ideas are rarely recog-

nized their during their lifetime and do not surface in the public domain for decades, particularly if it requires effort and a different way of thinking. On the other hand, in these days where educators are searching for practical and innovative solutions and programs for unmotivated public school students and declining test scores and increasing dropout rates, Waldorf education deserves further study.

Elliot Eisner, Professor of Education and Art, Stanford University, appears to recognize their potential: ". . . Waldorf education possesses unique educational features that have considerable potential for improving public education in America . . ." (Waldorf flyer, nd.).

There is some light at the end of tunnel with the adoption of the Waldorf model in Milwaukee and Sacramento and charter schools in Texas, Michigan, Oregon and California—San Francisco, San Diego, Novato, Sebastopol, Nevada City and other public school districts, it may become the education system for the 21st century. On the other hand, having both public Waldorf programs and also independent Waldorf schools causes confusion. Waldorf educators fear the integrity of Waldorf movement will be lost by the piece meal adoption of various aspects of Waldorf methodology. The Waldorf movement has attempted to make distinctions between the independent Waldorf schools, Waldorf inspired programs and Waldorf methods incorporated into traditional educational programs. The Waldorf movement has resolved to tolerate the compromise to provide the benefits of Waldorf education to children who seek them.

References

Barnes, H. (1990). *Waldorf education . . . an introduction*. Fair Oaks: AWSNA.

Blunt, R. (1995). *Waldorf education theory and practice*. Cape Town, South Africa: Novalis Press.

Coulton, H. L. (1972). *Homeopathic medicine*. Washington, D.C.: American Foundation of Homeopathy.

Elkind, D. (1981). *The hurried child*. Reading, Pa: Addison-Wesley.

Finsor, T. (1994). *School as a journey*. Hudson, N.Y.: Anthroposophical Press.

Harwood, A.C. (1969). *The recovery of man in childhood*. London, England: Hodder & Stoughton.

Huebner, T. (1972) *The rudolf steiner schools*. *The american german review*. 15: 2.

Fenner P. & Rivers K. (1992) *Waldorf education: a family guide*. Mass: Michaelmas Press.

King, I. (1955). Effects of school entrance into grade 1 upon achievement in school. *Elementary School Journal*. 7: 331-36.

Ilg F. & Ames I. (1964). *School readiness*. New York: Harper and Row.

Maher, S. & Shepperd R. (1995), *Standing on the Brink: An Education for the 21st Century*. Cape Town, South Africa: Novalis Press.

Re R. & Moore D. (1979). *School can wait*. Utah: Brigham Young University Press.

L. (1970). *Acupuncture and you*. N.Y.: Dell Publ.

Ostrander S. & Schroeder L. (1970). *Psychic discoveries behind the iron curative*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Peitzner, C. (1966). *Aspects of curative education*. Aberdeen, Scotland: University Press.

Steiner, R. (1967). *Discussion with teachers*. London, England: R. Steiner Press.

Steiner, R. (1943). *Education and the modern spiritual life*. London, England: Anthroposophical Publ. Co.

Steiner, R. (1948). *Essentials of education*. London, England: Anthroposophical Publ. Co.

Steiner, R. (1964). *Philosophy of freedom (Philosophie der Freiheit)*. London, England: Anthroposophical Publ. Co.

Steiner, R. (1937). *Practical course for teachers*. London, England: Anthroposophical Publ. Co.

Steiner, R. (1924). *Roots of Education*. London, England: Anthroposophical Publ. Co.

Steiner, R. (1966). *Study of man*. London, England: R. Steiner Press.

Steiner, R. (1988). *The child's changing consciousness and waldorf education*. London, England: R. Steiner Press.

Earl Ogletree is emeritus Professor of Education, Department of Curriculum and Instruction, Chicago State University. Studied Waldorf education in England. Founded the Esperanza School (Steiner school) for special children in Chicago.

WHAT MULTICULTURALISM SHOULD NOT BE

ALEXANDER MAKEDON
Chicago State University

INTRODUCTION

The paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, I discuss the meaning of multiculturalism. In the second, I use the theory of "radical perspectivism" to embrace the whole universe of our multicultural possibilities, instead of merely human-centered perspectives.¹ Human-centered perspectives are not formally different from other ethnocentric perspectives that use only a limited number of assumptions to understand the world. Having established the epistemological context of multiculturalism, in the third part of the paper I examine what multiculturalism should not be, such as, including under the rubric "multiculturalism" certain extreme ethnocentric beliefs that have little or nothing in common with multiculturalism, if not represent its philosophical antithesis.

MEANING OF MULTICULTURALISM

Multiculturalism is the ideological ocean that several theorists in the United States concerned with a wide range of issues may eventually have to cross, from immigration policy, conflict resolution, and international law; to archeological research and educational policy.

Multiculturalism waives the flag of intercultural exchange and understanding. As the term "multiculturalism" implies, a variety of cultures are allowed to co-exist, if not form the sine qua non of what

it means to exist as a human being.²

In a seemingly paradoxical but in fact quite rational order, multiculturalism becomes the long sought after golden fleece of our sometimes elusive balance between the rights of the majority, and those of minorities. Once acknowledged as a movement in its own right, multiculturalism offers a parallel bridge for diverse groups of people to live under a democratic regime without falling in the cataclysmic river of absolute rule below.

In the United States, multiculturalism is couched inside legal, political and psychological "protective shields" that make it more than just a theory of social existence. Thus based on legal decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court, which are in turn based on the court's interpretations of the Federal Constitution, minority ethnic or cultural groups may not be unreasonably discriminated against.³ This legal protection gives such groups the opportunity to coexist with all their rights intact even if a real or hypothetical "majority" were to prefer that they do not.

Our attitudes toward multiculturalism have been shaped by a multitude of court cases, and legislation passed by Congress in response to the civil rights movement. Several of these cases and laws have also shaped educational policy, such as those that led to desegregation (protection extended to racial minorities), bilingual education (linguistic minorities), mainstreaming (students with disabilities), and Title IX (gender protection).⁴ Cultural minorities that were once discriminated against may no longer be denied the opportunity to compete on the basis of their relevant skills or qualifications.

Our recent political reality has increasingly become multicultural. Multiculturalism transcends the cultural imperatives of any one group, but attempts, instead, to embrace them all. As a result, multiculturalism has become a psychologically cathartic antidote used by previously oppressed minorities against possibly humiliating ideas concerning their alleged "inferiority." Multiculturalism offers the opportunity to oppressed cultural minorities to "educate" those who were earlier almost immune to their achievements or concerns, let alone offer them an equal voice.⁵

Historically, what may have always been at least in theory a movement in this country to respect the cultural background of diverse groups of people, was superseded by a larger movement to "assimilate" everyone into a common pot.⁶ Nevertheless through such upheavals as the civil rights movement, multiculturalism now gained awaited social recognition. As the ultimate expression of fraternity, equality, and understanding, multiculturalism the rightful heir to constitutional ideals that have legally

defined this country ever since it became independent.

As with almost all social paradigms at least ever since Plato wrote The Republic, multiculturalism is not without certain problems. For example, one of the component cultures may refuse to subscribe to a common set of rules for peaceful coexistence. A fair example of such "culture" may be the political subculture of the Nazis, or similar racial supremacists. In these cases, one group may advocate its own supremacy over others without their consent, and therefore may feel compelled to rule over them over their objections, if not in extreme cases even attempt to destroy them. Although one group may advocate its own supremacy over others, to survive in the context of a legally sanctioned multicultural society it may have to abide by laws that require it to respect the rights of other groups. At the same time, such group may be allowed to express publicly its anti-multicultural ideology. Ironically, it is precisely the underlying multicultural ideology that such groups attack that allows them to co-exist with other groups, or even attack it, in the first place.

One wonders how influential public expressions of anti-multiculturalism may be in a society where there is an overwhelming support for multiculturalism, if not legal sanctions against extreme forms of racial, ethnic, or other types of intolerance. Groups espousing non-multicultural ideologies may "speak" a different "game" than they dare practice. For example, when it comes to actually applying their anti-multicultural ideology, such groups may conform to the multicultural reality that surrounds them, such as, requesting permission for a peaceful march, or else risk imprisonment if they decide to act illegally. The question may be raised, how effective will their non-multicultural ideology be on a public that may not only disagree with such group's ideology, to start with; but is also witness to the group's own compromising behavior?

In theory, a society as a whole may consist of groups whose common principle is precisely the lack of such, which may lead almost by definition to constant intercultural conflicts. Of course such society is highly unlikely, especially given not only most humans' desire for non-paradoxical realities, but also on a more practical level their desire for prolonged survival. It doesn't take the application of complicated mathematical formulas to appreciate the significance of commonly established rules that make peaceful coexistence possible. For example, if no one were to obey traffic signals, then one might expect huge traffic jams at intersections where traffic signals are not obeyed. If everyone tries to be first to cross over to the other side without regard to the traffic light, then hardly anyone will be able to do so in an orderly manner. Instead of traffic flowing smoothly, one may get an uncoordinated mass seemingly going nowhere due to cars getting in the way of each other, even though the road ahead is empty.⁷ Likewise, if we had no commonly estab-

lished rules, let alone obey them, then either the lack of such, or our "disobedience" may return to haunt us in the form of ultimately self-inflicted crime, pollution, disease, or poverty. I wrote "ultimately self-inflicted" because through our own example of "disrespect" for social rules, we may incite others to disobey, also, and thus one day to cause us the same harm that we caused others through our self-serving "disobedience." This may happen not only literally at the crossroads of traffic, where someone else equally disrespectful of the traffic signal may be faster than us, and therefore may cut right in front of us; but anywhere in "social space" where one may expect to encounter similar conflicts.

Examples of self-serving disobedience of social rules, or just plain lack of rules, abound. For example, we may pay for littering with our own yard being littered by others, or having property values in our neighborhood decrease dramatically, thus possibly costing us a large part of our investment; or, more dramatically, we may pay for stealing from others by having our hard-earned money being stolen, in turn. Hence we have rules against stealing, littering, or disobeying traffic signals. In a sense, multiculturalism follows a similar logic: by respecting the rights of others, we can expect in the majority of cases others to respect our own rights. This mutual respect is not only ethical, in the sense of expecting to be treated as we treat others, but makes living together "livable." By this mean I mean everyone is allowed enough space to live creatively or productively without necessarily harming others.

The theory of the "categorical imperative" aside,⁸ in popular speech this fundamental truth regarding social rules has been crystallized over the centuries in some well known sayings. For example, in English we say that if you "live by the sword, you die by the sword." Or more plainly "what goes around, comes around." This doesn't mean that disobedience is always undesirable, as it may not be where social rules do not protect everyone fairly. Of course like almost anything else which people think about, which includes just about everything, so is "fairness" to a certain extent in the "beholder's eye." For example, some people may perceive certain forms of social stratification as more fair, than a strictly horizontal form of social organization. In some cultures there may exist a hierarchy of class privilege which all the classes may consider fair, as was the case for different periods in many places around the world. For example, during the Middle Ages some people were perceived as deserving of more privileges than the rest of the population. This idea of "fairness" culminated in the policy of government by "divine right." Until such hierarchical psychology changes, for example, as a result of the impact of non-hierarchical or democratic ideologies, one may be able to

at in certain historically hierarchical societies few people might it unfair that opportunities for wealth or power are unequally

distributed.

On a more personal basis, someone may find multiculturalism "unfair" because under such paradigm he or she may no longer be able to enjoy the same social privileges as before, but must now compete for such privileges with people who were earlier denied the same opportunity to compete. Clearly in this case, such person redefined fairness for strictly self-serving purposes, instead of seeing fairness more abstractly as a social principle that should apply equally to everyone, as in "equality of opportunity."

If for no other reason, people's mathematical ability may act as their "natural" buffer against unfair practices. This is so because everyone who can count can see the difference between the number of opportunities that different people have for education, success, or other "privileges" that society may have to offer. To paraphrase the Pythagoreans, who read mathematics into the whole universe⁹, fairness is based on a mathematically verifiable ethic of equality of opportunity for all people. Likewise, multiculturalism is fair to the extent that it affords all cultural groups, or, more broadly, all people, the same social opportunities for self-expression, communication, status, and success.

Multiculturalism gains particular significance in the United States, where even in spite of the multicultural dynamic embedded in certain principles of the American Constitution regarding equality and freedom of speech, in practice there were severe cases of arbitrary discrimination, racism, ethnocentrism, and nativism, all of which are opposed to multiculturalism. Nevertheless, given the democratic dynamic embedded in the Federal Constitution, an argument may be made that eventually the United States would either have to resolve this dichotomy between constitutional principle, and actual practice, or cease to exist as the type of nation that our Constitution dictates we should have. In fact, one may even postulate that the "true" American citizen should be multicultural almost by definition. By "true" here I mean the type of citizenship that conforms closely to the political ideals embedded in the American Constitution.

By protecting individual rights, such as, through the "Bill of Rights," our Constitution makes it necessary that we respect the rights of all people in the United States, and therefore also of our cultural minorities. Of course given the birth rate within certain minority populations today, in the future it is not unlikely that there will be no one group that could claim an absolute majority.¹⁰ In fact, one of the groups today that is considered "minority" might become the "majority" in the future.

It is doubtful whether the term "majority" today refers merely to bers, as contrasted to also certain privileges that the present major as historically enjoyed. Thus although a majority might have more

numbers in democratic elections, because of its historically privileged status in the nation's culture, if not popular imagination, it may not lose such status even if it becomes literally a "minority." The issue for the multiculturalists thus becomes how to allow democratic elections based strictly on numbers of people voting for certain candidates without making any majorities that may emerge gain an aura of superiority that remains even after they are no longer a majority. For example, due to their long enjoyed status as the majority of people in this country, "whites," or, more correctly, Anglos gained an aura of superiority, or even of who counts as a "true" American over non-whites, such as people of African or Asian descent.¹¹ One need only watch old movies where whites were given in the majority of cases more elevated roles than non-whites to appreciate the hold that "whiteness" had on popular culture. The degree to which such status was cultivated over a period of centuries may also be witnessed from such cold-blooded realities as slavery and Jim Crow laws that obviously denigrated African Americans, and widespread discrimination against non-whites as a whole.

In the past, discrimination was so intense that even-English whites were discriminated against. Usually, such discrimination diminished when such "whites" assimilated into a larger "Anglo" identity, beginning with such European groups as Germans and Irish, and extending later to nativist discrimination against southeastern Europeans.¹² Interestingly, some of these non-English groups were originally not even defined as "white," particularly in the South.¹³ This may betray the need by the original English colonists to feel superior even at the cost of making color distinctions where essentially none existed.

Where color ultimately failed to separate certain European groups from expanding the multicultural fabric to include them in the American mainstream, the spectre of racial differences was raised to separate "native" Anglo groups, from foreign "Celtic" or "Teutonic" barbarians.¹⁴ Eventually, the inner logic of constitutional democracy relegated such claims to interesting, but futile attempts to reverse democratic processes.

Any nation that upholds certain principles to be true, and claims to be governed by them, is bound by such principles to act according to the ideas that make such principles, rather than specifically the tribal, racial, or ethnic composition of its members. For example, no matter how closely one's ethnic background may be aligned to that of the original colonists, or of the Fathers of the Constitution itself, our "Americanism" is technically determined more by our constitutional principles, than the blood in our veins. If one accepts the premise that legally all American citizens must at a minimum abide by the Constitution to be considered "true" citizens, as immigrants must when they are naturalized,

then a recently naturalized citizen that swore allegiance by, and truly believes in the American Constitution is a "true" citizen, while someone else who does not believe may not be, even if he can trace his genealogy back to the Mayflower. Likewise, one may argue that a person with a multicultural belief system may be more American, than someone else who would rather exclude or suppress the cultural contributions of other groups. This is so because by respecting the rights of others, or by willing to offer all others the same social opportunities, he or she is more closely aligned with the ideals of the Constitution regarding equality of opportunity, than someone else whose family may have lived here a long time, but neither espouses, nor practices such equality.

Equality of opportunity doesn't mean that all people should enjoy the same privileges irrespective of their skills or productivity, but only that they should be given a fair chance to compete for jobs, admission to colleges, and the like. Likewise under the multicultural paradigm, all cultures are given an equal chance to be examined by everyone, such as, through a multicultural curriculum in schools, instead of examining only certain cultures, or, worse, glorifying one at the expense of another. Students should be free to make up their own minds regarding which culture, if any, they would prefer to investigate further, or even adopt for themselves.

Facilitating this dynamic of mutual respect, is our ability to empathize with our fellow citizens without expecting them necessarily to conform to our own values, with the exception, perhaps, of conforming to the overarching ethic of multiculturalism itself. In fact, if one draws our constitutional principles to their logical conclusion, one may even argue that the less we expect people to conform to any one specific subculture within the United States, the more likely it is that we can actually practice multiculturalism without fear of losing our American identity.

MULTICULTURAL IDENTITY

Multiple group membership may be seen as the best possible expression of the freedom in American society to shape one's destiny, or, for that matter, one's own identity. Multiculturalism is not the aggregate of so many ethnocentric groups, each one of which coalesces around its particular island of cultural values, but on the contrary a tightly interwoven network of cultural centers that every citizen feels free to learn from. By "cultural center" I mean any center with cultural focus in the broadest sense of the word, inside or outside the traditional family. A Greek-American could join an African-American cultural center. Such person may become culturally "assimilated" to at least some of the center's values in the process. An African-American could join a Greek-American cultural center, and likewise become acculturated in that cen-

ter's values. A Philippine-American may convert to Irish-American values by learning about Irish-Americans, practice certain of their traditional customs, or join certain Irish-American associations, thus in effect "becoming" Irish-American. The reverse is also true regarding Irish-Americans wishing to learn about, or even "become" or acquire Philippine-American cultural characteristics. Alternatively, an American citizen may decide to live as a "cultural eclecticist," by which I mean share in the values of a variety of other groups, some of which may not be at all like the ethnic group as that individual may be descended from, or not even "ethnic," but religious, political, or educational in nature, or of some other type.

Eventually, the logic of multiculturalism points to the rise of the "multitudinous human" capable of identifying with other people's ideas, rather than feeling "stuck" with one's physical appearance, or cultural or ethnic background. This doesn't mean that one must necessarily divest or reject his or her particular background to become multicultural, but only that even where one keeps her background, as is presently likely with probably a majority of humans, she cannot do so at the expense of multiculturalism, such as, by denigrating others, or by not allowing them to become members of her cultural group. This gives new meaning to the familiar term "secondary group membership," since in the end such membership, assuming it becomes inclusive rather than exclusive, may be seen as the bedrock of multiculturalism.

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MULTICULTURALISM

Multiculturalism may be seen as the weaning out of their ethnic territory of citizens of a many-cultured democracy. In true Platonic fashion, multiculturalism may reflect at the social level the psychological changes within individual members of a democratic society that happens to embrace many cultures. Beginning with their family, individuals later identify with their specific ethnic or racial group, only later to widen their circle of understandings to encompass all others in the society, including those who may be very different in physical appearance, or in some of their cultural beliefs. By contrast to the ideals espoused by multiculturalism, ethnocentrists remain glued to their particular racial or ethnic group, especially if they do so as a reaction to some earlier ethnic trauma that became either the reason for their fixation, or the catalyst for a retreat from multiculturalism.

It is not unlikely that as a result of the humiliations experienced as a member of a specific racial or ethnic group one may plunge gladly into the multicultural ocean in order precisely to avoid being perceived as a · of the "traumatized" group. This phenomenon of escape from traumatized self is well documented in ethnic and assimilation stud-

ies, where it shown that when people were expected to disavow their native culture in favor of the dominant Anglo culture they went to great lengths to do so, or at best lead seemingly non-conflicting "double lives."¹⁵ Such people may long one day to return to their original ethnic group, if for no other reason to understand it better. Instinctively, they may also long to expunge once and for all traces of their own self-doubts, if not even self-hatred. This may explain the seemingly unexplainable resurgence recently in ethnic or racial pride, as in the "Black is Beautiful" movement, or the resurgence in ethnic pride among third generation "hyphenated" Americans.¹⁶

CULTURAL CONVERSION

Multiculturalism may represent the latest stage toward the abstract conceptualization of our social identity, including not only who counts as a true citizen, but also whether, when, or how often one may decide to convert to another culture. As I indicated earlier, multiculturalism allows us to choose our cultural membership, instead of having it ascribed to us on the basis of our birth, previous group affiliation, or physical characteristics. It is in that sense that people under multiculturalism are free to "convert" to another culture. This doesn't mean that anyone can choose to belong in any group, or work anywhere, but only that there is equality of opportunity for anyone to join assuming he or she meets certain reasonably "acquirable" characteristics that are neither strictly racial nor ethnic. For example, in theory anyone in our society may choose to work as a professor assuming he or she first obtains the prerequisite educational qualifications.

RADICAL PERSPECTIVISM

In line with my earlier writings on "radical perspectivism," I propose to expand our view of multiculturalism to include even non-human world parts which collectively make life on earth possible. In spite of our good faith effort to include a variety of cultural perspectives in our examination of multiculturalism, they are usually limited to human beings, instead of encompassing all of nature. As members of the same "family of being" as the rest of nature, we are no more her rightful masters, than we should be under her spell. From a larger "universal" perspective, human-centered perspectives, however well intentioned, are not formally different from other ethnocentric perspectives that use only self-centered assumptions to understand the world.

Ultimately, the logic of multiculturalism leads us away from ourselves as humans, instead of merely as members of this or that culture.

Expanding our imagination, we can imagine what the perspectives of other world parts" may be, thus selflessly giving the universe a voice through

our cognitive and imaginative abilities. This can be done through such long practiced techniques as role play, fictional or creative writing, and disinterested study of other world parts.¹⁷

MULTICULTURALISM VERSUS ETHNOCENTRISM

What are some differences between ethnocentrism and multiculturalism? To the extent that multiculturalism is inclusive, ethnocentrism is exclusive. In multiculturalism, we are enriched with multiple understandings precisely because we are expected to suppress none, or exclude anyone from participating. Ethnocentrism, on the other hand, has a totally different dynamic. In ethnocentrism, especially when practiced in its extreme forms, outsiders are not only excluded, but often denigrated, or even means are found or speculated about on how to control them. Ethnocentrism is often at the root of such historical phenomena as colonialism, imperialism, and conquest. By drawing the line so clearly between us and them, and raising this side of the tracks to a much higher status than the "people on the other side," one creates the conditions for caring only for one's own group, if not exploit others without regard to how such exploitation may make them feel. It is for these reasons that multiculturalism may be seen as the antithesis of ethnocentrism, since the former is open to all, while the later is socially and psychologically cliquish, or even chauvinistic.

Ethnocentrism may have been practiced in the past more intensively by certain groups than by others, but that doesn't mean that an emerging group that was earlier suppressed or dominated by another group cannot also become ethnocentric. In fact, one may argue that it is precisely because such group was earlier suppressed, as were, for example, African Americans during slavery, that at least some members of such group may have a greater need to cling to some real or manufactured sense of self-importance to overcome prior or present discrimination. Nevertheless, no matter what the reasons might be for becoming ethnocentric, the fact remains that multiculturalism requires that people become "philosophical" enough to allow themselves to imagine, if not empathize, with the point of view of the "other."

CONFUSION BETWEEN ETHNOCENTRISM AND MULTICULTURALISM

There seem to exist in some circles some confusion on the differences between ethnocentrism and multiculturalism. This is so because in the context of a non-multicultural experience, an ethnocentric doctrine that offers an ethnic alternative to the dominant ethnic ideal may be erroneously seen by virtue of its apparent contrast to the dominant ideal

"multicultural." In fact, since both ideals are mono-ethnic, they are more alike than different, or, more plainly said, two sides of the

same ideological coin. They are both ethnocentric, except one of them may have been politically more powerful, or at least so perceived by many within both the "oppressed" and "oppressor" groups. Given a chance for political or other types of "power," the oppressed ethnocentrists would happily replace the oppressor's ethnocentrism with their own, unless theirs is a type of "ethnocentricity" than somehow embraces multiculturalism (in which case it would not really be ethnocentric).

AFROCENTRISM

One form of ethnocentrism is Afrocentrism.¹⁸ Afrocentric beliefs are often incorrectly referred to as "multicultural." I decided to discuss them here partly because of their popularity among some of my college students, and partly because of my personal interest in studying the social psychology of myth making. In some cases, extreme afrocentrists have re-written history without sufficient evidence to support their claims.¹⁹ They rely, instead, on innuendo, non-existing facts, self-serving claims, or little analyzed historical writings. Typical of this approach are the writings of such afrocentrist writers as George G. M. James, who wrote in his book Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy that the ancient Greeks stole their philosophy from the ancient Egyptians.²⁰ Elsewhere James' book is described by another author as "fraudulent."²¹ But one need not consult James' reviewers to discover that it is replete with errors so glaring, such as mistaking cities for islands, that he may wonder whether James wrote his book to really revise how we understand the history of Greek philosophy to be, or merely to serve as example of logical non-sequiturs, unsupported arguments, or circular reasoning, or just plainly incorrect descriptions of geographic places. There is no reason, though, to disbelieve James's own reasons for writing his book, which were, as he pointed out in his Introduction, primarily to make his fellow African Americans at the time stop feeling inferior about themselves. One wonders, though, how much does a reading of James's book may cause his readers in the long run to raise their self-esteem, as opposed to developing as a result of finding out later that James's claims are outlandishly untrue an unhealthy distrust for all types of historical revisionisms.

Instead of serving myth as history, as did James, shouldn't we use myth, instead, to understand humans, such as, their idealism? For example, myth may reflect the need of humans to imbue the world with meaning. By imagining fictional but "understandable" causes for a variety of events (gods, spirits, or imaginary heroes), humans read what they know best into the unknown, which may not be much compared to what they did or did find out later, but at least served a useful purpose at the time. One interpretation may be that their mythical interpretations may

be a camouflaged version of their own ideal perception of themselves. From a perspectivist viewpoint, which we briefly discussed earlier in the paper, no matter how multicultural their interpretations may allegedly be, they usually reflect their human-centered understanding of the universe.

Even if it could be shown that afrocentric education builds up our students' self-esteem, which may not be easy to show,²² low self-esteem is no excuse for dishing out to our students sloppy or unresearched scholarship. We should aim, instead, to build multicultural understanding which is unmotivated by political or other motives that unduly shape our interpretation in favor of this or that ethnic or racial group.²³ Unlike ethnocentrism, which to a certain extent may be seen as a form of perhaps occasionally useful but ultimately self-centered therapy, multiculturalism requires that people empathize with other people's points of view. In fact, it may require that we improve our tolerance for views that are even opposite to ours.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AFROCENTRISM

The popularity of such books as James's may be due to the need within the African American community for recognition. This is especially so in light of the long history of racism and discrimination against the African American community until recently in this country, if not tearing apart of its cultural contributions. Humans everywhere need to be loved and respected, and may even have to invent a "God" that loves them where none is readily available. Even a cursory review of ancient myths and religions may reveal the ability of humans to invent myths to allow them to imagine a higher level of existence for themselves where they are transformed into admirable heroes, as are, for that matter, so many of the fictional heroes on Hollywood versions of the past. The problem with afrocentrist revisions such as James's has been that in their rush to recognition in the end Jamesian afrocentrists may cause more harm than good, as one must have more faith than facts to believe them.

Another problem with afrocentrism is that in extreme cases afrocentrists may refuse to abide by such rules as will inevitably refute their arguments, even if such rules are acceptable to almost the rest of the academic community. Such rules may include the reasonable resolution of conflict on the basis of verifiable or "scientific" evidence. By refuting these rules, such afrocentrists make dialogue almost impossible, thus requiring again that readers believe them on the basis of faith, as did ancient people myths, than strictly scientific evidence. Seen from that angle, such afrocentrism resembles more a religion, than disinterested inquiry.

MULTICULTURALISM VERSUS NATIVISM

As mentioned earlier, contrasted to multiculturalism is also Nativism.²⁴ Nativism is the idea that those born here are somehow more true Americans, than recent immigrants. Nativism became particularly pernicious in the mid-19th to early twentieth centuries in this country, when its followers associated a particular ethnic group, usually the English, or later those of European descent who assimilated into the prevalent English culture, or "Anglos," with true Americans. This implied that ethnicity, or more broadly speaking "race," are more important in determining who is a true American, than the ideals embodied in the Federal Constitution. It is in this sense that multiculturalism represents not only the logical "social outcome" of the Federal Constitution, but ultimately its final victory over more tribalistic forms of social engineering, such as, nativism.

MULTICULTURALISM VERSUS RACISM

Racism has had a long history in this country, which may explain why it took so long for the U.S. Supreme Court to finally close the gap between principle and practice. It is only for so long that any human, or group of humans can continue operating in such clearly contradictory manner. Multiculturalism may be diagnosed as a sign of the nation's health, since it may represent the recovery of its founding principles, and with it its hopefully unshakable sense of identity or purpose.

CRITICISM OF MULTICULTURALISM

It may be argued that knowledge of other cultures does not guarantee that one will end up appreciating, as opposed to hating them. For example, where one before may know nothing about another culture, and therefore feel neither love nor hate for that culture, he may feel so frustrated, intimidated, or "challenged" by certain beliefs in that culture when he does find out about it, that he develops an aversion toward it that even he himself may not be able to fully comprehend. This is why multicultural education alone may not suffice as a condition for the continued existence of a multicultural society, but must be supplemented by a whole series of legal and social policies that protect it. In the end, what guarantees at least the legal protection of the peaceful coexistence of divergent cultures is precisely a system of laws that proscribe overt social or legal discrimination on the basis merely of one's ethnic or racial background. The Federal Constitution in the U.S., together with its interpretation by the courts, may be seen as just such legal foundation for the protection of diverse cultural minorities, or, more abstractly, of multiculturalism.

CONCLUSION

Multiculturalism may be seen as the modern expression of those political principles that allow for both majority rule, and respect for the rights of minorities. These two may be seen as the counterweights that keep multicultural acrobatics in the United States on the balance beam. In closing, I would like to make the following four recommendations in designing for ourselves a multicultural identity: first, our multiculturalism should not be limited to strictly human perspectives, but include the lessons one may learn from imagining the "perspectives" of all the possible non-human "others;" second, avoid consciously or subconsciously working within assumptions that are ethnocentric even if camouflaged as "multicultural;" third, recognize the ability of human beings to learn about, join, or even convert to other cultures, all of which are not only allowed in a multicultural society, but should be legally protected; finally, when discussing culture, allow the chips of evidence fall where they may under conditions of careful empirical research even if the results may shatter a popular, or well-liked, belief.

Endnotes

1. The author presented a paper on his theory of radical perspectivism during the 1992 annual conference of MPES (Nov. 14). His paper, titled "Humans in the World: Introduction to the Educational Theory of Radical Perspectivism," was subsequently published in the Proceedings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, 1991 and 1992, ed. David Owen and Ronald M. Swartz, pp. 297-310. ERIC Document No. ED 368-628.
2. Barry Kanpol and Peter McLaren, eds. Critical Multiculturalism (Westport, Conn.: Bergin and Garvey, 1995); Nicholas Appleton, Cultural Pluralism in Education (New York: Longman, 1983).
3. Howard Bahr, Bruce A. Chadwick, and Joseph H. Strauss, American Ethnicity (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1979); William J. Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Ilan Stavans, The Hispanic Condition (New York: Harper-Collins, 1995).
4. For example, regarding desegregation see the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954); regarding bilingual education, see its decision in Lau v. Nichols (1974); regarding Title IX, see the 1972 Education Amendments to the Civil Rights Act; and regarding mainstreaming, see the Education for All Handicapped Children Act passed by Congress in 1975.
5. American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (AACTE), "No One Model American: A Statement of Multicultural Education" (Washington, D.C.: American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, 1972).
6. See the chapter "Theories of Assimilation: Anglo-Conformity," in Milton Gordon, Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 84-114.
7. The author just such traffic jams in his travels abroad, in countries which shall neless, where if the traffic police is not present rarely anyone obeys the traffic

University of Chicago Press, 1950).

9. Andreas Papamihalopoulos, "Pythagorean Influences on Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Science." In K. Boudouri, Pythagorean Philosophy (Athens, Greece: International Center of Greek Philosophy and Culture, 1992), pp. 82-6.

10. Allan C. Ornstein and Daniel U. Levine, Foundations of Education, 6th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), p. 859.

11. See Peter Schrag, The Decline of WASP (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973).

12. Regarding nativism in the U.S., see John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925 (New York: Atheneum, 1972).

13. See, for instance, Charles C. Moskos, Greek Americans: Struggle and Success (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1980).

14. See the chapter "Patterns in the Making," in Higham, Strangers, pp. 4-11.

15. See Saloutos' account of efforts by Greek Americans to conform to Anglo-American ideals in Greeks in the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 249, 251-53. Also see the chapter "Spiro T. Anagnostopoulos: Remembrance of Humiliations Past," in Michael Novak, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnic (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 116-34.

16. Novak, Unmeltable Ethnic.

17. For a more detailed description of radical perspectivism, the reader may consult "Humans in the World: Introduction to the Educational Theory of Radical Perspectivism," MPES Proceedings 1991/1992; or his book on radical perspectivism, published by Abacus Publishing (Chicago, 1997).

18. See, for instance, Molefi Asante, The Afrocentric Idea (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).

19. Mary Lefkowitz, Not Out of Africa: How Afrocentrism Became an Excuse to Teach Myth as History (New York: A New Republic Basic Books/Harper Collins, 1996).

20. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954; republished by The African Publication Society, 1980; reprinted by United Brothers Communication Systems, 1989).

21. James' book was examined in a special issue of the journal Society (March/April 1994) on the topic "Fraud in Research." See Mary Lefkowitz, "The Myth of 'Stolen Legacy,'" Society, vol. 31, no. 3 (March/April 1994), pp. 27-33.

22. See Molefi Kete Asante's claim that afrocentric education raises the self esteem of African American students in "The Afrocentric Idea in Education," in James Wm. Noll, ed., Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Educational Issues (Guilford, Conn.: Dushkin/McGraw-Hill, A Division of the McGraw-Hill Companies, 1997), pp. 208-17; and Arthur M. Schlesinger's response in "The Disuniting of America," in Taking Sides, pp. 219-228.

23. A. Makedon, "Plato, Paideia, Politics, and the Past: Response to Jacob H. Carruthers' Article on 'Reflections on the History of African Education,'" Illinois Schools Journal (Spring 1998): forthcoming.

24. See Higham, Strangers in the Land.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

**REALISM RECONSIDERED
- BY ANY OTHER NAME,
IS REALISM REALLY POSSIBLE -**

PHILIP SMITH

The Ohio State University

The title of my paper, listed in the program, is something of a misnomer. I'm not even sure that what I have to say here amounts to a paper, in the ordinary sense. "Fledgling commentary" is perhaps a better description. "By Any Other Name, Is Realism Really Possible" was the title of a presentation I made last April in New York at AERA. The question was "does science require the assumption of a mind-independent, objective reality?" I looked specifically at academic psychology and reviewed the struggle over the past century to establish this field as a credible empirical discipline in the contemporary research university. I wanted to say that while the commitment of modern science to realism has remained steadfast, the form that realism should take is constantly being debated and, moreover, has undergone considerable refinement since psychology first emerged as a field.

Along the way, I had reason to mention two prominent neo-pragmatists, Richard Rorty (a strident anti-realist) and Hilary Putnam (an unapologetic realist). I claimed that each philosopher was putting an exaggerated emphasis on different aspects of the pragmatic attitude. Rorty's point, I said, was that reality is a nexus of ever changing contingencies; Putnam's point was that these changing contingencies, with their value and what they mean, are not always deter-

I was not satisfied with this explanation even then. When is it important to reconfigure ourselves, and when is it important to suck it up and accept things as they are? In that other paper, here's how I expressed this contrast, trying to relate philosophy to education: "In his book, The Closing of American Mind (Simon and Schuster, 1987), Allan Bloom laments how students nowadays no longer come to the university looking on their education as a great adventure. They have little passion to explore the world beyond themselves, to transcend their local prejudices. Bloom saw his students as self-indulgent and implacably cynical, and considered this to be a reflection of the complacency and political correctness that defines their social environment. Richard Rorty, an undergraduate classmate of Bloom's in the late 1940's at the University of Chicago, offers a sharply contrasting picture from Bloom's in an essay he titled "The Opening of American Minds." Rorty took essentially the same facts that Bloom used and gave them a positive spin. He saw today's students as the heirs to a tradition of increasing liberty and rising hope. He believed they should see themselves 'as proud and loyal citizens of a country that, slowly and painfully, threw off a foreign yoke, freed its slaves, enfranchised its women, restrained its robber barons and licensed its trade unions, liberalized its religious practices and broadened its religious and moral tolerance, and built colleges in which 50% of its population could enroll—a country that numbered Ralph Waldo Emerson, Eugene V. Debs, Susan B. Anthony and James Baldwin among its citizens.' (Harper's Magazine, July, 1989: 22.)

Interestingly, both Bloom's assessment and Rorty's are based on the contention that realism has lost its philosophical hold on us. What this suggests is that if we believe that hegemony (or higher authority) has served us well in the past, and that lack of hegemony has hurt us, we are likely to be realists. Correspondingly, if we think that in the past hegemony has caused us to suffer, and that lack of hegemony has allowed us to prosper, we are likely to be anti-realists. By extension of this logic, if we insist that a realist ontology has not lost its hold on us, that Bloom is evil for saying otherwise and that Rorty is either naive or a devious conspirator with Bloom, and that this realist ontology continues to beat us down, politically and psychologically, as well as philosophically, continues to oppress us American-style, we are likely to be French-style post-modernist.

As far as philosophy goes, realism comes in many varieties. Standard formulations include: (1) metaphysical realism, the assumption of universals outside of space and time, (2) naive realism, that asserts a mind-independent, objective reality as a condition for making sense of our sensations and experiences, (3) scientific realism, that takes materialism for granted, and (4) semantic realism, Putnam's view, that sees the meaning

of words as a function of their natural designation, understood by science. What all these formulations have in common is an insistence on the independence of certain entities from the human mind, and especially from human activity.

What realist philosophers mean by this is that without taking these entities into account our thoughts and our actions, our logic and our language, becomes incomprehensible. Even the naive realist, who adopts this view for practical reasons, regards realism as first and foremost a philosophical doctrine, because the condition it identifies is so pervasive and deep. This is precisely, what I am no longer so sure about. Not that realism cannot be a philosophical doctrine. Of course, it can. Only that it may not be a philosophical doctrine first and foremost. We educators, even those of us who are philosophically inclined, might be wiser to think of it in other ways.

Let me go back to Rorty's essay "The Opening of American Minds." There he says that when people on the political right talk about education they emphasize the importance of truth (which they typically regret is no longer being inculcated in the young). When people on the political left talk about education they emphasize the importance of freedom. They believe that old familiar truths emphasized by the right are a crust that needs to be broken through, vestiges of oppressive modes of thought from which we need to be freed. The right believes that if you have truth, freedom will follow automatically—as in, "the truth will set you free". The left believes that the biggest obstacle for education to overcome is not passion, or sin, but convention and prejudice. What the right calls self-control, discipline, and denial, the left calls "stifling healthy human desires." What the right thinks of as "the triumph of reason," the left describes as "the power of acculturation", engineered by those who would maintain the status quo. What the right describes as "civilizing the young," the left describes as "alienating them" from their true nature.

Whatever the practical and attitudinal differences between right and left, they both accept a philosophical distinction between nature and convention. The right regards convention as a rough but reliable reflection of the true nature of things. The left sees it as an arbitrary suppression of our natural and legitimate freedom. But they both insist that things have a nature. As does most contemporary philosophy, Rorty denies this. He is an anti-realist, remember? He believes that philosophy in and of itself has no special access to the truth, nor any special authority to tell us how to live our lives. Philosophy may be edifying, Rorty admits, but it cannot provide a foundation for anything. Interestingly, this admission ^d keep him from acknowledging the importance of a mind-independent reality. Only that he sees this reality in material and

practical terms, as something that is sometimes under our control and sometimes not, but which is never as rooted in philosophical truth.

Rorty believes that our culture has picked up on this fact, and so have most of our social institutions. Within education the right and left have reached a compromise. The right controls K-12 education. The left controls the humanities, arts and sciences as they are taught at our best universities, what Rorty calls "non-vocational higher education." Rorty likes this arrangement. About K-12 education Rorty says, "Any society has the right to expect that whatever else happens in the course of (youth) and adolescence, the school will inculcate what is generally believed." He goes on to tell us that non-vocational higher education is, or should be, a place where each successive college generations is nudged a little more to the left, made a little more conscious of the cruelty built into any institutional arrangement, even ours. Each successive college generation needs to be a little more skeptical about the current consensus, whatever it is, and to see the need for "reform." Our current attitude towards diversity, especially as it applies to women, minorities, and children is an example of this type of thing.

What should we think about all this? To start with, wouldn't nudging each successive college generation a little more to the left eventually push the whole society too far in that direction? It would be one thing to make everyone aware of the flaws that are inevitably built into any set of social norms. It would be quite another to tolerate ignorance or encourage contempt for society's rules. How could we move ahead with the first thing without promoting the second? John Dewey had an answer for this question: Do for K-12 education, what Rorty says we do now for the humanities, arts and sciences at our best universities. We will develop the whole-child from the start, so to speak. We will foster critical intelligence, experimental methods, and the capacity to learn how to learn. In short, we should have good Deweyan-style progressive education for the public elementary and secondary schools, as well as for elite universities.

But we have already tried this, have we not? This is what so many people, including Rorty's friend E.D. Hirsch, are complaining about. Either Dewey's theory is wrong for K-12 education, or else there are not enough capable and committed professional educators working at this level to successfully accomplish the task. The problem may be that our fellow citizens and social leaders, perhaps even the parents themselves, don't care enough about the children. But who could deny that the schools today are in big trouble. Is the solution more progressive education or less? For critics like Hirsch, the feeling is that our schools are not paying enough attention to content and standards of excellence. Worse than that, our schools are becoming increasingly political, not only in the

moting a narrow and partisan social creed. When the language of the curriculum and the atmosphere of the school become ideological and politically correct, emotive meaning prevails and objective reality disappears. Realism, even in Putnam's neo-pragmatic sense, is lost.

What would Dewey say, or Circe? I don't think that either one would be interested in teaching a narrow and partisan social creed. Nor would they want education to become ego-centric. Dewey was arguably the first and only important philosopher to link-up democracy and education in a philosophically serious way. He not only insisted that education is necessary for democracy, but, also, that education must itself become democratic. This may be true. But what does it mean? It is hard to say, except that for Dewey it meant promoting what he called "cultural pluralism," which in turn involved social diversity and respectful, curious, clear-headed, and intelligent communication between human beings living together in a social environment. For Circe it seems to mean "multiculturalism." Is that the same as what Dewey meant? One difference is that Circe seems more intent than Dewey on helping desperate souls by political as well as educational means. I think Dewey would have admired her for this. He sure admired Jane Addams and his first wife, Alice, both of whom were aggressively political. But even if these few smart individuals knew what they were doing as educators, it was not something they were able to codify for others. Rejecting realism, philosophical or otherwise, can be seen as a huge mistake when taken into an educational arena.

**'I'LL TEACH YOU DIFFERENCES':
CONTRAST, OPPOSITION, AND ANTONYMY WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MULTICULTURALISM**

WALTER P. KROLIKOWSKI

Loyola University Chicago

John Wilson, in Thinking with Concepts (29-30), suggests the use of opposite concepts as one way to clarity in our use of concepts. Such a technique may prove useful in addressing multicultural issues. But it is not an easy technique to use, being more difficult to master than might appear at first glance. Contraries, antonyms, and opposites can be quite elusive. When the opposite of 'red' can be 'purple' or 'green' or 'wave,' we should not be surprised that the words clustered around multicultural may be difficult to analyze, until we are conscious of the opposites with which they are being contrasted. A discussion may be in order if we are to respect all the nuances multicultural issues involve. But there is another hidden reef: different authors use the same concepts. It is only when we come to realize that the same word has different opposites in different authors that we realize the word has a different signification. Many such words are more than vague; they become ambiguous, and their place in an argument makes for a different argument and quite radically different conclusions.

For the following material, I am greatly indebted to John Lyons, to Don L. Nilsen and Alleen Pace Nilsen and to all the authors in the Bibliography. Many of the examples in this paper come from my general reading and from these authors mentioned, but, in order to be helpful, I have tried as much as possible to use examples from cur-

rent articles and books on race, gender, and culture as well.

A preliminary distinction. It might be helpful if we used the following classifications. "Contrast," the most general term, carries "no implications as to the number of elements in the set of paradigmatically contrasting elements." "Opposition" refers to "dichotomous, or binary, contrasts." "Antonymy" is restricted to "gradable opposites" (Lyons, 279).

I

Words or concepts can be related to each other by way of inclusion or difference (Chisholm, 34-40). There are two kinds of inclusion. 'Pear' is related to 'fruit' as 'species' is related to 'genus'; the first is included as a part of the second. Lyons calls this relation one of hyponymy. Trial and error is related to enquiry in exactly this way. Hirst and Peters (106) speak of asylums, schools and prisons as being institutions in that each, though different from the others, involves some kind of building. So, likewise, toleration is related to mutual respect. As Amy Guttmann (89) says, "toleration is an essential democratic virtue and a necessary but not sufficient condition of mutual respect." On the other hand, 'hide' is related to 'conceal' as synonym is related to synonym; the first is identical with the second. Such inclusions turn out to be, then, definitions. Thus, Rawls (55) defines the word 'institution': "a public system of rules, which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like."

But some inclusions can be quite controversial. Guttmann (95) includes ritual human sacrifice and the denial of essential health care to children under the rubric of religious practices. Ruth Ginzberg alleges that "modus ponens, one of the basic laws of logic, was a male patriarchal creation oppressive of women" (Nussbaum, 59). "Anti-analytic feminists" charge that "traditional epistemology has been inherently male-biased in conceiving of reason as a faculty that enables us to grasp a reality which exists independently of human history and human concepts" (Nussbaum, 62-63).

II

In addition to inclusions, there are differences, compatible or incompatible, complementary or not, gradable or not, converses or not. Like inclusions, differences involve similarities, but which similarity is being invoked makes a difference.

Differences can be compatible or incompatible. 'Wide' is opposed to 'narrow' but one and the same thing can be both wide and blue. Hirst and Peters (64) note the crucial difference between the "form"

and "content" of experience, but they are obviously compatible because together they constitute the experience. Disciplined thinking is not necessarily imaginative thinking but, as McClellan (132) says, inventing possible societies requires both. Likewise, science is a practice, but love is not (2); they are, nevertheless, compatible. What sometimes looks like a conflict need not be: "There would seem to be an incipient conflict between those who want to introduce real-life applications of mathematics and those who want to teach the mathematical systems used by ancient cultures. I suspect that most mathematics teachers would enjoy doing a bit of both, if there were time or student interest" (Ravitch, 174). In a subtle analysis, Blum (19-20) notes how 'interracial community' and 'multiculturalism' are compatible but remain distinct values and de facto may be seen, through "overemphasizing cultural difference and mutual inaccessibility of different cultures to one another," as incompatible.

Different concepts may also be incompatible. Sometimes the incompatible words contrast; that is, they are more than two; e.g., the colors, green, yellow, blue, and red, are incompatible, and, if they are mixed, they no longer remain what they were. The student can learn by means of a lecture, a controlled experiment in a laboratory, or a field trip, but the methods are incompatible with each other. It is frequently noted that different ethics have differing sets of values and the sets are incommensurable.

Sometimes the incompatibles are binary, that is, two in number, and are stated as opposites or antitheses: Integration and segregation, male and female, dead and alive—all are examples.

There are many more examples of opposites: wet/dry, odd/even, correct/incorrect, valid/invalid (Hirst and Peters, 77). Societies can be monocultural or multicultural. Multiculturalism can be pluralistic or particularistic: "The pluralists seek a richer common culture, the particularists insist that no common culture is possible or desirable" (Ravitch, 168). Particularism "implies that American culture belongs only to those who are white and European; it implies that those who are neither white nor European are alienated from American culture by virtue of their race or ethnicity" (Ravitch, 169). Commentators frequently note that many binary opposites are hierarchical, "with one member of the pair construed as higher or of greater value than the other." Examples are soul/body; reason/emotion; reality/ appearance; natural/artificial; male/female (Colapietro 53).

Some opposites are gradable and are antonyms; that is, contraries. Weather conditions can be found all along the spectrum which runs from wet to dry. They can be neither wet nor dry but somewhere in between. Is the same true of discrimination between African-Americans and whites? Michael Kinsley (62-63) has spotted a group who believe so:

"The potted analysis is that there is a simple spectrum of discrimination, with a zero point in the middle—the C.B.E.O. [Color Blind Equal Opportunity] point—where discrimination against blacks stops and discrimination against whites begins." Is affirmative-action in itself a grading phrase? Kinsley (62-63) himself sees that there are different places on the way to success: "Although affirmative action of course gives blacks an advantage in specific situations, a black face is still a net minus in the climb up the American greasy pole." Quantitative comparisons are always examples of grading: "Whites live longer than blacks; women live longer than men" (Kinsley 67). Or, as Kinsley (66-67) writes: "If people really could be ranked from No. 1 to No. 260,000,000 in terms of 'qualifications,' past discrimination would clearly have moved blacks down the queue and moved whites up—and affirmative action really does begin to look like rough justice for that. Of course, in real life there is no such simple queue. So the black person who moves up the line thanks to affirmative action may not logically 'deserve' the place he gets. But, for that same reason, the white person who loses that place doesn't 'deserve' it, either." Ravitch (169) speaks of fostering and developing self-esteem. Is self-esteem gradable, with places for low and high esteem?

Some things are non-gradable and therefore complementary; that is, contradictories. Each group is simply different from every other group. A thing is either odd or even, correct or incorrect, valid or invalid. Gilbert Ryle's distinction of task from achievement words describes a non-gradable complementary pair (Concept, 149-153), as does Ryle's (Dilemma, 94-95) distinction of the counterfeit from the real, which Ryle compares to thin and thick, surely a gradable pair. Ravitch (170) avers that "particularists reject any accommodation among groups, any interactions that blur the distinctions between them." Molefi Kete Asante distinguishes Eurocentrism from Afrocentricism. Ravitch (171-172) tells us that "A popular black rap singer, KRS-One, complained . . . that the schools should be teaching blacks about their cultural heritage, instead of trying to make everyone Americans. 'It's like trying to teach a dog to be a cat,' he wrote." The many writers who hold that all cultures are equal obviously think that culture is non-gradable, whose complement is non-culture, while those who hold that cultures can be ranked in some way think that the term is gradable.

In ordinary language, 'feminine' is gradable; 'female' is not. From one point of view 'feminism' is gradable: "I would not hesitate to call someone a feminist who supported a program for the liberation of women . . . "(Bartky, 22), for a program can be supported with varying degrees of support, including non-support. From another point of view, 'feminist' is not-gradable: "to become a feminist is to develop a radically conscious consciousness of oneself, of others, and of what for lack of a bet-

ter term I shall call 'social reality'" (Bartky 23); "radical" erects a barrier between the non-feminist and the feminist and on this supposition makes them non-gradable. Lyons gives another example of ungradable opposites being explicitly graded: There are "occasions when we will grade a pair of normally ungradable antonyms, because we do reject their interpretation as contradictories. 'Male' and 'female' are obvious examples. We normally operate under the assumption that any arbitrarily selected human being will be either male or female (rather than neither male nor female, or both male and female), but we may well recognize that certain people cannot be satisfactorily classified in terms of this yes/no opposition of 'male' and 'female'. "We can say, for example, X is not completely male and X is more male than female. But in cases like this, we are modifying the language-system, if only temporally" (Lyons 278-279). Some radical feminists would insist that they are not modifying the language-system; they are simply denying that male and female describe something ungradable in its very nature, that gender is socially constructed.

At times opposites are converses of each other; for example, mother/daughter, brother/sister. Mary's daughter is Joan; Joan's mother is Mary. Joe is Joan's brother; Joan is Joe's sister. Note that these distinctions are not utterly exclusive. Brother/sister is not only an example of opposites that are converses; it is also an example of complementary opposites. But complementaries (e.g., mother/father) need not be converses. Mary is John's and Joan's mother but not Joseph's; Joseph is John's and Joan's father but not Mary's. But, as being a teacher and a student are not incompatible, so Mary can be both a mother and a daughter. Lawrence Blum's (9) remark that "all ethnic cultures have an ancestor culture," is therefore like daughter/mother. But he then goes on to say, "not all current groups bear the same relationship to that ancestor culture. For example, African-Americans' connection to their ancestor culture is importantly different from that of immigrant groups like Italians, Eastern European Jews, and Irish." But how many different kinds of descendants can an ancestor have?

III

Let us note some further characteristics of opposites. First, opposites are similar in meaning. Both 'black' and 'white' are color words. Magenta/crimson/scarlet are contrasting colors of red. History and mathematics are both forms of understanding (Dearden, 65-70). "Blacks," "Afro-Americans," "African-Americans", and "Colored" are similar but not the same, and yet all four have reference, though in different ways, to a common group. It would be very difficult to contrast two terms if the commonality between the two were not established. The two terms

are related through their relationship to a third. Greimas (21) explains the opposition between 'bar' and 'par' as really the difference between /b/ and /p/. "If we are in a position to compare and distinguish between /b/ and /p/ . . . it is because these two phonemes are comparable, in other words, because their opposition is located on one and the same axis, that of voicing. The term voicing may be incorrect, since it points only to the 'voiced' property of one of the terms, while ignoring the other one. Still, it is not important: we know that we are dealing with a metalinguistic, descriptive terminology which could eventually be replaced by a notation in letters or figures. What matters is the existence of a unique point of view, of a dimension inside which the opposition manifests itself, presents itself as two extreme poles of the same axis."

Secondly, until we know which similarity is being invoked, we cannot be sure what the opposite of a word is. When we talk of the spectrum of colors, we know that the opposite of red is purple. When we talk of the color wheel, we know that the opposite of red is green. If, as Taylor does, we speak of liberalism in terms of equality, the opposites are uniformity and inequality; if we speak of liberalism in terms of survival of a culture, the opposites are letting a minority culture live or die (Taylor, 51-61). Liberalism as a fighting creed presumes a certain superior culture and is therefore different from multiculturalism which holds that all cultures are of equal value. (Taylor, 61-73). Cultures are laid out on a scale of value: superior, equal, inferior. Yet at other times liberalism is seen as compatible with multiculturalism, when liberalism is contrasted with communitarianism or with conservatism.

Third, we are more interested in differences when the similarity invoked involves a more closely related word than when it involves one more distantly related. 'Walk' is more different from 'red' than 'purple' is, but 'purple' is the more meaningful opposite. 'Keep ignorant' is more different from 'teach' than 'indoctrinate' is, but 'indoctrinate' may be the more meaningful opposite. Procedural liberalism is contrasted more meaningfully with substantive liberalism than with conservatism.

Fourth, in any contrast which allows multiple viewpoints, one viewpoint must be selected. (It is also important to keep constant the level of formality, positive/negative connotations, and social register.) If we are working with something communicated, that category of "something communicated" becomes the framework in which opposites are sought. For example, we would not invoke 'remained silent' as an opposite; the opposites must each be examples of something communicated; e.g. the truth and a lie. Amy Guttmann (88-89) trips over this condition in her discussion of self-esteem. On the one hand, she views it from the aspect of ~~what is, the past and the present: Self-esteem should not be based on~~ ~~ERIC~~ ancestry but rather on what one is presently doing. On the

other, she views it from the aspect of source, that is, self and others: self-esteem should be tied to academic achievement which is publicly honored.

Fifth, in many contrasts there is a mid-term between opposites, and the mid-term also constitutes a kind of opposite. The Nilsens speak of positive and negative actions with the mid-point being zero action, which Edward Sapir (128) calls a "zone of indifference." Thus, there are the trinities of "helpful/helpless/troublesome," "accept/ignore/refuse," "persuade/say nothing/dissuade." There is a whole series of contrasting words where the mid-term is 'do nothing.' Examples are 'freeze/melt,' 'solidify/liquefy,' 'write/erase,' 'hire/fire.' In this last series, it is interesting to note that one can only freeze what is melted and vice-versa. According to Walzer, Taylor's argument stands in opposition to high-minded moral absolutism and to low-minded subjectivism (Taylor 99). One can be victim or a victimizer, and there is a neutral mid-point between them. There is the trinity of reform, do nothing, conserve. There does not seem a mid-point involving economic discrimination for its opposite is the zero action, non-discrimination, but is there a mid-point between racial segregation and racial integration? Possibly the most interesting example is equality. Is it one extreme with inequality as the other, which is the way most political arguments and logic conceive it? Or is it, as Sapir (136) suggests, a dynamic mid-point on the way toward or away from increasing or decreasing, a more or less temporary point of rest? If the latter, it is parasitic on differences and comes psychologically to be known only through differences.

Sixth, George Boole and Augustus de Morgan have a very helpful discussion of complementaries. If we define a class of things in terms of a property or set of properties possessed by each member of the class, then a complementary class will be defined by the absence of that property or set of properties. For example, the complement of the class of birds is the class of non-birds containing those animals which lack the properties defining birds. But this notion of a class and its complement can be ambiguous. Non-birds can include all other animals, all other living things, or all other things. For this reason, it may be helpful to use an idea of de Morgan called "universe of discourse." The concept and its complement exhaust the universe of discourse. Thus, depending on one's purpose, bird and non-bird may be placed in any one of a number of universes of discourse. In a Venn diagram, the universe of discourse is represented by a rectangle, the significant class by a circle within it, and the complement by the remaining space. Thus, the rectangle might be "animals," the circle "birds" and the remaining space within the rectangle "non-birds." (See Alexander, pp. 160-162.) A problem can be that universe of discourse chosen may not fit. So Appiah (4) insists that

'race' as a universe of discourse for "Caucasian" or "Negro" does not fit.

Finally, one and the same event can be described by converse pairs depending on which part of an interaction is being described: e.g., 'lend/borrow,' 'throw/catch.' Bartky's (31) trip to Marshall Field's is an example: "The shopping trip turned occasion for resistance now becomes a test." If teaching is taken to be a task word, ignorance and learning are seen as extremes. If teaching is taken to be a success word, it becomes a form of learning. It is not exactly the same as learning, because one can learn without being taught; so it is not exactly like the converse pair "buying/selling," a comparison Dewey is famous for (McClellan 93).

IV

We should not be surprised, then, that proposing opposites for a concept or a case can take many forms. In every case, however, the following remark should be worthy of any difference: "Well, whatever so-and-so is, this certainly is not an instance of it." Or, at least, "this certainly is a different way to conceive of it." What then becomes crucial is in what way we conceive the opposites and how accurately. Without differences no analysis of content is possible. And, as Ferdinand de Saussure asserts, "Everything that we have said so far comes down to this. In the language itself, there are only differences. Even more important than that is the fact that, although in general a difference presupposes positive terms between which the difference holds, in a language there are only differences, and no positive terms" (118). It is only from differences that the principle of identity comes. Or, as William James wrote in a letter to Gertrude Stein, "I need resistance to cerebrate!"

And that may turn out to be an important clue not only in speaking about multiculturalism but in seeing its desirability.

Bibliography

Alexander, Peter. An Introduction to Logic. The Criticism of Arguments. New York: Schocken Books, 1969.

Appiah, Kwame Anthony. "Racisms." In Anatomy of Racism, 4-17. Edited by David Theo Goldberg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990.

Baker, A.J. "Universal and Exclusive Terms." Dialogue 8 (1995): 84-101.

Ball, C.J.E. "Lexis: The Vocabulary of English." In History of Literature in the English Language. Vol. 10. The English Language. pp. 287-299. Edited by W.F. Boulton. Barrie and Jenkins, 1975.

Bartky, Sandra Lee. "Toward a Phenomenology of Feminist Consciousness." In Feminism and Philosophy, 22-34. Edited by Vetteling-Braggin, M; F. Elliston; and J. Blum, Women and Resistance: A. Antiracism, Multiculturalism, and Interracial Community. Three

Educational Values for a Multicultural Society. Boston: University of Massachusetts, 1991.

Chisholm, Roderick. Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977.

Colapietro, Vincent M. Glossary of Semiotics. New York: Paragon House, 1993.

Dearden, Robert F. The Philosophy of Primary Education. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968.

Fredrickson, George M. "Demonizing the American Dilemma." The New York Review of Books, 19 October 1995. Pp. 10-16.

Greimas, A.-J. Structural Semantics. An Attempt at a Method. Translated by Daniele McDowell, Ronald Schleifer, and Alan Velie. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983.

Guttmann, Amy. "Challenges of Multiculturalism in Democratic Education." Philosophy of Education 1995, pp. 86-109.

Hirst, P.H. and R.S. Peters. The Logic of Education. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970.

Lehrer, Adrienne and Lehrer, Keith. "Antonymy." Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (1982): 489-501.

Lyons, John. Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. I, 270-335.

Kinsley, Michael. "The Spoils of Victimhood." New Yorker, 27 March 1995, 62-69.

McClellan, James. Philosophy of Education. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1976.

Nilsen, Don L. and Alleen Pace Nilsen. "Antonymy." in Semantic Theory: A Linguistic Perspective. Rowley, Mass.: 1975.

Nussbaum, Martha C. "Feminists and Philosophy." The New York Review of Books, 20 October 1994, 59-63.

Outlaw, Lucius. "Toward a Critical Theory of 'Race.'" In Anatomy of Racism, 58-82. Edited by D. Goldberg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1990.

Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971.

Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949.
_____. Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954.

Ravitch, Diana. "Multiculturalism: E Pluribus Plures." Pp. 165-183.

Sapir, Edward. "Grading: A Study of Semantics [1944]," in Selected Writings, pp. 122-149. Edited by D. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics. Translated by Roy Harris. La Salle: Open Court, 1986.

Taylor, Charles. Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition." Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.

Wilson, John. Thinking with Concepts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

"Be ye neither radical nor romantic."

**THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF RESEARCHING A CULTURE
OTHER THAN YOUR OWN**

BONNIE JEAN ADAMS

Loyola University Chicago

Sincere intent, and the desire not to offend, on the part of the researcher is not enough. In my work with Native Americans, I have learned that I was not only a representative of my school (Loyola), but of my gender, (female) and of my race, (white) all factors which impact upon not only the process of my study, but the effectiveness of the results. What I am learning was not found in the literature. It is beyond even the best advice. A very wise professor (at Loyola) warned me against the radicalization or romanticization of a cause close to my heart. Taking an advocacy position assumes a paternalistic stance when it regards a culture other than my own. There is always the danger that if I presume too much, and, or listen too little, I will founder upon the sterile shore of ineptitude.

The first challenge of researching a culture other than my own was in review of the literature. The American Indian's means of transmission of culture has been primarily oral. Until the late nineteenth century, what has been written had been the echoes of the voices of others; the diaries and journals of a people who often viewed the Indian as part of the natural wilderness frontier, an obstacle to be overcome so that they, themselves, could survive and s. Although there is never excuse to disregard another, it can haps, understandable that through ignorance, rather than intent, the American Indian became foe, not friend.

Although recognized as a tribe by the state of Louisiana, at this time, the Houma is a tribe 'unacknowledged' by the federal government. For an American Indian, and for an American Indian tribe, 'unacknowledged' is synonymous with unrepresented in the legal system of the United States. The federal government is obliged to protect the tribal lands and resources of federally recognized tribes, and to provide them with health care, education and economic development assistance. The tribal governments of 'acknowledged' tribes can negotiate with federal, state and local governments. Federal acknowledgement is recognition of a tribe's identity, organization and rights. The acknowledged tribe becomes a sovereign nation and political entity.

In 1978, Federal Acknowledgement Policy was enacted enabling unacknowledged tribes, such as the Houma, to petition the federal government for a change in their legal status. At the time of my first visit to them, the Houma people were working through the process of meeting certain established criteria to prove that the United Houma Nation was a 'legitimate American Indian Tribe'. The attempt is a time-consuming, expensive and politically charged process, full of congressional politics and bureaucratic delay. Tribal government becomes necessarily overly concerned with the administration of its community; and entangled in its own new bureaucracy.

This researcher became determined to become the 'voice' for the Houma Nation. The Houma had become 'my cause'.

It was at a meeting with my graduate advisor, that this researcher was challenged about intent; of having a hidden agenda of my own. "Cultures have been lost," he said. And this is when my journey began. The classical culture upon which ours is based is founded upon the wisdom of such as Socrates, Aristotle and Plato. In the words of the philosopher, Plato, "Learning is remembering". There has always been realization of the importance of looking to the past, and learning; our actions based upon that knowledge. But we do great injustice to ourselves if we hold our past so sacred and inviolable that it precludes our acting in the present; interferes with our building the future. As writers and teachers of history, we can do no less than to research the unwritten history of 'others', not so that we can rewrite our own history, but so that we can see a more comprehensive picture of it. We continue to have an, often unrecognized opportunity, and certainly, a responsibility, to interview the people who still remember the past.

As a researcher, I discovered just how small a part I played in the overall scheme of things; especially in what I desired to influence, and to change so badly. As a former teacher, accustomed to having the answers, most solutions, I had been unaware of the authority and power allowed an easy compassion. I had always told my students that

learning is a process. That there are not always 'right' answers; that there are, often, no answers at all. While this is wise teaching in the classroom; a 'safe' environment where I was 'in charge', in the field, it is hard-learned lesson in observation, patience and humility.

Knowledge is nothing without wisdom. While knowledge implies answers; learning as means to an end, wisdom includes understanding. As the researcher of a 'people', there was no 'body of knowledge' to be identified and mastered. The American Indian is not an 'other'; a topic of study, but individual people. While I had the chance to brand my students with the tattoo of my beliefs and values, and prided myself on my ethical principles for choosing not to consciously do so; as a researcher, I entered unknown territory, with belief system and custom so different than my own that it was necessary that much knowledge precede even the beginning of understanding, and influence was more theirs upon me, than mine was upon them.

Perhaps, a great deal of our insensitivity and lack of awareness of other cultures is our ignorance, and while this may have been an excuse in the past, for those with concerns of basic survival uppermost in mind, for those with the luxury of technology, and communication systems so advanced that one can contact anyone else almost anywhere in the world in a matter of minutes, there is no excuse to be uninformed, or unaware about any 'other'. And yet, with increased opportunity for more knowledge, comes increased insularity on the part of the individual; a selfishness and preoccupation with using such tools of possibilities to play games and to chat.

Having returned to the classroom, I face what I would formerly not have recognized as a culture. Yet, my students are also an 'other'; disregarded and mistrusted. The American Indian was once seen as an obstacle to the progress of building a new nation. The solution was

education and assimilation. The future generation needs only to become educated, accustomed to tradition, properly prepared, and also, assimilated into the dominant American Dream. And this is good. Or, this is a mistake. In the words of educational theorist, John Dewey, "Knowledge is Growth".

When my students first encounter the chapter about philosophy in their text, they are overwhelmed, and intimidated; until their educational training kicks in. Memorization of key terms and concepts, and the names of philosophers and...when asked about their own beliefs and values- they are puzzled. Perhaps, this is too much of a challenge, to burst through the flaming hoop of sacred custom, to realize that those such as Socrates, Aristotle and Plato admonished remembrance, not worship. I  my students the task of writing about their own educational experience, by looking at the past; their own educational experience,

and thinking about their own belief system, why and how it will influence the future. Without a realization of what you believe- your own philosophy, there is no self-knowledge. Ignorance precludes understanding of ourselves, and of others. "Each person is a truth" someone wise once said.

If this is true, what will be remembered of our own culture? What will be our contribution? As educators, those so much responsible for the future; assigned to part of the task of assimilation- how will we prepare ourselves, and the future generation? The way in which thinking is taught is often like a show; three ring circus competition of educational innovation, circus flyer advertisements handed out to the audience of parents and the school board. The many colored multiculturalism flag waves bright among the other current 'isms' identified as being most pressing issue. Read the flyer and hand out more. We disagree on definition of terms and implementation of practice. Like the novice researcher, there is sincere intent and, perhaps, misdirected effort on our part. And as advocacy interferes with the writing of effective history, it does much the same with the teaching of effective thinking. It takes courage to step off the familiar bandwagon. If educators are believed to be overpaid and underworked performers in the eyes of the public, certainly, in our own eyes, we are heroes.

And it is because history is still being made, and we are not yet relegated to obscurity, or fame in any history book that we have the responsibility to not just 'be' heroes, but to 'act' as such. Heroes are heroes because they do something. Not only being (by best personal example) but action (through influence) is implied. Teachers are the head scribes; those who will not only record, but show others how to record history. When my students talk and write about what others 'should' do- parents, administrators, the state and federal government, I tell them that "Shoulds' cannot matter. It all begins with you".

Teachers speak and write about how and why their students 'should' understand each other, and then assume that the way to show them how to do this is by handing out 'info' work sheets and doing projects in the name of 'multiculturalism'. You cannot color a flag, and expect to understand the allegiance of one from a war-torn country, you cannot make bread, or build a tepee, and understand a culture, or even a custom and meaning handed down over generations. Neither can you rely on what 'should' happen; what other people 'should' do, believe or think. With experience as teachers, my students will realize this. With experience in the field, educators will be reminded of it.

If I were to go to another country, with customs and language different from mine, in a sincere attempt at understanding, the teacher, perhaps, would introduce me as American. She would show where

America is on the map. We would color an American flag, study a hand-out of current slang phrases, bake an apple pie, and since I am from Chicago, we may watch a segment of the 'Untouchables'. This is how culture is taught in our country; token acknowledgement, assigned attention being paid by month, day or class period. In the classroom, learning about those from a culture other than our own is project not process. This must change.

As a teacher, I have always kept a kaleidoscope on my desk as reminder of the multiplicity of possibilities, the diversity of ideas. But most important, as a researcher, (one, who has been in the field) I have come to the true realization of the multiplicity of individuals beliefs, values, custom. Unfortunately, there are too many of those who refuse to take on the challenge for fear of failure- even before they begin. I have overheard more than one of my fellow graduate students voicing the concern that the step beyond theory in regard to oral interviews is one better not taken. And yet, it is in the very attempt that contributes to our own growth and self-knowledge. As an educator, it is my responsibility and privilege to be a creator of possibilities; to enable students to have wonderful ideas. If the kaleidoscope is important for reminding the teacher of the beauty of myriad possibilities, the binoculars of the researcher enable one to continue to see what is really out there. My experience has already enriched my teaching. It has expanded my own vision, so that if I were to stop now- it would have been worth it.

Binoculars and kaleidoscope set upon my desk. And I will return to the field. This time, however, I will not be looking for answers, or results, or solutions for a cause. I will take advantage of an opportunity, also a privilege to work with the Houma Indians, those from a culture other than my own. What is needed for one conducting oral interviews is much the same as what one of my students described good teaching to be- "Feet on the ground, head in the stars, and the ground is always shifting."

While it is true that many cultures have been lost, it is my hope that the Houma culture will not be among them. It is also, partly, my responsibility. For, only through my realization and respect of the 'other' will my own culture be enriched. Only through my own looking outward and remembering will I be able to be effective teacher and historian. What I have learned by researching a culture other than my own has been to return to a familiar place, seeing it as if for the first time. No more 'shoulds'. No more 'hand-outs'-as Cher Bono says so simply, yet so well "It's just you and me, babe." I want to extend a special thank you to my students from whom I have learned so much.

References

Bordewich, Fergus M. *Killing the White Man's Indian. Reinventing Native Americans at the End of the Twentieth Century*. New York, New York: Doubleday, 1996.

Bruckner, Pascal. *The Tears of the White Man. Compassion as Contempt*. New York, New York: MacMillan, Inc., 1983.

Burnham, Philip. *How the Other Half Lived. A People's Guide to American Historic Sites*. Boston, Massachusetts: Faber and Faber, 1995.

Cahill, Thomas. *How the Irish Saved Civilization. The Untold Story of Ireland's Heroic Role from the Fall of Rome to the Rise of Medieval Europe*. New York, New York: Doubleday, 1995.

Farb, Peter. *Man's Rise to Civilization as Shown by the Indians of North America from Primeval Times to the Coming Industrial State*. New York, New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1968.

Gilliland, Hap. *Teaching the Native American*. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1992.

Purvis, Alan C. *The Scribal Society. An Essay on Literacy and Schooling in the Information Age*. White Plains, New York: Longman, 1990.

Riessman, Frank. *The Culturally Deprived Child*. New York, New York: Harper & Row, 1962.

Takaki, Ronald. *A Different Mirror—A History of Multicultural America*. New York, New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1993.

Thernstrom, Stephan, Orlov, Ann, Handlin, Oscar, ed. *Concepts of Ethnicity*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1982.

Tyler, Daniel, ed. *Red Men and Hat Wearers*. Papers from the Colorado State University Conference on Indian History, August, 1974, published by Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, 1976.

Utter, Jack. *American Indians—Answers to Today's Questions*. Lake Ann, Michigan: National Woodlands Publishing Co., 1993.

Walker, Deward E. Jr. *The Emergent Native Americans. A Reader in Culture Contact*. Boston, Massachusetts: Little Brown and Co., 1972.

Walton, Anthony. *Mississippi*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

SUPERMAN, ADOLESCENTS, AND THE METAPHYSICS OF POPULAR CULTURE

MICHAEL A. OLICKER

Northeastern Illinois University

It has long been my view that one aim of education should be the teaching of critical thinking. There is, however, a continuing controversy over whether critical thinking can be taught outside the context of a well-established academic discipline. The "disciplinarian" viewpoint on this issue would exclude materials from the curriculum that are not considered reputable by authoritative writers within the traditional disciplines. So the view of, for example, Harry S. Broudy (210-211) would be that an English teacher can teach students to think critically about the works of Shakespeare or Herman Melville, but there is no point in teaching critical thinking about comic books. Broudy would take the categorical position that the meaning of a story in a comic book or a children's TV program or a monster movie is obvious and provides no basis for critical inquiry. The job of persuading "disciplinarians" that popular culture is worthy of critical thought will certainly be a difficult one. It may even be a job for Superman!

It is my view that teaching students to think critically about popular culture is especially important in the case of adolescents. The culture of adolescence—as I. C. Jarvie (1972) argues—is increasingly a ~~com~~ culture. John R. Palmer (147-149)—drawing from the psychologist Kenneth Keniston—argues that the alienated adolescents of the 1960s created a negative, cynical mythology

that separated the cultures of adolescence and adult society even further. For Palmer and Keniston, there may be a need for a new mythology that will enable adolescents to understand that they are part of history and have genuine roles in society. Certainly this will be no easy task. Lawrence Grossberg describes a class on popular music that he taught in which students became hostile when he asked them to give reasons for their preferences in popular music. He gives the impression that he abandoned any attempt to encourage critical thinking in his class for fear of becoming an unpopular teacher. For many writers, critical thinking and the creation of myth are necessarily conflicting activities. "Myth" is taken to be equivalent to "illusion" which necessarily involves falsehoods. Critical Thinking is often identified with the search for truth. So from the perspective of a dichotomy between myth and critical thinking, the task of a critical thinker is to shatter illusions and deprive us of our myths in order to see reality naked.

I would like to urge a functional basis for mythology and critical thinking. The mythology in popular culture may function for some people may indeed function for some people as a poisonous illusion. The belief that there really are aliens from other planets among us may be seen as a justification for police state. By contrast, a mythology may provide us with ideals that are worthy of emulation. The person who mocks and ridicules our mythological ideals may very well be urging a cynicism that is just as dangerous as the belief that we are the objects of a conspiracy by Martians. There are a variety of critical questions that can be asked about adolescents (A) and popular culture (POC):

How does POC influence A and how does A influence POC?

What are the predominant images of A in POC?

Are the images of A in POC an influence on or influenced by educational ideology or educational philosophy?

What are the predominant images of education in POC?

Are there images desirable or undesirable?

As a sort of case study in the critical analysis of popular culture, let us consider one of the most influential characters in popular culture: Superman. In 1930 the science fiction novelist and social critic Philip Wylie published a novel entitled *Gladiator*. This novel tells of a scientist who injects his pregnant wife with chemicals that give their baby superhuman powers. But as the young man grows up he finds that his ability as a football player and as a soldier produce resentment and not admiration. Toward the end of the novel the character (Hugo Danner) has become increasingly depressed and embittered. In the final scene, he goes to the top of a mountain and denounces God for making the

human race the way they are. He is then killed by a bolt of lightning.

A few years later a copy of *Gladiator* came into the hands of two Cleveland adolescents by the names of Jerry Siegel and Joe Shuster. Siegel was an aspiring writer and Shuster an aspiring artist. Yet they wanted to be able to use their interests to make a living. So they created a character who was a heroic version of Hugo Danner and sold the idea to a new York publisher who had just started a line of comic books. In 1938, the two boys' character—initially called The Superman—appeared in issue #1 of *Action Comics*. By the early 1940s, Superman was appearing in several comics, a nationally broadcast radio program, a newspaper, comic strip, and in animated cartoons. In a 1943 World War II film about army nurses, the head nurse (Claudette Colbert) and her subordinates are shown reading Superman comics to war orphans. The head nurse's boyfriend—a combat soldier—was played by a muscular ex-prizefighter turned actor by the name of George Reeves. In the late 40s, two Superman movie serials were made starring an actor and dancer by the name of Kirk Alyn. At that time the movie serial was a declining genre, so when the radio producer Robert Maxwell was approached by Kellogg's cereals about doing a Superman television series, he rejected Kirk Alyn and chose George Reeves for the part.

The recent book *Hollywood Kryptonite* (Kashner & Schoenberger) bears the subtitle "The Bulldog, The Lady, and The Death of Superman." Of course, the book is about the death of George Reeves (the star of the 1950s TV series *The Adventures of Superman*) (AOS). Recent headlines announced that Superman had broken his neck in a fall from a horse. Of course it turned out that the victim of the accident was Christopher Reeve (who portrayed Superman in several films of the 1980s). In the summer of 1996 at Superman Week in Metropolis, Illinois I met Dr. Jeff Anderson of Cleveland, Texas who is assisting Kirk Alyn (now approaching his 90th birthday) in preparing a revised edition of his autobiography. No doubt that when Alyn and Anderson publish the book a headline will appear somewhere saying "Superman Publishes Autobiography." And should Dean Cain (who played the part of Superman in the recent TV series *Lois and Clark: The New Adventures of Superman*) somehow become engaged to Sarah Ferguson, tabloid headlines all over the world will scream "FERGIE TO MARRY SUPERMAN!"

What is going on here? I would call it Metaphysical Confusion.

In his book *Superman: Serial to Cereal*, Gary Grossman tells the story that after a year of producing AOS Robert Maxwell was replaced as Producer by Whitney Ellsworth. The episodes produced by Maxwell treated AOS as an adult-oriented show about a crimefighter who often m vi into situations when his friends find themselves confronted by criminals who cannot be stopped by conventional means or situ-

ations that an ordinary man cannot handle. The later episodes produced by Ellsworth cut back on the film noir atmosphere in Metropolis and the vicious criminal behavior and emphasized stories that supposedly appealed to children. I recall that after watching AOS religiously (see Kozloff on Superman as a religious figure) during its first few seasons, by 1957 when I was 11 years old I had lost some enthusiasm for AOS. Nevertheless I retained my enthusiasm for Superman and at the age of 50 in 1996, I still continue to enjoy his appearances in comics, films, animated cartoons and whatever. (Andrew Lotterman would probably claim that I am still at a pre-adolescent stage of moral development.)

Yet there seem to be kids who have had attitudes toward Superman that are much different from mine. As a kid, I had seen both George Reeves and John Hamilton (who played Perry White on AOS) appear on other TV series. I remember Reeves singing country and western songs on Tony Bennett's show and Hamilton appearing on *I Led Three Lives* as Herb Philbrick's boss in Philbrick's 9 to 5 job as an insurance agent. I knew that George Reeves was an actor and occasionally a singer. Grossman reports that not long after George Reeves began shooting the "child-centered" version of AOS under the supervision of Whit Ellsworth, he made a personal appearance in a Detroit store where he was confronted by a child brandishing a real gun that was really loaded with real bullets. Reeves acted heroically and coolly talked the kid into handing over the gun because—he said at the time—although the bullets could not hurt Superman they might hurt others when they bounced off Superman. I suspect that Reeves did not quite have the same enthusiasm for personal appearances after that incident. Yet the confusion of George Reeves with Superman continued. Grossman has even suggested that if George Reeves did commit suicide his appearance on *I Love Lucy* may have sent him into a depression that eventually was a contributing factor in his death. And even if Reeves was murdered, I would guess that the appearance on *Lucy* did not do much for his self-respect.

In "Lucy Meets Superman" it should be noted that neither "George Reeves" nor "Clark Kent" is ever mentioned during the program. Who then is the guest star? Well it is Superman but it does not seem to be Kal-El the Last Son of Krypton. It is a character called "Superman" who stars on a children's program that Little Ricky is a fan of and that Ricky Ricardo "once met in Hollywood." The program is full of cynical remarks from Lucy and Ethel Mertz such as "If he's really Superman, why is he taking an airplane to Terre Haute?" With the exception of the brief film clip from AOS that Little Ricky is shown watching at the beginning of "Lucy Meets Superman", "Superman" is never shown doing any kind of superhuman stunts that he did regularly on AOS. In short,

the character called "Superman" who appears on *I Love Lucy* would seem to be a vaguely untrustworthy entertainer who is taking advantage of the gullibility of Ricky and Little Ricky but is easily seen to be what he "really is" by Lucy and Ethel. Fred Mertz who usually has strong opinions—remains strangely neutral in the matter.

Grossman suggests that George Reeves felt he was being set up as an object of ridicule by Lucille Ball. If it is obvious that "Superman" is not really Superman then it may very well be that anyone who claims to be Superman is somehow untrustworthy. Of course we would regard anyone who told us that he really could fly and really could pick up a locomotive as delusional. But should we meet Kirk Alyn, Christopher Reeve, or Dean Cain and hear them mention that they had played Superman in a film, a film serial, or a TV series, would we then be justified in calling the local mental institution or the police??? Or would we be somehow justified in pulling out a weapon and with a cynical grin saying, "I'm going to show the crowd here that you aren't really Superman." That seems to be the way some people—especially some children—would react!

Although Superman differed from most other visitors from outer space in the mass media of the 1950s in that he was a good guy the atmosphere in the "real world" of the 1950s was that of suspicion and distrust. Watching AOS during the 1950s was a vacation from a world in which we kids were being subjected to drills in the schools to prepare you for a possible nuclear attack. I can remember watching the Army-McCarthy hearings and *I Led Three Lives* on TV and becoming suspicious of a couple of old men in my neighborhood who acted rather peculiarly. I feared that they might be Communists and expressed my worries to my father—an attorney who worked as a prosecutor for the US Treasury Department. He reminded me that accusing someone of being a Communist was a very serious matter. (In the 50s—if I remember correctly—being a Communist was illegal.) He asked me if I had any evidence that Mr. X was a Communist and I admitted that I didn't. Although my parents had given me the usual warnings about not getting into a car with a stranger, I learned from that incident that there was an important difference between being careful and being suspicious of everyone.

There are many people who are capable of being heroes should the occasion arise. When Lucy got stuck on the ledge near the end of "Lucy Meets Superman," it was "Superman" who unhesitatingly went out on that ledge and rescued her. Even if that character did not have superpowers, that was still a heroic act. And when George Reeves was confronted by that kid with the gun in real life, he did not hesitate to deal with the situation. So even though George Reeves was not "really"

Superman, he was capable of heroic action. Although the Grossman and Kashner & Schoenberger books may contain inaccuracies, there is still no evidence for the oft-repeated rumor that George Reeves's tragic death in 1959 resulted from his suffering from the delusion that he really was Superman.

Superman is not just a superpowered being. He is a superpowered being who recognizes that he has the obligations of a hero and acts on them. In an episode of AOS entitled "Panic in the Sky" Superman loses his memory as the result of a collision with a Kryptonite-laden meteor that is on course to destroy Earth. As he gradually regains his memory, he realizes that someone must attempt to save the world from the meteor and that since he has the ability, he is the one who must act. Superman's ethics* are just as important as his superpowers. If that isn't a good reason to regard Superman as a hero, I don't know what is.

Note

* Which may be either Aristotelian or Kantian. If Superman must act because he is the only individual in his universe with the power to take the necessary action, his obligations—as Aristotle might argue—come from his particular virtues. (No other superheroes appeared on AOS.) But should there be others in his universe with the power to take such actions (as there were in DC Comics) then we have the basis for a Kantian ethic of the superhero. For this point I am indebted to Prof. Frederick Rauscher of the Department of Philosophy at Eastern Illinois University. (I have some reservations about this Kantian point. A superhero's ethics—I would argue—would depend on the nature of his powers. Superman's powers are superhuman but the powers of his fellow DC Comics heroes The Spectre and Captain Marvel are supernatural. If the meteor had been sent toward Earth by Satan, Superman might be incapable of stopping it. But Captain Marvel possesses the powers of Solomon, Hercules, Atlas, Zeus, Achilles, and Mercury (a/k/a The Power of SHAZAM!). And The Spectre is a murdered policeman sent back to Earth by the archangel Michael (and his Supervisor) with the power of The Wrath of God to avenge the deaths of murder victims. While both Captain Marvel and The Spectre have the power to pinch-hit for Superman, Captain Marvel might also have an ethical obligation to stop the meteor, but The Spectre might have an ethical obligation to punish Satan if Satan should destroy Earth!)

Bibliographies

I. PHILOSOPHY, ADOLESCENTS, AND POPULAR CULTURE.

Broudy, Harry S. *Enlightened Cherishing: An Essay on Aesthetic Education*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972.

Dorrell, Larry D., Dan B. Curtis, and Kuldip R. Rampal. "Book-Worms Without Books? Students Reading Comic Books in the School House." *Journal of Popular Culture* 29.2 (Fall 1995): 223-234.

Grossberg, Lawrence. "Teaching the Popular." In *Theory in the Classroom*, ed. Cary Nelson, 177-200. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1986.

Jarvie, I. C. *Concepts and Society*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972.

_____. *Movies as Social Criticism*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow, 1978.

Nehamas, Alexander. "Serious Watching." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 89, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 157-180.

Palmer, John R. "Theories of Social Change and the Mass Media." *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 5, no. 4 (October 1971): 127-149.

Shusterman, Richard. "Popular Art." In *A Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. David Cooper, 336-340. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1992.

_____. "Popular Art and Education." In *The New Scholarship on Dewey*, ed. Jim Garrison, 35-44. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, 1995.

II. ON SUPERMAN.

Anderson, Patrick D. "From John Wayne to E.T.: The Hero in Popular American Film." *American Baptist Quarterly* 2, no. 1 (1983): 16-31.

Anderson, Richard W. "Biff! Pow! Comic Books Make a Comeback." *Business Week*, September 2, 1985, pp. 59-60.

Beniger, James R. "Far Afield." *Communication Research* 20, no. 5 (June 1993): 494-500.

Bifulco, Michael J. *Superman on Television*. Canoga Park, California: Bifulco Books, 1988.

Brown, Slater. "The Coming of Superman." *The New Republic*, September 2, 1940, p. 301.

Chang, Gordon H. "Superman is about to Visit the Relocation Centers' and the Limits of Wartime Liberalism." *Amerasia Journal* 19, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 37-60.

Collins, Bradford R. and David Cowart. "Through the Looking-Glass: Reading Warhol's Superman." *American Imago* 53, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 107-137.

Connor, John W. "Superman on Main Street: The Schizophrenic Hero in America." *Journal of Psychoanalytic Anthropology* 3, no. 4 (Fall 1980): 335-347.

Daniels, Les. *DC Comics: Sixty Years of the World's Favorite Comic Book Heroes*. Boston: Bulfinch Press, 1995.

DeMarco, Mario. "Superman—Everybody's Hero: Two Young Boys' Dream Finally Realized." *Good Old Days* 26, no. 7 (July 1989): 32-37.

_____. "Superman: The Super Hero." *Antiques and Collecting* 93 (October 1988): 74-77.

Eco, Umberto. "The Myth of Superman." In *The Role of the Reader*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979.

Engle, Gary. "What Makes Superman So Darned American?" In *Popular Culture: An Introductory Text*, ed. Jack Nachbar and Kevin Lause, 331-343. Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1992.

Feiffer, Jules. *The Great Comic Book Heroes*. New York: Dial Press, 1965.

Fleisher, Michael L. *The Great Superman Book*. New York: Warner Books, 1978.

Friedrich, Otto. "Up, Up, and Awaay!!! America's Favorite Hero Turns 50, Ever Changing but Indestructible." *Time*, March 14, 1988, pp. 66-73.

Galloway, John T. *The Gospel According to Superman*. Philadelphia: A. J. Holman, 1973.

Gates, Henry Louis. "A Big Brother from Another Planet." *New York Times*, September 12, 1993, Section 2, pp. 51+.

Goodman, Ellen. "It's Tough Giving Up Your Cape and the Big S." *Kansas City Star*, July 28, 1981, p. 15A.

Grossman, Gary H. *Superman: Serial to Cereal*. New York: Popular Library, 1976.

H _____ Michael. "It's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's . . ." *The Spectator* 275, no. 8730 November 4, 1995): 8-9.

_____. "Who Owns Our Myths? Heroism and Copyright in an Age of Mass Culture." 217

Social Research 52 (Summer 1985): 241-267.

Henderson, Jan Alan. "Still Super After All These Years." *American Cinematographer* 72 (October 1991): 42-48.

Hughes, Rob. "The Dawn of the Golden Age." *Collector's Showcase*, April-May, 1995, pp. 33-48.

Hugick, Larry. "Public to DC Comics: Resurrect Superman" *Gallup Poll Monthly*, no. 326 (November 1992): 28-30.

Kashner, Sam and Nancy Schoenberger. *Hollywood Kryptonite: The Bulldog, The Lady, and the Death of Superman*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Kauffman, Stanley. "Stanley Kauffman on Films." *The New Republic* 189, no. 3 (July 18 & 25, 1983): 22-23.

Keefer, Truman F. *Philip Wylie*. Boston: Twayne, 1977.

Kipniss, Marc. "The Death (and Rebirth) of Superman." *Discourse* 16, no. 3 (Spring 1994): 144-167.

Kozloff, Sarah. "Superman as Saviour: Christian Allegory in the Superman Movies." *Journal of Popular Film and Television* 9, no. 2 (Summer 1981): 78-82.

Lang, Jeffrey S. and Patrick Trimble. "Whatever Happened to the Man of Tomorrow? An Examination of the American Monomyth and the Comic Book Superhero." *Journal of Popular Culture* 22, no. 3 (Winter 1988): 157-173.

Lederman, Marie Jean. "Superman, Oedipus, and the Myth of the Birth of the Hero." *Journal of Popular Film and Television* 7, no. 3 (1979): 235-245.

Legman, Gershon. *Love and Death* (1949). New York: Hacker Art Books, 1963.

Leonard, Harris K. "The Classics—Alive and Well with Superman." *College English* 37, no. 4 (December 1975): 405-407.

Levin, Schneir. "Was Superman Jewish?" *Journal of Irreproducible Results* 41, no. 1 (January 1996): 5-6.

Ligorski, Mark. "The Masked Superhero." *Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis* 22, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 449-464.

London, Herbert. "The Death of Superman." *First Things*, no. 31 (March 1993): 11-12.

Lotterman, Andrew. "Superman as a Male Latency Stage Myth." *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic* 45, no. 6 (November 1981): 491-498.

Mandell, Paul. "It's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's." *American Cinematographer* 72 (November 1991): 66-72.

Marlowe, John W. "Some Thoughts on Nuns, Teachers, and Supermen." *Theory into Practice* 8, no. 2 (April 1969): 76-78.

McNair, Wesley. "The Secret Identity of Superman: Puritanism and the American Superhero." *American Baptist Quarterly* 2, no. 1 (1983): 4-15.

Minganti, Franco. "1939: Flying Eyes, Flight, Metropolis, and Icons of the Popular Imagination." *Storia Nordamericana* (Italy) 7, no. 1 (1990): 93-103.

Mitchell, Jane P. and Joseph D. George. "What Do Superman, Captain America, and Spiderman Have in Common? The Case for Comic Books." *Gifted Education International* 11, no. 2 (1996): 91-94.

Perlman, Ellen. "Little Cash Cows on the Prairie." *Governing* 8, no. 4 (January 1995): 26.

Reissman, Rose. "Crimebusters or 'Rightsbusters'?" *Update on Law-Related Education* 15, no. 2 (Spring-Summer 1991): 18-19.

Reynolds, Richard. *Super Heroes: A Modern Mythology*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1992.

Rollin, Roger B. "Beowulf to Batman: The Epic Hero and Pop Culture." *College English* 31, no. 5 (February 1970): 431-449.

Rothfield, Lawrence. "At a Single Bound: Illiberal Reflections on 'Truth, Contingency, and Modernity.'" *Modern Philology* 90 (May 1993): Supplement: S134-S141.

Rons, Martin. "Montessori, Superman, and Catwoman." *Educational Theory* 38, no. 3

(Summer 1988): 341-349.

Snyder, John. "King of the Comic Book Premium." *Collector's Showcase* 14, no. 7 (October 1994): 35.

Steranko, James. *The Steranko History of Comics*. Vol. 1. Reading, Pennsylvania: Supergraphics, 1970.

Wachtel, Paul L. "The Preoccupation with Economic Growth: An Analysis Informed by Horneyan Theory." *American Journal of Psychoanalysis* 51, no. 2 (June 1991): 89-108.

Waitman, Michael D. "Superman: Invulnerable to All but Kryptonite, Compassion, and Concupiscence." *Journal of Mental Imagery* 8, no. 3 (Fall 1984): 87-98.

Wertham, Fredric, M.D. *Seduction of the Innocent*. New York: Rinehart, 1953.

Wilcox, Rhonda V. "Dominant Female, Superior Male." *Journal of Popular Film and Television* 24, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 26-39.

Williams, J. P. "All's Fair in Love and Journalism: Female Rivalry in Superman." *Journal of Popular Culture* 24 (Fall 1990): 103-112.

Zinn, Laura. "It's a Bird, It's a Plane—It's a Resurrection." *Business Week*, no. 3314 (April 12, 1993): 40.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

219

**A SCHEMATIC ANALYSIS OF POPULAR
CULTURE, ADOLESCENCE AND SPORT**
*-Surprising Implications for Education and
Our Democratic Future-*

PHILIP SMITH
The Ohio State University

Culture with a capital "C" has traditionally been defined as Platonic-like in nature. Meaning and value are assumed to be ultimately transcendent, owing little or nothing of their construction to ordinary human beings. The thinking here goes something like this: "If Culture were dependent on circumstances, or contingent in any way on ordinary people, it would lose its intellectual and moral authority. Authority is grounded in objective and immutable truth. Only those who understand this and possess the talent and training to recognize the truth in tradition and law are fit to shoulder the burden of leadership and decide how power should be exercised."

Culture of this kind has never been easy to establish, not only for obvious political reasons, but because it is hard to translate general cultural mandates in specific and concrete situations in a relevant and consistent manner. The usual model for this has been to regard general cultural mandates as core, abstract principles that are embodied in tradition, reflected in social conventions and sustained by the legal and moral practices of ordinary people in their daily lives. High culture represents the purest form in which these principles are known and celebrated. Low, or "popular," culture, defined by the mundane practices of ordinary people in their daily lives, is an attempt to understand and appreciate general cultural mandates from "the ground up," so to speak.

It is not force to disparage these practices or the people who engage in them to characterize popular culture in this way. Rather it is to recognize the need everyone must face to live their lives in particular circumstances. The problem is how to do this in an acceptable way, given the great distance between high and low culture and the variable conditions of human experience? Popular culture tends to develop its own internal dynamic precisely because the translation of general cultural mandates is so problematic. Operating idiosyncratically it begins to resist and undermine higher authority. When higher authority initiates corrective action, an adversarial relationship is created that fosters the further development of popular culture's internal dynamic as a mode of resistance.

By various means and degrees ordinary people begin to show animosity towards virtually every symbol of higher authority. There comes a point when popular culture can no longer be described as a loyal, although perhaps misguided, attempt to honor the core, abstract principles of Culture with a capital "C." Popular culture has been transformed by its own internal dynamic into a hostile alternative both to the principles of culture and to the very idea of a Platonic-like model for conceiving of meaning and value. On the alternative model, meaning and value are relativistic, worldly and highly personalized.

This picture of popular culture can be seen as either positive or negative. Viewed as positive, it portrays schematically the development of Western-style democracy, from Athens and Rome, through the Renaissance, Reformation and the Enlightenment, to the present, where at the end of the 20th century a fashionable number of intellectuals have proudly proclaimed that, at least philosophically, we have finally purged ourselves of the idea of cultural hegemony and can openly oppose its exploitative consequences. We fully recognize that individual human beings must be given their due as ends-in-themselves and that lasting community can only be found in respectful association with natural diversity.

The negative view of popular culture sees it as a reflection of adolescence, understood to be a necessary but dangerous stage in human development that goes from infancy to adulthood. Without adolescence maturity could never be achieved. The danger is that it combines growing independent power with unreasonableness. The emergence of independent power during adolescence may be largely a physiological phenomenon, but to some extent it represents an allowance from an enlightened adult community, recognizing the individuals in this phase of life to test their talents against. The rejection of externally imposed modes of control is essen-

tial for the final leaf to maturity, whereby a higher authority can be understood and appropriated as valid extensions of an independent and rational self.

If by some measure adolescent rebellion is to be accepted as normal in the course of healthy self development, it might still be asked, "how much development is that?" The danger inherent in adolescence is that coupling self-assertion with immaturity can be a recipe for disaster. Lacking the guidance of a strong cultural authority would seem to be no less detrimental for individual development than being oppressed by it. How can the right balance be found?

The feeling of being alone in a hostile world is typical of adolescence. Moreover, it is unclear to the adolescent who should bare the responsibility for this. Is it one's own fault? Would embracing the authority of the adult world help the problem or worsen it? Adults would like to believe that given sufficient time and a decent education an adolescent will be brought back in line with reasonably prudent social conventions. Popular culture prepares the individual for the possibility that social conventions may never be prudent. It encourages people to believe, for a variety of reasons, that one must always be ready to fend for one's self. Assuming this attitude, the distinction between "acting-out," which suggests an untutored, perhaps malevolent, immaturity (and which is epitomized by adolescence) and "acting-up," which suggests a more reasonable and courageous response to troubling circumstances becomes fundamentally problematic.

Herein lies the difficulty: If popular culture regards this distinction as fundamentally problematic, by what light does it guide adolescent development? Adolescence, it would seem, is an idea that itself was born of popular culture and reflects the same kind of immaturity that is found in its source. In this regard it is similar to our modern conception of democracy, which is also a product of popular culture. Democracy is not driven by a logically consistent vision of a good society. And adolescence cannot be contrasted with a reliable image of a mature person. Because popular culture relativizes, materializes and individualizes meaning and value, it cannot establish any substantial or generalizable authority for the normative ideas that it generates. It lacks an internally coherent structure that would allow ideas like democracy and adolescence to be explicated and justified *a priori*. Its sole basis for understanding ideas, for discussing and defending their meaning and value, is human experience. Charles Peirce, the father of Pragmatism, said about human experience that "it is the most mendacious witness there is, but it is our only witness, and all we can do is put it in the sweat-box and torture the  of it as best we can." Peirce believed that ultimately truth resides in the *de* of human experience. It is only that human experience, serious-

ly examined, is our only way to know the truth. John Dewey, the more influential philosopher of pragmatism who followed Peirce, did not believe that truth could be kept apart from experience even in this modest way. Neither does popular culture. So, where does that leave us?

The increasing dominance of popular culture in the world today explains why the institutions and practices associated with high culture are in such rapid decline. High culture pillars like philosophy, theology, opera, museums and libraries are seen by popular culture as being out of touch with reality, disrespectful of actual human experience, or both. However, what reason is there for believing that popular culture can protect itself, and us, from the degrading effects of the hyper-demanding, sensation-seeking, self-indulgent post-modern personality without reverting to the assumptions of high culture? To suggest that ordinary people can do better at managing their affairs than their high culture counterparts only begs the question. How is this possible? Lacking external standards, or special mental powers, the only tool available to popular culture for interpreting experience is self-assertion, the quality of which is to be judged by two criteria: 1) its objective and practical developmental outcomes, and 2) its capacity to sustain interest and motivation.

An illustration of how self-assertion can be put to good use can be found in the area of sport. Sport begins as play. As play moves away from purposeless self-expression and adopts the characteristics of socially constructed, rule-governed behavior, games emerge. Games become sport when interaction becomes competitive and rules not only regulate activity, but begin to define its meaning and value for anyone who participate in the sport. Eventually the sport develops a practice that has its own integrity. Understanding this practice is more than an intellectual act, more than a behavioral expression or display of skill, and more than having any particular feeling or attitude. It involves all these things and, thus, is like a culture unto itself. As with any culture, it has its own reality. Not everyone who engages in the practice necessarily understands or cares about it. At some point the practice must resist challenges to its integrity, and the stewards of the sport must be prepared to sanction or exclude those who do not sufficiently understand or respect it.

Notice, too, that, as with popular culture, there is no assumption that the practice of a sport is anything except the human construction of those who partake of it. The sport may serve a host of extrinsic, even conflicting, ends. It may be commodified as a business, consumed as a form of entertainment, or indulged in as egotistical self-expression. But if the practice is like a culture, maintaining its own standards and ensuring the pursuit of its own internal good, its meaning and value is

honor. At the same time it is something to experiment with and to modify when conditions warrant, since, after all, it is a human construction for which its stewards are reasonable.

The challenge of developing and maintaining sport practices that mature and enrich those who engage in them is in one way easier now than ever, in another way harder. It is easier in that sport practices can no longer be constrained or trivialized by high culture. As a dimension of popular culture, they are simply too powerful. It is harder, because the control of these practices is increasingly in the hands of those who do not understand or respect them, and who themselves seem to need the guidance the practice is supposed to provide. How this circumstance has come about is a long and ugly story. Yet, sport practices survive and prosper today as never before. In this there may be a lesson for other areas of popular culture. The self-assertion they promotes is participatory, objective and practical. They involves the body and spirit, equally with the mind, in building practices that are as exhilarating as they are developmental, which is something even volatile adolescents can understand and respect.

Dead End:
**THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF JUVENILE
DELINQUENTS**

GENE D. PHILLIPS
Loyola University Chicago

Film historian Jerry Vermilye states that films of social conscience produced during the 1930s were box office successes because they blended social commentary with exciting melodrama. "And sometimes they raised enough public consciousness to effect reform."¹ As we shall see, William Wyler's 1937 film of Sydney Kingsley's play Dead End was one such film.

The real center of the film, like the play before it, is the youth gang headed by Tommy (Billy Halop). He and the foul-mouthed hoodlums in his gang fritter away their time by playing truant from school, committing petty thefts, and brawling with rival gangs. While the boys appear essentially harmless at this stage, Gregory Black observes, "it is clear that these lads have little education and no skills, and are destined to live in the slums; only a miracle will save them from a life of crime."²

By the same token, the high-class apartment building which borders their slum area symbolizes the world of affluence from which they are excluded. In short, they are in training to become criminals. Tommy's parents are dead, so he is being raised by his older sister Drina (Sylvia Sydney), who has little control over the defiant boy.

1. The villain of the film is the environment, Black points out; "but the epitome of the environment is Baby Face Martin" (Humphrey Bogart), a notorious gambler and murderer wanted by the police, who pays a visit

to the slum that spawned him to see his mother and his former girlfriend Francine.³

The members of Tommy's gang idolize Martin. "He is the future, as far as these youngsters are concerned," writes Graham Greene. Furthermore, Martin's early life as a juvenile delinquent growing up in this shabby neighborhood "is there before your eyes in the juvenile gangsters."⁴ Dave Connell (Joel McCrea), who still lives in the old neighborhood, remembers Martin from their boyhood days; and he eventually turns Martin in for the reward money, whereupon Martin is killed in a gun battle while trying to escape capture.

Lillian Hellman, who wrote the screenplay for the film, set out, in consultation with William Wyler, the film's director, to bring her script in line with the film industry's censorship code (while still retaining as much of the play's unvarnished realism as possible), so that the industry censor, Joseph Breen, would grant the movie the industry's official seal of approval. For example, Hellman purged the obscenities from the vulgar street language of Tommy and his gang.

Withal, Black rightly remarks, "The startling point of the film is not how much of the play was removed from the film, but how much of the social commentary survived . . . Joseph Breen."⁵ For example, the film follows the play in boldly dramatizing the social inequities existing between the occupants of the elegant high-rise on one side of the street and the occupants of the tawdry tenement on the other side of the street. Furthermore, Dave could be called the social conscience of the film, to the extent that he does what he can to encourage Tommy and his buddies to rise above their slum environment and become law-abiding citizens. Hence Andrew Bergman endorses the screen version of Dead End in these terms: "There had been nothing like Dead End's high voltage class tension in any Depression film."⁶

One scene in the film is particularly noteworthy for Wyler's use of visual imagery. Tommy cowers in a shadowy basement stairway as he hides from the police, who want to apprehend him for his delinquent behavior. As Mike Cormack notes, Wyler shows us "Tommy's face in close-up, crushed" by the shadow of the prison-like bars of the stairway railing.⁷ This image implies that Tommy is already imprisoned by his wretched life in the cruel and indifferent world of the slums.

Tommy eventually goes to jail; but as the film draws to a close, Dave assures Drina that he will bail Tommy out of jail with the reward money that is his due for bringing down Baby Face Martin, who had a price on his head. He thereby saves Tommy from going to reform school—in contrast to the play, where Tommy's future remains in doubt.

In Dead End the theme which pervades Wyler's films clearly survives; i.e., that an individual can become a better person by enduring the

sufferings which life visits upon them. In the present case this theme is reflected in Tommy. In the wake of his brush with the law, Tommy turns over a new leaf. In fact, Tommy begins to mature as a person as a direct result of his ultimately rejecting the likes of Baby Face Martin, a vicious criminal, as his role model, and choosing instead a decent, honest man like Dave to serve as a model for his future growth. The hardworking Dave will provide a good home for Tommy, once he and Drina are married.

But the film's closing scene implies that the rest of Tommy's gang will not be as lucky as Tommy. As the boys disappear into a dark alley, Wyler photographs them through a fence, reminding us once again that these delinquent boys are imprisoned together in the harsh, grim world of the slums. They feel they must stick together for survival.

Graham Greene terms Dead End "a magnificent picture of the environment that breeds the gangster."⁸ That is why Joseph Breen, the industry censor, stressed that the film offered "a strong plea for slum elimination and better housing" as a means of crime prevention, as Black notes.⁹ (In fact, the ads for the movie aptly referred to "Dead End, cradle of crime.") An editorial in The New York Post echoed Breen's sentiments: "The best thing that could have been done at the last session of Congress would have been to show the film Dead End" (August 31, 1937). Breen accordingly issued Dead End the film industry's official seal of approval (seal number 3596), which meant that Lillian Hellman had successfully fulfilled her plan to keep her screenplay in harmony with the industry's censorship code. In addition, the movie was popular with both the critics and the mass audience.

For the record, Tommy and his gang of ruffians were referred to in publicity layouts for the film as the Dead End Kids, though they are never called that in the movie itself. The young actors who played the gang members continued to be billed as the Dead End Kids in the movies which they made together after Dead End. But Billy Halop and the others never again recaptured the energy and vibrant spirits which they exhibited for Wyler in his superior film about adolescent delinquents.¹⁰

Notes

1. Jerry Vermilye, The Films of the Thirties (New York: Carol, 1990), p. 87.

2. Gregory Black, "Dead End," in Hollywood Censored: Morality Codes, Catholics, and the Movies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 278.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 276.

4. Graham Greene, The Graham Greene Film Reader: Reviews, Essays, and ed. David Parkinson (New York: Applause Theater Books, 1995), pp. 240-41. Black, "Dead End," in Hollywood Censored, p. 278.

6. Andrew Bergman, We're in the Money: Depression America and Its Films (New York: New York University Press, 1971), p. 155.
7. Mike Cormack, Ideology and Cinematography in Hollywood, 1930-39: Dead End and Other Films (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 18.
8. Greene, Film Reader, p. 427.
9. Black, "Dead End," in Hollywood Censored, p. 280.
10. On Wyler's contribution to the film, see Jan Herman, A Talent for Trouble: The Life of Hollywood's Most Acclaimed Director, William Wyler (New York: Putnam's, 1996), pp. 163-73.

I WAS A TEENAGE WEREWOLF AS YOUTH CULTURE IDEOLOGY

DON G. SMITH

Eastern Illinois University

G. Stanley Hall coined the term "adolescent" in 1904. The word "teenager" came into our vocabulary in 1941, followed quickly by the term "juvenile delinquent." The American cinema reflected the growing concern of adults for young people aged 13 to 19. Early examples include *Where Are Your Children* (1944), *I Accuse My Parents* (1944), *Delinquent Daughters* (1944), and *City Across the River* (1949, based on Irving Schulman's novel *The Amboy Dukes*). With the release of *Blackboard Jungle* and *Rebel Without a Cause* in 1955, the screen's depiction of American youth grew even darker as our alienated children challenged authority figures with switch blades and rejected all that adults held dear. One year later swivel-hipped Elvis Presley appeared in his first film, *Love Me Tender*, and Bill Haley and the Comets enticed hormone-driven youngsters to *Rock Around the Clock*.

The youth of America may have been forming a counterculture that frightened and concerned adults, but it was not until 1957, with the release of *I Was a Teenage Werewolf*, that a teenager literally became a monster on the movie screen. The popularity of *Teenage Werewolf* spawned subsequent teenage monster films in the late Fifties. What that and subsequent teenage monster films of the Fifties suggest

is more critical attention.

the slightest provocation. Moody, temperamental, and hypersensitive, Tony is the constant concern of his school principal (Louise Lewis), Detective Sergeant Donovan (Barney Phillips), and his girlfriend, Arlene (Yvonne Lime). After Tony beats up one of his best friends at a Halloween party, he agrees to accept medical assistance from Dr. Brandon (Whit Bissell). Unfortunately, Dr. Brandon uses Tony as a subject of an experiment in regression. Placing Tony under hypnosis, Dr. Brandon succeeds in taking the teenager back in time to a primitive, animal period in his evolution. Thereafter, Tony periodically turns into a werewolf and commits unpremeditated murders in Rockdale. When one of his friends identifies Tony as the werewolf, police hunt the confused killer to Dr. Brandon's laboratory. After the werewolf kills Dr. Brandon and his assistant, police bullets end Tony's confused reign of terror.

Tony is a sociopath who cannot adjust to parents, teachers, and other students. When Sergeant Donovan asks him why he can't control his temper, Tony replies, "People bug me." Arlene's parents berate Tony because he doesn't have a job. "You've got to bow to authority," Arlene's father tells him. Tony's father, a working man who has reared the boy since his mother's death, advises Tony that "Sometimes you have to do things the other fellow's way," to which Tony answers, "I don't like being pushed around."

So in the first teenage monster movie of the Fifties we have a boy, raised by a single parent, who cannot conform to social expectations. But to what sort of society will Tony not conform? Historian David Halberstam writes:

Three decades later, the Fifties appear to be an orderly era, one with a minimum of social dissent. Photographs from the period tend to show people who dressed carefully: men in suits and ties, and—when outdoors—hats. The women with their hair in modified page-boys, pert and upbeat. Young people seem-ed, more than anything else, 'square' and largely accepting of the given social covenants. At the beginning of the decade their music was still slow and saccharine, mirroring the generally bland popular taste.¹

The adults in *I Was a Teenage Werewolf* largely conform to Halberstam's description. The teenagers, however, are definitely end-of-the-decade models; their music is rock and roll. It is probably no accident that Tony's Elvis-style, combed-back hair is just a little longer than that of his peers. Perhaps it was no accident that the first teenage monster sprouted the long hair of the werewolf? But against what is Tony willing? Halberstam continues:

In the years following the traumatic experiences of the Depression and World War II, the American Dream was to exercise personal freedom not in social and political terms, but rather in economic ones. Eager to be part of the burgeoning middle class, young men and women opted for material well-being . . . security meant finding a good white-collar job with a large, benevolent company, getting married, having children, and buying a house in the suburbs.²

But Tony isn't interested in the American Dream. He isn't even interested in getting a job. The freedom he wants is personal and social, not economic. He couldn't care less about saving up enough money to buy Betty Furness' latest Westinghouse refrigerator. Tony wants to be left alone to live his own life on his own terms. This attitude, when pushed to its extreme under hypnosis, turns Tony into a murdering werewolf. As Aristotle said, "the man who lives beyond society must either be a god or a monster." It is clear which Tony is! Of course, Tony would not have taken the extreme path of werewolfery had it not been for Dr. Brandon, a scientist and intellectual. In the Fifties, just as in every other epoch of American history, "we, the people" distrusted intellectuals as amoral, naive and atheistic. Intellectuals were different, not quite like us, susceptible to the cry of communism and other siren songs of corruption. We liked Ike because Ike was one of us. Stevenson was an egghead, one of those untrustworthy thinkers. The message of *I Was a Teenage Werewolf*, of course, is that individuality is commendable unless it turns into a sociopathic desire to murder the American Dream. Then the police must enter and eliminate the threat. Tony's death, though regrettable, is finally necessary.

I Was a Teenage Werewolf resonated with troubled teens across America; and it must have made wheels turn in the minds of teens who had not yet experienced the generation gap full-force. At least Mother stands by Charles, but she must do so covertly, hiding him from public view for his own protection. How many parents in the Fifties cringed to see their sideburn-sporting, leather-jacket-wearing sons "escape" from the house, unable to prevent the inevitable embarrassment?

When *I Was a Teenage Werewolf* took in over two million dollars in less than a year, American International Pictures quickly produced a follow-up double feature comprised of *I Was a Teenage Frankenstein* and *Blood of Dracula* (1958). Soon to follow would be other teenage monster films: *How to Make a Monster* (1958), *Teenage Caveman* (1958), *Teenage Monster* (1958), *Teenage Zombies* (1958) and *Teenagers from Outer Space* (1959).

Teenage monster films exploit America's general paranoia, also exploit America's anti-intellectual tendencies. According to

Richard Hofstadter's Pulitzer Prize-winning *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*, Americans have always distrusted the intellect. Without a doubt, the teenage monster films of the Fifties reinforce this anti-intellectualism. In four of the seven films made, scientists use teenagers as guinea pigs for their amoral experiments, illustrating Hofstadter's contention that Americans view intellectuals as amoral. This is nothing new, of course. Intellectuals in Thirties and Forties horror/science fiction films were also suspect. But after scientists led us to victory in World War II with the creation of the atomic bomb, Fifties America viewed scientists as potential saviors, the purveyors of progress, the behind-the-scenes personnel who would invent our next time-saving device, our next modern product. But the teen exploitation horror/science fiction films of the Fifties did not hold out such promise. In those films, paranoia held sway. The youth of America did not trust the adult generation that had weathered the Depression and won World War II. American youth wanted freedom from that debt, and license to be themselves. This required a rebellion against the concept of life as an endless search for greater physical comfort. This required a rebellion against success as defined as a house in Levittown with a new Westinghouse refrigerator. In essence, it required a rebellion against the American Dream. Love for the benefit of community.

Let us review the ground we have covered. *I Was a Teenage Werewolf* was a film made by adults for teenagers. It acknowledges that the lives of some teenagers are hard, but it makes the point that, though some adults may prey upon teenagers for their own ends, the teenager who becomes monsterous becomes so as a result of his own character flaws. The seven teenage monster films that followed, all made by adults, lay the blame at the feet of their own generation. The adult generation, in effect, assumes the guilt of turning innocent teenagers into monsters.

In 1944, Helen Valentine launched *Seventeen* magazine, which encouraged retailers and manufacturers for the first time to target a teenage audience, particularly teenage girls. The magazine stressed the teenager's desire for personal freedom coupled with a pitch for personal responsibility. By the mid-1950's, businessmen were replacing the emphasis on personal responsibility with a wholesale pandering to teenage counterculture, rock 'n' roll music being the most visible example.

In the late 1950's, studio executives looked around for ways to exploit the growing teenage market. The teenage monster movies were among a wave of films made by adults for teenagers. In that wave were such titles as *Hot Rod Girl* (1956), *Hot Rod Gang* (1958), *High School* *lcats* (1958), and *The Cool and The Crazy* (1958). Though these films

highlighted adolescent "Sturm und Drang," they were not as bleakly anti-adult as the teenage monster films. In the latter, adults are predators who create the objects of their own fear. With the possible exception of Tony in *Teenage Werewolf*, the adolescent monsters themselves are blameless. Note also how the image of the scientist changes in horror/science fiction films from the early to the late Fifties. In the first half of the decade, scientists and science itself are ambiguous. While scientific progress is responsible for creating many horrors, science is usually also humankind's savior. In the teenage monster films of the late Fifties, scientists are uniformly evil. This is an example of how the films portray an adolescent vision in which hope is replaced with despair and trust in authority is replaced with distrust and fear. If the paranoid style was prominent in the American vision, it was nowhere more prominent than in the teenage monster films.

In a review of Grace Palladino's book, *Teenagers: an American History*, Diana West writes:

... where Palladino examines the record, she sees only the rise of the teenager; equally important, however, is the death of the grownup. One is not possible without the other. The fact is, as consumerism became the American pastime, and as consumption, particularly consumption of entertainment, became driven by the infantile yearnings of adolescents, the influence of the adult on taste and behavior rapidly diminished. . . . [By 1965] . . . the grownup was dead, and a brave new age of infantilism was upon us. Since then, we have seen the rise of adolescents—and adolescently influenced adults—who have scarcely any links to their predecessors, cut adrift as they are from the moral strictures and social conventions of the past. The results—the teenage epidemics of premarital sex and illegitimacy, suicide, and violence, drug abuse and alcohol abuse—are not pretty.⁹

It is arguable that the rise of adolescent popular culture and the adults' abdication of their role as transmitters of culture have helped bring us to the point where we find ourselves today. In her review of Disney's *The Hunchback of Notre Dame*, Marian Kester Coombs writes that the process of cultural deterioration is already well under way:

The principle subversion [in the film] is not the happy ending, but the stylized hatred of straight, mainstream, adult society. Back when actual adults were in charge, this vision of kids in control, of the inmates taking over the asylum, was a harmless distraction. But now look who's president. And look at the ugly chaos spreading throughout the school sys-

tem and wherever else youth congregates; nihilism is no longer just a cartoon.⁴

It is one of the great dangers in a capitalist democracy that adults are free to mock themselves and their culture in the marketplace if such mocking leads to financial profit. Unfortunately, the young are only too eager to see films praising the wisdom and virtue of the immature and the greed, heartlessness, and stupidity of the mature. When the doctors abdicate, the inmates are only too eager to run the asylum. The trouble is that the doctors don't get to leave. Instead, they must stay and suffer the consequences of their abdication. The young naturally seek guidance from adults, and in all cultures preceding mid-1950's America, adults had obliged. Since the mid-Fifties, however, adults have lost faith in the basic goodness of Western culture in general and in American culture in particular. Postmodern America is an America devoid of any sincere religious faith and devoid of any real faith in traditional American values.

There is little difference between nihilism and postmodernism. In a world without value or truth, the young seek only entertainment and creature comfort. Adults, who have no answers to the questions of the young, abdicate all responsibility for leadership and again become as children. The seeds of American nihilism were planted before the advent of cinematic teenage monsters, but cinematic teenage monsters were among the first sprouts to break the soil.

Notes

1. David Halberstam. *The Fifties* (New York: Villard Books, 1993) p. x.
2. Ibid. 66-67.
3. Diana West. "Review of *Teenagers: an American History* by Grace Palladino," *New Criterion* 15, no. 1 (1996): 140.
4. Marian Kester Coombs. "Mondo Quasimodo," *Chronicles* 20, no. 11 (1996): 47.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

WHY WE DO WHAT WE DO AS EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATORS

SANDY ALBER & SHANNAN MCNAIR

Oakland University

BEGINNING

As newly hired faculty, we found ourselves discussing our practice as early childhood educators. We found that we had many common beliefs about what we hoped to achieve in our teaching and why we held those learning goals. As early childhood educators, we quickly moved into a discussion of the guidance we found in the theoretical foundations provided us by Piaget and Vygotsky. The notions of development and scaffolding learning was as important for our adult students as for their own young students. We could identify ourselves as professors who believed in co-constructing learning with our students. We saw ourselves as guides, rather than lecturers. We valued active engagement and facilitating our learners' move to new thinking through those experiences. We thought that social interaction and dialogue were critical to the success of our students in their own teaching. As teacher educators, we believed that modeling these behaviors for our graduate school students was crucial. On one warm spring morning following a department meeting, we decided to formalize our reflections and conversations by attempting to trace our philosophical roots. The results of our structured collegial reflection in this paper.

Though we brought different expectations for our students in terms of content, we identified four key teacher attributes that we

both attempt to promote in our students. These attributes were identified after reading and discussing Colton and Sparks-Langer's (1993) article A conceptual framework to guide the development of teacher reflection and decision making. When we read the following statement in Colton and Sparks-Langer's text, we found a general concept to guide our thinking. "Technical proficiency is not enough; morals and democratic principles must also guide the reflective teacher's actions" (p. 45). This agreement gave us a common ground for limiting our joint reflection. Colton and Sparks-Langer described four attributes of reflective decision makers, which were: efficacy, flexibility, social responsibility and consciousness. These four attributes focused our discussion and reflection. Before we attempted to identify our philosophical base, we needed to arrive at a common set of definitions for our key teacher behaviors. Colton and Sparks-Langer wrote that flexibility was important so that one can view issues through another's eyes and because "things do not always turn out as expected . . ." (p. 50). To us flexibility meant to be able to change thoughtfully and purposefully. Colton and Sparks-Langer defined efficacy as "the teachers' belief that they can have an impact on children and schools" (p. 50). We agreed, defining efficacy as the power to act on one's beliefs. Colton and Sparks-Langer required reflective teachers to be actively engaged to promote democracy and "contribute to social cause" (p. 50). For us, social responsibility was characterized by a willingness to consider goodness beyond benefits to one's self. Finally, Colton and Sparks-Langer described consciousness as "clarifying one's own thinking" (p. 50). For us consciousness was described as deliberate self awareness in social context arrived at through reflection on self and environment.

To continue shaping our understandings of these terms, we decided to tell each other stories and then trace these stories to our philosophical foundations. We concluded that we would each take parallel branches on our journey. Shannan's stories focused on actions and Sandy's stories focused on modeling. We then identified the theoretical influences based on our four key behaviors and stories. Having mapped out our arena and our limits for discussion, we began our overt reflections. The dialogue from those reflections follow.

DIALOGUE ON KEY BEHAVIORS, STORIES AND THOUGHTS ON
PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS

Shannan's Efficacy Story

I see my role as cheerleader. I try to take little pieces at a time. For example, I structure assignments to build up to a feeling of efficacy. One thing each class has enjoyed doing was identifying something that they

did with a student that was successful. Then I provide the vocabulary for them to talk about that experience. As I do this, I try to model reflection on practice. I have students choose their own topics or projects and then have them work in cooperative groups.

Sandy's Efficacy Story

I am a story teller, because I believe in the power of stories. When I began my course "Teacher as an adult educator and child advocate", I selected a story from my own experience as an urban early childhood classroom teacher. For example, a favorite story with my students has consistently been the one that follows. I have attempted to avoid gender and names in order to conceal identities.

Early one fall in the city of Detroit, just as I was beginning to know my students, a parent appeared at the classroom door in a three piece suit with a brief case in hand. I was informed that this parent was on the way to a very important trial and had little time to spend with me that day in discussing his/her predetermined agenda. It became clear early on that I was to listen, receive and be intimidated. After stepping very close to me, the parent opened the brief case and withdrew a file folder. Upon handing me the folder, I was informed that the contents were the child's curriculum for that school year. I was to implement the contents without question or variation. After thanking the parent for the concern, support, time from that busy schedule and work involved in preparation of the curriculum, I asked if there was a brief moment that I could discuss a legal issue that was troubling me. I said, "I need a lawyer to represent me in court. I have prepared my own brief and just need someone who can present it to the judge. Would you be interested in taking my case?" Quite naturally, the parent quickly informed me that I was not educated to write a brief and that I would need the expertise of a lawyer to prepare any brief that would be presented in court. I continued our conversation by replying, "That's just like teaching. I use my education in child development, pedagogy and curriculum development to write curriculum plans for students in this classroom. Smiling, the parent reached for the folder and said, "I never thought of it like that before. I heard you were a good teacher. I guess you know what you're doing. I asked the parent to keep the folder, so that I might better understand the family's hopes and expectations for their child, which would make us a stronger team for the child. I reviewed the folder contents and returned it to the parent. Reading it was indeed helpful. This parent was later

one of a group of parents who nominated me for teacher of the year in Detroit Public Schools.

After telling the story and discussing it, I remind the students that they too are experts on child development, pedagogy and curriculum. This story is often mentioned when students recall the course. They remember it and say they use it like a tape when they are anxious about being a child advocacy. They say it helps them feel stronger as they enter a new and frightening area of development-child advocacy. Many say they feel like they can have a voice now that they see how teachers can stand up for children and their profession politely. These recollections encourage me to continue to use this story from my classroom experience, because I want to support teachers as they move into advocacy action.

Philosophical roots that emerged from our efficacy story

Having told our stories, we saw that a common thread was the importance of experience and thoughtful discussion of that experience. We consistently found ourselves using words like story and example, which convey and are based in experience. When we thought of experience, our roots lead back to Dewey and his discussions of the importance of educative experience. We also found Greene's ideas surfacing in our discussion. When she said, "Power may be thought of, . . . as 'empowerment', a condition of possibility for human and political life and, yes, for education" (Greene, 1967, p. 134).

Shannan's Flexibility story

I give the students mental exercises that require them to go from the big picture to the small picture. Basically, what is math? What is science? I ask open ended questions. We move to discussion about how the day-to-day classroom experiences of the child relate to the "big picture" and then students examine their own behaviors. I ask them to bring a piece of child work and we practice examining it and answering questions about it on the spot. Students provide examples from their classrooms that are personally meaningful. I help students to relate from examples to principles introduced in the course.

Sandy's Flexibility story

When I think of modeling flexibility for students, I think about our Flint cohort of students who tested my ability to model flexibility. They forced me to put my academic behaviors where my academic mouth had traveled. Because co-construction implies joint decision making, I have that I wanted to be thoughtfully flexible in my teaching. In my

advocacy class, I required students to plan and carry out and reflect on an advocacy action. Like most professors, I explained this expectation in the first class session. We were midway through the course, and I had just completed a class on building coalitions, when my students challenged me to model my thoughtful flexibility. They said that they had learned from our classroom activities how important coalitions really were and how powerful they could be in improving the lives of children. They wanted me to change the course requirements. Instead of doing individual projects, they wanted to form a coalition and do one large advocacy project citywide. This meant that I needed to consider their learning in such an act. Having believed their idea was a useful and generative activity, I decided I needed to be flexible. This meant revising the remaining class sessions, restructuring the project assignment and the grading policies for the course. Because I wanted the students to become advocates, because I was sure of the importance of coalitions, because I professed to believe in co-constructivism and because I work to be congruent in teaching rhetoric and action, I made the adjustments. The students rewarded my risk-taking by completing an outstanding citywide advocacy project on parental involvement.

Philosophical roots that emerged from our flexibility stories

Again, we returned to Dewey and pragmatism. We discovered that we were concerned with more than flexibility. We wanted thoughtful flexibility. Dewey's thinking on the issue of continuity of experience was crucial to thoughtful flexibility. If being flexible in providing experiences are without continuity, they can be miseducative. That is, if experiences are genuine when modified, they must be generative. We continued to see the need for flexibility with reflection as we considered how educators need to learn to work with and learn from their surroundings. As we considered flexibility in experience, we learned that educators must "extract from them (environments) all that they have to contribute to build up experiences that are worthwhile" (Dewey, 1938, p.40) This helps us understand why we believe in co-construction. It allows us to extract from all our students bring to us.

Greene also spoke to us as we considered our roots. Her thoughts on the temporary nature of groups in her text Releasing the imagination: Essays on education, the arts, and social change (Greene, 1995) helped us to see that our concern for flexibility could also be traced to the reality and constancy of change. Since our students are involved in change and because school reform is a driving educational and political force, we would be remiss if we did not hope to teach thoughtful flexibility. Greene also helped us understand the philosophical thinking that resonates with Colton and Sparks-Langer.

Shannan's social responsibility story

All of my classes have a group activity of some kind. We talk about the process. We compare and contrast. Once I put students in cooperative groups without a warm-up activity. I learned that they need the time to come together as a group. I try to model for them different ways to create diversity in grouping. It has been interesting to see adults line themselves up into a continuum from creative to not so creative. They do this willingly. Then I mix the groups to make sure they have a diverse representation of creative ability. We talk about the strategies I model for them in class. They learn about the strengths of group members and learn to scaffold each other's learning.

Sandy's social responsibility story

Another major teaching responsibility for me is mentoring Master of Arts students through their action research projects. I also use modeling with students in this two course sequence. In these classes, I always bring a piece of research that I am currently interesting. As we begin to identify our professional passions, the question of the importance of the studies for children, families, and the profession arise. As we work on rationale and purpose for the studies, I provide students with an example of rationale and purpose in my research. These models allow us to discuss the importance of research beyond our own professional curiosity and professional growth. For example, when I shared with them a study on parent involvement in urban schools, I not only discussed how I hoped this work would support parent and child growth; I shared with them Guttman's thinking on the rights of parents to be involved in the issue of of social justice that provides me with the passion to continue my work. As we continue to share our studies, we address the ethical issues that must be considered as we conduct our studies. (For an example of this, see the paper on using Dewey's thinking as a project assessment tool in this issue.)

Philosophical roots that emerged from our social responsibility stories

We found that Dewey and pragmatism still had a strong influence on our thinking. We returned to the importance of surroundings in experience as we reflected on social responsibility. Continuity also requires going beyond one's self to provide generative experience.

Greene also spoke to us when we considered social responsibility. Again, her discussions (1995) on creating public space related to our thinking on social responsibility. In her 1988 text, The dialectic of freedom, as she credited Arendt with thinking on public space. This became clearer when she cited Arendt, "Power is never the property of an individual."

ual, it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together (1972, p. 143)" (p. 134).

Noddings' work began to enter our thinking as we considered social responsibility. Noddings' (1984) thinking on community and relationships as a way of determining good in a feminine model seemed to be influencing our thinking. When she wrote, "the one caring has one great aim: to preserve and enhance caring in herself and in those with whom she comes in contact" (p. 172), we heard our concern with social responsibility. Noddings' discussions on human relationships also resonated with our concept of social responsibility.

CONCLUSIONS

Shannan's and Sandy's joint consciousness story

Shannan told a story about how she has students reflect on awareness of their growth in a curriculum class. Sandy told a story about modeling consciousness by sharing a self-study paper with students in a research class. Although both of us brought individual stories, we found that participating in this joint reflection on our practice, preparing a presentation, reflecting on the presentation and writing this article was a good example of a generative and meaningful experience. As we performed these acts, we were engaged in becoming more aware, more conscious of our individual and programmatic practices. We thought, we discussed, we agreed, we disagreed, we questioned and we read. We learned together. In fact, we were engaging in the very behaviors that we were discussing.

Shannan's and Sandy's Philosophical Roots

This final series of reflection again brought us to pragmatism. Consciousness is necessary for creating authentic experiences. Dewey told us experience without reflection fails to meet the criteria for being educative. Interestingly, we had actually identified a primary root in our philosophical base without realizing it. We chose to work through our thinking in terms or stories, examples, which are vehicles to record and contemplate experience. Clearly, our understanding of Dewey's work influences our own work and thinking. As we considered consciousness we again Greene reappeared. She told us, "at the very least, he must make decisions authentically and sincerely; he must take responsibility for every act which he performs. . . . Engaged as he must be, he is bound to move into himself from time to time—exploring his own consciousness . . ." (1967, p. 4). Greene (1988) also wrote, "It requires, as well, a consciousness of the normative as well as the possible: of what ought to be a moral and ethical point of view, and what is in the working.

what might be in an always open world" (p. xi). We also returned to Noddings in our deliberation on consciousness. When she wrote, "there is no true ethical relation between humans and plants because the relation is logically one-sided and there is no other consciousness to receive the caring" (p. 170), we noted the critical role consciousness played in her thinking. We are left to consider our roots. We are certain that we find our home in open systems, but beyond that we have work to do. We have discussion, reading, and thinking to do. Perhaps that is the beauty of searching for our philosophical roots. It provides us with an opportunity for generative experience and professional growth. Although these thoughts sound quite Deweyan, let us close with Greene, "Teachers, like students, have to learn to love the questions . . ." (p.134). We have.

References

Colton, A. and Sparks-Langer, G. (1993). A conceptual framework to guide the development of teacher reflection and decision making. *Journal of Teacher Education*, 44 (1), pp. 45-51.

Dewey, J. (1938). *Experience and education*. New York, NY: Macmillan.

Greene, M. (1995). *Releasing the imagination: Essays on education, the arts and social change*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Greene, M. (1988). *The dialectic of freedom*. New York, NY: Teachers College Press.

Greene, M. (Ed.) (1967). *Existential encounters for teachers*. New York, NY: Random House.

Guttmann, A. (1987). *Democratic Education*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Noddings, N. (1984). *Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and moral education*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

PESTALOZZI'S IDEA OF "INNERE ANSCHAUUNG"

SILVIA SCHMID

Loyola University Chicago

Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827) was a Swiss educational reformer. Strongly influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau's philosophy of naturalism, Pestalozzi used concepts of Rousseau and modified them into a philosophy of education. He believed it best to teach the child by the nature of things themselves, not with words. The child should himself learn to see, hear, find, stumble or be mistaken. Nature teaches the child better than men.

In his first writing *Abendstunde eines Einsiedlers* (1780) (A Hermit's Evening) Pestalozzi explained his understanding of the concepts of God, nature and education. Pestalozzi defined man as a moral, intellectual and physical being with innate potentialities. Education should draw out these inherent powers and develop abilities through activity. His method of natural education (development of head, heart and body) is based on the principle of "Anschaung," translated as observation, sense perception and sense impression. It is defined as face-to-face experience of the realities of the universe and can be summed up as "things before words," "concrete before abstract" or "concept formation."

THE ROLE OF MORALITY

According to Pestalozzi, no pure morality is possible on earth. The source of morality originates in the innermost depths of man.

Man becomes a moral being only through exerting his free will.

Pestalozzi explained that within himself man is a threefold being, an animal, a social and a moral being. As the product of nature, he follows his animal inclination in which there is ambivalence between selfishness and benevolence, always in danger of degeneration. Man's instincts may compel him to behave in a certain way.

The social man is the product of society in which the natural corruption of man still continues. He feels bound to do what the social contract obliges him to do.

In the moral state man takes responsibility for his actions. Man develops and exercises the principles of love, gratitude and justice. In spite of his free will, man decides how to react. The will in human nature will foster morality. By that power, morality becomes man's own work.

Education must follow the course of nature; recognize man as an animal being, preserve his natural feelings and make it possible for him as a social being to live in society unhurt and unharmed; educate him to be a moral being, able to restore himself from his corruption through strengthening his power of self-determination.

If actions are taken by a conscious mind, then man will act morally. It is the highest aspiration of nature to control the flesh with the mind. Pestalozzi claimed:

My ego is more than animal, my love is more than simple instinct. Here we find the core of the new conception of morality: it is an ethos of love. It is the supernatural secret in the innermost of human nature, it ennobles man, so that he is distinct from any other creatures. Love needs to be originated in the inner autonomy. Love is something I create. Religion is something I create and comes solely from the individual (Pestalozzi, 1927-1977, Bd 7: 508).

Education of the mind is submitted to the education of the heart. The most effective method in education of the mind is exercise in thinking. The most effective method of moral education is exercise in loving deeds, in thanksgiving and in faith. The purpose of moral education is the elevation of man toward the power of love.

THE ROLE OF "INNERE ANSCHAUUNG"

If the child is left to nature alone, this will lead to one-sidedness in education, to deception and error. Moral education begins with "innere Anschauung" (inner observation or inner sense perception). The foundation of morality, "innere Anschauung," is based on feelings of love, ~~it~~ ^{it}itude and trust, but also on feelings of order, harmony, beauty and ~~se~~ ^{se}e. "Innere Anschauung" educates in love, gratitude and trust. As

Pestalozzi defined it:

Where "äussere Anschauung" (external observation or sense-perception) is missing, language becomes empty and dead. The same is true for "innere Anschauung" (inner observation or sense-perception): if we miss it, we lack power. The nature of our morality is based on power and purity of our "innere Anschauung." Feelings that arise from the seeds of morality, create the content of our "innere Anschauung," feelings of love, thanksgiving and truth (Roth, 1976/1977, Bd 1: 33).

It was clear to Pestalozzi that the laws of moral education must conform with the laws of the intellectual and physical education. A sense-impression of an object (Äussere Anschauung) is the first step in intellectual education before the child is able to verbalize and describe the object. The same is true for moral education, where feelings have to become alive in the soul of the child before it is able to articulate them. Pestalozzi claimed: "The whole of our morality is based on our most perfect knowledge, will and capacity for good. Therefore, it is important that intellectual and physical elementary education conform harmoniously with moral education" (Roth, 1976/1977, Bd 1: 33).

Feelings of love, gratitude, trust, experience of aesthetic, harmony and inner repose make it possible to feel unity with the self. The mother is able to provide the child with the right foundation of moral education. But she can only do it with an uncorrupted powerful heart and pure mother instinct.

Pestalozzi explained "Äussere Anschauung" as "I observe the world," and "Innere Anschauung" as "I observe myself." The way in which we do this is through the five senses. "The simple impression on the senses is "äussere Anschauung." The judgment of my mind and the feeling of comfortable or uncomfortable that it creates in me is "innere Anschauung." "Äussere Anschauung" is the source of "innere Anschauung." But only "innere Anschauung" gives human worth to "äussere Anschauung" (Pestalozzi, n.d., Bd 16: 330).

Pestalozzi described three achievement levels of the moral state of the soul (moral state of mind or moral disposition). The lowest level of "innere Anschauung" is the natural moods of the infant which come before feelings and strivings which already have intentional character. The second level is the state of self-overcoming. The third level, reflection of own action, realization of own behavior and critical thinking, develop a consciously moral attitude that will manifest itself as moral behavior. It will be manifested in a moral conviction, belief and attitude. Education must guide through these levels.

Even before the child can verbally express the word love, it already experiences security, and an atmosphere of love. The basic mood of love is the connection to the world. Pestalozzi acknowledged: "Animal benevolence, carefree peace, repulsion at the sight of blood, faith in the smile of man, these characteristics of the innocent nature are also the first characteristics of which I recognize the disposition of my mind from which my morality originates like a bud before it flowers" (Pestalozzi, n.d., Bd 12: 111).

THE ROLE OF THE MOTHER AND THE HOME

How will man's inborn moral disposition be awakened, nurtured and strengthened by human care and education? The starting point of a harmonious moral education is the cradle. The mother is concerned for safe and immediate satisfaction of the child's needs. This vivifies the seeds of trust and love in the child. Human nature unfolds only in an environment of repose. Without it, the love of truth and blessing becomes powerless. Unrest increases the demands of the animal nature and weakens the foundation from which moral powers should unfold. The mother instinctively wants to provide her child with rest and her power and fidelity manifest this instinctual desire. Pestalozzi explained: "In the continuous care of the mother, the child realizes feelings of love, gratitude and trust. Through "Anschaung" of her benevolent actions, they elevate to morality, through "Anschaung" of her faith to religious feelings" (Morf, 1868-1889, Bd 3: 196).

On the other hand, unrest arises because of lack of mother's care, needs that are not satisfied, and selfishness. It produces unkindness and unbelief, tendency to animal decadence and violence. If the child is missing the kind hand and the comforting eye of the mother, kindness and grace will not unfold.

How does man learn to love people, trust them, thank them, obey them? Pestalozzi believed that the starting point is the relationship between the mother and the infant. The mother is driven by her maternal instincts to nature, feeds and protects her child. She satisfies its needs. That's how love will grow in the child. If the child is scared, if the child cries, the mother presses it to her breast until the child stops crying. The child responds to the mother's laughing. Pestalozzi explained: "My educational method begins with the natural relationships that exist between the mother and the child. She does anything that the germ of the more noble feelings will not desert if the child will detach from the mother" (Pestalozzi, n.d. Bd 13: 14).

The circle of human love and human faith radiates and extends.

child loves those whom the mother loves. The child trusts those

faith. Faith and love are the beginning of all morality and religion, the beginning of all natural development and education. Pestalozzi acknowledged: "Moral education uses its means,—the sphere of the home and family—from the moment of birth. The child believes and loves before it thinks and walks. The influence of the domestic life awakens and strengthens his moral powers that are to be considered as assumption to all human thoughts and deeds" (Roth, n.d., Bd 1: 60).

Pestalozzi believed that only with a soft hand can the young child be nurtured. Feelings of love, gratitude and trust will be translated into morality. Love must become obedience; gratitude must become devotion; and trust must become respect. Faith and love, nurtured and stimulated from early on by the mother is crucial, as the roots are important to the growth of the tree. Instincts or sensuality are hidden in them. Pestalozzi emphasized that it is life that educates—it is the organic self-instinct that educates.

THE ROLE OF GOD

Pestalozzi believed strongly that human nature is from God, a spiritual nature. Pestalozzi claimed that God reveals himself in the innermost human soul. True religion, according to Pestalozzi's philosophy, exists only in the moral man, for man finds God only with his own heart.

Pestalozzi connected his theory of human development with the most profound essence of the human soul. He saw life in God's light, and through his love. The soul, contains the key to everything. Elevation to religion demands the basis of love; gratitude and trust as reality exists in the childish heart whereby the longing for the supernatural is produced. Moral education has to stimulate the heart's feelings and needs and will thereby move the religious emotional state and direct the heart's feelings towards God.

Moral education must lead to moral conscience by awakening pure sentiments within the child. By exercise, moral education must accustom the child to control himself and to apply life principles. By reflection and comparison, moral education must lead the child to a value system of right and wrong. Moral duties, according to Pestalozzi, are the results of the child's disposition and surrounding.

REFLECTIONS: IT IS LIFE THAT EDUCATES

Nature leaves man in an imperfect state and man himself has to complete his human nature. Education of man stands on a double foundation: first the sensual, the instinct that man has in common with the animal; second, human development is based on the higher dispositions of the human heart, and a human educated power of thoughts and of art that makes him distinct from all other creatures on earth.

Pestalozzi claimed that the principle "Das Leben bildet" ("It is life that educates") had guided him in all his attempts in elementary education. He was convinced that moral education belonged to family life; in it could be found maternal, paternal and fraternal love; natural and instinctive feelings which God has given to humanity and which are forever the starting point of love and faith, of all morality and religion.

Pestalozzi stimulated educational theory and practice and his principles have been absorbed into modern elementary education in many countries.

Endnotes

Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, Sämtliche Werke: Kritisches Ausgabe, 28 Bde, Begründet von Artur Buchenau, Eduard Spranger; bearb. von Walter Feilchenfeld Fales, Emanuel Dejung (Berlin; Leipzig: Croyer; Zürich: Orell Füssli, 1927-1977, Bd 7, 508. All the translations are by the author. The German text follows: Mein Selbst also ist mehr als tierisch, meine Liebe ist mehr als brosser Instinkt. Hier liegt das Herzstück der neuen Auffassung vom Sittlichen: es handelt sich selbstverständlich um ein Ethos der Liebe. Sie ist das überirdische Geheimnis im Innersten der Menschennatur, sie veredelt den Menschen, so dass er sich unterscheidet von allen Wesen, die wir kennen. Aber die Liebe muss nun unter die innere Selbsttätigkeit und Autonomie gerückt werden. Die Liebe ist das Werk meiner selbst; und die Religion ist das Werk meiner selbst; auch sie entspringt ganz der einsamen Individualität.

Heinrich Roth, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, Texte für die Gegenwart, Band 1: Menschenbildung und Menschenbild (Zug: Klett & Balmer, 1976/1977), 33. Wo äussere Anschauung fehlt, wird die Sprache seelenlos und leer. Für die innere Anschauung gilt das gleiche: wenn sie uns fehlt, fehlt uns ihre Kraft. Das Wesen unserer Sittlichkeit beruht auf der Kraft und Reinheit unserer inneren Anschauung. Die Gefühle, aus denen die Keime der Sittlichkeit entspringen, bilden den Gehalt unserer inneren Anschauung. Es sind die Gefühle der Liebe, der Dankbarkeit und des Vertrauens.

Ibid. Das Ganze unserer Sittlichkeit besteht in unserem vollendeten Kennen, Wollen und Können des Guten. Deshalb kommt es darauf an, dass die intellektuelle und die physische Elementarbildung mit der sittlichen in harmonische Übereinstimmung gebracht werden.

Pestalozzi, Sämtliche Werke, Bd 16, 330. Der einfache Eindruck, den alles, was ist, auf diese Sinnen macht, ist das Äussere der Anschauung, die äussere Anschauung. Das Urtheil meines Geists über diesen Eindruck und das Gefühl der Behaglichkeit und der Unbehaglichkeit, das derselbe in mir hervorbringt, ist das Innere der Anschauung, die innere Anschauung. Die äussere Anschauung ist die Quelle der inneren; aber als solche belebt sie nur die Fundamente des Urteils. Aber nur die innere gibt der äusseren einen menschlichen Werth.

Pestalozzi, Sämtliche Werke, Bd 12, 111. Thierisches Wohlwollen, sorgenlose Ruhe, Abscheu vor dem Blut, Glauben an das Lächeln der Menschen, diese Merkmale der Unverdorbenheit meiner Natur sind auch die ersten Kennzeichen, an denen ich die Beschaffenheit meines Geistes, von welcher meine Sittlichkeit ausgeht, wie in ihrer Knospe, ehe sich noch ihre Blüthe entfaltet, zu erkennen vermag.

H. Morf, Zur Biographie Pestalozzis, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Erziehung 4 Bde. (Winterthur; Osnabrück: Biblio, 1868-1889) Bd 3, 196. In der fort-

dauernden Versorgung der Mutter wird es sich Gefühle der Liebe, des Dankes, des Vertrauens bewusst. Durch die Anschauung ihres wohlwollenden Handelns erheben sie sich zum sittlichen, durch die Anschauung ihrer Frömmigkeit zum religiösen Gefühl.

Pestalozzi, Sämtliche Werke, Bd 13, 14. Meine Erziehungsweise geht von den natürlichen Verhältnissen aus, die zwischen Mutter und Kind bestehen. Sie tut alles, damit der Keim der edleren Gefühle nicht verödet, wenn sich das Kind allmählich von der Hand der Mutter löst.

Roth, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, Band 1, 60. Die sittliche Elementarbildung benötigt und benützt ihre Mittel—den häuslichen Lebenskreis—vom Augenblick der Geburt des Kindes an. Das Kind glaubt und liebt, bevor es denkt und wandelt. Der Einfluss des häuslichen Lebens weckt und stärkt seine sittlichen Kräfte, die als Voraussetzung alles menschlichen Denkens und Handelns anzusehen sind.

THE EDUCATIONAL THEOLOGY OF JAMES SOLOMON RUSSELL

TERRENCE A. WALKER
University of Houston

The Venerable James Solomon Russell is a little known figure in educational history. His fifty-three year ministry and the college he founded have touched the lives of thousands of people and endeared him to the hearts of those he served and those he inspired. So profound was his work that the effect of it is still being felt today, sixty-one years after his death.

RUSSELL: HIS LIFE AND TIMES

James Solomon Russell was born a slave on December 20, 1857 in the rural green hills of Mecklenburg County, Virginia. This, at least, fourth generation American was the product of a slave breeding program between his mother, Araminta, of the Hendrick plantation and his father, Solomon, who was a slave on the Russell plantation in Warren County, North Carolina. It was not until after the Civil War that his parents were able to come together to endure the hardships of post-Emancipation life (Russell 1936, 1-2).

It was not until 1868 that Russell was able to start school, but soon he had to quit in order to help his tenant-farmer parents. In 1869, his family moved and he was able to attend a private school in Palmer Springs, Virginia where he would do chores around the school and barter in order to pay his tuition. This private institution went out of existence when public schools were started and Russell

was able to attend school every day when the weather was not suitable for farming. Yet, whether in school or not, Russell continued his education on his own, reading and re-reading the Bible and whatever other books he could find. He also had the advantage of a Sunday school, starting in 1870, which was run by the former superintendent of the local White Sunday school. Russell took over the job of superintendent in 1873 (Russell 1936, 4-5).

Also in 1873, the Superintendent of Public Instruction in Mecklenburg County, upon visiting the school in which Russell was enrolled, advised him to try to attend boarding school since he had completed the course of study in the public school. With this in mind, Russell worked hard on the farm in order to get enough money to enter Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute in the fall of 1874 (Russell 1936, 5).

Although Russell's quest for an education so soon after the burden of bondage had been lifted is admirable, he was in no way alone as Johnetta Cross Brazzell explains:

Long before the abolition of slavery, Blacks recognized the importance and power of education. At the same time, slaveowners understood the need to control the slaves' access to literacy and therefore made learning to read a criminal offense. The illegality of learning did not keep some slaves from seizing every opportunity to acquire as much education as was possible. The slaves understood that a thing denied was a thing to be desired. If it were extremely important to their owners that they did not know how to read and write, then it was equally important for the slaves to learn to do so. Although only a small percentage of slaves emerged from bondage with any degree of literacy, as a group they exhibited a thirst for education they immediately began to pursue. (Brazzell 1992, 26)

Russell's pursuit of an education at Hampton Institute, a school started by the American Missionary Association, was quite enriching. At this co-educational institution Russell studied a wide range of subjects while working on the school's farm for much needed cash. After watching Booker T. Washington graduate in 1875, Russell left Hampton and was not able to return there until 1877 due to a lack of money to pay his bills since his father had just purchased a one hundred acre farm. In the meantime, Russell taught school in North Carolina an eight mile walk from home which he made weekly. Of science Russell noted:

By my mother, by those white friends of our family, and by Hampton, I had been fired with enthusiasm for an education; this same enthusiasm I tried to carry to my pupils, to make them see that although the schoolhouse was small and humble, and the classroom poorly furnished, they could, nevertheless, learn and prepare themselves for greater opportunities. (Russell 1936, 13-14)

Although his job consisted mainly of teaching the three R's, Russell also taught his students prayers, hymns, spirituals and the Apostle's Creed which he had found in a secular newspaper. Upon hearing of the student's 'New Belief' the parents became interested and visited the school. Among this group was an Episcopal laywoman who told Russell about the church, peaking his interest. Later on, he found an old Book of Common Prayer. Upon reading his first whole Prayer Book, he "then and there became, spiritually, a member of the great Episcopal Church" (Russell 1936, 14).

Upon hearing of his decision to enter the ministry of the Episcopal Church, one of Russell's aunts urged him to join the African Methodist Episcopal Church instead, even going as far as to have her pastor from Warrenton, North Carolina come to Palmer Springs for a special service and a talk with Russell. This effort was to no avail, since as he put it, "I had seen the whole Prayer Book and my mind was made up to enter the ministry of the Episcopal Church" (Russell 1936, 15).

Not having anyone to guide him in this matter, Russell turned to Mrs. P. E. Buford of Lawrenceville. Mrs. Buford had long acted as a missionary to Blacks in Brunswick and Mecklenburg Counties, establishing schools and even a hospital for Blacks. She is also credited with converting many of the local Zion Union Apostolic Church members to the Episcopal Church between 1880 and 1890 (Raper and Jones 1992, 31).

Mrs. Buford referred Russell's case to the Rt. Rev. F. M. Whittle, a native of Mecklenburg County and bishop of the then undivided Diocese of Virginia, who appointed a commission to look into the matter. They decided to allow Russell to attend seminary by establishing a branch of Virginia Theological Seminary at St. Stephen's Church, Petersburg, which already had a normal school. This branch of VTS became the Bishop Payne Divinity School for the training of Black men for the priesthood (Russell 1936, 15-16, 23).

It was in Petersburg, on Thursday, October 2, 1878, a day after his arrival, that Russell got a chance to attend his first Episcopal service, Morning Prayer at St. Stephen's Church. On that Sunday, Russell became a lay reader. During his four years at seminary, along with study theology, Russell also studied Hebrew, Greek and Latin.

On March 9, 1882, Russell was ordained to the diaconate and was soon sent out as missionary to Brunswick and Mecklenburg Counties, the first Black missionary sent out by the Episcopal Church in Virginia. Upon a request from the local White priest who already had Blacks in his parish, Russell was sent to set up his base in Lawrenceville, Virginia, which was to be his home until his death. The group worshiped and had Sunday school in the White, St. Andrew's Episcopal Church, separately, for eleven months after Russell's arrival (Russell 1936, 22-27).

In May of that same year Russell attended his first diocesan council at Old Christ Church, Norfolk. He was joined by the two other Black clergymen in the diocese. This council meeting proved quite successful for Russell who came away with money for a horse, bridle and saddle for his missionary circuit and three hundred dollars toward the building of a church (Russell 1936, 27-28).

On December 20, 1882, Russell married Miss Virginia Michigan Morgan of Petersburg, a graduate of St. Stephen's Normal School and the daughter of a prosperous former State Assemblyman, land owner, community leader and advocate of public education (Russell 1936, 28-29). Of his wife (d. 7-2-20) and mother of his five children, Russell would later say:

Kindly, sympathetic, understanding, a zealous mother, and a sacrificing worker, Mrs. Russell was my help-meet in the fullest sense of the word, my co-thinker, and part of my very self in every task connected with the founding and developing of St. Paul's and the extension of the work of the Church. (Russell 1936, 30)

The Russells soon started a parish school in the vestry room of the new chapel and thus began what was to become their greatest work. Soon the single room grew too small and they decided to build a three-room structure which they out grew in only two years. It was this growth that prompted Russell, after much prayer and meditation, to establish a "normal day and boarding school that would give a good English education, coupled with a trade of some kind, and both rooted in thorough Christian training" (Russell 1936, 31).

On September 24, 1888, "the St. Paul Normal and Industrial School was founded on faith in God" (Russell 1936, 31-32). Although Russell, a priest since 1887, had some organizational experience gained from organizing eight congregations and supervising the construction of their chapels, he started the school with the great disadvantage of having no money. Land was bought with faith and the Russells' good names as the starting point for the school was a 'land-buying spree' (1936, 37) which Russell described as an "adventure in faith"

(Russell 1936, 38). The buying of land was financed by donations from friends and churchmen all over the country and from the land itself which contained valuable lumber. When it was all over, the entire property consisted of about one thousand six hundred acres. Although Russell was criticized for purchasing so much land, it came in handy in 1922 when the school, being heavily in debt, sold a portion of the lumber on the land for an amount more than ten times the price of the entire estate (Russell 1936, 32-38).

Built upon the former site of a Freedman's Bureau school that existed there from 1866 to the start of public education, St. Paul's quickly grew into an institution that has educated thousands of young people from all over the world. This growth was accomplished with the help of diverse organizations and people who supported the mission of the school that was constantly being promoted by Russell and his friends. So great was Russell's faith in God and the mission of his school that once when a bishop predicted that St. Paul's would soon be 'extinct' due to debts and budget deficits that had reached eighty thousand dollars, Russell "replied: 'No sir, how can it become extinct? In the first place, it is the work of God, and secondly, it is an institution of this great Church of ours; it cannot become extinct'" (Russell 1936, 41).

St. Paul's did not become extinct and by the year 1906, it was the largest educational institution conducted by the Episcopal Church (Russell 1936, 114). Yet, its development was not without controversy or in a vacuum.

St. Paul's genesis and development was part of a larger movement toward the education of Blacks in the South following the Civil War. There was resistance to the education of Blacks in some parts of the South due to a fear that it would loosen White control over their ex-slaves and threatened the traditional Southern way of life. After Reconstruction, with the Union troops gone and the Freedmen's Bureau disbanded, it was mostly Northern missionary societies that ran elementary schools for Blacks and pushed for a change in White, Southern attitudes. It is largely due to the efforts of Blacks and Northern missionary societies that a common school system was put in place across the South (Brazzell 1992, 29-30).

Yet, these schools were not without their limits. The industrial leaders of the South were looking for a way to create an efficient and organized agricultural sector to complement the new industrial sector. Education for Blacks was seen as a form of social control that "would be used to train and socialize them for unskilled and semiskilled positions, such as household managers, share croppers, dressmakers, commercial

As many of these missionary elementary schools got absorbed into

the public education system, the missionaries turned their attention to secondary and higher education for Blacks. This effort not only spawned much opposition from Whites, it also gave birth to the classical versus industrial debate that tried to determine the proper role of education for Black people in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Brazzell 1992, 30-31, 38).

On one side of the debate stood those, like W.E.B. DuBois and Northern missionary representatives, "who saw education as the vehicle by which political and economic independence could be achieved through the training of Black intellectuals who could organize the Black masses" (Brazzell 1992, 40).

On the other side of the debate was Booker T. Washington and later, Northern philanthropic interests who viewed industrial education as a moral program as Brazzell explains:

It was designed to instill the virtue of industry, that is, the development of appropriate habits such as thrift, sobriety, self-discipline, and a rejection of secular pleasures. It was believed that such habits, in turn, developed character. Morality was an inextricable part of this equation. In short, industrial education, as conceived by some, was designed to teach people how to live. The acquisition of vocational skills was secondary. Teaching people how to think and how to conduct their lives was of far greater importance. (Brazzell 1992, 38-39)

Russell did not escape this debate at St. Paul's. On one side he was criticized by Whites and the county paper who saw the school as not preparing Blacks to work with their hands. On the other side of the debate, Black parents felt that their children knew enough about working and wanted them to receive a literature based education. Russell resolved this issue by going ahead with his idea for a school to prepare some Black young people to teach and to train others for industrial pursuits. This plan got Russell "blacklisted" by both groups for a while only to win them over as time passed (Russell 1936, 82).

A major contributor to Russell's success was his and the school's community involvement. Russell organized the St. Paul Benevolent Society in 1882, which looked after its sick and paid small claims to the heirs of the deceased (Russell 1936, 83). In 1902, the St. Paul Farmer's Conference was formally organized to "carry out a definite plan of constructive racial uplift" (Russell 1936, 83). St. Paul's conducted the elementary education for Blacks in Brunswick County and provided the on-¹ school in the county at least into the 1930s (Russell 1936, 87-88). The college, under the direction of Russell, also founded the first open to Blacks in a fifty mile radius (Russell 1935, 89). The col-

lege, for nine years, produced the ice and the electricity for Lawrenceville, did all the wiring in town, and built most of the local houses at one time. These and other honest jobs performed by the students or graduates of the institution endeared the school to Lawrenceville and fostered good race relations, according to the Richmond News Leader (Russell 1936, 57).

Yet, for all the good works that Russell did with St. Paul's and the pastoral care he showed, not only for his church, but for the whole community, these things only begin to show the dimensions of his greatness. He was an outspoken advocate of racial reform within the Episcopal Diocese of Southern Virginia of which he was made Archdeacon in 1893 (Russell 1936, 64-72). He was the first Black person to be a member of a department of the National Council of the Episcopal Church (Department of Christian Social Service—January, 1924 to September, 1931). He received the Harmon Award for meritorious service to his people in 1929. He was also a recipient of honorary degrees from Virginia Theological Seminary and Liberia College, Monrovia. Russell was a member of Phi Gamma Mu, a national honorary social science society and he was created Knight Commander of the Humane Order of African Redemption by the President of Liberia. Yet, far and above, his greatest honor during his lifetime, was being twice elected to the episcopate (Diocese of Arkansas, 1917 and Diocese of North Carolina, 1918). He was thus the first Black person ever elected bishop in the Episcopal Church for service in the United States. He declined both offers to stay at St. Paul's (Russell 1936, 73,81,115).

On March 28, 1935, after a year of failing health, the Venerable James Solomon Russell died at home at the age of 77. No matter what other weighty accomplishments and honors that might be added to his name, the people of Southern Virginia and the many students, past and present, of what is now Saint Paul's College, will always be eternally indebted to this great man for his work among them.

CONCLUSION

As with many educators who do not consider themselves philosophers or theologians, it is extremely difficult to deduce James Solomon Russell's educational theology from his sparse writings. Still, given the information I have been able to uncover up to now, a few conclusions can be drawn.

To truly understand Russell's educational theology it must always be remembered that he was first and foremost an Episcopal priest advancing the mission of the Church. Whether it was at the elementary, secondary, or higher education level, education served a moral, as well as academic end and thus, was the proper work of both the Church and

the home. Russell put this idea best in his thoughts about the decline of parish schools:

I have also contended for the religious education of our children. For that reason I regret discontinuance of the parish schools. They supplied an educational need that the public schools do not and cannot fill. Religious education is necessary because it develops in the child character and morals along with book education. It is significant that at a recent conference of judges to inquire into causes for the tremendous amount of youthful crime, it was the unanimous verdict that the main cause was the breakdown of Christian training in the home. Reports from probation officers also show that too many of the young criminals come from prayerless homes where parental authority is woefully at fault. In order to prevent this flow of crime and to save those who must be the men and women, fathers and mothers of tomorrow, we who call ourselves Christians must reestablish the family altar, we must pray with our children, we must find time to send them to Sunday school and to accompany them to church, and we must introduce them to the beautiful stories and wholesome truths of the Bible. The Church and its ministers could do no greater good tha(n) to create a new interest throughout the nation in the religious education of its children. (Russell 1936, 72)

With this framework in mind, it is not hard to see why Russell embraced both sides of the classical versus industrial debate in African-American higher education. For Russell, the appeal of industrial education would have been its moral as well as its practical implications. On the other hand, Russell wanted to produce both teachers and priests for ministry to his race and thus, he could not avoid the inclusion of a program of classical education at his institution. Also, being someone well vested in the classical tradition, he would have been familiar with the wisdom to be found in that great tradition. Unlike DuBois and Washington, who have been somewhat unfairly characterized as elevating one type of education at the expense of the other, Russell has long been remembered as embracing both sides of the educational coin in order to benefit the broadest segment of the population which he served.

It is for this reason, and in light of the profound effects of his ministry, that I believe this great man deserves far greater attention from the higher educational establishment. The neglect that surrounds the study of his life and work, for whatever reason, is not deserved and should be corrected as soon as possible. This is especially true considering his

school vouchers. Also, his practical solution to the classical versus industrial debate is extremely important as higher educators struggle to define the purpose and scope of higher education in the twenty-first century. On both these counts, and many more, Archdeacon Russell has much insight to offer this and future generations.

References

Brazzell, Johnetta Cross. 1992. Bricks without straw: Missionary-sponsored Black higher education in the post-Emancipation era. The Journal of Higher Education 63 (Jan./Feb.): 26-49.

Raper, Derris L. and Constance M. Jones. 1992. A goodly heritage. Norfolk, Virginia: Pictorial Heritage Publishing Co.

Russell, James Solomon. 1936. Adventure in faith. New York: Morehouse Publishing.

NONVIOLENCE IN EDUCATION

IAN M. HARRIS

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

"Through our scientific genius we have made of this world a neighborhood; now through our moral and spiritual development we must make of it a brotherhood. In a real sense we must learn to live together as brothers or we will perish as fools" (King, 1961/1986, p. 209)

Educators have contributed to scientific advances referred to above that have created a global villages of our planet. Now it is time for schools and teachers to use their crafts to create what Dr. King called beloved communities. At a time when there is widespread conflict and victimization throughout the world, when neighborhoods and schools are experiencing outbursts of violence, and when there is increasing evidence of racial intolerance and social injustice, educators are turning to peace education strategies to deal with rising levels of violence in schools and to teach their pupils how to respond nonviolently to conflict (Harris, 1995). Leaders in postmodern societies facing an epidemic of violence¹ are using educational strategies to build a culture of peace (Pivoranov, 1994). Why should educators foster nonviolence? Because youth who are bombarded every day with a plethora of negative and violent images need to know about alternative nonviolent ways to settle disputes. Fear of violence is the behavior of American youth (National Institute for Education in the Law, 1995). Education about nonviolence

helps counter a culture of violence that reverberates in the media, entertainment industry, politics, national policy, schools, community, and the family. By the time children become citizens, if they neither learned how to resolve conflicts nonviolently nor how to treat living things in a peaceful manner, they can become violent adults, further promoting dysfunctional behavior. Educators at all levels can help counteract an appalling ignorance about nonviolence that exists at all levels of society. One of the reasons there is so much violence in the postmodern world is that people neither understand nor appreciate the power of nonviolence.

Peace education has three different levels at which it approaches problems of violence (Berlowitz, 1994). At the peace-making level, educators use violence prevention activities to create an orderly learning climate in schools. At the peace-keeping level, conflict resolution techniques teach students to manage their own conflicts constructively. At the peace-building level, teachers teach about the power of nonviolence so that young people will choose not to harm others. In spite of a widespread interest in violence prevention and conflict resolution in schools,² there has been little or no discussion either in educational journals or in debates in professional education societies about how to apply the insights from nonviolence to the field of education.³ Peace theory states clearly that the goal of peace education should not be just to stop the violence, but rather to create in children's minds a desire to learn how nonviolence can provide the basis for a just and sustainable future (Galtung, 1976). Some peace educators (Harris, 1988; Hicks, 1989; Reardon, 1988) have emphasized the importance of teaching about peace and nonviolence to provide young people with hope about the future, but their work has not made it into professional debates about how to respond to rising levels of school violence (Sautter, 1995).

This paper will develop a theoretical perspective for nonviolence in education that draws upon the work of Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., Krishnamurti, and recent feminist educational philosophers like Jane Roland Martin and Nel Noddings. After an explanation of the breadth of nonviolent theory, the author will explain how nonviolence can be brought into schooling content, teacher's pedagogy and the administration of schools.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The role of nonviolence in education is to build in the minds of pupils both a desire to live in a nonviolent world, and to give young people skills so they can construct that world. Teaching about nonviolence attempts to build a consensus about the best ways to achieve peace. Teachers searching for creative ways to respond to rising levels of violence in schools can turn to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Mohandas

Gandhi for inspiration. Although neither of these men was a professional educator, both had many insights into the human condition that would be valuable for school personnel concerned about youth crime, rebellion, and antisocial activities. Both Gandhi and King struggled to build a just society. They both believed that without justice there will be no peace. Dr. King devoted his life to righting the wrongs of a racist society. He hoped to transform social institutions to meet the demands of a multiracial society. Gandhi was also committed to multiculturalism:⁴

I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. (Kripilani, 1992, p.142)

Gandhi strongly opposed the caste system in India and realized that the best way to reduce class antagonisms, and hence promote peace, was through service that required students to work with people different than them:

Nothing can be farther from my thought than that we should become exclusive or erect barriers. But I do respectfully contend that an appreciation of other cultures can fitly follow, never precede, and appreciation and assimilation of our own. . . . An academic grasp without practice behind it is like an embalmed corpse, perhaps lovely to look at but nothing to inspire or enoble. (Kripilani, 1992, p.143)

Nonviolence promotes empathy and helps students become compassionate towards the suffering of others at a personal level, not just through study. Gandhi had a holistic view of education that relied upon the hand, heart, mind, and body to arouse in students a sense of common human destiny.

A commitment to nonviolence enables a better appreciation of truth. Gandhi taught that nonviolence is the way to truth:

There is no way to find truth except the way of non-violence. I do not seek to serve India at the sacrifice of Truth or God. For I know that a man who forsakes Truth can forsake his country, and his nearest and dearest ones. (Kripilani, 1992, p.73)

For Gandhi, the commitment to truth implied devoting your life to higher principles that transcend national interests which so often lead to war, diseases, and other problems of violence. He even titled his autobiography *My Experiments with Truth* (1948). Nonviolence allows a per-

son to be empathic and put him/herself in the shoes of another and see that person's truth.

Gandhi devoted his life to overthrowing an unjust colonial system with its exploitative economic relationships which destroyed village communities and natural ecosystems. Both King and Gandhi led nonviolent movements to overcome the forms of oppression that cause misery and conflict. The key to nonviolence in education is not just using conflict resolution strategies to create peace in schools, but rather teaching young people peace building skills to create a more just world order where the needs of people are met through standards of justice, love, and truth. As Martin Luther King Jr. said,⁵ "Peace is not just the absence of tension, it is the presence of justice and brotherhood" (King, 1961/1986, p.51). In order for schools to contribute to the creation of beloved communities, they must prepare students to achieve high standards of justice and work towards reconciliation with adversaries.

King learned from Gandhi that nonviolence is not passivity. Nonviolent methods that can be used to protest and resist evil imply an active commitment to end violence through nonviolent means, by organizing people to achieve common goals, through mediation and conflict resolution, and through education about different forms of oppression. Gandhi and King did not want to polarize the world into warring camps but rather used nonviolence and compassion to help understand an enemy's point of view. Nonviolence is so important because it heals the pain of violence. Both Gandhi and King understood that violence is the antithesis of creativity and wholeness. It destroys community and makes brotherhood impossible. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. preached that nonviolence, or a type of love known as *agape*,⁶ creates genuine human communities. *Agape* does not distinguish between worthy and unworthy people. It urges humans to stop their hating and forgive in order to restore community.

King understood that laws can regulate behavior, but morality cannot be legislated. An orientation towards justice and peace can only come through education that changes inner attitudes away from complacency about suffering to anger towards injustice. Education has a key role to play in developing a world perspective, so that children see that they have similarities with people from other cultures, nations, and races. Martin Luther King, Jr. saw an urgency to teach about nonviolence:

It is no longer a choice, my friends between violence and nonviolence. It is either nonviolence or nonexistence, and the alternative to disarmament, the alternative to a greater suspension of nuclear tests, the alternative to strengthening the United Nations and thereby disarming the whole world may well be civi-

lization plunged into the abyss of annihilation, or our earthly habitat would be transformed into an inferno that even the mind of Dante could not imagine.
(King, 1968/1986, p.276)

Dr. King believed in the power of dissent to establish a creative tension that challenged the violence of the status quo and awakened feelings of compassion for the victims of violence. He would often use public demonstrations, like the Montgomery bus boycott, to bring problems out into the open where they would be subject to public scrutiny and debate. King saw that violence begets more violence and make brotherhood impossible. The only way out of cycles of violence is through non-violence. Education can play an important role in promoting awareness about the power of nonviolence to create a more peaceful world.

Neither King nor Gandhi wrote specifically about the relationship between education and nonviolence. Krishnamurti(1953/1981) stated that the responsibility for building a peaceful and enlightened society rests with the educator. He feared that the present education system makes people mechanical and thoughtless and asked the important question, "What is the good of learning if in the process we are to destroy ourselves?" (p.15). Krishnamurti was a precursor to postmodern thought when he stated that our modern educational system with its emphasis upon technological knowledge makes us ignorant about ourselves:

Merely to cultivate the intellect, which is develop capacity or knowledge, does not result in intelligence. There is a distinction between intellect and intelligence. Intellect is thought functioning independently of emotion, whereas, intelligence is the capacity to feel as well as to reason; and until we approach life with intelligence, instead of intellect alone, or with emotion alone, no political or education system in the world can save us from the toils of chaos and destruction. (Krishnamurti, 1953/1981, p.64)

Krishnamurti decried the use of fear or intimidation in education. Following authority is denying intelligence. Traditional education based upon authoritarian practices promotes ambition, envy, and enmity. Teachers should encourage the spirit of inquiry and discontent within children. The conditioning of a child's mind to a particular authority breeds enmity. How can there be unity when beliefs divide human beings into isolated communities with restrictive values?

Krishnamurti understood that love was essential for the right kind of education which must promote acceptance of different points of view and stimulate creativity. Love and understanding break down walls of

isolation, nationalism, and racism. Students should learn in schools how to resolve their conflicts nonviolently. Compulsion does not lead to freedom. To discover truth, we must be free from strife. Inner strife projected outward becomes violence to others. Krishnamurti saw that the key to the right kind of education was self knowledge that leads to love⁷ which alone can create a tranquil mind capable of resolving tensions in the world which are caused by the wrong kind of relationships based upon self-aggrandizement.

One teaches because one wants the child to be rich inwardly, which will result in giving right value to possessions. Without inner richness, worldly things become extravagantly important, leading to various forms of destruction and misery. One teaches to encourage the student to find his true vocation, and to avoid those occupations that foster antagonism between man and man. One teaches to help the young towards self-knowledge, without which there can be no peace, no lasting happiness. (Krishnamurti, 1981, p.113)

Only knowledge based upon the principles of love and nonviolence can lead to the kind of self-knowledge that urges individuals to seek peaceful relations with others.

Feminist thinkers also decry the lack of an emphasis upon building caring relationships in modern schooling. They have been promoting educational reforms based upon the 3 Cs of care, concern, and connection (Brabeck, 1989; Martin, 1993; Noddings, 1984). Martin (1985) has argued that a person cannot properly be considered to be educated unless that person's capacity for care has been developed. Nonviolence as a way of acting in the world tries to promote a spirit of caring for other human beings that is the basis for morality. Those who promote the importance of caring criticize traditional educational practice for being solely concerned with rational analysis, critical thinking, and self-sufficiency. In traditional classrooms the development of feelings and emotions are ignored. In nonviolent classes care and connection are promoted.

Nonviolence is one form of love. Pestalozzi (1915), the nineteenth century Swiss educator, promoted educational methods based upon a loving relationship between teacher and student. He believed that the impulses of love spring from the child's innermost being. Like a delicate plant, these impulses need to be nourished if children are to grow into healthy, productive adults. Feminists have reminded us that educators should provide pupils an environment of love where children trust enough to take risks to learn about their world. Pestalozzi maintained

that all teachers must demonstrate a capacity to love before they are allowed into the classroom.

As a form of love, nonviolence in education implies that educators will take great care not to harm their pupils. A commitment to the principles of nonviolence in education rules out any form of physical force, however it does not imply passivity. Educators often have to be direct and forceful in setting goals and directing pupils towards the mastery of instructional objectives, but they can do this in a loving way that respects the boundaries and limits of all students in their classes. According to nonviolent theory, educators should love their students in a disinterested way that seeks to draw the best out of them, not in a selfish way to meet their own ego needs.

Ruddick (1989), in her book *Maternal Thinking*, reminds us how all young people need to be brought up in a climate of nonviolence in order to develop their potential. In spite of the importance of nonviolence to a child's development, very little has been written about how schools can promote nonviolence. This may be because of the complexity and breadth of nonviolence, which provides a holistic response to violence. Because violence appears in many complex ways in human communities, nonviolence is very multifaceted. Problems of violence that students should study in order to prepare them for citizenship in the 21st century include physical harm, structural violence, domestic violence, environmental destruction, and threats from wars. Nonviolence must correspondingly cover many different aspects of human behavior if it is to address successfully the many threats of violence in the postmodern world.

THE BREADTH OF NONVIOLENCE

Nonviolence has three different aspects. It is a philosophy of life that focuses on how people treat themselves. As a way of living, it promotes loving relationships with other human beings and the natural world, and it is a strategy for change that seeks to implement standards of justice, nonviolent social institutions, and inclusive social norms.

As a philosophy of life, nonviolence requires a commitment to truth that is profoundly spiritual. "When you want to find truth as God the only inevitable means is love, i.e. nonviolence" (Gandhi, 1937, p.3). Because truth resides within each person, nonviolence in education encourages respect for all humans because of that source of divine inspiration that resides within. Educators committed to nonviolence in education encourage students to discover violent ways they think about themselves and others, replacing fears, hostilities, negative statements, and attitudes with nonviolent ways of thinking about self and others that reflects the truth that can reside in each of us. As a philosophy of

life, nonviolence encourages humans to be compassionate towards all human beings because we all suffer.

As a way of living, nonviolence provides guidelines for how to behave towards others. Gilligan (1982) noted that nonviolence is the highest form of morality. People should not harm others because they, themselves, do not want to be harmed. A commitment to nonviolence implies that the best way to live is to build respectful, trusting relations drawing upon the human capacity for love—caring, charity towards others, compassion, friendship, and kinship. An act of violence tears apart the spider web of relationships that are the foundation of community. Only nonviolence can mend those gossamer ties. Feelings of kinship make social life possible. Since all humans are involved in the same process of life, all of us are brothers and sisters. A hurting act to one person, is a hurting act to the common humanity we all share. As a way of life, nonviolence promotes redemption and reconciliation. As Martin Luther King, Jr. (1953/1986) said, "The aftermath of nonviolence is the creation of the beloved community, while the aftermath of violence is tragic bitterness" (p.17). Individuals interested in nonviolence in education teach students to accept retaliation without striking back, that unearned suffering is redemptive and has educational and transformational possibilities. Suffering is infinitely more powerful than the law of the jungle for converting an opponent and opening ears that are otherwise shut to the voice of reason. Humans always have free will and can choose how to relate to others. They do not have to choose violence in their daily dealings. It is always a better choice to find nonviolent ways to act because nonviolence helps build the beloved community.

Nonviolence as a strategy for change leads both an individual or a group of people to resist tyranny and injustice other than by physical force. People committed to this method of challenging the violence of the status quo strive to remove the causes of violent conflict. Nonviolence as a strategy for change goes from passivity, turning the other cheek, and withdrawal, to speaking truth to power. As Sharp (1989) has pointed out, it implies withholding support from unjust authorities, an active refusal to submit to injustice. Gandhi (1948) demonstrated with his life how it takes courage to stand up for nonviolent social principles. Recent history has shown the power of nonviolent movements in places as diverse as the old Soviet Union, the Philippines, South Africa, and protests against nuclear weapons in northern countries. Nonviolence as a strategy involves seven steps: define the problem, conduct research, educate all involved, negotiate until truthfulness becomes apparent, withdraw to engage in self purification, conduct nonviolent direct action, and unite reconciliation. Promoters of nonviolence teach forms of action research that will help participants unearth their own truths and teach

research skills that can be used to promote the truthfulness of a cause.

NONVIOLENCE IN SCHOOLING CONTEXTS

In order to give students in a postmodern world appreciation of the power of nonviolence, school personnel can apply nonviolent theory at all different levels of educational enterprises. They can teach about nonviolence (content) to pupils of all ages. They can at the micro level use nonviolent techniques (pedagogy) to run their classes. At the macro level, they can run schools nonviolently (administration).

Content: A nonviolent approach to education helps students realize that there are alternatives to violence. The goal of nonviolence in education is not just to stop the violence and reduce conflict in schools but rather to create in young people's minds the conditions for positive peace. When young people watch the news, they see terrorism and acts of violence being committed all around the world. When they study history, they learn about wars. To provide positive images of peace to counteract violent cultural images, teachers can focus on three different content areas—theoretical concepts, skills, and feelings.

Nonviolence has a proud history. Teachers interested in sharing this history can teach about the various peace movements and nonviolent cultures that have existed in various human communities. Students can learn in school that violence is unacceptable and understand how nonviolent strategies have been used to address injustice. Teachers can explain this to their students by telling the stories of peace heroes and heroines, like the winners of the Nobel Peace Prize. They can through art encourage students to express images of violence in their lives and their wishes for peace. They can involve students in peace projects, like planting a tree or volunteering in a shelter. They can provide peace resources—books, posters movies, and videos—that have peace themes. They can connect students with community based organizations that promote nonviolence—women's shelters, violence reduction programs for batterers, peace groups, and anger management support groups. Such projects can motivate pupils to value peace.

Nonviolence does not seek to defeat an opponent but rather to win friendship. A nonviolent strategy is not about humiliation. Young people should understand that the goal of a nonviolent strategy is to defeat the problem not the persons involved. It is directed against the forces of evil rather than the people who happen to be doing evil.⁸ A person or a group of people practicing nonviolent resistance accept blows from an opponent without striking back. Such a person avoids not only external physical violence but also internal violence of the spirit. Both Dr. King and Mahatma Gandhi provide excellent examples of how nonviolent

viction that the universe is on the side of justice. Consequently, the believer in nonviolence has a deep faith in the future and attempts to create a better future by building beloved communities.

Nonviolence in education is committed to democratic practices, because a democracy allows for all points of view to be heard in the promotion of the truth. Such an approach to education has been heralded in recent school reforms through the promotion of multicultural education (Nieto, 1992). A multicultural approach to knowledge teaches that all different cultures have important insights into the truth. A nonviolent approach to conflict resolution in a diverse world requires that all voices be respected and urged to come to the table to create a dialogue that will build a consensus about how to create positive peace. In order to appreciate the diversity of life on this planet, students should be taught global awareness, where they learn to respect different cultures. Respect for different cultures develops a consciousness essential for living together in a "global village."

Other content areas that should be taught in classes that emphasize nonviolence should be the development and protection of human rights, the use and abuse of international treaties, and the history of the United Nations. All aspects of international education (Savitt, 1993) help prepare global citizens for the twenty-first century. Environmental issues should be taught in such a way that students develop an appreciation of and respect for natural processes (Bowers, 1993).

A recent approach to nonviolence in education that has been developed in the United States concerns peacemaking strategies to prevent violence. Prothrow-Stith (1988), who was the secretary of Health for the State of Massachusetts, developed a violence program to help reduce the high rate of homicide in the United States, where 20,000 people are killed each year. Fifty-five percent of these murders occur between acquaintances. People in public health use these programs to explain the risk factors associated with such homicides. Teachers using these curricula stress that there are healthy and unhealthy ways to express anger and point out the dangers associated with fighting. Students in violent prevention classes are encouraged to talk about violence in their own lives as well examine the root causes of violence. They learn about different forms of violence which comes from thoughts, words, and deeds—any dehumanizing behavior that intentionally harms another. Physical violence includes direct harm to others—street crime, attacks by gangs, sexual assaults, random killings, wars, terrorism, and physical forms of punishments. Psychological forms of violence diminish a person's sense of worth and efficiency. Structural violence comes from social institutions that deny certain basic rights and freedoms. A society is considered structurally violent when its citizens can't get work, health care, social securi-

ty, safe housing, or civil rights. Many of the problems in a postmodern world come from a commitment to militarism to solve problems. A violated and polluted environment also threatens people's security and creates fear about the future. Violence at home in the form of domestic abuse, sexual assault, and child neglect, causes students to have low self esteem and to mistrust adults. Violence in the larger world, both structural and physical, makes the adulthood seem like an absurd fate. In violence prevention programs students learn about these different forms of violence and study ways to create security in order to remedy problems caused by commitments to violence.

Students in classes where teachers are promoting nonviolence acquire both theoretical concepts about the dangers of violence and the possibilities of peace, as well as skills about how to live nonviolently. Teachers can teach about the power of generative love, care, and justice to build the beloved community. Here, nonviolence extends to personal relations and relations with the broader environment. Do teachers help students find peace within themselves? At one school in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, which has as its motto, "peace works," staff wrote a grant and hired two art therapists to work with children in the inner city who had been traumatized by high levels of violence in their lives. Some of these children had been abandoned by their parents. Others had seen siblings shot. They were placed in a support group called "Peace Bridge" to help students articulate their feelings about violence. Trauma circles, peer counseling, and support groups can help young children manage some of the grief, fear, and anger caused by violent events in their lives (Morrow, 1987). Anger management groups in secondary schools help adolescents deal with some of the deep-seated rage children have who come from abusive and/or dysfunctional homes. Some urban school districts in the United States even have curricula on death and dying to help young people deal with the trauma of losing their friends to suicide, accidental death, or homicide (Ulin, 1977). Such activities can help improve the academic performance of students who are so distracted by violence that they can not focus on cognitive lessons. Adults who listen and show concern to the problems caused by violence in young people's lives can help heal some of the wounds that often lead to hostile aggressive behavior.

Nonviolence in education requires more than a theoretical understanding of the problems of violence and knowledge of strategies for peace. Teachers interested in nonviolence in education attempt to stimulate the human heart to be charitable and provide students with skills they can use to demonstrate their feelings of compassion for all forms of life.



or knowledge. The greater our love, the deeper will be its influence on society. But we are all brains and no heart; we cultivate the intellect and despise humanity. (Krishnamurti, 1953, p.78)

A challenge provided by a commitment to nonviolence in education is to figure out how to increase students' abilities to love. Teachers can instruct youth about alternatives to dysfunctional violent behaviors. They teach listening, caring, tolerance, cooperation, impulse control, anger management, perspective taking, and problem solving skills. They also try to make students aware of their own biases, ways they stereotype others by gender, sexual preference, religious beliefs, or skin color. Children learn about racial differences and gender identity formation to help them avoid discriminatory behavior (Derman-Sparks, 1993). The goal of these instructional activities is to provide students with communication skills and to help them be empathic (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987). Peer mediation techniques are being built throughout classrooms in the United States to provide students with conflict resolution skills (Johnson & Johnson, 1992). Providing these skills educates children beyond hate (Deutsch, 1991) and enables them to become more loving. Students who learn about nonviolence in schools should choose the ways of love when faced with conflict. Nonviolent content in schools prepares children to become peacebuilders in their interpersonal relations, their homes, their schools, in relationship to their physical environments, and in the global village.

Pedagogy: A teacher committed to nonviolence in education uses a dialogue method to help students discover their own truths. Dewey (1938) argued that classes should be structured in a problem solving way, so that students can discover their own truths, as opposed to a teacher-centered pedagogy where an adult teacher is the source of all truth. Teachers interested in having their students learn nonviolently can borrow from Socratic and Deweyan methods by presenting problems caused by violence and by encouraging students to develop alternative strategies to resolve conflicts nonviolently. Students can learn about nonviolence by examining violent situations, by questioning assumptions, by examining the implications of conflict resolution mechanisms, and by gathering evidence to support their hunches about nonviolent solutions. In such a classroom students are encouraged to think critically about violence in contemporary culture.

Teachers who promote nonviolent learning structures in their classes draw upon the principles of cooperative learning (Johnson, Johnson, Holubec, & Roy, 1984). They set up in their classes democratic learning communities where students provide each other feedback and support that they become proficient in group process techniques. In coopera-

tive learning situations students stimulate each other to find the best solution to problems and hence they learn how human beings benefit from cooperative relationships. Such classes, based upon positive interdependence among group members, teach individuals to care for others.⁹

Teachers interested in nonviolence have a unique approach to discipline. They give their students guidelines about how to behave through positive affirmations rather than through punishing. They use democratic boundary setting principles which help students understand the importance of respecting different people's boundaries (Harris, 1973). Instead of threatening children, who so often learn from the broader culture that violence is an exciting way to resolve differences, a nonviolent teacher uses positive reinforcement to reinforce rules that all agree upon. Such practices teach that nonviolence is a much better choice. Acting nonviolently neither creates enemies nor invites retribution.

Teachers confronted with a student who is creating problems in a class sees that as an important learning moment. Rather than humiliating that student, a teacher committed to nonviolence sees a behavior problem as a chance for students to take responsibility for their actions. By encouraging students to mediate their own problems, such teachers do not always have to play the role of judge and jury, meting out punishment in arbitrary ways. They comfort students who are having difficulty, doing everything possible to bolster student self esteem.

In a nonviolent classroom courtesy, care, compassion, and respect help build a beloved community where the peace loving instincts of students flourish. In such a classroom the teacher provides a model of non-violent behavior, so that students can learn by example that they have free will in making decisions and can choose whether to be violent or not. Seeing an adult who manages conflicts without using force can teach children they do not have to resort to violence when faced with conflict. Students exposed to peaceful adult role models learn from them nonviolent responses to conflict.

Teachers in nonviolent classrooms study their students carefully. They watch them develop and understand their strengths and weaknesses. To know something is to understand its nature. Teachers have a responsibility to construct a learning environment but rather than responding mechanically, assuming that all students are learning at the same rate, teachers interested in nonviolence respond to the uniqueness in each individual. In a nonviolent class listening and watching are more important instructional activities than lecturing and commanding.

Administration: A nonviolent school would be administered democratically. Children have rights that are respected within such schools. Such schools are like loving families. They provide sanctuaries where

children feel good and safe (Morrow, 1987). Bullies are trained in conflict resolution techniques so they can direct their leadership skills in positive directions. A peaceful school has an inclusive atmosphere where everyone should be seen as a peacemaker (Bey & Turner, 1996). Such schools are run on the principles of site based management where staff have the authority to make personnel choices and decisions about resources.

Principals of such schools ought to have structures in place short of ultimate authority punishments, like suspensions, or expulsions. Such structures—like time out rooms for students who are acting aggressively, peer mediation programs, and programs that teach anger management skills—allow students to face inevitable conflicts in a rational, constructive, and compassionate way. They permit all people on a school staff to search for creative nonviolent solutions to problems that nurture tension, anger, aggression, and violence. Administrators of nonviolent schools do not deal with conflicts coercively. Nonviolence in thought, words, and deeds, must be practiced. An equal balance of consequences and empathy replaces punishment wherever possible.

The principal can create school wide events that motivate students to seek peace. Pep rallies for peace and school assemblies can inspire youth to seek nonviolent ways to resolve their conflicts. Awards for peacemakers that can help young people understand the importance of nonviolent behavior can be passed out to all students individually, providing them with peacemaker badges, or through a school assembly where each class nominates a student who has excelled at peacemaking. Such recognition helps youth understand the importance of keeping the peace.

Some schools in the United States have sponsored a week on nonviolence following the national holiday of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s assassination. During this time children are encouraged to draw pictures of peace, guest speakers urge students to resolve conflicts nonviolently, and students write essays about how to stop the violence in their neighborhoods. Some schools have even established stop the violence clubs that give students an outlet for expressing their desires to live in a more peaceful world. Principals can also reach out to community groups interested in nonviolence and use those groups to inform students about neighborhood resources to help them deal with problems of violence.

Principals concerned about creating a nonviolent school climate can educate parents about the importance of not hitting their children. Physical means of disciplining children provide bad role models of conflict resolution, lower children's self esteem, and make it difficult for children to trust adults—all of which are counter productive to school suc-

cess which depends upon rational ways of learning, high levels of self esteem and young people trusting adults, their teachers. Many parents

teach their children to stand up and fight when challenged. Children often learn at home violent problem solving behaviors. Such physical behaviors, when carried into a classroom, can create chaos and do not belong in school settings. Parents need to be told that, even though they want their children to be able to defend themselves, that fighting has no place in schools. Principals can sponsor positive parenting skills workshops at their schools and send home newsletters with tips about nurturing.

Lasting and sustainable peace in a school requires the rearrangement of hierarchical relationships into democratic decision making structures. Peace-building must be modeled by administrators if it is to be endorsed by staff and learned by students. The leader of a school where children are to learn about nonviolence must be a good listener and show deep respect for all people in it. Respect is the key to influence, insisting on mutual responsibility to solve problems. When there are problems, the administrator must be careful to address the problem and not the person. The goal is to engage in a dialogue for self examination that does not seek to create winners and losers.

POSITIVE PEACE

Most educators respond to conflicts in schools with peace-making strategies, using adult authority to enforce rules and create a safe school climate. Educators who only focus on punitive measures to deal with safety issues in schools ignore many of the crucial aspects of the violence problem. Deterrence policies neither provide students understandings of the problems of violence nor strategies to avoid violence. Such approaches to conflict in school mirror punitive strategies used in the criminal justice system which attempts to deal with juvenile crime by locking up youth. Removing violent offenders from schools will not make the problems associated with violence disappear. They promote a negative peace whose goal is the cessation of violence and resolution of conflicts.

The goal of nonviolence in education is not just to stop the violence and reduce conflict in schools but rather to get young people to adopt a nonviolent philosophy of life and way of living. Nonviolence provides educators with a set of guidelines by which teachers, students, and school administrators can promote the maximum growth for pupils.

The state of creativeness cannot exist where there is conflict, and the right kind of education should therefore help the individual to face his problems and not to glorify the ways of escape; it should help him to understand and eliminate conflict, for only then can this state of creativeness come into being.
(Krishnamurti, 1953, p.120)

Nonviolence in education does not just mean a quiet classroom. It suggests a learning environment in which students are acting on problems constructively, managing their conflicts creatively, and taking on challenging tasks.

Educators committed to nonviolence in education urge their schools to play a proactive role in relation to the problems of violence that make education so difficult. Promoting nonviolence in education is an attempt to address school failure that comes from the problematic nature of the modern world so deeply steeped in violence. Addressing the chaotic frightening aspects of this world by teaching young people about potential of nonviolence to prevent violence provides youth with hope that they might be able to resolve conflicts that distract them from school tasks. Students will have a hard time learning in school as long as they are worried about problems of violence. Children who come from violent homes and communities often cannot focus on cognitive lessons until some relief is provided for the anxiety they feel about violence in their lives. This happens in affluent communities with dysfunctional homes, in crime ridden inner city neighborhoods, and in war torn areas. Children learn better when their teachers address directly the many forms of violence that make their worlds so frightening.

School personnel addressing problems of violence in the postmodern world can give students an appreciation for the value of nonviolence by teaching values like justice, truth, freedom, equality, and democracy. It is in the interest of the greater society that schools teach the values of peace, justice, and truth, since so many children learn to value violence from the media and from watching it in their own lives where in families torn by domestic abuse, in gangs, in areas of ethnic conflict, and in crime-filled neighborhoods, might makes right. Such instruction helps youth find alternates to the violent behavior they see all around them and builds the foundations for creating a beloved community based on justice and freedom, as opposed to a garrison state based on might and force.

References

Berlowitz, M. (1994). Urban educational reform: Focusing on peace education. *Education and Urban Society*, 27(1), 82-95.

Bey, T. M., & Turner, G. Y. (1996). *Making school a place of peace*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press.

Bowers, C. A. (1993). *Education, cultural myths, and the ecological crisis*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Braibec, M. (1989). *Who cares? Theory, research and educational implications of the ethics of caring*. New York: Praeger.

Chancellor's Working Group on School-Based Violence Prevention. (1994). Draft report.

New York: Board of Education.

Children's Defense Fund. (1994). *Cease fire in the war against children*. Washington, DC.

Eisenberg, N., & Strayer, J. (Eds.). (1987). *Empathy and its development*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Derman-Sparks, L. (1993). *Anti-bias curriculum: Tools for empowering young children*. Washington, DC: National Association for the Education of Young children.

Dewey, J. (1938). *Experience and education*. New York: MacMillan.

Deutsch, M. (1991). Educating beyond hate. *Peace, Education, and the Environment*, 2(4), 3-19.

Galtung, J. (1976). Peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. In J. Galtung (Ed.), *Peace, war, and defense* (pp. 282-305). Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers.

Gandhi, M. (1937, December 31). *Young India*.

Gandhi, M. (1948). *An autobiography: Or the story of my experiments with truth*. Ahmadabad: Navijan Publishing House.

Gilligan, C. (1982). *In a different voice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Harris, I. (1973). Boundaries, limits, and set theory: An alternative way to structure the classroom. *Education*, 93(3), 285-292.

Harris, I. (1988). *Peace Education*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.

Harris, I. (1993). Teaching Love to Counteract Violence, *Thresholds in Education*, 19(3), 12-20.

Harris, I. (1995). Peace education: A modern educational reform. In C. W. Strokel & D. B. Owen (Eds.), *Proceedings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society* (pp. 253-274). Ames IA: Midwest Philosophy of Education Society.

Louis Harris and Associates (1993). *The Metropolitan Life survey of the American teacher: Violence in America's public schools*. New York: Louis Harris and Associates, Inc.

Hicks, D. (1988). *Education for peace*. New York: Routledge.

Johnson, D. W., Johnson, R. T., & Dudley, B. (1992). Effects of peer mediation training on elementary students. *Mediation Quarterly*, 10(1), 89-97.

Johnson, D. W., Johnson, R. T., Holubec, E. J., & Roy, P. (1984). *Circles of learning*. Washington, DC: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.

King, M. L. (1953/1986). An Experiment in Love. In J. Washington (Ed.), *A Testament of hope: The essential writings of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (pp. 16-20). New York: Harper and Row.

King, M. L. (1958/1986). *Stride towards freedom*. San Francisco: Harper.

King, M. L. (1961/1986). The American dream. In J. Washington (Ed.), *A Testament of hope: The essential writings of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (pp. 108-216). New York: Harper and Row.

King, M. L. (1968/1986). Remaining awake through a great revolution. In J. Washington (Ed.), *A Testament of hope: The essential writings of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (pp. 268-278). New York: Harper and Row.

Kripalani, K. (Ed.). (1992). *Mahatma Gandhi: All men are brothers*. New York: Continuum.

Krishnamurti, J. (1954/1981). *Education and the significance of life*. New York: Harper and Row.

Martin, J. M. (1985). *Reclaiming a conversation*. The ideal of the educated woman. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Martin, J. M. (1992). *The schoolhouse*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Morrow, G. (1987). *The compassionate school: A practical guide to educating abused children and traumatized children*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

National Institute for Citizen Education in the Law. (1995). *Between hope and fear: Teens, crime, and the community*. Washington, DC.

No. 92). *Affirming diversity*. White Plains, NY: Longman.

No. 1984). *Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and moral education*. Berkeley:

University of California Press.

Noddings, N. (1992). *The challenge to care in schools*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Pestalozzi, J. (1915). *How Gertrude teaches her children* (L. E. Holland & F. C. Turner, Trans.). Syracuse: C. W. Barden.

Pivoranov, M. (1994). *Towards a culture of peace: International practical guide to the implementation of the recommendations concerning education for international understanding, cooperation and peace education relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms*. Paris: Unesco.

Prothrow-Stith, D. (1988). *Violence prevention: Curriculum for adolescents*. Newton, MA: Educational Development Center.

Reardon, B. (1988). *Comprehensive peace education*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Ruddick, S. (1989). *Maternal thinking*. New York: Ballantine Books.

Sautter, R. C. (1995). *Standing up to violence - Kappan special report*. Bloomington, IN: Phi Delta Kappan.

Savitt, W. (1993). *A curriculum guide: Teaching global development*. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press.

Sharp, G. (1989). *Civilian-based defense: A post-military weapons system*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ulin, M. L. (1977). *Death and dying education*. Washington, DC: National Education Association.

Notes

1. Statistics often referred to that provide evidence of this epidemic of violence include the following: Homicide has become the third leading cause of death for children 5 to 14 years old and the leading cause of death for young African American men. Counting suicides, a gun takes the life of an American child every two hours (Children's Defense Fund, 1994). Incidents of violence are causing problems in schools. One hundred thousand children carry guns to school every day. Each hour, on average, more than 2,000 students are physically injured upon school grounds. More than 400,000 violent crimes are reported in and around schools each year in the United States with still more going unreported (Chancellors Working Group on School-Based Violence, 1994). Teachers suffer, too. Each hour approximately 900 teachers are threatened. Nearly 40,000 teachers are physically assaulted each year in schools (Louis Harris and Associates, 1993).

2. The October 1994 edition of *Education and Urban Society*, entitled "Conflict Resolution and the Struggle for Justice in Schools," highlighted latest efforts at school-based conflict resolution. The February 1995 edition of *Educational Leadership* had a special section on mediation in school based responses to conflict, and the August 1995 edition of the *Harvard Educational Review* was dedicated to violence prevention programs in schools. *Phi Delta Kappan* has also produced a special report, "Standing up to Violence" (Sautter, 1995).

3. It is interesting to speculate about why nonviolent theory has been not been included in debates about to make schools safer. Part of the reason may be that the American public knows very little about nonviolence, so that educational leaders have no widespread tradition with a commitment to nonviolent principles to draw upon. A more likely explanation is that people in the U.S. tend to rely upon peace through strength and threats of deterrence to settle disputes. This is seen both in foreign military policy and civil responses to youth crime which emphasize a retributive model of incarcerating people who mis-

have, instead of a restorative model of education and training to bring deviants back to the social order.

4. The quotes from Gandhi used in this paper come from the book *All Men are Brothers*, edited by Krishna Kripilani (1992), hence his name appears under each quote.
5. Quotes from Martin Luther King, Jr. are taken a collection of his writings by James Washington, *A Testament of Hope* (1986).
6. *Agape* comes from the Greek. It implies an unconditional positive regard for all human beings simply because they are human.
7. This is similar to Rousseau's concept of *amour propre*, which leads the individual away from selfish concern for self to an understanding of each person's interdependence with other human beings.
8. For an example, see Dr. King's own account of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, *Strive Toward Freedom* (1958/1986).
9. See a special edition of the *Phi Delta Kappan* (May 1995, Volume 76, Number 9), dedicated to caring in schools.

A PARADIGM FOR TEACHING PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

JEROME A. POPP

Southern Illinois University—Edwardsville

I. INTRODUCTION

Philosophy of education is properly characterized as normative inquiry into the relationships among (a) personal (or individual) development, (b) teaching, and (c) social institutions. The nature of normative inquiry is itself a philosophic issue, but all will agree that philosophy of education is an evaluative activity, and that students in philosophy of education courses should be engaged in evaluative discussions and writing assignments. But what values should these evaluative activities exemplify? I present a paradigm that embodies a view of the values around which courses in philosophy of education should be centered, and suggest a direction for course activities.

II. FIRST RULE OF CRITICISM

If criticism is to be enlightening and evaluative, it must not manufacture distorted and self-serving characterizations of the view to be criticized. In other words, it is not legitimate to make the tasks of criticism less difficult by presenting the view to be criticized in such a way that it is more vulnerable to attack, the most egregious case of which is to make the position appear absurd at the outset. Such difficulties are overcome by the first rule of criticism.

THE VIEW TO BE CRITICIZED SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THOSE WHO HOLD THIS POSITION CAN AFFIRM YOUR CHARACTERIZATION OF IT.

One might wonder, especially in the present relativist climate of social foundations, whether this rule is implementable? What about Kuhn's incommensurability thesis, i.e., different paradigms talking past one another? There may be areas of discourse where this principle cannot be applied, but I claim that the literature in epistemology does indicate that philosophers can adequately describe points of view that they do not hold, and even vehemently reject. In many cases there is a middle-ground where disagreeing discussants can understand each other. I do not believe that the debates between empiricists and Kantians, or the current debates between the functionalist and the structuralists in cognitive science can be adequately characterized as different schools of thought talking past one another.

Should philosophy of education professors attempt to be neutral on the arguments under study, or should they be advocates? Professors who have taken strong positions in the literature are not, thereby, incapable of being objective or neutral in the analysis of other peoples' arguments. It turns out that professor who are known for holding strong positions can be excellent models of objectivity in analysis. Consider professor X who is known to her students as the leading advocate of theory T. She is, in all likelihood, the best person to teach theory T. Since Professor X knows the critics of theory T, she should, after some preliminary reading and lectures, require that students express the opposing arguments in an adequate fashion, and not allow students to characterize them as nonsense or obviously flawed. When Professor X requires that her students adequately state the arguments of those who disagree with her views, she is exemplifying philosophic inquiry. Only by knowing the way that opposing views frame their criticisms of theory T, and what is the best reply to these criticisms can students understand theory T. As a physics professor once pointed out to me when we were discussing books on the Big Bang theory, it is important to distinguish explanatory accounts from books that present only the illusion of understanding. I was led to wonder if much of what I read today as foundations of education is not more cognitive illusion than epistemology.

A fundamental point of inquiry is sometimes elided in contemplations: if the theory we embrace is the best account yet then we will find that the inadequacy in opposing views will

be exposed by our analyses. If, on the other hand, our theory is not the best account available, then we will either discover ways to improve it or be lead to more adequate theories, assuming that we are interested in finding the most adequate theories, and not in seeking ways to protect a theory from all criticism. This used to be referred to as dogmatism, and was considered an inadequate form of inquiry, but today is commonplace. When professors will not permit the criticism of certain views, their students are lead to equate criticism with perfidy, which is miseducative.

III. WHAT IS NORMATIVE INQUIRY?

Korsgaard, in her book, *The Sources of Normativity*, presents a useful characterization of normative inquiry.

A lower animal's attention is focused on the world. Its perceptions are its beliefs and its desires are its will. It is engaged in conscious activities, but it is not conscious of them. That is, they are not the objects of its attention. But we humans turn our attention on to our perceptions and desires themselves, on to our own mental activities, and we are conscious of them. That is why we can think about them.

And this sets us a problem no other animal has. It is the problem of the normative. For our capacity to focus our attention on our own mental activities is also a capacity to distance ourselves from them, and to call them into question. . . . Skepticism about the good and the right is . . . the view that the problems which reflection sets for itself are insoluble, that the questions to which it gives rise have no answers. (Korsgaard, 1996: 92-94) (emphasis in original)

If there are no answers to normative questions, then anything goes. The "relativist fellow travelers" (as Laudan calls them) are, of course, plentiful, and they want to tell us that since anything goes, all we can do is to have an edifying conversation about education. But without norms, what kind of conversation is it? Without norms, we cannot distance ourselves from our mental activities. Without norms there can be no reflective conversations.

When people disagree intellectually, they do so with conversation. But conversation becomes pathological when it becomes impossible to engage in normative conversation about the conversation of disagreement. Note that a reflective conversation is not simply a conversation about conversation (metaconversation), because, as some have pointed

out, a conversation about conversation can be just another part of the game as is the original conversation. (Watzlawick, *et. al.*, 1967)

Without normative conversations about conversations, all conversations about education will become political, and eventually politically polarized.

Justification is the ultimate topic of study in philosophy of education. The analysis of various views of education will lead to comparisons of these views, which will lead to the question of norms, i.e., by what norms do we measure the worth of this or that view? The analysis of norms will eventually lead to the evaluation of claims about means-ends relationships, because without attention to means-ends relationships, we are left choosing between empiricism and relativism (Laudan 1996). In other words, when professors present students with the choice between a decontextualized methodology of inquiry and an ideologically contextualized one they are offering students an overly simplified disjunction. It is possible to give up the certainty promised by empiricism and not be forced to conclude that all norms are relative to some individual or group.

IV. DEWEYAN PROBLEM-SOLVING

When two well-developed points of view are contraries (both cannot be true), Deweyan analysis does not focus on the differences between the two points of view, but upon what they share. In his famous analysis of interest versus effort (EW ?), Dewey considered what he referred to as the lawsuit between interest and effort, a metaphor that emphasizes that we have an issue being treated as an either/or choice. He presented the basic ideas of the effort and the interest theories of motivation, and then showed that both views assume that there is a gap between subject matter and children that must be bridged by either forcing effort or inducing interest.

If we reject the thesis that there is a gap between the child and the curriculum that must be closed by the actions of teachers, then we open the way to developing the existing relationship between subject matter and children. Thus, we find Dewey saying that teaching "is giving direction to tendencies already present." Bruner's theory of intrinsic motivators (curiosity, striving for competence, reciprocity, and the urge to narrate experience) is an explication of this point (Bruner 1966; 1990).

Another example of Deweyan problem-solving can be found in the right-to-life versus the pro-choice debate. What would Dewey say about this issue? Again, let's focus not on the rhetoric of disagreement, but on the common assumption, viz., there will always be unwanted children. Why would there be a child in utero who was not wanted? With very few exceptions, the conditions that lead to a child in utero not being wanted are ~~anatomic~~ (a matter of knowledge). At one extreme we have people who don't understand the reproductive process, and at the other

extreme we have the possibility of designer children.

Laudan's rejection of the positivism/relativism choice takes the same argument form, i.e., both empiricism and ideological relativism assume that value claims cannot be warranted. Laudan claims that the normative relativism of the present is not so much a replacement for empiricism, but the end game of empiricism. In the beginning, empiricism it was confident in its search for analytic certainty and its syntactical interpretation of epistemological problems. In its end game, it is equally confident in its reinterpretation of philosophic problems as political issues. The pragmatists have long held that epistemology was not centered on language and analyticity, and that normative inquiry would be successful only if we gave up the quest for certainty and focused on the means-ends relationships, as does Laudan's approach to philosophy of science.

V. MEANS-ENDS RELATIONSHIPS

To evaluate a given evaluandum, for example, the theory of teaching methodology known as "cooperative learning," we consider its consequences. The evaluation of the evaluandum (that which is doubted in this context) will be evaluated in terms of the evaluanda (valuables that are not doubted in that context). We assess the value of the consequences of the evaluandum in terms of these undoubted values. The point is that any means is evaluated in terms of certain previously established ends. Does the evaluandum produce the desired ends? Does the evaluandum have consequences beyond the established ends? If so, are these additional consequences desirable?

At this point we must expand our analysis: Are these additional consequences desirable? If their desirability is established in the context, i.e., they are part of the undoubted, then we can make the appropriate judgment. But what if these additional consequences are not part of the undoubted in this context? How do we evaluate these consequences? We have to evaluate them as ends. But how do we evaluate ends? It is at this point that critics of instrumentalism assert themselves. Of course, they say, we can evaluate the effectiveness of means at producing established goals, but instrumentalism cannot deal with the justification of ends. I like to quote Dewey himself on this complaint:

The objection always brought against the view set forth is that, according to it, valuation activities and judgments are involved in a hopeless regressus ad infinitum. If, so it is said, there is no end which is not in turn a means, foresight has no place at which it can stop, and no end-in-view can be formed except by the most arbitrary of acts—an act so arbitrary that it mocks the claim of being a genuine valuational-proposition. (LW 13: 231)

This objection simply misses the thesis of instrumentalism.

To evaluate a goal, instrumentalism asks two questions: (a) is this goal achievable, i.e., do we have any reason to believe that we can realize this goal if we decide that it is worthy? (b) are the consequences of realizing this goal desirable? Let's consider each of these. Because there are presently no means to achieve a given goal does not mean that the goal cannot serve as a justification for pursuing its means. Obviously this is just what is involved in seeking a cure for cancer or in placing people on Mars. But the point is that if we knew that there is good reason to think that the goal is unachievable (eg. building a perpetual motion machine), then we will come to a negative evaluation of the goal. If we think that the goal is achievable, then we must ask ourselves about the consequences of achieving this goal. How do these consequences mesh with the consequences of other goals? It is possible that one set of consequences will undo others (eg., attempting to lose weight while trying to enjoy chocolate cake). So, we see that there is no regress. Evaluative problem-solving takes place within a given context (hence the name 'contextualism'), which is formed by that which is undoubted. Within this context of what is valued, we analyze the consequences of new goals in terms of their compatibility with these established values. This does not make valuing overly conservative, because in the course of our analysis, we may come to doubt what was previously an undoubted goal. This changes the context of our evaluative inquiry, i.e., what was previously undoubted has become the doubted.

VI. THE PARADIGM

If we combine the points of the above discussions into one totality, we obtain the following paradigm for evaluative inquiry in philosophy of education courses.

	Means Problems	Ends Problems
Characterization problems	What methods are being advanced?	What ends are being advocated?
Justification Problems	Why are these methods thought to be effective?	Why are these ends thought to be worthwhile?

FIGURE 1. THE ANALYTICAL SCHEMA

Any complete analysis of a view of teaching will provide answers for all of these questions. You can imagine summarizing the answers that we have given for Dewey, Bruner, Piaget, Rousseau, Montissouri, and all of them. This paradigm or schema has the good feature of indicating

that these questions should be seen in relationship to each other.

This schema is not a device for descriptive analysis only. After students have analyzed a given view of teaching, there will be evaluative discussions of the findings of the analysis. The paradigm casts a shadow over these discussions in the sense that as students find fault with the views of Bruner or Rousseau, their claims about how to form a more adequate view are conditioned by the four questions. Students can see that as they develop their own views of teaching, they must present a consistent set of answers to these four questions.

During the presentation of this schema, the objection was raised that this approach separated means from ends. My response was that it did, and that we must do so to evaluate both means and ends. Let me elaborate on this point. I assume that the admonition, "Do not separate means and ends." means the following: There should be a close relationship between the means actually being used (or attempted) and the ends being pursued (or advocated). For example, we might want to create a classroom environment in which trust and warmth are present, but by using procedures that involve extensive oversight and checking. In this case, we would say that the methods-in-use are actually undermining the goals held. We would agree that means and ends should not be separated in this sense. I claim that this sort of means-ends incompatibility is just the sort of thing that the paradigm will expose.

It will also expose the establishment of ends without regard for available means, and it will detect those educators who are married to means without regard for the ends being realized. By examining the justificatory arguments for the ends, and then considering the evidence for thinking that the means being advocated are effective will lead us to discover any means-ends misfits. I think it is clear in the logic of instrumentalism that the means-ends relationship is contingent, as opposed to analytic, i.e., an *a priori* matter. The principle of not separating means and ends is a methodological rule, or an evaluative principle.

As we move into the age of neuroscience, this paradigm may become even more important, because it will be possible in a few years to modify drastically the genetic code. (Kitcher, 1996) If Crick (1994) is correct, and consciousness is a function of either specialized (dedicated) neurons, or a special neuron function, or both, then it may be possible to actually engineer consciousness-raising genetic changes. All sorts of other cognitive and affective 'enhancements' are also possible. With the human mind taking complete control of human evolution, the traditional role of philosophy of education's investigation of the desirable characteristics of human affective and cognitive experience will become critical in the age

VII. INTRINSIC VALUE

An objection that is sometimes raised about the above paradigm is that it does not take intrinsic value into consideration. Some time ago, I argued that the notion of intrinsic value is fraught with difficulties (Popp 1979). Intrinsic value is typically characterized as something that is good for its own sake, but I am not at all clear on what a sake is. Is education good for its own sake? Does education have a sake? Instrumental value theory rejects talk of "intrinsic value." Moreover, I claim that Dewey did not advance a theory of intrinsic value. His writing include discussions of 'intrinsic' in four places as follows: (a) LW 13: 214-216, 227, 327; (b) LW 14: 305; (c) LW 15:42-45; (d) LW 16: 346-350.

(a) In Theory of Valuation, Dewey makes the following comment:

The extreme instance of the view that to be intrinsic is to be out of any relation is found in those writers who hold that, since values are intrinsic, they cannot depend on any relation whatever, and certainly not upon a relation to human beings. Hence this school attacks those who connect value-properties with desire and interest on exactly the same grounds that the latter equate the distinction between the values of means and ends with the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values. The views of this extreme nonnaturalistic school may, accordingly, be regarded as a definite exposure of what happens when an analysis of the abstract concept of 'intrinsicalness' is substituted for analysis of empirical occurrences. (LW 13: 216) (emphasis in original)

Notice that the last sentence above suggests that the relationship between means and ends is contingent, thus separated logically, semantically, and so forth.

(b) Dewey reviews Santayana's discussion of the intrinsic character of things, and makes the following parenthetical remark: "Intrinsic" is italicized in the original; "effects" and "on" are not. (LW 14: 305)

(c) In "The Ambiguity of 'Intrinsic Good'" Dewey does some language analysis on the term 'intrinsic', and makes the point that there are several different meanings involved. He states:

It may be held that the moral issue regarding a good as a satisfaction or enjoyment arises only when such enjoyments have become problematic and arouse reflective inquiry. In this case, the contrast in question is to be regarded not as a contrast between something good only in an "extrinsic" or accidental sense and that which is good because of an eternal and univer-

sal nature, but as a contrast between a good which is immediately such and one determined as good upon reflection covering an extensive number of existing cases. (LW 15: 44) (emphasis in original)

(d) Finally, in "The Field of 'Value', " Dewey says:

So-called relational theories often retain an attenuated relic of absolutistic theories in the use of the term "intrinsic." This retention is manifested when "intrinsic" is placed in opposition to "extrinsic" and the later is identified with a "value" belonging to things as mere means ("means-in-themselves"), and the former with the "value" belonging to things as "ends-in-themselves." In fact, the necessity of employing the phrase "in-themselves" shows that the absolutistic retention in question is more than attenuated. "In-themselves" is always a sure sign of denial of connections, and hence is proof of an affirmation of an absolute. (LW 16: 349) (emphasis in original)

I think that I have presented enough text from the citations mentioned to show that Dewey did not attempt to use the concept of intrinsic value in his instrumental theory. Furthermore, he did not want the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction to become a working part of normative discourse. It seems clear that he wanted to develop a theory of the means-ends relationship (instrumentalism) without the language of 'intrinsic value'.

What about his comments about education, such as "education has no end beyond itself"? Does this not make education an intrinsic value? I believe that some Dewey scholars talk this way because they tacitly assume that if all evaluation is instrumental, then all values occupy the same level of priority. The point that Dewey was making is that some ends are more important than others. The growth of the individual's cognitive and affective powers is not an intrinsic value, because this would confer on growth an absolute status, and suggests that to evaluate growth by means of instrumentalist methodology would, somehow, underestimate its true value. Dewey's point is that when we pursue the instrumental methodology to its full extent, we find that growth is our highest priority. We come to this conclusion through the harmonizing and articulating of our goals. I claim that to view education (in the sense of personal development) as an intrinsic value is as great a conceptual error as the equating of democracy and voting.

VIII. PARADIGMING THE PARADIGM

Can the paradigm be turned on itself? Can we use a means-end

argument to justify the means-end paradigm? The pragmatists are arguing the affirmative, which involves specifying ends and establishing methods to achieve them. If you take the Dewey-Laudan approach to justifying epistemological theories, then this problem is simply an instance of naturalized epistemology.

References

Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).
John Dewey, LW 18 (Theory of Valuation).
Philip Kitcher, The Lives To Come (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 92-94.
J. Popp, "Intrinsic and Symbolic Value," Philosophic Studies In Education, 1979.
P. Watzlawick, *et. al.*, Pragmatics of Human Communication (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1967).

ESSENTIALIST EDUCATOR:
FANNY J. COPPIN

CHARLESETTA M. ELLIS
Chicago State University

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Until recently, the contributions of many African American women to education has gone unrecognized. Fanny J. Coppin (1837-1913) educator, community activist, and feminist is one such individual. Born during an era when human bondage and oppression were common place, Coppin transcended the shackles of slavery through education. Given the circumstance of nineteenth century black men and women this was not an easy task.

Freed at aged fourteen by a generous aunt, Coppin's pursuit of knowledge became incessant. Through sheer determination, she managed to obtain the rudiments of schooling via private lessons and by attending a public "colored" school in Newport, Rhode Island. (Coppin, 1913:11) For Coppin, however, this meager accomplishment was unacceptable. Thus she became so proficient with her studies that by 1859, she was able to pass the entrance examination for the Rhode Island State Normal School.

Most young adults with a desire to enter the field of teaching would have been satisfied with the educational program at the institute. But, Coppin yearned for more. With an eye on Harvard University, Coppin rigorously prepared for admittance. Had Harvard encouraged African Americans, or women to enroll there, during this period in American history, she would have been

amongst its graduates. (Perkins, 1992:225)

Disappointed, but undaunted Coppin applied for and was accepted at Oberlin College (1860). This school was only one of a select few institutions of higher learning that enrolled African Americans during the era.

Excited by the school's curricula, as well as motivated by the academic freedom extended to women by way of the institute's educational programs, Coppin chose to study the classics. A choice that even at liberal Oberlin drew raised eye brows. For the classics were considered a "gentlemen's" course.

Another factor pertinent to Coppin's decision to pursue the classics was an alleged racist remark made by John C. Calhoun, proslavery advocate and vice president to both presidents John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson, that "if there be found a Negro that could conjugate a Greek verb, he would give up all his preconceived ideas of the inferiority of the Negro." (Coppin, 1913:19)

As with other educational ventures, Coppin also excelled at Greek and Latin. She became so competent with the subject matter and its related language that by her third year at Oberlin, Coppin was asked to teach such courses to first year students. Initially, the Euro-American students were surprised to see an African American woman instructor. However, Coppin's academic skill quickly alleviated their anxiety.

Most ordinary young adults would have been delighted with a teaching position at the college. But, Fanny J. Coppin was a "personne extra-ordinaire." Thus she was compelled to do still more. While still enrolled at Oberlin, during the height of the Civil War, Coppin established night classes for migrate freedmen.

Coppin's efforts did not go unnoticed. Upon graduation from Oberlin (1865) she was hired to teach at the prestigious Institution For Colored Youth (ICY). The school created (1837) and financed by the Friends of Philadelphia, an Orthodox Religious Society, offered a classical program. (Perkins, 1987:4) Its clientele were predominantly middle class sons and daughters of freedmen.

By the end of Coppin's fourth year at ICY, she was appointed principal. She held the position from 1869-1902.

PURPOSE OF EDUCATION

According to Coppin, the purpose of formal education was to educate the useful and competent individual to become a productive member of society. In essence, its aims must: (1) transmit the society's heritage via basic skills and knowledge; (2) stress the teaching of those subjects and skills which sharpen mental facili-

ties and motivate students to reach for even higher levels of knowledge/skills; and (3) use formal education as a tool for cultural enhancement, as well as link past knowledge and values to present societal needs. (Ornstein and Levine, 1993:464)

Coppin's educational theory relevant to basic schooling was conservative. For example, she stressed the importance of the 3 R's, as well as history, science, and language at the elementary level. She also favored a classical course of study for the higher grades. However, Coppin did not discourage the use of vocational training. In fact, she was instrumental in creating a successful industrial program at ICY for both young men and women.

Of major concern to Coppin, was the exclusion of "Negro" boys from trade schools. Unfortunately, during this period in American history, the "House of Refuge" or the "penitentiary" were the only institutions that taught young African American males a trade. (Coppin, 1913:28)

Coppin's educational goal for the African American female was a radical departure from nineteenth century norm. For instance, she was not against the idea of home economics as an educational concept. As a wife, mother, or domestic the acquisition of such skills were invaluable. But, she did stress the need for women to become knowledgeable about the chemical properties associated with food preparation and its related activities.

In addition, women were taught business management skills. As a feminist, Coppin did not frown upon the services of the female domestic or employee. It was important, however, for both women and men to become entrepreneurs. Coppin emphasized such ideas because of the lack of employment opportunities for both sexes. In addition, women and men were urged to fight for political inclusion. Moreover, both women and men were also encouraged to study and teach the classics.

On the educational success of the African American, Coppin believed that it came not from the idea of wanting to imitate members of the dominant culture. But, instead, from a desire deep within the soul to know "not just a little, but a great deal." (Loewenberg and Bogin, 1976:316) However, with knowledge must also come the desire to inspire others.

INSTRUCTIONAL METHODOLOGY

Coppin was an essentialist by design. However, she was not opposed to progressive ideas. Accordingly, teachers were to be competent instructors, always prepared, excellent directors of activities, as well as a good facilitator.

Coppin believed that the roles of director and class facilitator could be accomplished with minimal effort. For example, once the lesson was

prepared and the students industriously engaged with its related activities, the role of the teacher then became that of facilitator.

Consequently, students became active rather than passive participants of the learning process. Coppin's plan by no means, however, suggested that the classroom become a "three ringed circus" that is noisy and chaotic via moving bodies, or vocal outbursts. Teachers were to be in control at all times. (Coppin, 1913:46-48)

IMPORTANCE OF MORAL INSTRUCTION

Coppin believed that because parents were the first teachers for their children, good moral training should begin with the family. Thus parents were to be exemplars of proper social behavior. Although she favored the role of the class teacher as that of strict disciplinarian, Coppin believed that students' adherence to school rules should be enforced without corporal punishment.

Coppin stressed that such action common to improper student conduct was best left to parents, or guardians. Unruly students, however, should be handled with firmness. Moreover, punishment if warranted should be reasonable, administered with gentleness, and always fair. (Coppin, 1913:54)

Coppin further suggested that religious instruction, lessons related to trustworthiness, and obedience were important components of character development for younger students. In addition, moral training should also emphasize truthfulness, and a "love" of fair play. (Coppin, 1913:58)

For Coppin, the acquisition of good manners was of equal significance. The development of such was seen as an outgrowth of character molding. She was also concerned about the moral character of teachers. Thus instructors were expected to be self-disciplined, and models of good moral judgement.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY'S EDUCATORS

Many contemporary educators agree with Coppin's educational philosophy relevant to schooling, especially that of skill acquisition. For instance, proponents of the 1970s "back to basics" movement suggested a return to essentialism. These advocates contend that untested innovations and social experimentation have lowered academic standards, especially at the elementary level.

They further argue that many course electives, as well as "mini courses" offered at the secondary level are of little value. In keeping with essentialist tradition, such educators recommend that schools focus on skills subjects needed to development cultural literacy, intellectual and social enculturation.

Neoessentialists of the 1980s, suggest that school curricula be based upon five intellectual disciplines English, mathematics, science, social studies, and computer science. Germane to past and present essentialist thought is the idea that learning requires "disciplined attention" and "hard work." (Ornstein and Levine, 1993:464-66) Coppin would have agreed with this position.

The concept behind the 1980s push for effective schools can also be linked to essentialism in terms of what, indeed, constitutes effectiveness. For example, schools are deemed effective when principals and teachers stress academic excellence, and perceive the school's role as that of cultivator.

In addition, effective teachers are those that are subject competent, disciplined in lesson execution, and motivate students to excel academically. In this sense, Fanny J. Coppin, truly, exemplifies the definition of what makes an effective educator.

"Coppin's greatest wish was to obtain an education, and through teaching inspire young African Americans to pursue their academic dreams." (Perkins, 1987:4) History has recorded that she superseded her goals, and thus became one of the most talented educators in the annals of American schooling.

Pertinent to Coppin's extra-ordinary achievements, Loewenberg and Bogin contend that she, "when through life proud, upright, and courageous." (Loewenberg and Bogin, 1976:320)

Likewise, we can also add to this tribute that Coppin accomplished in her adult life via dedication what few African Americans, especially women, have ever dared to consider. In addition, Coppin's educational objectives were thus graciously achieved by way of intellectual continuity and mental dexterity.

Bibliography

Coppin, Fannie J. Reminiscences of School Life, and Hints on Teaching. Philadelphia, PA: AME Book Concern, 1913.

Loewenberg, Burt James and Ruth Bogin. Black Women in Nineteenth-Century American Life. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1976.

Ornstein, Allan C. and Daniel U. Levine. Foundations of Education. 5th edition. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1993.

Perkins, Linda M. "Fanny Jackson Coppin and the Institute for Colored Youth, 1865-1902." Barbara Miller, ed. Educated Women: Higher Education, Culture, and Professionalism, 1850-1950. New York & London: Garland Publishing, 1987.

Perkins, Linda M. "Fanny Jackson Coppin (1837-1913)," Jessie Carney Smith, ed. Notable Black American Women. Detroit, MI: Gale Research, Inc., 1992.

**PLURALISM—WITH INTELLIGENCE:
A CHALLENGE TO EDUCATION
AND SOCIETY**

ARTHUR BROWN
Wayne State University

I
In the late 60's and early 70's, during what was called the Age of the New Morality, pluralism achieved an acceptance probably unequaled in American history. Graphically illustrative was a complaint made to me by a neighbor, a high school student, about her misfortune in having been born a White Anglo Saxon Protestant, and therefore, as she put it, a "nobody."

But times have changed. Pluralism is not so fashionable in America. And the liberal and humane spirit of the New Morality, predicated on faith in human intelligence to control events, has given way to a pervasive conservatism which values instead accommodation to presumed independent realities. Thus, we are witnessing once again the rise of absolutism and determinism, exemplified by such phenomena as the intrusion of religious fundamentalism into politics and education; renewed faith in the "invisible hand" for resolving economic problems; the revival of social Darwinism as a rationale for legitimizing hierarchical social arrangements; and confidence that studies of our genes, such as those done by ethologists and sociobiologists, will be able to inform our ethics and our politics.

It is not diversity, then, it is not cultural pluralism or ethnic difference or divergent thinking which, in my view, pose a major threat to democratic community in America. Rather it is conformity—the

conformity generated by bureaucratized social institutions, entrenched economic and political interests, monopolized sources of information, and moral majoritarianism—which is rationalized by questionable metaphysical assumptions and/or theories about the essential nature of human nature and society, such as those I just mentioned.

With that by way of introduction, I should like to consider first the conceptual relationships between diversity and democracy, between democracy and democratic community, and between democratic community and education. I shall follow up with some suggestions as to how the American ideals of freedom and equality can be more effectively realized in both the larger society and in the schools.

II

Diversity is a defining feature of a democracy. It is a source of personal and social enrichment. Without it the future holds no promise. But diversity can also lead to dead ends. There are limits to what a democratic society can tolerate by way of differences. Unless there is an ethical center, a common core of values to which all are committed, a democratic society is simply a collection of disparate groups or individuals who happen to live within some political unit, and often in an adversary relationship. It is not a democratic community.

The ethical center of a democratic community consists of two primary values: freedom and equality. But freedom and equality are potentially competing values. If freedom is to be conceived of as simply the license to do whatever is personally desired and legal, and is uninformed by a sense of fraternity, it will undermine equality of condition. On the other hand, if equality of condition becomes an overriding social concern, it will undermine freedom of opportunity, of thought, and of action. The principal task of a democratic community, then, is to ensure that freedom and equality are maintained in dynamic balance and are both enjoyed to a high degree. Later I shall offer some suggestions toward that end, but first something must be said about the relationship between democratic community and education.

Democracy in the sense that I am using it, as community, cannot be separated from education. A democratic social life is impossible without a particular kind of nurturing designed to support and extend it. And that system of nurturing must embody democratic principles, or else not only will it be ineffective in sustaining a democratic social life, it will be, by definition, not education. Democracy and education, then, are not simply interrelated or interdependent; they are essentially identical. To elaborate, as a social system democracy is designed to enable its members

solve problems through the use of their collective intelligence. In the course of contending with such problems, their intelligence is further

developed and their moral sensibilities refined—a never ending process. As opposed to a system which requires that conduct conform to pre-established rules, where no demands are made on the use of intelligence, democracy requires the use of the intelligence of all its members in determining what the rules shall be. As a consequence, a democratic society is necessarily a learning society, an educational community, and not, as radical pluralists would have it, some kind of Babel where a thousand voices are heard—but none listened to or understood.

Just as democracy is a method of living which calls upon the collective intelligence of its members, so is education as a nurturing process. If education is to be regarded as merely a process whereby the young are to collect information, acquire mechanical skills, conform to pre-established rules, learn the "cultural heritage," etc., in a word, if education is to be regarded as merely a matter of students serving as passive recipients of that which is handed to them or demanded of them, whatever potential for intelligence they may possess will not be developed. Only insofar as the nurturing process is one which offers the young an opportunity to actively participate in the process (to think critically, for example) and to assume responsibility for their action, can it be said that education goes on. All else is some form of training or indoctrination or conditioning, not the development of intelligence, and not, therefore, a system of nurturing designed to produce democratic citizens.

III

What, it may be asked then, must a democratic, pluralistic society do to become a democratic community? And what can the schools do to ensure that students are educated rather than indoctrinated or trained or conditioned? Consider, in this regard, the following statement by John Dewey in his book, Freedom and Culture:

The conflict [of the moral Old and New Worlds] as it concerns the democracy to which our history commits us is within our own institutions and attitudes. It can be won only by extending the application of democratic methods of consultation, persuasion, negotiation, communication, cooperative intelligence, in the task of making our own politics, industry, education, our culture generally, a servant and an evolving manifestation of democratic ideas. . . .

If there is one conclusion to which human experience unmistakably points it is that democratic ends demand democratic methods for their realization. . . .

Our first defense is to realize that democracy can be served only by the slow day by day adoption and contagious diffusion in every phase of our common life of

methods that are identical with the ends to be reached.¹

Democracy, as Dewey described it, is too little practiced in America. The stratified, hierarchical model of governance prevails in almost all of its institutions. It is characterized more by adversariness than by the spirit of cooperation. If there is "consultation," it exists usually with respect to relatively trivial matters. If there is "persuasion," it is seldom admitted. If there is "negotiation," it is often characterized by ploys designed to take advantage of the opposing party and to emerge victorious. And if there is "communication," much of it is in the form of slogans and factual distortion. Major decisions are made primarily on the basis of power, not "cooperative intelligence." As a result, the ideals of freedom, equality, and community remain unrealized.

What Dewey called for is what I have termed "institutional democracy."² A number of arguments are offered against institutional democracy as an idea, on both theoretical and practical grounds. For example, claims are made that only a few are sufficiently capable of effectively exercising authority; that most people are fearful of responsibility; or that democracy "requires too many evenings," as Oscar Wilde once said in arguing against socialism.

But we need no longer speculate about such matters, at least with regard to business and industry. Ample evidence is now available to support the claims of organizational theorists like Schumacher, McGregor, Hertzberg, Thorsrud, and Herbst, that management procedures which are democratic can also be highly efficient. Numerous studies show that giving workers a voice in decision making can result in economic advantages such as increased productivity, lower absenteeism, and superior quality of product. Consider, for example, International Group Plans, an insurance company based in Washington, D.C., as described by Daniel Zwerdling:

The system does work—better than any other self-managed enterprise in the country, and, I would argue, better than any corporate system in America. Despite the problems and tensions at IGP, 340 rank and file workers and managers are operating a \$60 million corporation—and making a profit—with a degree of freedom, democracy, and equality never before achieved by a major corporation in the United States.³

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

IV

While institutional democracy is by no means widespread in

America, its economic and human advantages are becoming well known. And the number of business organizations moving into the participatory mode is increasing. But what about the schools? What are the schools doing these days to develop those attitudes, skills, dispositions, and understandings which make for democratic community? What are the schools doing to foster the development of intelligence and a commitment to the democratic ideals of freedom and equality? Never particularly successful in these matters, the schools, I am afraid, promise to get worse.

America is now conducting an intensive examination and reformation of its educational system. The Great Awakening, long in gestation, was brought forth in the form of a report published in April, 1983, of the National Commission on Excellence in Education. Virtual clones of the report have been published by any number of commissions, both private and public. In the past year or two, practically every state in the union has made educational reform a top priority. Driving the reform movement is the fact that student academic achievement, as evidenced by test scores and other perceived standards, has been dropping for many years. In itself that is seen as bad enough. But worse still, according to the National Commission, America is "at risk" because its economic strength and competitive position in world commerce are eroding by virtue of its inferior educational system.

Now just as it was sheer nonsense to assume in 1957 that it was their superior educational system which enabled the Russians to launch Sputnik (only one year before the Americans launched Explorer), so it is sheer nonsense to believe that current American trade deficits are attributable to its educational deficits. Nonetheless, economic competition seems to be the principal driving force behind the contemporary call for "excellence" in education. Toward that end, curricular mandates, particularly in science, mathematics, reading, and composition, are being issued by state departments of education; state and possibly federal tests for all grade levels are being developed; and schools along with their teachers are being held accountable for test results. Generally speaking, the American public is strongly supportive of such steps—as, I might add, are legislators, the business community, and, sad to say, most college professors. After all, what rational person would oppose educational excellence? But many teachers are resistant, and understandably so. They feel imposed upon and robbed of their professional freedom. To illustrate, I cite an article in the New York Times about Dr. Eleanor Friedman. The article is entitled, significantly, " 'The System' Wins Out Over a Dedicated Teacher."⁴

Dr. Eleanor Friedman, an outstanding New York English teacher and department chair, described as a

woman in perpetual motion in the classroom who proffers William Faulkner's words as if they were a gift, who takes enormous pleasure in finally teaching her slower students that they must bring a pencil with them each day, has retired at age 54. "I really thought," she said, "when I was 70 years old somebody would say 'You cannot teach any more' and pull me out of school kicking and screaming. I thought that was how it would end."

And why is Dr. Friedman retiring? Not because of the kids . . . "It is the system that I hate. There is less and less interest in what is. They are interested in what it says on paper is." And she is tired of having to draw up lesson plans when she is most comfortable with a few leading questions scrawled on a slip of paper. And she is tired of producing pages on goals and objectives for the coming school year when the goals are quite simply to have the teacher teach and the students learn. "I am out of sync with the system. We are here for the kids. We are not here to make paper for 110 Livingston Street. And that is why I am retiring."

Mrs. Friedman is not alone. Teacher burnout is a major problem in America. And although it is not simply the "system" which causes it, research does show that of all the sources of frustration facing teachers—and there are many—they regard the most stressful to be (1) limited opportunities to participate in making decisions in the school setting and (2) poor teacher/administrator relations.

Of course, the failure to include teachers in the formulation of educational policy and depriving them of the freedom to use their intelligence in performing their professional responsibilities are destined to be counter-productive. Not only are good teachers like Mrs. Friedman dropping out, others are being corrupted: they teach for the test, fudge test results, and spend time almost exclusively on what they will be held accountable for. And administrators in many cases encourage such action for they, too, are held accountable for measurable results.

As for the students, few educational reformers of the day seem to recognize that students are not empty vessels waiting to be filled from the fountain of knowledge. If students are not sufficiently interested in what the school offers, it is not difficult to understand why so many of the young are turned off by school or actively rebel against it or suffer from such severe psychological problems that they are deemed "learning disabled." And why has the suicide rate of the young has risen alarm-

gly. Surely this is one of the worst times in American history to grow up. Single parents . . . broken marriages . . . the loss of the extended fam-

ily . . . drugs . . . unemployment . . . underemployment . . . recessions . . . inflation . . . TV violence . . . crime . . . terrorism . . . sexual revolution . . . abuse . . . threat of nuclear war . . . loss of faith in the future.

When one adds to all that the fear, distrust, and cynicism among teachers caused by the increasing politicization of education, and when one considers the pedagogical limitations imposed by a rigid curriculum and uniform tests, it becomes quite difficult to see how anything resembling education for democratic life can be achieved in the school. Surely under these conditions, the Mrs. Friedmans of the teaching world, with their scraps of paper, their inspiring enthusiasm, and their empathy and commitment, will disappear. And when they go, any hope for "excellence," insofar as that means an education for the development of a life of intelligence, will go with them. But perhaps all is not hopeless. If democratization of business organizations should become widespread, the climate for democratizing educational institutions would no doubt change since any major contradiction between business and education in purpose and operational style would not be tolerated. In the meantime, supporters of democratic community in the schools might join with other communitarians in contending with the more destructive aspects of the current educational reform movement and in developing those personal and social relationships which make for greater freedom and equality. I suggest, for example, working toward:

1. Stemming the movement toward the centralization of educational authority at the state and federal levels, particularly with respect to the curriculum. Mandates from a distant source destroy the cooperative spirit, make for corruption, inhibit the development of intelligence, and cause people to act stupidly;

2. Decentralizing school systems. Large school systems are costly, impersonal, and inefficient. They should be broken up into autonomous units sufficiently small to allow for the full range of participation which democracy demands;

3. Giving teachers, rather than professional administrators, the major responsibility for operating the schools. Hierarchical arrangements in the schools tend to make for imperialism, rigidity, alienation, cynicism, and inefficiency. Consider the small school district in Westchester County, New York, where for one reason or another no principals were available when school opened in September, 1975. The district allowed the teachers in the three schools to take on supervisory responsibilities. So well did the teachers perform that the district requested permission from the New York State Department of Education to eliminate the position of principal and allow the teachers to run schools.⁵ Permission was granted and, at least up to a few years

ago, the arrangement has been highly successful;⁶

4. Developing more effective partnerships between parents and teachers. The role of parents in the educational achievement of students cannot be overestimated. If parents are not willing to volunteer (I may sound inconsistent when I say this), I believe that they should be called to school duty just as they are subject to jury duty;

5. Paying more respect to students as persons. We all recognize, of course, that the role of student is different from that of the parent or teacher. But we must rid ourselves of the idea that students are raw materials to be shaped, stuffed, and processed. The habit of intelligence can be realized only by active engagement on the part of students in the educative process and in community life. In concrete terms that means, for example, that students should feel that the school is their home, and not a prison; that academic work makes sense to them and is not removed from their reality; that they have an opportunity to think through problems, rather than "soak" up meaningless information; that they participate to a reasonable extent in formulating the rules which govern the school; and first and foremost that their backgrounds, interests, needs and differences as individuals are respected.

v

A final word insofar as the cybernetic age relates to what I have said. No doubt it will be the case that an enlarged use of computers in the schools will provide for greater individualization of instruction and, in general, more "effective" instruction in certain respects. No doubt it will be the case that computers will add new dimensions to the ways in which knowledge is acquired, stored, employed, and disseminated. And like other electronic media, and before them the printing press, computers will change the way people relate to one another and to the world at large. However, whether computers will enable the majority of us to be more creative, as is the claim, remains to be seen. And whether computers will enhance our collective wisdom is highly questionable. As history amply demonstrates, knowledge, though necessary, does not guarantee wisdom; nor does creativity necessarily eventuate in desirable ends.

Wisdom and right action are aspects of social intelligence. And social intelligence can be developed only through responsible engagement in the several communities in which we live—the school, the work place, the larger community. Social arrangements which foster that kind of engagement are the best guarantee that the dual democratic ideals of freedom and equality will be realized.

References

1. Capricorn Books (N.Y.), 1963, pp. 175-176.
2. See "Institutional Democracy: Problems and Prospects," Educational Theory, Spring, 1979, pp. 79-85.
3. "At IGP, It's Not Business as Usual," Working Papers for a New Society, Spring, 1977, p. 81.
4. June 15, 1983, Section 2, p. 5.
5. David Vidal, "Westchester Area Ending Role of Principal," New York Times, May 18, 1976, p. 24.
6. As reported to me by a skeptical student of mine—a principal—who wrote to the school district.

Note

This paper was first presented at the First International Convention on Education, December 19-23, 1984 in Jerusalem. It was later published by invitation in ERIC, Vol. 22, No. 1, Jan. 1987. I have dealt with the themes in the paper in various other writings, particularly "Institutional Democracy: Problems and Prospects" (Educational Theory, Vol. 29, No. 2, Spring 1979) and "Democracy and Education Revisited" (Thresholds in Education, Vol. Vi, No. 2, May, 1980) from which I have drawn substantial sections.

I gave some consideration to "updating" the paper or making revisions, but decided against doing so. I believe that the paper has a certain integrity which I would probably damage by making substantial changes. And cosmetic changes would not add anything. Further, the philosophical issues I am dealing with are perennial in nature and the topical issues are still with us. In fact, to the question I have been asked more than once, "Have things improved?" my answer has been, "No; they are worse." Consider in this regard the number of states which are now requiring standardized testing, the fact that the Clinton administration is touting national standards, the movement toward charter schools and the privatization of schools the principal rationale for which is higher academic "achievement", i.e., test scores, and the growing opposition to affirmative action. Hardly ever do educational policy makers and leaders (outside of the academy) speak out about education as a democratic enterprise or address the function of the schools in helping to create democratic community.

RECLAIMING THE ANCIENT THEME OF HOSPITALITY

WILLIAM E. RUSSELL
Merrimack College

Some ancient themes merit reclamation. Hospitality may be one such ancient concept deserving consideration in current educational conversation. If the quintessential purpose of a school or college is to provide a climate of learning then, perhaps, the seldom discussed topic of hospitality becomes a fruitful concept for thought and application. Moreover, as a religious/philosophical/cultural concept the notion of hospitality contrasts with the dominant themes, models, and metaphors of most current educational conversation. The concept of hospitality, a relationship linking host (teacher) with stranger (student), has it would seem, obvious implications to pluralistic ideals.

In this paper, the concept of hospitality is first briefly noted in The Rule of Saint Benedict, in scripture, and in literature. Moreover, the paper depends heavily on the writing of Henri Nouwen and to a much lesser and minor extent draws ideas from Parker Palmer, Sara Lawrence Lightfoot, Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel, and Alfred North Whitehead. The methodology is to identify and explicate the concept of hospitality as discovered in these writers, particularly Nouwen, followed by an application to teaching. The paper lacks, I think, the virtue of unity; it is more, at least in intention, like a series of snapshots of the same object from different locations or like a prism showing different angles of reflection.

"The biggest disease today" claims Mother Teresa "is not leprosy or tuberculosis, but rather the feeling of being unwanted, uncared for, and deserted by everybody." But, being a stranger must be part of the human condition. At different times and places everyone must experience leaving one's own familiar home to enter a world of otherness. Or perhaps we feel loneliness rather than solitude or as strangers because of some difference—social, cultural, religious, political, racial, personal, physical, mental, geographical. As teachers we meet in the classroom each semester those with diverse biographies about whom we know very little, strangers, but whose presence once there demands something of us. In the movement from hostility to hospitality, the movement that allows us "to receive instead of conquer" Henri Nouwen writes of the school climate:

Fear and hostility are not limited to burglars, drug-addicts, or strange-behaving types. In a world so pervaded with competition, even those who are very close to each other such as classmates . . . can become infected by fear and hostility since they experience each other as threats to their intellectual or professional safety. Not seldom places which were created to bring people closer together and help them form a peaceful community have degenerated into mental battle-fields. Students in a classroom, teachers in a faculty meeting, . . . often find themselves paralyzed by mutual hostility, unable to realize their purposes because of fear, suspicion, and sometimes blatant hostility. Institutions which were explicitly created to offer free time and free space for developing the most precious human potentials have become so dominated by hostile defensiveness that some of the best ideas and some of the most valuable feeling and intuitions remain unexpressed. Grades, exams, selection's systems, promotion chances and desires for awards often lock the manifestation of the best that man can produce. (4)

With a view to a literature of spirituality, my freshman class read novels, poems and short stories, two of which concern in some manner hospitality. The first, Camus' complex and challengingly ambiguous story "The Guest" tells of an isolated school teacher, Daru, a peids-noir, who teaches Arab children in the mountains of French Algeria. Daru, a guest himself in Arab territory, acts as a concerned and sympathetic host to an Arab who has killed a cousin, perhaps according to his culture and law justifyingly, but not according to ironically the final arbitrator of his guilt. Daru, despite his

objections, is charged by the police officer Balducci with delivering the Arab to police headquarters in a distant city.

A critic writes, explaining Daru's motivations:

Daru is a humanist in an inhuman or dehumanized world. He genuinely sees a brother in the Arab, but Balducci and the Arab's brothers can see only a criminal or a victim, a pretext for vengeance or a problem, an object within a system of objectified relationships (82 Showalter)

Besides "The Guest," the class reads Washington Irving's Rip Van Winkle. While not at all concerned with hospitality, Rip van Winkle does portray a critical, closely related topic, the dangers of individualism, the importance of community.

Rip Van Winkle is the classic American hero. Frustrated and unhappy at the demands of the community—through the voice of his nagging wife—would place upon him, he escapes one day to the mountains to hunt. A twenty year sleep follows. During his slumber, his wife dies, his children grow to adulthood, and the Revolutionary War is fought and won. Returning to society, Rip is now without obligations to family or community, and he lives happily ever after, "having arrived at the happy age," Irving writes, "when a man can be idle with impunity." Although Irving recognized, in the noisy babble of the election day mob that greets Rip on his return from the mountains, the dangers of individualism, Rip Van Winkle is the archetypal American hero: fulfillment, happiness, moral integrity, self realization, freedom are found only outside the community, and so the American hero gets out of town.

Robert Bellah and his associates have also questioned the risks of faith in the individual. Interviewing Bellah Bill Moyers says of *Habits of the Heart*: One of my favorite characters in your book is a Californian who says that his ideal home is twenty acres and a moat around it with alligators. What if many Americans don't want a common identity or a community? What if they like being apart, living alone, and gratifying their own desires? (283)

Welcoming those interrupting their life's trek has always been a mark of civilization from ancient times. Scripture, for example, documents for Judaism and Christianity the value and rewards of the practice of hospitality. The earliest scriptural account of hospitality chronicles Abraham, himself now a pilgrim dependent entirely upon the hospitality of God as his journey takes unknown turns and twists, entertaining

three men who intrude upon his sleep. Later the three are revealed as angels of the Lord (Gen. 18:1-15). Abraham welcomes his guests imitating the habits of his pagan neighbors. After the founding of Israel religious reasons, memory of experiences, prompt the observation of hospitality. For instance, Moses commands: "The stranger who sojourns with you shall be as a native among you, and you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt" (Lev. 19:34).

The writer Cynthia Ozick bluntly asserts in "Metaphor and Memory" that the ancient Greeks despised the stranger.

As a society they never undertook to imagine what it was to be the Other; the outsider; the alien; the slave; the oppressed; the sufferer; the outcast; the opponent; the barbarian who owns feelings and deserves rights. And that is because they did not, as a society, cultivate memory, or search out any historical metaphor to contain memory. . . . The Jews—they were named Hebrews then—were driven to a preoccupation with history and with memory almost at the start of their hard-pressed desert voyage into civilization. The distinguished Greeks had their complex polity, their stunning cities; in these great cities they nurtured unrivaled sophistications. The Jews began as primitives and nomads, naive shepherds as remote from scientific thinking as any other primitives. . . . A nation of slaves is different than a nation of philosophers (277).

The classic Christian statement of hospitality may be The Rule of Saint Benedict, chapter 53, which contains a forceful, vigorous appeal, or rather rule of hospitality. Benedict instructs: "All guests who present themselves are to be welcomed as Christ, for he himself will say: 'I was a stranger and you welcomed me'" (Mt.25.35) The theology of hospitality expressed by this institutionalization of hospitality proclaims a radical openness, transcending any hint of tribalism, distrust, or suspicion of the stranger/wayfarer. For the follower of Benedict the theology could not be more definite; ministering to the stranger is ministering to Christ. Respect for persons is certainly the underlying principle of Benedict's instruction on hospitality.

A modern example of the practice of hospitality might be found in the life and work of Dorothy Day. Robert Coles in his book *Dorothy Day: A Radical Devotion* writes of her co-founding the houses of hospitality that became a part "of the American social scene for men and women who had no other place to go, nothing to eat, and were at the mercy of whatever secular or religious charity happened to be available" (14).



offers this quote from Dorothy Day:

A community is not a place where 'desert fathers' are testing themselves—more and more, harder and harder, each on his own. A community is what Saint Paul told us—our differences granted respect by one another, but those differences not allowed to turn us into loners. You must know when to find your own, quiet moment of solitude. But you must know when to open the door to go to be with others, and you must know *how* to open the door. There is no point in opening the door with bitterness and resentment in your heart. I have noticed that those alcoholics, those bums and tramps and ne'er-do-wells have a way of reading our faces, getting quickly to the truth of our souls. They do that, I fear, better than we do with one another. We try to protect one another, we 'cover' for one another—oh, maybe we don't want to see in each other what we don't want to see in the privacy of our own rooms, staring into the mirror: our sins work in our lives (130).

Switching now from literature to more educational related commentators, first consider some themes from Martin Buber. As far as I know Martin Buber does not explicitly use the word hospitality as an educational metaphor, but he seems certainly to embrace the ethic. Education is for Martin Buber, as expressed in *Between Man and Man*, the selection of the effective world. The teacher embodies that world that comes in person to meet and help form the student. The act of inclusion, the essence of dialogue, is in this meeting the essential characteristic. There is no desire to dominate another. The teacher does not select those who face him. They are truly strangers. They are just there, waiting. Buber writes: "He [the teacher] sees them crouching at the desks, indiscriminately flung together, the misshapen and the well proportioned, animal faces, empty faces, and noble faces in indiscriminate confusion, like the presence of the created universe; the glance of the educator accepts and receives them all" (375). To educate them genuine mutuality must be established resulting from trust. "In order to be and remain truly present to the child" say Buber, "he must have gathered the child's presence into his own store as one of the bearers of his communion with the world, one of the focuses of his responsibilities for the world." (376).

Further, contact and confirmation are two related terms with an educational context that Buber analyzes. He writes:

Contact is the basic word in education. It means that the teacher must relate himself to his students not as one brain to other brains—a well-developed brain to still undeveloped ones—but as on being to other

beings; as a mature being to maturing ones. He must meet them unequivocally, on their own level; his guidance should emanate not from above to below, from his lectern to their desks, but from a genuine interrelatedness and exchange of experience—the experiences of a full life and those of lives still unfulfilled but no less significant. What is required is not merely a search for information from below and a handing down of information from above, nor a mere interchange of questions and answers, but a genuine dialog into which the teacher must enter directly and unselfconsciously, though he must also guide and control it. This dialog ought to be continued until in fact it culminates in a wordless being-with-one-another. It is this that I call the dialogical principle of education.

Buber writes concerning confirmation:

Man wishes to be confirmed in his being by man and wishes to have a presence in the being of the other. The human person needs confirmation because man as man needs it. An animal does not need to be confirmed, for it is what it is unquestionably. It is different with man: sent forth from the natural domain of species into the hazard of the solitary category, surrounded by the air of a chaos which come into being with him, secretly and bashfully he watches for a Yes which allows him to be and which can come to him only from one human person to another (208)

From the relationship of students, whether as Buber describes them crunching at their desks or other wise the teacher enters into a kind of social ethic. The exact, predominate features describing that ethic depends in part on the choices of the teacher. The choice is influential. Buber's choice—contact, confirmation, inclusion, dialog and response.

Gabriel Marcel is another philosopher/religious thinker treating the concept of hospitality. Marcel poses the question: "What does it actually mean to receive"? He responds in part "to receive is to admit or welcome an outsider into one's home" (27). My home explains Marcel is not some abstraction; it has qualities from my being there, from my living in that place, a place to which the stranger is invited to participate. Marcel continues distinguishing the meaning of receptivity, turning the concept into a gift.

If we devote our attention to the act of hospitality, we will see at once that to receive is not to fill up a void with an alien presence but to make the other person participate in a certain plenitude. Thus the ambigu-

ous term, 'receptivity,' has a wide range of meanings extending from suffering or undergoing to the gift of self; for hospitality is a gift of what is one's own, i.e. of oneself" (28)

Receptivity may mean on the one hand undergoing, something quite passive, like the imprint received by soft wax. More profoundly it may also mean a gift, even of self. "To provide hospitality" writes marcel "is truly to communicate something of oneself to the other" (91).

Marcel seems to emphasize concretely the human condition, not unlike Buber, that calls for a response of hospitality. He calls attention to the universal feeling of loneliness. "The distress felt by a child during a trip or change of residence, the nameless sadness we have all experienced in certain hotel rooms where we had the feeling of not being in anybody's home . . . (90).

In contrast to the usual connotation of hospitality, Parker Palmer suggests an extension. This concept, receptivity, may be related to a further dimension of hospitality, the receptive nature of knowledge; to receive is to open myself to, hence give myself, rather than undergo an external action" (91). A learning space has according to Parker Palmer "three major characteristics: openness, boundaries, and an air of hospitality" (71). Considering the third member of this trinity, Palmer writes:

Hospitality means receiving each other, our struggles, our new born ideas with openness and care. It means creating an ethos in which the community of truth can form, the pain of truth's transformations be born.

Hospitality is a central virtue of the desert teachers and of the monasteries they founded. It is a virtue central to the biblical tradition itself, where God is always using the stranger to introduce us to strangeness of truth. To be inhospitable to strangers or strange ideas, however unsettling they may be, is to be hostile to the possibility of truth; hospitality is not only an ethical virtue but an epistemological one as well. So the classroom where truth is central will be a place where every stranger and every strange utterance is met with welcome. . . . Hospitality is not an end in itself. It is offered for the sake of what it can allow, permit, encourage, and yield. A learning space needs to be hospitable not to make learning painless but to make painful things possible, things without which no learning can occur—things like exposing ignorance, testing tentative hypotheses, challenging false or partial information, and mutual criticism of thought. Each of these is essential to obedience to truth. But none of them can happen in an atmosphere where people feel threatened and judged.

Palmer goes on to say that he is not talking about rhetorical or political questions, that is those not designed to elicit truth but rather to perform or score points.

Another prominent education author, Sarah Lawrence Lightfoot, echoes a hospitality theme. Speaking in terms of children and teachers who bring gifts to school:

The child brings himself or herself quite full of history and preoccupations and dreams and hopes and concerns and fears. And the teacher comes with her or his own set of those. That's negotiated every day throughout the year, and it changes over time. Social scientists often talk about forming the collective as being opposed to individual initiative. But my sense is that it doesn't have to be that way at all. There can be a difficult but harmonious coming together—the building of a rich community *and* individual expression. As a matter of fact, if we would let some of those individual gifts thrive, there would be more possibility for a rich community life (159).

Children claims Lightfoot need to be praised for their gifts, for the way they may be different from others. They are proud of their gifts; however if they are told she says "those gifts aren't appropriate or legitimate in the school environment, then it's very hard to rekindle that later on, and they'll stop bringing them in (159).

For Lightfoot schools take on or should take of a culture—living, vibrant, contagious—from those living there, students and teachers.

Of those I have read Henri Nouwen provides the most extensive treatment of hospitality as a classroom ideal. He too speaks of gifts in the context of hospitality. The host, writes Nouwen, can

"create a friendly empty space where no hostility or suspicion need exist and where the guest can reveal his own best self to his host . . . the stranger can become the friend, revealing to his host the promise he is carrying with him . . . in the context of hospitality guest and host can reveal their most precious gifts and bring new life to each other. I should like to propose that the concept of hospitality is one of the richest concepts to deepen our insight in the relationship with our fellow human beings. . . . When I use the term hospitality, therefore, I do not want to limit it to the literal sense of receiving a stranger into your house. It is a fundamental attitude toward our fellow human beings, which can be expressed by a great variety of behavior (7-8).

ly the creation of a space where the stranger can enter and become a friend instead of an enemy. . . . Hospitality is not a subtle invitation to adopt the life style of the host, but the gift of a chance to allow the guest to find his own" (8). It is not an easy task to create space in a society filled with activity, personal concerns, restlessness, willed distractions, being busy, being preoccupied.

Nouwen in his monograph on hospitality turns to teaching, asserting that students, despite hours of lectures and readings, show great resistance to learning viewing education as an "endless row of obligations," earning credits and degrees yet sacrificing genuine growth. Teachers are perceived more as "demanding bosses than as guides in their search for knowledge and understanding" (13). Solutions are offered without questions being posed; the value of the experiences of students, a "least used source of formation," is discounted. Central questions are left unanswered "If there is any culture" he states "which has succeeded in killing the natural spontaneous curiosity of people and in dulling the human desire to know it is our technocratic society" (13). Nouwen claims the teaching environment often appears hostile where students feel vulnerable, fear rejection, doubt their own abilities, harbour unexpressed anger, hide talents, leave central questions untouched (14). First of all teaching calls, asserts Nouwen, for mutual trust, and must "create a space where students and teachers can enter into fearless communication with each other and allow their respective life experiences to be their primary and most valuable source of growth and maturation" (14). The two most important tasks of the hospitable teacher are according to Nouwen revealing and affirming.

To reveal is to manifest that students have something to offer. Nouwen asserts:

Many students have been for so many years on the receiving side, and have become so deeply impregnated with the idea that there is still a lot more to learn, that they have lost confidence in themselves and can hardly imagine that they themselves have something to give, not only to those who are less educated but to their fellow students and teachers as well. Therefore the first task of the teacher is to reveal, to take away the veil covering many students' intellectual life, and to help them see not that they still have a lot to learn, but that their own life-experiences, their own insights and convictions, their own intuitions and formulations are worth serious attention. A good host is the one who believes that his guest is carrying a promise which he wants to reveal to anyone who shows a genuine interest. . . . We will never believe that we have anything to give unless there is someone

who is able to receive. And indeed, we discover ourselves in the eyes of the receiver. Every teacher who can detach himself from his need to impress and to control, and can allow himself to become receptive to the news that the student carries with him, will find that it is in receptivity that the gift becomes visible (15).

Next, Nouwen describes the second important task of the hospitable teacher, affirmation.

What is revealed as good and worth-while, as a new contribution, needs affirmation. Affirmation, encouragement and support are often much more important than criticism. The good host is the one who not only helps the guest to see that he has a hidden gift, but who also is able to help him develop and deepen this gift so that he can continue his way on his own with renewed self-confidence. Self-doubt is such a rampant disease in many schools that affirmation is more important than ever. Affirmation can mean many things. It can simply mean an expression of excitement and surprise, or a word of thanks. It can mean suggestions for good reading or referral to people with special talents. It often means just bringing the right persons together, or setting apart a time and place where more thinking and working can be done. But it always includes the inner conviction that a precious gift asks for attention and continuing care. . . . More important than the imposition of any doctrine or pre-coded idea is the offer to the student of a place where he can reveal his great human potentials to love, to give, and to create, and can find affirmation which gives him the courage to continue his search without fear(16)

May it not be important to see things otherwise than what they are. Teaching often seems very much at odds with the virtue of hospitality as expressed by Buber, Marcel, Lightfoot, Nouwen. The classroom concentration seems on competencies, behavioral objectives, taking quizzes and tests, seeing students as reactive creatures, behaving organism. Behaviorism seems to be the dominant, invading psychology. The standard of what really counts is measurable, quantifiable. The teacher inserts knowledge forcibly into memory for the sake of test scores, for the sake of comparison, for the sake of accountability. Predefined performances mean that control; talking at, manipulating, are talents to be developed. Numbers and what can be quantified are what seem to count. In the ancient theme of hospitality could expand the conversational to state that teaching is an act of charity, a way for

someone privileged to serve, to labor, to show hospitality, to men and women in the hope to make the world a more livable community for all.

References

Buber, Martin. (1966). *The Ways of Response: Selections from His Writings*. New York: Schocken Books.

Camus, Albert. (1957). *The Fall and Exile and the Kingdom*. New York: Random House.

Coles, Robert. (1987). *A Radical Devotion*. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Fry, T. Ed. (1981). *The Rule of Saint Benedict*. Collegeville, MN.

Marcel, Gabriel. (1964). *Creative Fidelity*. New York: The Noonday Press.

Marcel, Gabriel. (1950). *Mystery of Being*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company.

Ozick, Cynthia. (1989). *Metaphor and Memory*. NY: Alfred A. Knopf.

Irving, Washington. *Rip Van Winkle*.

Moyers, Bill. (1989). *A World of Ideas: Conversations with Thoughtful Men and Women About American Life Today and the Ideas Shaping our Future*. N.Y. Doubleday.

Nouwen, Henri. (1974). "Hospitality." *Monastic Studies*.

Palmer, Parker (1983). *To Know As We Are Known*. NY: Harper and Row.

Showalter, "Camus' Mysterious Guests: A Note on the Value of Ambiguity." Newberry College: English Studies in Short Fiction.

LET US PRAISE THE BODY EROTIC

LOUIS SILVERSTEIN

Columbia College Chicago

It is a balmy night and the heat is on with sweltering and swaying bodies showing skin giving off the multicultural aromas of diverse bodies, hearts and minds dancing in an "undercover" nightclub that has sprung up in the Chicagoland environs and which serves as a retreat from the pleasure needs to be policed way of being that has swept across institutions of higher learning. Seeking release in this erotic haven from the pleasure management bureaucrats are faculty, administrators, staff, trustees, students and alumni of many a college and university to be found in this metropolitan area. After all, it is a physical world. And we educators are the stuff of bodies as much as minds.

"It's wonderful. It's awfully nice. It can take you to paradise." Sexuality, that is, albeit one would be hard pressed to know or guess this to be the case in the realm of the halls of ivy if one were to read the coverage of the subject as it is being played out on the campuses of this land in the higher education press, such as *The Chronicle of Higher Education*. Date rape, sexual harassment, AIDS and other STDs, pornography, scabrous language, warning to students if one plans to use sexual imagery in one's classroom, ad infinitum.

It is as if we who work in the colleges and universities have joined the Howard Sterns, the 2 Live Crews, and the Madonnas in communicating on the subject of the sexual only in terms of trash

talk and imagery, albeit with a veneer of a civilized manner, that serves to both diminish and debase human sexuality.

It is as if the spokespersons for higher education had joined ranks with those who view the joys and pleasures of the body as earthly attributes that the human race would be better off without due as much to the inherent sinfulness of human sexuality as to the sensual and the erotic being a problem, a scourge, as that which is devoid of the rational, the good and the spiritual.

To be certain we humans contain within us that which can turn sexuality into a tool of discomfort, harassment, pain, and the beastly. Yet, that is only part of the story.

The sexual has been a blessing, a gift of immense proportions to humans as well as having been a problem and scourge. This being an incontrovertible reality of human existence, one might ask why has most attention been given over to the negative aspects of sexuality in our educational settings, resulting not in education taking place as much as miseducation and the dissemination of a point of view that seemingly wishes to make human sexuality into a monster. We have arrived at a place in time where Walt Kelly's immortal words as spoken by his creation Pogo, "We have met the enemy and her is us," is now taken to mean that our humanity is being assaulted by our sexuality.

Sex being a passion of humans throughout history, the largest number of us shall continue to be sexual. We are sexual beings. How we choose to live out our sexuality has profound implications for ourselves, our families, our communities, our institutions and our world.

Utilizing an inter-disciplinary and transformative approach—that is, idea incorporation as well as idea realization—to teaching and learning, we shall look at the study of sex education that has as its goals safe, responsible, respectful, joyous, ecstatic, and transcendental sexual attitudes, knowledge, values and practices.

If, in the words of Martin Buber, we humans are to be about fostering an I/Thou rather than an I/It relationship with others, we need to teach the passions in a manner that liberates the self and promotes a sense of community. And by doing so, we shall, in the words of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., release the higher self of the human possibility upon this world of ours.

The general mission of education is to equip students with a perceptual framework, knowledge, skills and values that shall afford one the opportunity to both realize one's true self and to become a fully participating member of one's community. As educators, we are committed to creating a classroom environment, in terms of subject matter, structure

' process, that serves to foster amongst our students the reclaiming of imagination, and reading, writing, listening, questioning, dialogue,

problem-solving, decision-making and critical and creative thinking skills. Hopefully, we also seek to inspire students with a sense of responsibility, purposefulness, empowerment, and vision as they engage the realities and potentialities of their sexual selves in relation to self and other.

This paper is based on the following premises and questions concerning sex education:

—Sex is a blessing, a gift of immense proportions to we humans, as well as a problem and a scourge. At the present time, all too much attention is given to the negative aspects of sexuality in educational circles, resulting not in education, but, rather in propagandizing.

—No matter how hard the well-intentioned (reduce the incidence of AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases) and the not well-intentioned (the pleasure police) try, we cannot stop the lovemaking, but we can affect its quality in terms of safety, responsibility, joyfulness and the other objectives mentioned earlier in this paper.

—To our great misfortune, and contrary to what we would like to believe, humans do not emerge from the womb naturally good at sex. We possess the tools but are lacking the knowledge, skills and values to put them to best use, to make sex the complete and humane experience that it can be.

Not many of us have had the good fortune of a positive education in sex. To the contrary, many of us have been conditioned in our sexual attitudes and practices by belief systems that have instilled in us guilt, shame, fear, insecurity, and anger. Such negative imprints must be faced honestly and directly in the process of being supplanted by healthier ones that we may live more fulfilling lives as human beings.

For example, male sexuality remains focused on the inevitable disappointing, for both parties, goal of ejaculation ("getting off") instead of the orgasmic process of lovemaking. Males need to free themselves from the momentary release of ejaculation and come to value, desire and practice the physical, emotional and spiritual fruit of whole person (body, mind and person) orgasm—unification with one's own self and with one's partner.

—A classroom environment be established that is non-judgmental and which encourages free, open and candid expressions of one's deepest thoughts and feelings about sexuality. If our students cannot talk to us, they shall be taught by the mass media, the streets and their peers, sources that are uninformed at best and exploitative at worst.

—Attention be given to the teaching of communication skills on the intrapersonal and interpersonal level. One needs to engage in a dialogue with self in order to allow one's inner friend and wise person to offer a perspective on one's sexuality. And one needs to effectively communicate

one's needs, desires, thoughts, and feelings to one's sexual partner to both head off and resolve conflict within the sexual arena as well as to heighten the sexual experience.

—The choice of words used to communicate on the subject of the sexual must serve the educational goals we are trying to reach. If love is indeed a blessing, the use of such words as the "wand of light" when referring to the penis, or the "precious gateway" when referring to the vagina, or the "wave of bliss" when referring orgasm, sets a tone for the level of discourse that takes place in the classroom, posits sexual love as a human activity to say yes to as well as no to, and raises important questions concerning the choice of the language that teachers employ as a major determinant of what lessons students leave the classroom.

—Sexual lovemaking knowledge, skills, practices and values that serve to furnish students the opportunity to develop as makers of love be an integral part of the curriculum. Our students must come to know what to do and how to do it well, and not just what not to do and how not to. We must light candles and not just curse the darkness as much in the realm of human sexuality as is the case in any other realm of human endeavor that we wish our students to do well. An appropriate analogy is that those of us engaged in peace education have learned that if humans are not to make war, humans must learn how to make peace.

—Idea transformation as well as idea realization be part and parcel of what we are about. Idea realization being defined as coming to know something we didn't know before. Idea transformation being defined as the incorporation of such a realization into the fabric of our life. In essence, not only knowing what to do, but also doing what you know.

—How can we best assist students to better understand perspectives different than their own as well as the complex nature of controversial issues in the process of developing critical and creative thinking and decision-making skills as well as a sense of personal empowerment.

—How are we to work with students so that they become more flexible problem-solvers, able to meet the complex and diverse dilemmas and challenges of being a sexual being with a correspondingly thoughtful and rich repertoire or responses to sexual dilemmas and challenges?

Let us teach the children fully and well. If this is to be so, sex education must include among its overall objectives, the saying of yes as well as the saying of no. For as James Joyce wrote in *Ulysses*:

... and then I asked him again with my eyes to ask again yes and then he asked me would I say yes . . . and first I put my arms around him yes and drew him down to me so he could feel my breasts all perfume yes and his heart was going like mad and yes I said yes I will yes

Insomuch as the belief that the sexual is virtually nothing but dysfunctional, unhealthy, abusive, violent and exploitative is being promulgated seemingly throughout the land, taking risks that lead the human sexual journey into new directions would seem in order:

The ground became everywhere covered with lotuses of the five different colors . . . trunk-lotuses bloomed on the trunks of trees, lotuses on the branches, and vine-lotuses on the vines; on the ground, stalk-lotuses, as they are called . . . came up by sevens; in the sky were produced . . . hanging lotuses. A shower of flowers fell all about; celestial music was heard to play in the sky; and the whole ten thousand words became one mass of garlands of the utmost possible magnificence (resembling) . . . a bouquet of flowers sent whirling through the air, or a closely woven wreath, or a superbly decorated altar of flowers.

—The Introduction to *Jakata*

Everybody's hair was loose, ornaments shattered, clothing gone. The whole place resounded with bracelets, and mad with passion, everyone fainted. Then having done what they could on land, all headed for the lakes.

—*Brahma Vaivarta Purana*

In ending, I wish to return to the beginning. When does our journey as sexual beings begin? In Tantric Yoga, the sexual education of the self commences at the moment of conception with the quality of the love-making experienced by the couple engaged in the process of creating a child affecting not only the underlying spiritual condition of the child, but also orients the consciousness of the child toward sexual love as an integral aspect of the highly evolved self.

If one's door of perception does not allow one to go back so far in the development of the sexual being of the child, allow me to share with you these words of Herman Belmont:

It was dusk, the apartment was empty, save for the two of them. As they lay entwined in one embrace, this room, this bed, was the universe. Aside from the faint sounds of their tranquil breathing, they were silent. She stroked the nape of his neck. He nuzzled her erect nipple, first gently with his nose, then licked it, tasted it, smelled, and absorbed her body odor. It was a hot and humid August day and they had been perspiring. Slowly he caressed her one breast as he softly rolled his face on the contours of the other. He pressed his body close against her, sighed, and fully spent closed his eyes and soon fell into a fully satisfied

sleep. Ever so slowly, she slipped herself from under him, lest she should disturb him, cradled him in her arms and moved him into the crib. Having completed his six o'clock feeding, the four month old has also experienced one of the minute contributions to his further sexual development.

Back to the nightclub, we are still dancing. I believe I see Walt Whitman taking notes for a book of poetry that he is working on. Such a wonderful smile is beaming from his quite knowing face. It is as if our eroticism has transformed our bodies into that which is electric as we move, and he writes, in praise of the body erotic.

APPENDICES

319

1995 Annual Conference
"Philosophy of Education: Multicultural and Popular Educational
Theory—a MPES special"

Loyola University Chicago—Water Tower Campus
Host: School of Education
Robert E. Roemer, Dean

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 10

12:40 PM JOHN DEWEY—CHANGE AND PROCESS
Chair: Charlesetta M. Ellis, Chicago State University

Naoko Saito, University of Tokyo

Dewey's Idea of "Intelligent Sympathy" and The Development of the Ethical Self: Implications for Japanese Education

Sandy Alber, Oakland University

Using Dewey's Writings as a Basis for Assessment of Project Means

1:40 PM REFORM AND PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Chair: William Russell, Merrimack College

Charlesetta M. Ellis, Chicago State University

Carter G. Woodson on Education: A Philosophical Perspective

Bartley McSwine, Chicago State University

The Multicultural Challenge

2:30 PM PEDAGOGICAL METHODS AND STRATEGIES

Chair: John Green, Chicago State University

Walter P. Krolkowski, Loyola University Chicago

"This Wonder, Perhaps Deeper Than Love, That Is Friendship"

Louis Silverstein, Columbia College Chicago

The Internet & The Innernet: A Philosophy of Education in the

Technological Age

4 PM CULTURAL RELEVANCE AND DIVERSITY

Chair: Vanessa L. Ellis, University of Wisconsin—Madison

Wei Rose Zhang, Eastern Illinois University

Multicultural Education and Cultural Differences

Michael Davis, Illinois Institute of Technology

Multiculturalism: Some Second Thoughts about the Concept

4:50 PM TEACHING PARADIGMS AND PRACTICES

Chair: David B. Owen, Iowa State University

Arthur Brown, Wayne State University

The Introductory Course in Philosophy of Education

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 11

8:30 AM CURRICULUM THEORY AND APPLICATION

Chair: Betty-Jo Dunbar, Chicago State University

Christopher H. Jones, Maharishi University of Management

Study and Experience of Consciousness as the Core Curriculum

James D. Grant, Maharishi University of Management

The Existence of Pure Consciousness and Its Implications for Education

9:30 AM POPULAR EDUCATION—IDEAS AND VIEWS

Chair: Eddie L. Washington, Chicago State University

Joseph K. Yacoub, Loyola University Chicago

On Iris Murdoch's Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals

Don G. Smith, Eastern Illinois University

A Nietzschean Critique of Postmodern Educational Theory

10:40 AM POPULAR EDUCATION CONTINUED

Chair: Sandy Alber, Oakland University

Kenneth Sutton, Eastern Illinois University

Post-Modernism: A Phase of Development

Robert Craig, University of Houston

Hermeneutics: East Meets West? Interpretation of What? And/Or How to Be Awake At a Philosophy Meeting

11:30 AM ALTERNATIVE BRIDGES: LEADERSHIP AND PARTNERSHIP

Chair: Charlesetta M. Ellis, Chicago State University

Michael A. Oliker, Eastern Illinois University

The Language of Educational Policy and Administration

Betty-Jo Dunbar, Chicago State University

Philosophical Problems of Practice: The Emerging University/School/Community Partnership

OFFICERS OF THE SOCIETY

President: Robert Craig—University of Houston

Vice President: Alexander Makedon—Chicago State University

Secretary/Treasurer: Jerome Popp—Southern Illinois

University/Edwardsville

PROGRAM COMMITTEE

Gerald Gutek—Loyola University Chicago

Walter P. Krolkowski—Loyola University Chicago

Charlesetta M. Ellis—Chicago State University

ARRANGEMENTS

Walter P. Krolkowski—Loyola University Chicago

Silvia M. Craig—Loyola University Chicago

1996 Annual Conference
"Philosophy of Education: Multiculturalism Commonality and Diversity—
MPES 1996 Theme"

Loyola University Chicago—Water Tower Campus

Host: School of Education

Terry Williams, Acting Dean

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 8

12:40 PM PRUDENCE AND PEDAGOGICAL PRINCIPLES

Chair: Charlesetta M. Ellis, Chicago State University

David B. Annis, Ball State University

Unvirtuous Virtue Epistemology

Earl J. Ogletree, Chicago State University

Rudolph Steiner and The Waldorf Schools

1:40 PM MULTICULTURALISM: LIMITATIONS AND PERILS

Chair: Cathryn Busch, Chicago State University

Alexander Makedon, Chicago State University

What Multiculturalism Should Not Be

Joseph K. Yacoub, Chicago State University

Against Multiculturalism

2:30 PM PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS AND MULTICULTURAL IDEOLOGIES

Chair: Lorrie Reed, Chicago State University

Philip Smith, The Ohio State University

Realism Reconsidered -By Any Other Name, Is Realism Really Possible-

Circe Stumbo, University of Maryland

Relating Democracy and Multiculturalism

4:00 PM THE PROCESS: COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE

Chair: Alexander Makedon, Chicago State University

Walter P. Krolkowski, Loyola University Chicago

'I'll Show You Differences': Contrast, Opposition, and Antonymy with Special Reference to Multiculturalism

Bonnie Jean Adams, Loyola University Chicago

"Be Ye Neither Radical Nor Romantic." The Philosophical Implications of Researching a Culture Other Than Your Own

4:50 PM THE ADOLESCENT: INFLUENCE AND EDUCATION

Chair: Norma Salazar, Chicago State University

Michael A. Oliker, Northeastern Illinois University (Panel Chair)

Superman, Adolescents, and The Metaphysics of Popular Culture

Philip Smith, The Ohio State University (Panelist)

A Schematic Analysis of Popular Culture, Adolescence and Sport

-Surprising Implications for Education and Our Democratic Future-

Gene D. Phillips, Loyola University Chicago (Panelist)

Dead End: The Public Image of Juvenile Delinquents

Don G. Smith, Eastern Illinois University (Panelist)

I Was a Teenage Werewolf As Youth Culture Ideology

Delores Archambault, Eastern Illinois University (Panelist)

Charise Cheney, University of Illinois—Urbana (Panelist)

Wei Rose Zhang, Eastern Illinois University (Panelist)

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 9**8:30 AM KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION: MORALITY AND EDUCATIONAL CONCEPTS**

Chair: Seldon Strother, Chicago State University

Sandy Alber & Shannan McNair, Oakland University

Why We Do What We Do as Early Childhood Educators

Silvia Schmid, Loyola University Chicago

Pestalozzi's Idea of "Innere Anschauung"

Terrence A. Walker, University of Houston

*The Educational Theology of James Solomon Russell***9:30 AM PEDAGOGICAL MODELS AND QUIESCEENCE**

Chair: Bartley McSwine, Chicago State University

Ian M. Harris, University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee

Nonviolence in Education

Jerome A. Popp, Southern Illinois University—Edwardsville

*A Paradigm for Teaching Philosophy of Education***10:40 AM EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY: SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY**

Chair: Betty-Jo Dunbar, Chicago State University

Charlesetta M. Ellis, Chicago State University

Essentialist Educator: Fanny J. Coppin

Arthur Brown, Wayne State University

*Pluralism with Intelligence: A Challenge to Education and Society***11:30 AM HUMAN DIMENSIONS: DELIBERATIONS AND VIEWS**

Chair: Bonnie Jean Adams, Loyola University Chicago

William E. Russell, Merrimack College

Reclaiming the Ancient Theme of Hospitality

Louis Silverstein, Columbia College Chicago

*Let Us Praise the Body Erotic***MPES OFFICERS**

President: Robert Craig—University of Houston

Secretary/Treasurer: Jerome Popp—Southern Illinois University/Edwardsville

PROGRAM COMMITTEE

Gerald Gutek—Loyola University Chicago

Walter P. Krolkowski—Loyola University Chicago

Charlesetta M. Ellis—Chicago State University

MINUTES OF THE 1995 BUSINESS MEETING
Loyola University
November 10

1. President Craig called the meeting to order, and thanked Loyola University for its hospitality and commitment to the Society. He thanked Dr. Ellis for her work as program committee chair.
2. The president announced that we would dispense with the approval of the minutes of the 1994 meeting.
3. Dave Owen requested that a new editor of the Proceedings be appointed.
4. A title change for the Proceedings was discussed. This discussion led to a discussion of the possibility of changing the name of the Society. The president announced that a committee has been appointed to review the matter.
5. Mike Oliker moved, and J. Popp seconded, that Educational Theory not be given \$50 in support of its efforts. Dave Owen amended the motion to include a \$100 contribution to the CLS. Motion passed unanimously.
6. Naoko Saito was presented the graduate student award by Dr. Ellis.
7. Meeting adjourned at 6:00 PM

MINUTES OF THE 1996 BUSINESS MEETING

1. Subsequent to the dinner, President Craig called the meeting to order.
2. The Treasurer distributed copies of the financial report.
3. The secretary was instructed to send a thank you letter to Dean Mary Otto at Oakland University.
4. It was suggested that a \$100 contribution be made to the Council of Learned Societies in Education. During the discussion, it was suggested that dues be increased \$5 to support NCATE. After some debate, Art Brown moved and Ron Swartz seconded that the Society make the \$100 contribution to CLSE.
5. Father Krolikowski offered Loyola University and a site for next years meeting. Discussion ensued. It was decided to that the Society should accept the invitation to meet at Loyola University, and that the meetings date will be November 14 and 15 (Friday and Saturday). Some members suggested that Saturday and Sunday might be preferable meeting days, but it was agreed that the Friday-Saturday tradition should be retained for now.
6. The problem of publication of the Proceedings was discussed. Mike Oliker suggested that it may be possible to receive assistance from a professional person in the publishing area. A special sub-committee was created to explore the matter. Ron Swartz, Bob Craig, and Mike Oliker agreed to serve.
7. The Nominating Committee submitted the following report:
President: Jerry Popp
Vice President: Gerry Gutek
Secretary-Treasurer: Don Smith
Executive Committee: C. Ellis, B. Craig, L. Silverstein
8. Mike Oliker was appointed Executive Director to lead the membership effort. He requested support in the form of postage and supplies.
9. The secretary was instructed to send appreciation letters to the Program Committee and officers.
10. The members present thanked Bob Craig for his work as president of the Society.

**MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
MEMBERSHIP**

Compiled by Michael A. Oliker, November 1997

NOTE: If a telephone number follows the member's name it is an office number. If a phone number appears at the end of the entry, it is a home number.

Abascal-Hildebrand, Mary. University of San Diego, 5998 Acala Park, San Diego, California 92110.

Acevedo, Jose A. (Northeastern Illinois University) 2431 N. Mango Ave. Chicago, Illinois 60639-2312.

Adams, Bonnie Jean. 810 Manchester Ave. Westchester, Illinois 60154.

Alber, Sandy. (810) 370-3077. Oakland University, Human Development & Child Studies 530 O'Dowd Hall, Rochester, Michigan 48309-4401. Prof. (248) 557-8728

Alberti, Charles L. (Bemidji State University), 1500 Birchmont Drive NE, Bemidji, Minnesota 56601. Prof.

Annis, David B. (317) 285-1242 Ball State University, Philosophy Department, Muncie, Indiana 47306. Prof. (317)289-9427. **PAST PRESIDENT.**

Ansbacher, Ted. Science Services, 29 Byron Ave. White Plains, New York 10606. Mr.

Aud, Susan V. Rt. 2, Box 642, Anna, Illinois 62906.

Barger, Robert N. (University of Notre Dame) 1742 W. North Shore Drive, South Bend, Indiana 46617-1059

Biddle, James R. University of Dayton, 207 Chamin Hall, Dayton, Ohio 45469-0525.

Blacker, David J. (Illinois State University) (Educational Administration & Foundations) 1415 N. Clinton Blvd., Bloomington, Illinois 61701-1811. Prof. (309) 827-6173

Brown, Arthur. (313) 577-8920. (Wayne State University) 13343 Hart, Huntington Woods Michigan 48070. Prof. **PAST PRESIDENT.**

Broyer, John A. Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville Dept. of Philosophy, Edwardsville, Illinois 62026-1433. Prof.

Campion, Kate. (312) 440-5243. Playboy Enterprises, 680 N. Lake Shore Drive, 16th Floor, Chicago, Illinois 60611. Ms. (773) 292-1098.

Collins, Peter. (414) 224-7558. Marquette University, School of Education, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233. (414) 964-4142. Prof.

Craig, Robert P. (713) 743-5030. University of Houston, Educational Leadership & Cultural Studies, College of Education, Houston, Texas 77204-5874. Prof. **PAST PRESIDENT**

Cunningham, Craig. (773) 794-6260. (Northeastern Illinois University) (Educational Leadership and Development) 5014 S. Dorchester Ave. Chicago, Illinois 60615. Prof. (773) 538-6128.

Darlington, Sonja. 700 College Street, Beloit, Wisconsin 53511.

Davis, Michael. (312) 567-3017. (Illinois Institute of Technology) (Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions) 5300 South Shore Dr., #57, Chicago, Illinois 60615.

Dennis, Justin M. 1501 W. Pleasant Hill Road, #151-5, Carbondale, Illinois 62901. Mr.

Dennis, Lawrence. 817 W. High Street, Carbondale, Illinois 62901. (618) 549-2292. PAST PRESIDENT.

DiBianco, Douglas R. (217) 581-7202. Eastern Illinois University, Music Dept. Charleston, Illinois 61920. Prof. (217) 348-8621

Drower, Millicent. 110 E. Delaware, Chicago, Illinois 60611.

Dunbar, Betty-Jo. 7718 S. Wabash Ave., Chicago, Illinois 60619.

Dupuis Adrian. 5352 N. 48th Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53218. PAST PRESIDENT

Ekpo, Joseph. 430 Bohland Avenue, Bellwood, Illinois 60104.

El-Amin, Lynne. 7523 S. Kimbark, Chicago, Illinois 60616-1433.

Ellis, Charlesetta M. (773) 995-2069. (Chicago State University) 400 E. 33rd St., #700, Chicago, Illinois 60616. Prof. (312) 225-4824.

Engel, Bill. (617) 495-9084. Humanist Enterprises/Harvard University, P. O. Box 150521, Nashville, Tennessee 37215. Dr. (615) 269-6439.

Farnon, Harry J. 407 Wyldhaven Road, Rosemont, Pennsylvania 19010.

Feinberg, Walter. (217) 333-2446. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Educational Policy Studies, 1310 South Sixth St., Champaign, Illinois 61820-6990. Prof.

Fennell, Jon. (630) 574-1832. 1465 Briegate Dr., Naperville, Illinois 60563. Dr. (630) 778-0937

Fenstermacher, Gary D. (313) 764-1817. (University of Michigan) (College of Education) 8405 Cedar Hills Dr. Dexter, Michigan 48130-9348. Prof. (313) 426-7853.

Fine, Janis B. Loyola University Chicago, School of Education, 1041 Ridge Road, Wilmette, Illinois 60091. Prof. (847) 675-4102.

Fong, Peggy. (847) 853-3000. Loyola University Chicago, School of Education, 1041 Ridge Road, Wilmette, Illinois 60091. Dean.

Fredericks, Janet. (773) 794-2792. Northeastern Illinois University, Educational Leadership & Development, 5500 N. St. Louis, Chicago, Illinois 60625. Prof. (847) 677-3345.

Grant, James D. Maharishi University, 1811 Grandville Avenue, Apt. 2, Fairfield, Iowa 52557.

Gutek, Gerald L. (847) 853-3316. Loyola University Chicago, School of Education, 1041 Ridge Road, Wilmette, Illinois 60091. Prof.

Harris, Ian M. (414) 229-4323. University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Educational Policy & Community Studies, Enderis Hall — P. O. Box 413, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201. Prof.

Heinrich, June Sark. 938 North Blvd., #205, Oak Park, Illinois 60301.

Hostetler, Karl. (University of Nebraska, Lincoln) (Elementary/Secondary Education), 8136 S. Hazelwood Drive, Lincoln, Nebraska 68510. Prof.

Hughen, Richard. Fort Hays State University, Department of Philosophy, 600 Park Street, Hays, Kansas 67601. Prof. (xxx) 628-0209.

Johnson, Tony W. 5907 Channel Court, Greensboro, North Carolina 27410. Prof.

Johnston, Allan. (DePaul University/Oakton Comm. College) 1105 Ashbury, Evanston, Illinois 60202. Dr. (847) 492-9607.

Johnston, Guillemette. DePaul University, Modern Languages, 802 W. Belden Ave. Chicago, Illinois 60614-3214. Prof. (847) 492-9607.

Jones, Chris. Maharishi University, Fairfield, Iowa 50010

Kaman, Rita M. 343 N. Grove Ave., Oak Park, Illinois 60302-2023

Kelly, James S. Miami University, Dept. of Philosophy, Oxford, Ohio 45056.

Kizer, George. 3919 Dawes Drive, Ames, Iowa 50010. (515) 232-1446. PAST PRESIDENT.

Knoerzer, Pete. 2020 Blossom Row, Whiting, Indiana 46394.

Krolikowski, Walter P. (847) 853-3326. Loyola University Chicago, Jesuit Residence, 6525 Sheridan Road, Chicago, Illinois 60626. Rev. (773) 508-2008.

Litz, Charles E. 4816 Brentwood Road, Topeka, Kansas 66606.

Lopardo, Genevieve. Chicago State University, 9501 S. King Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60628.

Lurie, Yotam. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 105 Gregory Hall, 810 S. Wright St., Urbana, Illinois 61801.

Macaluso, Andrea. 1446 Ashland Avenue, River Forest, Illinois 60305.

Makedon, Alexander. (773) 995-2086. (Chicago State University) 4430 W. Main St., Country Club Hills, Illinois 60478. Prof. (708) 957-1142.

Malecha, Marcia. 2533 Park Avenue NW, Bemidji, Minnesota 56601.

Maschhoff, Mark. 24027 Walnut Hill Road, Hoyleton, Illinois 62803.

McKarty, Louise Prior. Indiana University, 205 Education, Bloomington, Indiana 47405.

McSwine, Bartley L. (773) 995-2086. Chicago State University, Curriculum & Instruction: 319 Education Building, 9501 S. King Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60628-1598. Prof. (708) 524-4924.

Meng, Yue. Loyola University Chicago, 820 N. Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60611.

Merritt, James. 419 Garden Road, DeKalb, Illinois 60115-2384.

Miller, Steven I. Loyola University Chicago, School of Education, 1041 Ridge Road, Wilmette, Illinois 60091. Prof.

Moore, Percy L. (313) 577-0577. Wayne State University, Interdisciplinary Studies Program, Detroit, Michigan 48202. Prof.

Murphy, Madonna M. 11608 S. Artesian, Chicago, Illinois 60655.

Nordberg, Robert B. Marquette University, School of Education, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233. Prof. (414) 351-2810

Nunneley, Dick. 330 Wulling Hall. 86 Pleasant Street. Minneapolis, Minnesota 55414-0221.

Oliker, Michael A. (773) 794-2792 (Northeastern Illinois University) (Educational Leadership and Development) 5006 W. Grace Street, Chicago, Illinois 60641. Dr. (773) 202-9280.

Owen, David B. (515) 294-7317. (Iowa State University) 2511 Kellogg Avenue, Ames, Iowa 50010 Prof. (515) 233-3298. PAST PRESIDENT.

Petruzzi, Anthony P. (308) 865-8299. University of Nebraska at Kearney, Director of Composition, Department of English, Kearney, Nebraska 68849-1320. Prof. (xxx) 665-7800.

Pickard, Al. 632 Lyman Avenue, Oak Park, Illinois 60304.

Pipan, Richard C. (Oakland University) 700 Mt. Pleasant, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48103.

Podeschi, Ronald L. P.O. Box 577, Oostberg, Wisconsin 53070.

Popp, Jerry. (618) 692-3297. (Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville) 1809 Monticello Place, Edwardsville, Illinois 62025. Prof. (618) 656-3086. PRESIDENT.

Popp, Marcia. 1809 Monticello Place, Edwardsville, Illinois 62025. (618) 656-3086.

Radebaugh, Byron F. (815) 753-1561. (Northern Illinois University) 1126 Stafford Street, DeKalb, Illinois 60115. Prof. (815) 756-9363.

Rinke, Dwight C. 2285 Golfview Drive, #205, Troy, Michigan 48084-3874.

Riordan, Timothy M. Alverno College, 3401 S. 39th Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53234.

Risley, Michael T. 1165 S. Oregon Ave, Morris, Minnesota 56267.

Rose, Nancy M. 5218C Castlewood Road, Richmond, Virginia 23234-6735.

Rosener, Fay. 6447 N. Claremont, Chicago, Illinois 60645.

Russell, William E. (508) 683-7111. Merrimack College, Education Department, North Andover, Massachusetts 01845-5809. Prof. (508) 475-8619.

Rutkowski, Ronald E. 1429 Brown Street, Arlington Heights, Illinois 60004.

Ryan, Carole Ann. 1329 Mound, Jacksonville, Illinois 62650.

Salazar, Norma. Chicago State University, 95th at King Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60628-1598.

Salls, Holly. (847) 824-6900. The Willows Academy, 1012 Thacker St., Des Plaines, Illinois 60016. Ms.

Samec, Charles E. 614 S. Clarence Avenue, Oak Park, Illinois 60304.

Schubert, William H. (312) 413-2411. (University of Illinois at Chicago) 727 S. Ashland, Unit 1, Chicago, Illinois 60607. Prof. (312) 738-0601.

Silverstein, Louis. (312) 663-1600. Columbia College Chicago, Liberal Education, 600 S. Michigan Ave. Chicago, Illinois 60605-1996. Prof. (847) 475-8912.

Smith, Don G. (Eastern Illinois University) 1825 Phillips Place, Charleston, Illinois 61920. Prof. (217) 348-1968

Smith, Philip L. (614) 292-6124. Ohio State University, College of Education, Columbus, Ohio 43210 Prof. (614) 486-3061. PAST PRESIDENT.

Stark, Thomas I. 5510 S. Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60637.

Stickel, George W. 2130 Shillings Chase Court, Kennesaw, Georgia 30144-4170. Dr. (404) 419-1006. PAST PRESIDENT

Swartz, Ronald. (248) 370-3078. Oakland University. School of Education & Human Services, Rochester, Michigan 48309. Prof. (248) 879-2778. PAST PRESIDENT.

Tolson, Carol A. 4140 O'Hare Drive, Hoffman Estates, Illinois 60195.

Tozer, Steve. (312) 413-7782. University of Illinois at Chicago, College of Education - 147, 1040 W. Harrison, Chicago, Illinois 60607. Prof. (708) 386-1844.

Venegoni, Charles L. 3814 Winston Lane, Hoffman Estates, Illinois 60195.

Walker, Terrence A. (University of Houston) 4362 Wheeler Street, Houston, Texas 77004.

Watras, Joseph. (University of Dayton) 1548 N. Euclid Avenue, Dayton, Ohio 45406.

Weinberg, Meyer. (Northeastern Illinois University) (Educational Leadership & Development) 5140 S. Hyde Park Blvd., Apt. 7D, Chicago, Illinois 60615-4262. Prof. (773) 288-0121.

Weston, Norman. 116 Callan, #3—South, Evanston, Illinois 60202.

Wiley, Beverly. 6735 S. Clyde, Chicago, Illinois 60626.

Williams, Stephen S. 1611 Lincolnshire, Detroit, Michigan 48203.

Winters, Clyde A. (Loyola University Chicago) 11541 South Peoria, Chicago, Illinois 60643. Mr.

Wozniak, John M. 4960 Lee Street, Skokie, Illinois 60077.

Yoon, Mark N. 4100 N. Mobile Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60634.

Zigler, Ronald L. (215) 881-7556. Pennsylvania State University, Ogontz Campus, 1600 Woodland Road, Abington, Pennsylvania 19001-3991. Prof. (610) 292-9935.

INDEX TO THE 1995-1996 PROCEEDINGS

Adams, Bonnie Jean, Loyola University Chicago "Be Ye Neither Radical Nor Romantic." <i>The Philosophical Implications of Researching a Culture Other Than Your Own</i>	201
Alber, Sandy, Oakland University Using Dewey's Writings as a Basis for Assessment of Project Means	13
— & McNair, Shannan, Oakland University Why We Do What We Do as Early Childhood Educators	231
Annis, David B., Ball State University Unvirtuous Virtue Epistemology	150
Brown, Arthur, Wayne State University Pluralism with Intelligence: A Challenge to Education and Society Response to Robert Craig's Presidential Address The Introductory Course in Philosophy of Education	289 145 59
Craig, Robert, University of Houston Contemplative Traditions, Modern Psychology and Education (1996 Presidential Address)	138
	105
Davis, Michael, Illinois Institute of Technology Multiculturalism: Some Second Thoughts about the Concept	51
Dunbar, Betty-Jo, Chicago State University Philosophical Problems of Practice: The Emerging University/School/Community Partnership	122
Ellis, Charlesetta M., Chicago State University Carter G. Woodson on Education: A Philosophical Perspective Essentialist Educator: Fanny J. Coppin	22 284
Grant, James D., Maharishi University of Management The Existence of Pure Consciousness and Its Implications for Education	69
Harris, Ian M., University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee Nonviolence in Education	255
Krolikowski, Walter P., Loyola University Chicago 'I'll Show You Differences': Contrast, Opposition, and Antonymy with Special Reference to Multiculturalism "This Wonder, Perhaps Deeper Than Love, That Is Friendship"	192 29
Redon, Alexander, Chicago State University What Multiculturalism Should Not Be	172

McNair, Shannan & Alber, Sandy, Oakland University <i>Why We Do What We Do as Early Childhood Educators</i>	231
Ogletree, Earl J., Chicago State University <i>Rudolph Steiner and The Waldorf Schools</i>	157
Oliker, Michael A., Northeastern Illinois University <i>Preface</i>	1
	207
	112
Phillips, Gene D., Loyola University Chicago <i>Dead End: The Public Image of Juvenile Delinquents</i>	221
Popp, Jerome A., Southern Illinois University—Edwardsville <i>A Paradigm for Teaching Philosophy of Education</i>	274
Russell, William E., Merrimack College <i>Reclaiming the Ancient Theme of Hospitality</i>	298
Saito, Naoko, University of Tokyo <i>Dewey's Idea of "Intelligent Sympathy" and The Development of the Ethical Self: Implications for Japanese Education</i>	4
Schmid, Silvia, Loyola University Chicago <i>Pestalozzi's Idea of "Innere Anschauung"</i>	239
Silverstein, Louis, Columbia College Chicago <i>Let Us Praise the Body Erotic</i>	309
	38
	216
Smith, Don G., Eastern Illinois University <i>A Nietzschean Critique of Postmodern Educational Theory</i>	93
	225
Smith, Philip, The Ohio State University <i>A Schematic Analysis of Popular Culture, Adolescence and Sport -Surprising Implications for Education and Our Democratic Future-</i>	216
	187
	216
Sutton, Kenneth, Eastern Illinois University <i>Post-Modernism: A Phase of Development</i>	99
Walker, Terrence A., University of Houston <i>The Educational Theology of James Solomon Russell</i>	246
Zhang, Wei Rose, Eastern Illinois University <i>Intercultural Education and Cultural Differences</i>	45

**PROCEEDINGS OF THE MIDWEST P.E.S. NOW AVAILABLE
AS ERIC DOCUMENTS**

1977 — ED 345 986.
1978 — ED 356 992. Presidential Address: Arthur Brown.
1979 — ED 345 983.
1980 — ED 345 984. Presidential Address: Adrian Dupuis.
1981 — NO PROCEEDINGS.
1982 — ED 241 407. Presidential Address: George Kizer.
1983 — ED 345 985.
1984 — NO PROCEEDINGS. Presidential Address: Philip L. Smith.

"Liberty and the Lust for Power: Searching for Excellence in a World of Expertise." *Journal of Social Philosophy* 17, no.3 (Fall 1986): 28-34.

1985-86 — ED 356 993. Presidential Address: Lawrence J. Dennis.
1987-88 — ED 319 670. Presidential Address: David B. Annis.
1989-90 — ED 345 987. Presidential Address: Ronald Swartz.
1989-90 — ED 371 973. Supplement to ED 345 987.
1991-92 — ED 364 493. Presidential Address: George W. Stickel.
1993-94 — (ED number to be assigned.) Presidential Address: David

B. Owen.

1995-96 — (In preparation.) Presidential Address: Robert P. Craig.

**ARTICLES BY MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
SOCIETY MEMBERS IN J. J. CHAMBLISS'S NEW
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION.**

PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA.

Edited by J. J. Chambliss. New York: Garland Publishing, 1996.
ISBN 0-8153-1177-X.

Gutek, Gerald L. FROEBEL, FRIEDRICH W. A.: 230-232;
PESTALOZZI, JOHANN H.: 445-449.

Krolikowski, Walter P. THOMAS AQUINAS: 640-644; WILLIAM
OF OCKHAM: 677-678.

Oliker, Michael A. CENSORSHIP: 72-74; EDUCATIONAL POLICY
AND ADMINISTRATION: 173-178.

Owen, David B. ROUSSEAU, JEAN-JACQUES: 566-573.

Popp, Jerome A. LEARNING, THEORIES OF: 347-350.

Smith, Philip L. EMPIRICISM: 183-185.



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement (OERI)
Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC)



NOTICE

REPRODUCTION BASIS



This document is covered by a signed "Reproduction Release (Blanket)" form (on file within the ERIC system), encompassing all or classes of documents from its source organization and, therefore, does not require a "Specific Document" Release form.



This document is Federally-funded, or carries its own permission to reproduce, or is otherwise in the public domain and, therefore, may be reproduced by ERIC without a signed Reproduction Release form (either "Specific Document" or "Blanket").